The British Journal of Sociology

Editors: Christopher Badcock and Percy S. Cohen

VOLUME XXXVIII NO 1 MARCH 1987

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
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Published quarterly by the Proprietors
ROUTLEDGE & KEGAN PAUL PLC
11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE
and 29 West 35th Street, New York, N.Y. 10001
for the LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE
Houghton Street, Aldwych London WC2A 2AE

Second class postage paid at Rahway, N.J. Postmaster: send address corrections to 'British Journal of Sociology', c/o Mercury Airfreight International Ltd. Inc., 2323 Englehard Avenue, Avenel, N.J. 07001

P 4816

Note

Subscription rate for Volume 38, 1987 is £32 (US $55) for institutions, £26 (US $38) for individuals. Special rates are available for members of the BSA and ASA. Single copies and back issues £9.50 (US $17). American subscription rate includes air service. Ten or more complete volumes ordered qualify for a 25% discount.

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Vols. 1–7, 8–14, 15–21, 22–28	£25 (US $45) each
Vol. 28–37	£10 (US $20) per volume

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Alan Neville Little

(1934–1986)

The death of Alan Little, Lewisham Professor of Social Administration at Goldsmiths' College, London was a sudden and tragic event which came as a devastating blow to his many friends and colleagues. He had suffered and recovered from a coronary three years ago and was awaiting a bypass operation that was already scheduled for only weeks away from his death. A life that ends at 52 must, by today's demographic criteria, be accounted not a long one. For this reason alone, what Alan Little was able to pack into his, constituted a very great deal.

It is doubtful that Alan himself would have been an uncritical adherent of the rule of *nisi bonum de mortuis*; his sharp mind was matched by a toughness of personality that marked a forceful committment to those things he believed to be right and sensible and just. It was no less evident when he took a contrary view, and those who were prone to be critical might have found him abrasive. But in gatherings of social scientists where, as Max Gluckman observed long ago, one of the social functions of gossip is to maintain the standards of the profession, there were never to be heard those sharpenings of knives or brewings of noxious rumour that are often the occupational hazard of succesful academics. Whoever would seek to make a list of those who thought less than well of him need use but a very small piece of paper. Always and legitimately ambitious, he drove himself for most of his life under full sail.

What is important about him consists not simply in his achievements but in the fact that he was an outstanding example of the social scientist of a particular generation in British academic life. In a curious way he symbolized a whole cohort who came up to the university in the late 50s and early 60s at a time when not only were universities as a whole expanding from their miniscule traditional base, but the social sciences were held in esteem as relevant to the management of an expanding economy and an increasingly affluent society. It was a group that was not simply heir to the consequences of that growth, but also to the social optimism of the immediate post-war period which saw a bright and practical future for the social sciences. The quintessence of that view was contained in Barbara Wooton's great *Testament for Social Science*. Alan Little's life and work has been a living testimony to that optimism.

A grammar school boy, proud of his humble social origins — he was one of the first of the bright young men to write his *apologia* in a Sunday colour supplement — he graduated from LSE with a First and went on to do criminological research for his PhD. under Hermann Mannheim at the School and Leslie Wilkins, then at the Home Office. For seven years from 1959 he held a lectureship in the Sociology department where he is still remembered not simply as a highly effective teacher, but one who commanded a great affection from his students. After graduation he had spent a year with Marshall Clinard at Wisconsin, and his broader experience probably contributed to his increasing dissatisfaction with his position at the School. 'Fed up' as he put it 'with being permanently in the reserve' he decided upon a sideways move to become Director of Research and Statistics at the Inner London Education Authority. Having spent a couple of years as a consultant to the OECD he had developed other, practical talents which he put to excellent use. Under his direction a major longitudinal study of the performance of London's schoolchildren was carried out.

Already the issue of race and ethnic disadvantage was becoming an item of the political agenda and in 1973 he made another sideways move to the Community Relations Commission. It was here that he perhaps made his greatest mark and possibly, here too derived some of his greatest work satisfactions. No-one could have called his job at the CRC a place for a quiet life; he seemed to relish the atmosphere, not least for its political flavour. In 1978 he became Lewisham Professor at Goldsmiths' but there was never a chance of his leading a quieter life. Tough minded and uncompromising as he could be, he never got on the wrong side of the 'Establishment' and became unobtrusively one of the company of 'the great and the good' that comprises the backbone of advisory and voluntary bodies in British society. Attachments to the Independent Broadcasting Authority, the BBC, the Social Science Research Council and the National Association for the Care and Rehabilitation of Offenders come naturally. He served in the office of Justice of the Peace and was a Chairman in the Juvenile Court. None of these things interfered with his production of materials for publication and he has left behind him a very creditable list.

Alan Little will remain a symbol of the kind of practical committment to policy and the affairs of the real world that has been since the last century at the heart of all that is vibrant and exciting in the British tradition of social science. It is the very kind of social science that is today most deeply suspected by the high priests and theologians of the New Right and seems largely to have been abandoned by the New Left as if it were no more than the detritus of an outworn Fabianism. His position in the political centre was entirely consistent with his essentially empirical approach. As a social

Bryan S. Turner

State, science and economy in traditional societies: some problems in Weberian sociology of science

ABSTRACT

In Weberian sociology, the social conditions which promoted the growth of rational capitalism (free cities, an autonomous merchant class, rational law and an ethic of world mastery) are typically associated with the emergence of modern science. Protestantism, capitalism and rational science are assumed to require an open discursive space, free from arbitrary restraint on conscience and consciousness. This 'uniqueness of the west' argument encounters the following difficulties. Technology and science flourished in Chinese and Islamic cultures in which the political system was patrimonial and bureaucratic. In these societies, innovative science was often associated with oppositional, magical beliefs. Furthermore, in Weber's interpretation of Protestantism, it was the irrationality of the salvational drive which led to the rationality of a calling as an unintended consequence of action. Although this sceptical viewpoint suggests that no general theory of scientific accumulation is possible, the paper employs Weber's economic sociology to identify the close historical relationship between economic change, state regulation and the patronage of intellectuals in the development of science. Scientific rationalism is the outcome of contingent features (such as the requirements of navigation), structural arrangements between the economy and the state, the presence of rational technologies (in mathematics, writing and experimentation) and finally the teleological impact of rationalization.

INTRODUCTION

The sociology of science like the sociology of knowledge is concerned to analyse the relationship between scientific thought and social existence. At one level, scientific innovation and changes in scientific paradigms may be regarded as relatively independent of the social organization of science and the scientific community. In this case, the

logic of scientific development is seen to be largely self-contained and determined by intellectual problems which are internal to science. Alternatively, sociologists of science have regarded scientific thought and scientific change as shaped by the nature of scientific organization, research networks and professional organization. Scientific change is the result of processes of competition for scarce resources between scientists in sub-disciplines which periodically become over-worked, over-populated and less rewarding.[1] This article argues for a very close relationship between scientific advance and the acquisition of an economic surplus. It has often been claimed that science, technology and economic development stand in an intimate and inter-dependent relationship. Weber asserted that 'the mechanizing process has always and everywhere been introduced to the definite end of releasing labour; every new invention signifies the extensive displacement of hand workers by a relatively small man power for machine supervision'.[2] Advances in technology produce increases in per capita output and reduce the average cost of basic commodities thereby stimulating further investment in labour-saving technology. Economic development comes to depend on technological innovation, but this technology presupposes the basic science and economic resources which make technological change possible. It is possible, however, to break into this circular argument by making an analogy between material and intellectual accumulation, or between the mode of production and the mode of cognition. All systematic and sustained intellectual activity requires a stratum of intellectuals which is relatively independent of manual work. Their training and maintenance, especially when intellectuals begin to form specialized schools, academic communities or other formal collectivities, require external economic support. The general argument is that sustained scientific activity requires an economic surplus through which mental workers can be funded under various forms of patronage. Advances in cognitive accumulation tend, therefore, to correlate directly with advances in material accumulation because an economic surplus is necessary for the reproduction of an intellectual stratum of mental workers.

Within this general relationship between science and economy, there can be considerable variation and divergence. The variation is primarily an effect of the conflict between intellectuals and patrons to determine the nature of service and payment. The precise manner in which science is determined by economic changes is mediated by the system of patronage in which intellectuals, patrons and clients struggle for the control of mental production. In this argument, I shall draw upon an analogy between the class struggle over the means of material production and the cognitive struggle between patrons and intellectuals over the means of mental production. Intellectual change may be conceptualized in terms of a struggle of discourses.

It is important to notice at the outset that any question as to the origins of systematic scientific practices leads conceptually and empirically to the problem of the historical origins of the capitalist mode of production. The connection between science and capitalism has been formulated in the most diverse conceptual frameworks. For Marx and Engels, the profitability of capitalist production is secured by the mechanization of the labour process which requires the systematic application of science in the technical division of labour. In a similar fashion, although Weber did not believe that capitalist interests were the direct cause of scientific development, he observed that the rational calculation of technical factors in industrial production 'is dependent on the peculiarities of modern science, especially the natural sciences based on mathematics and exact and rational experimentation'.[3] It appears, therefore, that the social conditions which stimulate and foster the institutionalization of science are also the conditions which were congenial to the eruption of capitalist enterprises out of the envelope of feudal relations. In the *General Economic History*, Weber gave an emphasis to the occidental city and the Protestant sects as factors in the rise of rational, scientific procedures. This problematical connection has been presented in the form of a theoretical challenge by J. Needham in the Chinese case since 'whoever would explain the failure of Chinese society to develop modern science had better begin by explaining the failure of Chinese society to develop mercantile and then industrial capitalism'.[4]

If the rise of modern science is associated with the origins of capitalism in the seventeenth century, then science is typically held to be intimately related to the growth of citizenship and democratic politics. Citizenship and science both require an open social space in which free discourse and uninhibited experimentation can take place without authoritarian and arbitrary limitations. The formulations of this relationship have been presented in diverse theoretical traditions. For example, Popper's falsification principle requires an open society in which conjectures can be scrutinised and eliminated by unrestricted criticism and experiment.[5] Problem-solving in science and politics both require an open, tolerant social environment which thereby institutionalizes criticisms. From an entirely different perspective, Habermas has argued that the achievement of the rational understanding of a situation presupposes the existence of free communication which is not distorted by arbitrary, hidden constraints. Hence, the search for valid knowledge must accompany the radical critique of existing social arrangements which inhibit human discourse.[6] In the perspective of history of science, the conjunction of capitalism, citizenship and natural science is embodied in certain 'heroic' social roles – the artist-engineer of fifteenth-century Italy and the engineer-industrialist of early nineteenth-century Britain. This mode of analysis implies a strong analogy between the independent, individual

capitalist who accumulates wealth in an open political environment and the individual scientist who accumulates knowledge by experiment in a contest of free discourse. The principle of *laissez-faire* in science and capitalism is allegedly promoted by institutional differentiation of state, education and economy.

The supposition that the differentiation and autonomy of medieval corporations – urban political associations, guilds, academies, universities, religious and legal institutions – were congenial to both capitalism and natural science leads inexorably to certain assumptions about the 'uniqueness of the west' Despite major achievements in science and technology in Oriental societies, a systematic programme uniting natural science and industry was allegedly peculiar to western civilization. By contrast with the exponential growth of science and technology in the west the societies which arose east of Athens were characterized by what Mill termed 'Chinese stationariness'.[7] One central explanation of Oriental stagnation has been that these societies were constituted by centralized states – Marx's Asiatic mode of production, Weber's patrimonial bureaucracy, Needham's bureaucratic feudalism – are by the institution of slavery. Arbitrary state interference which inhibited the free play of ideas and trade also mitigated against the emergence of a bourgeois class and a stratum of scientists. At the same time, slavery was not conducive to the application of labour-saving technology. Slave-labour did not promote technological innovation because there was no competition between capitalists to reduce the wage-bill by mechanization and there was no market for the consumption of standardized commodities. The argument about western uniqueness provides the basis for the conventional claim that the technology of antiquity was neither advanced nor altered in the centuries immediately following the Arabic expansion. In this perspective, the Greek city-states occupy, both conceptually and geographically, a pivotal position in the rise of western democracy and science. Greek culture has persistently provided a yard-stick for political and intellectual progress in the western imagination. The model of direct political participation in the small Greek states was central to the political thought of Rousseau, Kant and Hegel. The rise of rhetoric and logic as organized disciplines was connected with the political structure of Greek citizenship where politics were conducted in terms of open public argument. Successful politics necessitated an effective rhetoric. The conjunction of logical reasoning and democratic politics is thus seen to lie at the very roots of western civilization.

The origins of natural science in the west are consequently seen in terms of closely inter-connected institutions, values and motives. Free enterprise and free inquiry require, as it were, a discursive traffic inside a social space created by democratic politics. The presence of autonomous urban institutions created a legacy of political immunity

from constraint which was conducive to capitalism and science. The absence of these institutions in the Orient has been associated with political constraint and scientific stagnation. In short, the conception of 'the uniqueness of the west' also involves an Orientalist perspective.[8] Oriental society is characterized by a series of absent features – the city, private property, democratic rights, rational law, natural science and social revolutions. There is, of course, a *prima facie* reason for assuming that this intellectual charge could hardly apply in the case of Islam, given the well-known dependence of the European Middle Ages on the legacy of Averroes, Avicenna, al-Kindi and al-Razi.[9] However, the Orientalist solution to this historical difficulty has been to argue that Islam was merely a medium between Hellenism and the Occident; Islam neither contributed to nor improved upon the Greek heritage which eventually found its 'true' home in fifteenth- and sixteenth-century European science and technology.[10]

WESTERN CAPITALISM AND SCIENCE – SOME COUNTER-PROPOSALS

Weberian theory suggests the following features as necessary conditions for rational capitalism; (1) a free labour market in which wage-labourers, separated from the means of production, sell their labour-power to capitalist employers; (2) a system of autocephalous urban corporations providing uninhibited space for exchange; (3) a money economy providing exact calculation for commodity exchange; (4) a rational legal system to guarantee stability of commercial and administrative arrangements; (5) the existence of science-based technology for the mechanization of production in a factory-system, and (6) a culture of world-mastery – the Protestant ethic – which creates anti-traditional conceptions of the business calling and renders money ethically clean. To this theory of capitalist origins, it has been claimed that natural science was stimulated by the anti-magical force of Protestant theology and by the conception of the universe as a non-arbitrary system of dependable laws. In the history of cosmology, God the creator eventually gave way to the Divine Mechanic.

This basic Weberian framework has been elaborated in a number of ways. R. K. Merton,[11] in particular, has emphasized the fact that the roots of modern science lay, not in utilitarian economic interests, but in Protestant religious values which, in forming a scientific calling, positively encouraged men to find God in the immutable laws of Nature. Indeed, the 'ethos of science' – universalism, communalism, disinterestedness and organized scepticism – is at certain points in conflict with the individualistic, self-interest of the spirit of capitalism. To the list of Protestant values which Merton treated as congenial to science, others have argued that Protestantism contributed 'affective

neutrality' as an element of capitalist production and scientific innovation.[12] In general, the fact that the Protestant sects did not enjoy a religious or political monopoly of authority further underlined their emphasis on individual enlightenment and contributed to the religious acceptance of scientific activity. It has been claimed that a Protestant 'scientific policy' became part of a general struggle against Catholicism.[13]

As a general theory of the institutional development of European industry, politics and science, the Mertonian perspective provides an ethically satisfying marriage of rationalism, grounded in a religious conception of an orderly universe, open discourse conducted in terms of the scientific ethic and liberal democracy which established the institutional framework for disinterested communication. This perspective on democracy and science was clearly illustrated by Merton's analysis of Nazi Germany where the state impinged on the norms of universalism and scepticism. A parallel interpretation of the problem of German politics was adopted by T. Parsons.[14]

In order to begin a critique of this theoretical union between reason, capitalism and democracy, we can note one particular problem of exegesis, namely the difference between Weber and Merton over the rationality of Protestantism and its contribution to science. In Merton's sociology of science, Protestantism provided an early cultural support for scientific advance, but modern science no longer requires any religious legitimation since it provides its own rationale and its own rationalism. By contrast, Weber's sociology is shot-through with pessimism and with a sense of the precariousness of the scientific outlook. It was not religious confidence in the rationality of the world that drove Protestants to world-mastery in economic and scientific behaviour, but on the contrary it was lack of confidence in and anxiety about personal salvation that created this calling. It was the irrationality of the quest for salvation from an omnipotent God which lay at the root of the rational calling in this world. The rational discipline of capitalism was paradoxically irrational in the sense that 'incessant work, discipline and decication with no regard to tangible gratifications cannot be logically derived from any ends which naturally come to men'.[15] Just as capitalism requires people to go beyond a natural inclination of self-sufficiency and simple reproduction, so science requires an 'unnatural' pursuit of knowledge which is beyond immediate, utilitarian concerns. The problem for Weber was that science cannot be prescriptive and cannot itself lend support to a value which advocates the pursuit of pure knowledge. To some extent, Weber followed Nietzsche in believing that intellectualism has its psychological roots in resentment as a denial of affective gratifications.

The problem with the conventional view is that it is forced to deal with too many outstanding exceptions and counter-cases. These empirical counter-instances are not to be viewed as simply empirical

qualifications or restrictions on the general theory that natural science necessarily requires particular supports (of urban city institutions, rational thought, the differentiation of politics and economics, and so forth). The empirical problems which are to be raised here point to fundamental *theoretical* difficulties in the existing framework. It is convenient to start with the question concerning the importance of a rational cosmology (such as Merton's Puritanism) as a condition of *any* scientific endeavour. I have already pointed to Tenbruck's interpretation of Weber which showed that the 'calling' was an unnatural response to an irrational drive. In a broader perspective, we can see that science, under specific circumstances, has often been stimulated by social movements which, in Weber's terms, were mystical, other-worldly and irrational.

J. Needham[16] makes the point that magic, divination and science were historically always closely inter-connected. Taoist temples in China were early centres for the observation of nature and the Taoist emphasis on feminine receptivity, passivity and mysticism encouraged a form of empiricism towards natural phenomena. Taoists opposed the conventional and formal rationalism of the court scholars – the Confucian literati – whose sense of literary superiority discouraged both manual work and experimentation. A similar parallel can be discovered in the Ilkhwan al-Safa (the Brethren of Purity) who operated from Basra from around 950 A.D. Like the Taoist secret societies, the Brethren were an oppositional social movement drawing on an eclectic range of religious and philosophical trends against the court philosophy of the Buwayhid emirs. The Brethren published fifty-two epistles and a famous summary (*Risalat'al-jami'ah*) of their analysis of the arts and sciences. The clarity of expression in these epistles made them very popular and greatly influenced Islamic attitudes towards mathematics, music, astronomy, geology and mineralogy. In alliance with Sufi groups in Baghdad and Basra, the Brethren penetrated the guild system of craftsmen and artisans and their mystical doctrines thereby had an impact on the development of technology. Whereas Weber, from the perspective of the ethic of responsibility, treated rationalism and science as progressive forces in European civilization, there may well be socio-political circumstances where mystical doctrines can play a liberating and dynamic role. In particular, when a system of rationalist thought becomes the legitimizing ideology of a rigid social structure, mysticism can play a radical, oppositional role. When orthodox rationalism becomes closed to the value of manual work and sympathetic observation of nature because of the dominant role of court intellectuals, mystical and oppositional societies can become the vehicle for an empiricist form of scientific activity and technological experimentation.

There are, however, more serious and damaging problems for the conventional, Mertonian view of the social conditions for scientific

practice. We have noted the standard viewpoint that political citizenship and scientific enterprise are empirically and theoretically associated so that the Greek city-state provides the paradigm for open discourse stimulating the growth of logic, rhetoric and natural science. Needham has suggested that the absence of large-scale slavery in China provided a social framework which was congenial to science, while Marx and others[15] have argued that slavery in Oriental societies was an important factor in maintaining a stationary social system. Although the question of slavery in Islam is an obviously controversial one, it is important to point out that the Greek civilization which has been taken as the model of small-scale democracy by writers like Rousseau was based on slavery. Slavery was not an accidental feature of Greek society, but the fundamental basis of Greek civilization which penetrated every sphere, including drama and philosophy, family organization and personal status, political organization and political beliefs. Although the majority of slaves were 'barbarians' (that is, not Greek), the institution of slavery created a profound social unease because it was also true that Greeks enslaved Greeks. Loss of liberty threatened every citizen with ignoble status. For Plato, slavery was part of the hierarchy of society and cosmos; slavery was equated with irrationality and disorder so that the slave required an external authority in the same way that the natural world depended on external divine control. Aristotle was perturbed by the problem of the social origins of slaves, but, in treating slavery as a necessary aspect of the domestic economy, he did not call into question the institution itself. The Greek legacy has not, therefore, been an unambiguous blessing in western culture since it was based on a largely unquestioned system of patriarchal regulation and rigid social stratification.

One consequence of the Greek origins of western science was an enduring divorce, institutionally and normatively, between mental and manual labour, and hence between theoretical science and technology. While Greeks provided the philosophical basis for mathematics and logical proof, they were notably backward in technology. The moral and social inferiority of manual activities is connected with the fact that Greek science did not develop experimental and observational techniques. By comparison with medieval Europe and, as we shall see with tenth- and eleventh-century Islam, classical antiquity was underdeveloped in basic technology. Islamic scholars, therefore, did more than merely translate Greek philosophy; they added, especially in ophthalmic optics and chemistry, a significant technical and experimental component. Indeed, it is possible to go further in suggesting that the Galenic and Aristotelian legacy in medicine had major theoretical limitations, especially in the area of experimental medicine, anatomy and gynaecology. To understand this intellectual blockage, we need to refer back to Aristotle's

social ethics, particularly in relation to the status of women.

In Aristotle's philosophy, woman is inferior to man. This view is perhaps not surprising since the majority of Greek slaves were female. By nature and individual psychology, women were destined to social subordination and to a servile role within the home. For these reasons, women could not enter the arena of public discourse which was the moral universe of free-born men. In the Middle Ages, this Aristotelian world-view combined with the Christian doctrine of women as a 'monstrous creation' to produce a series of dichotomies: male/female, hot/cold, reasonable/unreasonable, dominant/submissive. Within this conceptual framework of Aristotelian scholasticism, it was difficult for any advances in the understanding of anatomy and gynaecology to take place. It was not until basic observation and experimentation in anatomy had taken place in the sixteenth century, particularly by Andreas Vesalius and Gabriele Falloppio, that there was a shift away from the clean/unclean paradigm. Even in Rembrandt's painting of the anatomy lesson of 1631 which combined the symbols of Protestant spirituality, bourgeois nationalism and observational science the conventional sign of the anatomical atlas still enjoyed a certain dominance and priority over the naked corpse.[19] By contrast, medical advances in Islam were achieved by an empiricist and experimental orientation which was less cluttered by such rigid scholasticism.

BUREAUCRACY AND SCIENCE IN CHINA AND ISLAM

There are difficulties in the attempt to provide a general sociological linkage between the rational philosophy of the Greek city-states and the conditions for *any* natural science enterprise. The basis of this view of science is the analogy between the free, enterprising, urban merchant and the independent scholar-scientist. It provides a *laissez-faire* model of innovation. One crucial difficulty for this analogy is the advanced technological and scientific inventiveness of Chinese and Islamic civilizations under systems of patrimonial bureaucracy. Of course, the major example in favour of the conventional view of the growth of natural science is provided by the scientific revolution of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries which was brought about by the application of science to production by private capitalists who were typically nonconformists in religion and liberals in politics. However, if this combination was the great strength of British science, it was also, in the longer term, its major weakness. It is well known that the revolution in the British textile industry with the inventions of Arkwright, Hargreaves, Wood and Crompton was not science-based, but represented a series of brilliant *ad hoc* responses to certain empirical needs of production.[20] While Britain had not been a great centre of theoretical science, the rapid growth of textiles and

mechanized transport brought Britain to the forefront of the industrial revolution before the middle of the nineteenth century.

British predominance in technology, however, gradually slipped away after the Great Exhibition of 1851. The causes of this decline are to be found primarily in the absence of a coherent, state-supported system of scientific education. British educational institutions fell behind in quantity and quality to the lead established by German research laboratories, the continental science associations, the French universities and the American academies. By 1914, for example, almost every professor of chemistry in British universities held German doctorates and, without a 'brain-drain' from the Continent in such figures as Ferranti, Marconi, Beyer, Siemens and Levinstein, the scientific and technological decline of Britain would have been even more pronounced. If amateur science and private interest were adequate bases for early British capitalism, it became obvious that continued industrial expansion both required massive state support for research and development, and for a national system of education in technology and theoretical science. The liberal view of the history of science which glorifies the eccentric inventiveness of British amateur gentlemen ignores

> the argument that precisely *because* Britain advanced so rapidly in its industrial organization, whilst at the same time acquiring maritime supremacy and an increasing number of colonies, the need for technological innovation was less marked for a long time. Colonies provided essentially soft, politically protected markets for British goods.[21]

If the 'dark side' of the great achievement of Greek philosophy was the institution of slavery, the background to British amateur science was imperial power.

Most conventional historical accounts of science have a strong Orientalist component by assuming 'the uniqueness of the west'. Through illustrations from Chinese and Islamic civilizations, it has been shown that there are major theoretical and empirical difficulties with this conventional position. Theoretical objections to this model can be organized in terms of arguments about particular scientific developments and about scientific development in general. In terms of the first set of arguments certain social arrangements may be conducive to limited forms of scientific or technological advance while being indifferent to, or indeed limiting, other forms of scientific development. To take one example, maritime and trading interests stimulated Henry the Navigator to establish a college of navigation in the fifteenth century. Similar practical and theoretical issues concerning the finding of the longitude in order to determine a ship's position at sea led to the founding of the Observatoire Royal (1672) and the

Royal Observatory (1675). These practical needs of navigation not only stimulated major technical developments – such as the ship's chronometer – but also crucial developments in theoretical mathematics. However, it is conceptually illegitimate to treat specific examples involving particular combinations of circumstances as the basis for a general theory for the conditions of scientific advances as such.

Different social and political circumstances in other cultures gave rise to different, but equally important, developments in science and technology. Again, the Chinese case is particularly instructive. Ancient China was an agrarian, centralized and bureaucratic society. In cultural terms, the ideographic language and organic, rather than mechanistic, world-view are typically regarded as not conducive to a scientific, experimental approach to nature. Yet the Chinese legacy in science and technology is massive, including the invention of gunpowder, the water clock, the horse stirrup and breast-harness, paper-making, and the wheel-barrow and the stern-post rudder.[22] China's contribution to science was not, however, limited to mere techniques, but extended into mathematics, astronomy and medicine. While Chinese bureaucratism might have inhibited certain scientific advances, it stimulated others such as the seismograph, hydraulic engineering, the segmental arch-bridge, on the one hand, and astronomy and mathematics, on the other. In a comparative framework,

> Chinese bureaucratic feudalism was much more effective in the useful application of natural knowledge than the slave-owning classical cultures or the serf-based military aristocratic feudal system of Europe . . . Indeed the bureaucratic ethos seems to have helped applied science in many ways.[23]

Indeed, by acknowledging the importance of merchants in the rise of European science, Needham tends to underestimate the role of the state bureaucracy as an environment for specific scientific advances. In presenting this argument, that particular social circumstance may stimulate particular scientific advances while inhibiting others, the Chinese case has been considered because much of Needham's argument about the precocity of Chinese science may also apply to the Golden Age of Islam. These centralized, patrimonial societies were both, in the history of science, 'wise before their time'.

Karl Wittfogel's *Oriental Despotism* is now largely discredited as a theory of Oriental political structure and social stagnation. However, Wittfogel's commentary on the effect of political organization in hydraulic societies on the nature and development of science is pertinent to Islamic advances in mathematics and astronomy. The political and economic requirements of large-scale irrigation works also stimulated developments in time-keeping, the making of exact measurements, the keeping of accounts, and geography. Thus,

> Time-keeping and calendar making are essential for the success of all hydraulic economies; and under special conditions special operations of measuring and calculating may be urgently needed. . . . The need for reallocating the periodically flooded fields and determining the dimension and bulk of hydraulic and other structures provide continual stimulation for developments in geometry and arithmetic.[24]

The particular requirements of state control of irrigation in Middle East societies may be one condition for the growth of astronomy and mathematics, but in Islam, unlike bureaucratic China, the merchant class was very powerful politically and socially. With the expansion of trade under *pax Islamica* from the eighth to the eleventh century in textiles, agricultural produce, medical goods, luxury commodities and other exports, the merchant class accumulated wealth which became the basis for their patronage of the arts and sciences.[25] Because merchants had special needs relating to book-keeping, accounting and price-determination, they were also associated with the patronage of arithmetic. Alongside the growth of banking and credit techniques, we find Muslim merchants acquiring the culture of scholars and scribes as they became familiar with the scientific treatises on natural science and mathematics. It is interesting, for example, that the tenth-century writer Ibn 'Abd Rabbihi observed that, while princes should be familiar with history, warriors with biography, the special concern of merchants was mathematics.

If the needs of irrigation and trade stimulated particular developments in mathematics and astronomy, it was also the case that the ritual requirements of Islam for daily prayer were also associated with theoretical and technical developments in measurement and time-keeping. The development of the clock in Islam is, therefore, of particular interest. Although the clock had been invented in China and various technical aspects of clocks had been transmitted to the west through Greek civilization, clocks became popular in Islamic culture and significant improvements had been achieved by Muslim horologists, such as the use of gear-wheels. Important contributions were made by al-Biruni (c. 1000) to the volvelle and astrolabe. While sundials are found in many different cultures, the suspended column dial was an important Islamic invention. By the thirteenth century with the publication of al-Jazari's *Book of the Knowledge of Mechanical Devices*, Islam had achieved supremacy in the field of time-keeping.[26] One major symbol of this technological ascendancy was the clock and planetarium presented by the Sultan of Egypt to Emperor Frederick II in 1232. The history of clocks in Islam, however, provides an illustration of the correlation between economic advance and scientific development. With the rise of European economic and political power, clocks from Islamic countries could no longer compete with

European imports. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when a new watch-manufacturing industry was established in Turkey, it was faced by major disadvantages

> The watchmakers there (Turkey) worked for the local market. How could they compete with European industry in the age of mercantilism, and a veritable export drive by which the Western countries tried constantly to establish new markets in all continents.[27]

Whereas from the ninth to the thirteenth century clocks travelled, so to speak, from east to west, from the seventeenth century they made the return trip.

In these examples, it has been suggested that one alternative argument to the 'uniqueness of the west' is to point out that certain specific conditions in the pre-modern world encouraged various developments in science of a particular nature. Instead of thinking in terms of one traumatic 'Scientific Revolution', we might think in terms of many discrete, particular advances in technology and science. However, this line of argument could suggest that no comparative, general sociology of science is possible, since each case is unique and can only be analysed in its own right. This interpretation would lead to an infinite regress of particular, discrete empirical studies of given developments in each branch of natural science. It can be claimed, however, that one general requirement for the development of any sustained, especially institutionalized, scientific activity is the presence of an economic surplus in the hands of the state, merchants or nobles which can be distributed to patronise a scientific or intellectual stratum.

STATE, SCIENCE AND ECONOMY IN ISLAM

Whereas the industrial bourgeoisie stimulated the development of applied science in early British capitalism, in pre-capitalist society it was the state or merchants that provided the social conditions for bureaucratic personnel, literati or schools of intellectuals to fulfil state requirements in engineering, astronomy, hydraulic technology and geography, or for intellectuals to serve directly the practical and status needs of merchant-patrons. On these assumptions, we would expect that pre-modern advances in science would correlate with extensions of the state's fiscal control over various sub-units of society – tribes, villages, the family, peripheral regions and so forth. Pre-modern advances in science occur when the state apparatus is strong and effective, not necessarily when 'middle classes' enjoy privileges and immunity from patrimonial states. The conventional assumption about the absence of a middle class and the weakness of the Oriental

economy and scientific development needs, therefore, to be critically scrutinized. The important advances in science in China and Islam under patrimonial or bureaucratic feudal conditions provides an obvious difficulty for this conventional assumption. Under the protective umbrella of the centralized Chinese bureaucracy, a powerful stratum of scholar-gentlemen was created and the literati came to dominate the cultural and political life of the empire to the exclusion of land-owning feudal lords and urban merchants. In Islam, an intellectual stratum flourished under the dual patronage of the caliphal courts and cosmopolitan merchants.

Although patrimonial empires can, through the creation of an economic surplus, provide the necessary financial basis for an intellectual stratum, there are certain perennial limitations on patrimonial political and economic structures which have long-term implications for pre-modern scientific development. Before the development of modern means of communication, administration and information-storage systems, patrimonial dynasties were faced with critical problems of bureaucracy, social control, military protection and tax collection. The dynastic families of such polities attempted to balance the interests of land-owning families which provided the back-bone of the traditional cavalry and the interests of subordinate classes by the intervening medium of families with prebendal rights to land and the official bureaucracy. This patrimonial structure produces a political see-saw between the political centre represented by the royal family and the bureaucracy, on the one hand, and noble families and dissident tribes, on the other. This constant conflict between centre and periphery, which was typically focused on attempts to convert prebendal into feudal land rights, gave rise to a phenomenon which Weber described as 'sultanism'. In principle, the bureaucracy was dependent on the imperial household because the state official had no legal title to land, no regional or parochial commitment because their promotion took them away from any regional attachment and no interest in family or, in the case of eunuchs, in reproduction and inheritance. To support this bureaucracy, a patrimonial system required either an efficient taxation system or an expanding frontier, or both. It was difficult, however, to secure an effective system of taxation in a pre-modern state. Without modern systems of record-keeping, surveillance, accountancy, legal provision in tax law and a national, literate salaried officialdom, large-scale patrimonial empires were faced with permanent fiscal crises. In patrimonialism, at each stage of the tax-gathering exercise and at each level of the bureaucracy, the tax-yield was progressively creamed-off by the bureaucracy. There was, therefore, an incremental diminution of the fiscal basis of the state as tax-collection moved from the periphery to the centre. The effect was to put severe limits on the fiscal basis of the state and forced patrimonial powers to seek various drastic solutions –

withholding of payments to bureaucrats and traders, money-clipping, increases in peasant taxation, and seizure of inherited property. These responses to the financial burden of the state resulted in the alienation of the bureaucracy, a depressed and impoverished peasantry and rebellious landlords. This social disintegration could be avoided if a powerful slave army could successfully and constantly expand the frontiers of the existing society. Where a patrimonial empire had the good fortune to be adjacent to weak neighbours, it could systematically extend its tax base. However, this external solution to the crisis of patrimonialism often produced another round of internal financial problems as military and surveillance costs increased.

In pre-modern societies, there were structural limits or brakes on the power and effectiveness of the state which constantly threatened its survival without necessarily replacing patrimonialism as a model of social arrangements. In China, the brake on the dominance of the state was the countervailing power of the local sib-group and kinship structure which dominated the villages. In Islam, in addition to the internal limitations on the apparatus of the state, there was the structural limit represented by tribalism and nomadic invasion. In the west, the urban city arose eventually without the internal limits which are common to a tribalized society and developed without the periodic devastation of nomadic invasion. In Islamdom, these two factors placed a decisive limitation on the development of what Weber regarded as the rationality of urban life. While Islam in its first four centuries was largely immune from external aggression and enjoyed a prosperous and flourishing civilization, it underwent a series of devastating invasions which undermined this urban mercantile culture: the collapse of the Umayyad dynasty in Spain in 1031, the Banu-Hilal conquest of North Africa, the Seljuk invasion, the Crusades and the Mongol conquests of the thirteenth century. The effects of these external brakes on Islamic development were particularly severe. These crushing interventions into Islamic societies further intensified the fiscal crises of patrimonialism, undermined the taxes which were extracted from international trade and created a system of minor kingdoms and petty regimes. External threat not only strengthened peripheral regimes in relation to the patrimonial centre but set in motion a defensive, conservative reaction among the orthodox religious authorities which contrasts sharply with the openness and receptivity of Islam in its period of formation.

In addition to traditional sources of land and poll taxes, Islamic states had, in principle, access to tax revenue from intercontinental and internal trade. In practice, since the state treasury often found itself in an impecunious position, the state raised liquid capital in the form of loans from merchants. These loans took the form of an advanced payment in return for the right of tax-farming in a designated region over a fixed period of time. While this exchange of

liquid capital for tax-farming rights involved a high-risk investment, tax-farming represented an important additional income for merchants. While the state treasury could meet its short-term needs from merchant loans, it meant that day-to-day and long-term control of regional and rural taxation was gradually transferred from the state to merchants. This situation was simply one indicator of the general weakness of medieval Islamic commercial and financial institutions which never evolved into a formal banking system. Islamic banking arrangements depended on personal and status relationships rather than on informal organizations:

> Given the slowness and unpredictability of communications between geographically distant locations, and given the sheer physical and psychological limitations on individual social intercourse the scale of economic activities was necessarily restricted to small, even intimate, circles. The possibility of expansion into a larger, more cohesive structure was precluded by the comparatively narrow social basis on which economic life was conducted.[29]

There were, therefore, not only limitations on state revenue, but also limitations on the productivity of merchant capital.

When Islam first burst out of the Arabian peninsula and established a new political order in the Middle East, it initially left the socio-economic and cultural organization of its new territories unchanged. Taxes raised on subordinate populations served to maintain a new elite in power. At first, the Umayyads were content to leave the administration of their newly-acquired territories in the hands of Greek officials but this policy of minimal control changed rapidly as the imperial structure became more permanent. One consequence of Islamic expansion was the creation of a stable, international framework for trade. The old cities of the classical world received a powerful economic stimulus and new cities also arose as major entrepots in this global commercial network. On the basis of this new wealth, political stability and religious unification, there was a rapid growth in manufactures – paper, porcelain, steel and silk – and in science under the patronage of the Umayyads (661–750) and Abbasids (750–1258). This economic surplus created by trade, taxation and expansion provided the economic basis for the great age of Islamic science.

> It was this courtly and wealthy patronage that enabled the doctors and astronomers of Islam to carry out their experiments and make their observations. It also protected them, while it lasted, from the active disapproval of religious bigots who suspected that all this philosophy would debase the beliefs of the faithful. . . This association

> of science with kings, wealthy merchants and nobles was immediately the source of its strength and ultimately of its weakness, since science became, as time went on, completely cut off from the people. . . As long as the cities and trade flourished there was a sufficiently large, cultivated middle class interested in science to ensure discussion and progress. As this broke down, however, the scientists became more and more wandering scholars, dependent on the varying fortunes of local dynasties.[30]

There were two general characteristics of Islamic science which remained dominant. The first was a notable inclination to observations, experimentation and practicality. We have seen that this tendency towards empirical science and technology was evidenced by improvements in water-wheels, clocks and astrolabes. The second characteristic was an all-pervasive conception of the unity of knowledge. The great philosophers of Islam such as al-Kindi, al-Razi and Ibn Sina were also mathematicians, alchemists, physicians, botanists and philologists. However, at the centre of this unity of science lay medicine and the representative court intellectual was the physician. The court physician/astrologer became the influential adviser of successive caliphs and embodied the traditions of *falsafah* which included both speculative metaphysics and natural science. The *adab* culture of the courts which embraced poetry, philosophy and natural science developed under the influence of educated administrators, rich merchants and physicians and came eventually to be clearly distinguished from what Marshall Hodgson referred to as the Shari'ah-minded members of the *ulama* and the mystical orders of Sufism.

While an interest in pathology, especially eye and skin disease, was no doubt motivated by the presence of certain persistent diseases in the Muslim population, it was also motivated by philosophical movements in *kalam* and *falsafah* which aimed in their different ways to give a coherent account of matter in relation to the Creator. In their search for a solution to the apparent contradiction or gap between revelation and reason, the true scholar combined existing knowledge in astronomy, astrology, logic, and medicine. From this trend towards universalistic rational knowledge, there emerged, on the one hand, a speculative interest in the atomic structure of matter, which centred on the philosophical issue of 'essence' and 'attribute' and, on the other, a practical concern with pharmacology, botany, opthalmology, and chemistry

> Extensive use and knowledge of chemistry and pharmacology in the practice of Arabic medieval medicine accelerated the development of botany, the cultivation of plants, and other relevant areas of study. In a way, the more elaborate pharmacological practice

> became, the further and faster other sciences were forced to move to keep up with this phenomenon.[31]

In chemistry, the Arab intellectuals not only built up a detailed knowledge of chemical properties, they also greatly improved various practical activities such as distillation, evaporation, and filtration.

The growth of Islamic science, philosophy, and technology was made possible by court and mercantile patronage, which in turn was financed out of inter-continental trade, territorial expansion and taxation. The patronage system failed ultimately because patrimonial states did not possess an adequate internal system of administration and taxation. As classical Islam began to break-up into smaller, petty kingdoms of a feudal nature, and as it was subjected to powerful external forces of invasion, science was retarded by the loss of financial support for libraries, research institutions, hospitals and schools. In response to social decay and intellectual threat, orthodox opinion hardened against philosophical speculation and scientific experimentation.

With the decline of the eastern caliphate, new centres of learning briefly flourished in the Cordoban caliphate in the tenth and eleventh centuries. With this newly acquired political power and independence, a new scientific spurt was patronized by the court, which established libraries, observatories and schools at Cordoba and Toledo. Intellectual and scientific advances were due to

> the prosperity of Andalusia under Abd al-Rahman III (912–61), the more frequent travels of scholars to and from the Arab East, and the desire of the monarch and his learned son al-Hakam to be patrons of the arts and sciences on a grand scale.[32]

Spain was one of the most densely populated and wealthy areas of the west. The financial resources of the state were enhanced by taxation of imports and exports. One major item in this intercontinental trading system was tanned and embossed leather, but Islamic Spain also became a centre for wool, silk, sericulture, glassware, pottery and precious metals. Seville became a great entrepot of the western Mediterranean through which the trade in basic and luxury goods passed. Islamic Spain also emerged as a great centre for agricultural development and experimentation. The Islamic occupation of Spain brought with it an increase in population and demand for land. The result was an intensification of cultivation, incorporation of marginal land and an increase in agricultural productivity. The Muslims replaced Aristotelian agronomics, which had been based on formal distinctions between heat and humidity, with a new experimental empiricism which, by controlled observation and experimentation, sought to solve problems of salination, evaporation, and erosion. The

need for increased agricultural output thus stimulated advances in agricultural chemistry, botany and the management of the land. This increased industrial and agricultural power provided the economic resources for impressive investment in new universities (at Cordoba, for example) schools and libraries. Islamic Spain rapidly became the intellectual centre, not only of Islamdom, but of Europe as a whole and it was in this prosperous and enlightened environment that Islamic, Jewish and Christian philosophers created a corpus of knowledge which provided the basis for the European Renaissance.

The growth of a dynamic urban culture based on extensive irrigation in Al-Andalus has given rise to a familiar debate as to the originality or sterility of Islamic culture as a whole. Wittfogel saw the impact of Islam on Spain in terms of the imposition of

> a genuine hydraulic society, ruled despotically by appointed officials and taxed by agromanagerial methods of acquisition. . . A protoscientific system of irrigation and gardening was supplemented by an extraordinary advance in the typically hydraulic science of astronomy and mathematics. . . The *reconquista* which in the 13th century re-established Christian control over the greater part of Spain, transformed a great hydraulic civilization into a late feudal society.[33]

Contemporary scholarship shows that Islamic Spain was in fact a predominantly decentralized structure, and that there was a significant administrative continuity between Islamic and Christian organization of irrigation. By their nature, irrigation systems can only be built up over many generations so that, while the Arabs inherited a classical system of public water-works, they also brought knowledge and techniques from Syria and Egypt.[34] That Al-Andalus

> experienced a considerable importation of eastern agricultural techniques and irrigation practices is clear from a variety of evidence. There is, for instance, within Spanish irrigation terminology a preponderance of terms and words of unmistakably Arabic origin. Then again, there is the evidence of irrigation machinery. The whole repertoire of Middle Eastern devices – the noria, the shaduf, the saqyiyah – was massively exploited in Moslem Spain.[35]

Arab engineers contributed significantly to improvements in the performance of horizontal and undershot water wheels to enhance the velocity and control of water flows from hydro-power dams, especially in the Guadalquivir region.

The collapse of the Cordoban caliphate very largely mirrored the collapse of the eastern caliphate. The Islamic state was subject to the external limitations of Christian armies in the north and to certain

fissiparous pressures internally. The court was weakened by the prevalent problems of succession in patrimonial polities and Andalusian society was stratified into competing social groups – Arabs, Mozarabs and Christians – which sought advancement and power. Periodic civil disturbances gradually undermined the authority of the caliphate. In the eleventh century, the Umayyad caliphate was replaced by a series of petty dynasties, of which the two most important were the Berber dynasties of the Almoravides and Almohads.[36] The replacement of the powerful urban caliphate of the Umayyads by Berber frontiersmen provides an obvious illustration of Ibn Khaldun's theory of the circulation of tribal elites. The followers of Ibn-Tumart (the *al-muwahhidun*, the 'asserters of unity' of God) condemned what they regarded as the moral laxity, softness, and heterodoxy of city-dwellers of Spain. While the doctrines of the Almohads had an appeal to those sections of the community which demanded a rational unitarian religion, they failed to win mass support among the subordinate population. Internal dynastic disputes and economic decline eventually prepared the way for a number of crucial military victories by Christian armies against Islamic Spain in the first half of the thirteenth century.

The western Umayyad and eastern Abbasid caliphates represent two illustrations of my argument that any sustained scientific advance presupposes a sustained economic advance or economic surplus. More technically, there are certain necessary connections between developments in the mode of production and science. Although the early patrimonial empires in their period of expansion provided an economic surplus which, through the vehicle of court and merchant patronage, supported research institutes, universities and individual scholars, patrimonial empires are limited by certain critical external and internal crises. The internal problems relate to taxation and social control; the external, to the nomadic, tribal brake. The same pattern of economic and scientific rise and fall could also be documented for subsequent Islamic patrimonial states (Safavi, Timuri and Ottoman) and for non-Islamic polities of south-east Asia.

CONCLUSION

Conventional accounts of Weber's concept of rationalization are typically one-sided in giving a prominence to rational *beliefs* in the process of modernization. For Weber, rationalization also had a distinctively institutional, structural and economic dimension. For example, an aspect of the rationality of capitalism involved the separation of the worker from the means of production which permitted the exercise of discipline over the worker and a basis for the rational calculation of wages. Similarly, the separation of the mental

worker from the ownership of the laboratory was an important feature of the rationalization of science in the modern university. Weber thus saw the rise of the scientific bureaucracy under the ultimate management of the modern state as an illustration of the 'quasi-proletarianization' of the intellectual who was transformed into the 'specialist'.[37] Weber's commentaries on the origins and development of the natural sciences are typically dominated by analyses of contrasted social structures rather than by contrasted belief systems.

The account of the absence of natural science development in China (or rather the thwarting of science in ancient China) is a particularly telling example. Weber argued that the crucial feature of Occidental development was the transfer of the empirical skills of artists into craftsmanship and technical experimentation on the foundations of rational thought, especially mathematics. It was the needs of the mining industry which contributed to the transfer of the craftsmanship of art into the experiment of the natural sciences in the service of industrial production. In China, the rationalism of the intellectuals failed to break out of the court circles and the official bureaucracy. The simplistic notion that Protestant rationalism was the great lever of scientific advance is thus very far from Weber's actual comparative sociology of science which treated scientific rationalism as the outcome of contingent features (the peculiar requirements of navigation and mining), structural arrangements (the form of the state and its relationship to dominant classes) and finally the presence of intellectual technologies (arithmetic, algebra, abstract writing and experimental designs). When Weber did create an explanatory space for rational beliefs, his argument was that the irrational quest for salvation in Calvinistic Protestantism had the unintended consequence of fostering rational practices. Weber also saw the rationalism of modern science as technical and thus limited, since science could never specify what ends of action *ought* to be pursued.

It can also be noted that Weber did not see the emergence of modern science as a sudden transformation which was conjoined with the emergence of capitalism. Although capitalism may have acted as a spur, the condition for rational science and technology took centuries to congeal. The transfer of Leonardo's artistic skills to the creation of technology related to warfare and mining was a typical step in the development of modern science, but these experiments presupposed the availability of sciences like mathematics which had evolved in Indian and Arabic civilizations. Weber's account of the origins of science and its service to capital accumulation presents us with an explanation which is characteristically Weberian – the combination of highly contingent historical circumstances with an over-arching sociological development of rationalization. Teleological rationality is spurred on by contingency in the shape of Protestantism, the urban

city, technical requirements in navigation, mining and banking, and the bureaucratic state which may drive scientific ambition in the direction of industrial application.

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Robert Miles

Recent Marxist theories of nationalism and the issue of racism[1]

ABSTRACT

This paper comments critically on certain assertions about the relationship between racism and nationalism made by recent Marxist contributions to the debate about the nature and origins of nationalism. The ideas of 'race' and 'nation', and the ideologies of racism and nationalism, are shown to have certain common features which create the potential for their articulation rather than opposition. Thereafter, taking the particular example of England, it is argued that the ideology of racism can be used to define and sustain nationalism.

> 'These racial elements impose their modes of existence on nations circumscribing them within limits from which, like blind slaves, they do not even wish to escape, although they would not even have the strength to do so. They dictate their laws, inspire their wishes, control their sympathies and stir up their hatreds and contempts.'[2]

Two recent Marxist contributions to the analysis of nationalism[3] refer to the relationship between nationalism and racism. In addition, one of these writers makes a pioneering contribution to the analysis of English nationalism, in the course of which he considers the specific influence and role of racism.[4] I doubt whether either writer would claim to have provided anything approaching a systematic analysis of this relationship, although each confidently advances a number of assertions in the form of theoretical and historical generalizations. Anderson argues that nationalism and racism are contrary ideologies

> The fact of the matter is that nationalism thinks in terms of historical destinies while racism dreams of eternal contaminations, transmitted from the origins of time through an endless sequence of loathsome copulations: outside history.[5]

And he takes issue with Nairn's view that racism derives from

nationalism.[6] But Nairn does not offer a coherent justification for this view, and most of his comments on the relationship between racism and nationalism focus on a single historical example, the place of racism in the expression of English nationalism since 1945. Nairn's discussion of this topic concentrates primarily on the ideology articulated by, and the political impact of, Enoch Powell, in which he maintains that racism has only a very limited potential for political mobilization under the banner of a right-wing nationalism in England,[7] and that the resort to racism in England is the result of the absence of the main mobilizing myth of nationalism, an idea of 'the people'.[8]

In advancing these various claims, both writers give only the most cursory attention to the nature and history of racism, a feature that is out of step with the considerably more detailed and analytical consideration of the nature and history of nationalism. Consequently, their comments on the interrelationship between nationalism and racism, despite their innovatory character, are flawed. *Contra* Anderson and Nairn, I argue in this paper that, although there are important differences in the nature and reproduction of these two ideologies, their interrelationship is not as fixed as Anderson and Nairn, in their different ways, suggest. *Contra* Anderson, I shall argue that nationalism and racism are not necessarily distinct and contrary ideologies,[9] while *contra* Nairn, I shall argue that racism does not derive from nationalism as if it were some secondary, dependent and derivative ideological form.

In the light of these arguments, I shall comment additionally on the claims made by Barker about the emergence of what he terms the 'new racism'.[10] Barker's argument, also advanced within the context of Marxism, focuses particularly on the emergence of the 'New Right' within the British Conservative Party but he fails to consider the extent to which this ideological reconstruction draws upon nationalism. My criticism of Barker is, therefore, that he ignores the possibility of an articulation of nationalism and racism.

These arguments are sustained with reference to a more limited range of empirical/historical material than is employed by Anderson. My concern is with a disagreement with one facet of his argument, with which I am in fact in broad agreement. My method is closer to Nairn who makes a number of theoretical claims which are sustained primarily by a detailed appreciation of historical development in the UK. The empirical/historical content here is similarly limited to the UK, but seen in a somewhat broader context in order to take account of colonialism. Such an empirical focus involves an important conceptual problem given the nature of the formation of the nation-state in the UK. The process of state formation left intact an institutional basis for the reproduction of quasi-national political identities, particularly in the case of Scotland. One consequence is

that there is a need to draw distinctions between, for example, England and Scotland, and between English and Scottish national (political) identities. At the same time, Britain constitutes a legal-constitutional unit, although with England as its core, a situation that leads to a more fluid English/British identity. This elasticity does not occur in Scotland and Wales where a sharper distinction with Britain tends to be drawn. I shall comment briefly on the significance of this for the articulation of nationalism and racism.

THE PROCESS OF INCLUSION/EXCLUSION

The ideas of 'race' and 'nation' are both categories of simultaneous inclusion and exclusion. They define certain types of boundary which separate populations into discrete groups which are alleged to be naturally and inevitably distinct. Considered abstractly, the criteria signified in the process of categorization are distinctive. Concerning the idea of 'race', the criterion is biological, usually phenotypical (e.g. skin colour) but occasionally genetic. In the case of the idea of 'nation', the criterion is usually cultural (e.g. language). In both cases, the criteria are often real in the sense that the signified characteristics are empirically verifiable: it is indeed the case that some people have a pinkish/white skin or speak the German language. The facts of difference are not necessarily disputable whereas the subsequent definition of naturalness is more problematic, certainly if it is alleged that those possessing the characteristics are assumed thereby to form a group by natural means. Herein lies a process of reification because the criteria of inclusion/exclusion are made to appear as the determinants of groups' differentiation rather the act of signification, the reproduction of the act of signification, and the ordering of the material world in ways consistent with the act of signification.

Such an interpretation places considerable emphasis upon ideological construction, a theme that has been prominent in the analysis of nationalism and the idea of 'nation' for a long time.[11] Such an interpretation is less consistently offered in relation to the idea of 'race'.[12] That both ideas or categories are socially constructed and reproduced can be illustrated by indicating the relevance of Anderson's conception of the 'nation' as an *imagined community*[13] for an understanding of the way in which the idea of 'race' serves as a category of inclusion/exclusion.

Like 'nations', 'races' too are *imagined*, in the dual sense that they have no real biological foundation and that all those included by the signification can ever know each other, and are imagined as *communities* in the sense of a common feeling of fellowship. Moreover, they are also imagined as *limited* in the sense that a boundary is

perceived, beyond which lie other 'races'. Utilizing Anderson's formal definition of 'nation', it is only the criterion of being sovereign that does not apply to the idea of 'race'.

Both categories have an additional characteristic in common. They categorize populations in a way which includes a range of economic differentiation within the imagined communities of 'race' or 'nation'. Within the context of Marxist theory, these are therefore supra-class categories because people categorized by skin colour or language etc. necessarily occupy a range of different positions in the relations of production. Each makes an ideological appeal to create a sense of community which overrides the conflicting interests arising from the social relations of production.

Both categories, where employed to differentiate between people, are simultaneously inclusive and exclusive. If, in the process of differentiation, one defines the characteristics of 'us', one is also defining the existence of 'them', i.e. those who lack that particular characteristic. The same process occurs if the process of differentiation identifies 'them' in the first instance by reference to some other characteristic: by defining 'them', an implicit statement is made about 'us'. To signify a population as a 'race' by reference to a real or alleged characteristic Y is to simultaneously signify the existence of other 'races' distinguishable by the absence of Y. Thus, where *ego* identifies *alter* as a member of a particular 'race' (or 'nation'), *ego* is necessarily also identified as a member of a particular 'race' or ('nation').

Any act of inclusion is therefore also an act of exclusion, and *vice versa*, whether or not *ego* or *alter* are specifically signified as possessing or lacking the criterion in question. This applies equally to the general categories of 'race' and 'nation' as well as to the alleged criteria of differentiation between alleged 'races' and 'nations'. Anderson's error is to assume that the category of 'race' is always used as a method of negatively-evaluated exclusion. In reality, as we shall see below, the 'race' category is also liable to be used first as a positively-evaluated means of inclusion which thereby excludes.

RACISM AND NATIONALISM: THE COMMON GROUND

The ideas of 'race' and 'nation' have each been placed at the centre of a distinct theoretical edifice which has sought to explain social and historical variation and to characterize that variation as being natural. The formation of '-isms' around these two criteria of classification in western Europe occurred at the same point in time, during the late eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries. During this period, the idea of 'race' was appropriated by a large number of biologists and anthropologists who were concerned with the significance of human physiological variation. Their intellectual and investigative

activity was concerned with the classification of the human species into discrete groups by reference to one or more phenotypical characteristics. Barzun has classified the consequences of their endeavours as a 'doctrine of racial typology'[14] while Comas refers to a similar group of writers as having formulated a doctrine of 'scientific racism'.[15]

The ideology of scientific racism asserted a number of claims. First, it suggested that the human species could be divided into a number of discrete and fixed biological types which determined the endowment and behaviour of individuals and the cultural variation of the human species. It followed from this that conflict between individuals and groups was the consequence of their biological constitution. Second, it was argued that the 'races' of which the world's human population was made up could be ordered hierarchically, certain 'races' therefore being destined for biological and cultural superiority. It follows that the more general characteristic of racism is that it is an instance of ideology which signifies some real or alleged biological characteristic as a criterion of group membership and additionally attributes that group with other negatively evaluated characteristics.[16] These arguments gained considerable credibility because they were advanced by people who practised as scientists in a period when science was first widely regarded as capable of revealing the truth about the natural and social world.[17] These arguments had a wide circulation and were used to interpret political and economic conflicts in various parts of the world where, for example, the British state, merchants and capitalists had economic and political interests.[18]

The idea of 'nation' underwent a process of theorization in the same period of western European history:

> Nationalism as we understand it is not older than the second half of the eighteenth century. Its first great manifestation was the French Revolution, which gave the new movement an increased dynamic force. Nationalism had become manifest, however, at the end of the eighteenth century almost simultaneously in a number of widely separated European countries.[19]

The object of this signification and theorization was again the world's population which the theory divided into natural and discrete units. It was argued that the human species was naturally divided into 'nations', each of which had a distinctive character. These naturally occurring units were defined as the ideal location for political organization. Thus each 'nation' should have its own territory within which forms of representation can sustain self-government and, more broadly, allow the full realization of the 'nation's' specific qualities. Smith claims

> Fundamentally, nationalism fuses three ideals: collective self-determination of the people, the expression of national character and individuality, and finally the vertical division of the world into unique nations each contributing its special genius to the common fund of humanity.[20]

The ideology of nationalism therefore specifies an ideal political organization of the world into nation-states, founded on the principle of popular sovereignty which, in the context of its formation, sought to overturn monarchy and aristocratic government by an appeal to the popular will.

In this sense, the theorization of 'nation' led to a more specific political project than did the theorization of 'race'. During the nineteenth century nationalism became synonymous with a struggle for political sovereignty within defined spatial boundaries and for some form of representative government, although the franchise was usually limited to just half of the adult population (i.e. men). Nationalism, therefore, identified particular political objectives which had specific political consequences in the form of the struggle for the formation of nation-states. By way of contrast, there was no single political strategy that could emerge from the general theory of biological, hierarchical differentiation. This was not only because there was little agreement about the boundaries between the supposed 'races', but also because scientific racism did not posit a single, coherent political objective. But each extended a point of contact to the other in the assertion of a division of the world's population into discrete groups. The ideology of nationalism grounded these divisions in cultural differentiation, of which language was the most common feature. The latter characteristic is in fact problematic in so far as it does not necessarily coincide with the formation of the boundaries of nation-states, a fact which leads to the conclusion that a wide variety of cultural *differentiae* have the potential to function as indicators of a difference of 'nation'.[21]

The theorization of 'race' and 'nation' took place in the context of internal European political and economic reorganization and external European expansionism, in the course of which the range of human cultural and physiological variation became more widely known to a larger number of people. The development of capitalist relations of production increased the circulation of commodities and the circulation of people, and this increasing mobility, migration and social interaction provided the foundation upon which the ideological edifices were constructed. The increasing profusion of physiological and cultural variation, as recognised in western Europe, became the object of intellectual curiosity and, thereby, for the mental production of scientists and philosophers.

Considered as theories, nationalism and scientific racism had the

potential to become interlinked. This potential was grounded in the very nature of scientific racism which asserted a deterministic link between biology and cultural variation/expression. Because 'nations' were identified as naturally occurring groups identifiable by cultural *differentiae*, it was logically possible to assert that these symbols of 'nation' were themselves grounded in 'race'. It could therefore be argued that 'blood or race is the basis of nationality, and that it exists eternally and carries with it an unchangeable inheritance'.[22] One example of such meshing is found in the writing of Robert Knox, who claimed

> The fact, the simple fact, remains just as it was: men are of different races. Now, the object of these lectures is to show that in human history race is everything.[23]

Consequently, for Knox

> The results of the physical and mental qualities of a race are naturally manifested in its civilization, for every race has its form of civilization.[24]

Knox argued that historical analysis demonstrated that each 'race' was engaged in a struggle to form its own laws, literature and language in accordance with its biological characteristics. And because these cultural phenomena were biologically determined, they could not be socially transmitted.[25]

One implication of such an argument is that each 'race' requires its own territory within which its distinctive capacity for 'civilization' can be realized. For Knox, 'race' and 'nation' were therefore interrelated. For the English 'race' this raised, for Knox, the following question

> The really momentous question for England, as a *nation*, is the presence of three sections of the Celtic race still on her soil; the Caledonian, or Gael; the Cymbr-, or Welsh; and the Irish, or Erse; and how to dispose of them.[26]

In Knox's racist theory of history, the all-determining character of 'race' shaped all aspects of cultural expression and capacity, and so the category of 'nation' dissolved into that of 'race': the interdependence of the categories was hierarchical, and biology dominated. A disciple of Knox, Kelburne King, developed this connection in an article titled 'An Inquiry into the Causes which have led to the Rise and Fall of Nations' which was published in 1876.[27] In this paper, the object of historical analysis is presented as a changing sequence of dominant 'nations', the pattern of change being explained in terms of 'race'. Using a distinction between pure and mixed 'races', King offers an

interpretation of European history in which 'race' is shown to explain the 'rise and fall of nations'.

Similar arguments were formulated by others. For example, Gobineau also referred to 'race' as the absolute determinant of historical development

> I was gradually penetrated by the conviction that the racial question overshadows all other problems of history, that it holds the key to them all, and that the inequality of the races from whose fusion a people is formed is enough to explain the whole course of its destiny.[28]

Consequently, the rise and fall of 'nations' was, for Gobineau, the result of degeneration which he used to mean that

> the people has no longer the same intrinsic value as it had before, because it has no longer the same blood in its veins, continual adulterations having gradually affected the quality of that blood. In other words, though the nation bears the name given by its founders, the name no longer connotes the same race.[29]

Writers such as Gobineau and Knox represent a particular strand of nineteenth century historical writing and their arguments were not uncontested. Nevertheless, their historical interpretation demonstrates that the categories of 'race' and 'nation' are not necessarily antipathetic and can be ordered in a hierarchical interdependence in which 'race' determines 'nation'. In these analyses, the two ideas function jointly as categories of inclusion/exclusion. I shall illustrate this shortly by reference to a tradition of English historical writing which employed the idea of 'race' to explain the origin of the English 'nation'.

But 'race' and 'nation' are categories and do not by themselves constitute ideologies. They are ideological constructs, to which additional assertions have to be appended in order to refer to the existence of racism and nationalism. Thus, the categories of 'race' and 'nation' predate the construction of the ideologies of racism and nationalism, each having its own history of shifting meanings. By itself, this does not obviate the argument that racism can be an integral element of nationalism: the hierarchical division of the world's population into 'races' advanced by scientific racism can serve as the initial differentiation upon which to erect claims about the political self-determination of naturally divided populations. This is most clearly evident in certain fascist ideologies.[30]

Nevertheless, we are required to identify the divergences between the two ideologies in order to sustain the distinction between them. There are two aspects to this differentiation. First, bases of 'natural'

differentiation in addition to 'race' can be advanced as means of distinguishing the populations deemed to constitute 'nations'. Second, nationalism is an ideology which has as a constituent element an explicit political objective, the formation of a supra-class political unit within which political organization and representation can occur. No similar political objective constitutes a defining feature of the ideology of racism.

RACISM AND NATIONALISM IN ENGLISH HISTORY

Both Banton[31] and MacDougall[32] have shown that, in English historical and political writing, the idea of 'race' was prominent in assessing the origin and characteristics of the English as a people and of the English state. MacDougall claims that by the mid-seventeenth century, there was

> . . . the first comprehensive presentation in English of a theory of national origin based on the belief in the racial superiority of the German people, a theme repeated a thousand times in succeeding centuries.[33]

This myth of national origin was shaped by at least two political events. The first was the English Reformation which, in order to sustain its challenge to a church based in Rome, found it convenient to identify the existence of an autonomous church in Saxon England. Second, the English Civil War was waged over the power of Parliament. Those opposed to the monarchy stressed that Parliament was an institution of great antiquity, with origins in the German democratic tradition from whence the Saxons were said to have originated.[34] The idea of an Anglo-Saxon 'race' oppressed by a foreign 'race' following the Norman invasion in 1066 therefore had considerable political significance in the mid-seventeenth century.

Banton stresses that the idea of 'race' employed at this time was not one which referred to inherent, biological inferiority/superiority in the manner of nineteenth-century scientific racism, but rather was used in the sense of lineage. However, with the idea of 'race' present, and connected with a sense of Englishness, the subsequent shift towards the idea of 'race' as a biological category ensured that the Englishness came to be viewed in such terms by the nineteenth century.[35] Thereafter, the English were defined as a distinct biological 'race' whose superiority originated supposedly in their German origins, in the inherent courage and desire for freedom of the Saxons, in the inherent superiority of their language and institutions (especially Parliament) and in a natural ability for science and reason.[36]

The idea of the existence of the English as a superior 'race' was an

inclusive categorization which necessarily had exclusive implications, particularly in the light of the extensive activity of English merchant capital within the world market. MacDougall comments

> On balance, the myth of Anglo-Saxonism served England's national purposes well. Belief in their racial supremacy encouraged visionary Englishmen to look beyond their shores to other continents and proceed to build a great world empire to support a vibrant domestic society.[37]

MacDougall conflates a complex process into a simplistic, one-way determination, but he does emphasize that the construction of a sense of Englishness upon the idea of 'race' was developed not only in relation to political conflicts within England, but also in relation to external economic and political processes. This, too, had a long genesis which can be traced back to the early written records of English explorers who established contact with Africans from the mid-seventeenth century, a contact which threatened key English ideological assumptions about a range of issues from the validity of Biblical explanation to the criteria for beauty.[38] Subsequent contact with African and other populations was increasingly shaped by economic considerations in the light of the expanding activity of merchant capital, and the idea of 'race' had an increasing utility in explaining the nature of those populations and the economic position to which they were assigned as a source of unfree labour. I have analysed elsewhere the complex interaction between this economic dimension and the political and ideological relations in the generation and reproduction of racism in England.[39]

What is significant to record here is that this racism had a dual object: the English 'race' was counterposed by the colonial 'races' in a hierarchy of interdependence and superiority. Within the discourse of 'race', the superiority of one was refracted by the inferiority of the other. By the middle of the nineteenth century, the idea of 'race' was central to a world view articulated and reproduced by the English bourgeoisie and sections of the working class, serving as a category of simultaneous inclusion and exclusion. Moreover, this ideological construction had a phenomenal adequacy because there was an evident difference in productive relations and material wealth between England and much of the rest of the world at this time.[40] This clear material differentiation warranted explanation and racism provided one.

The historical evidence surveyed here suggests that Englishness has been defined and developed from an early date utilizing a changing idea of 'race' to identify and exclude 'others'. This idea was not derivative or secondary, but an integral construct defining both the form and content of the attributed and real differentiation. This

ideological project was grounded simultaneously in real political struggles which were central to the successful emergence of capitalism in England and in the emerging pre-eminence of English merchant and industrial capital within the growing world economy.

I can agree with Nairn that English nationalism is unusual because it was constructed in the absence of a need to mobilize a working class to force through a bourgeois revolution to establish the political context for capitalist development. Thus

> The result was a particularly powerful inter-class nationalism – a sense of underlying insular identity and common fate, which both recognised and yet easily transcended marked class and regional divisions.[41]

But that sense of 'insular identity and common fate' was additionally cemented by the idea of 'race' from the seventeenth century and, during the period of world dominance of English industrial capital, by the ideology of scientific racism. Indeed, it is because 'stale, romantic, middle-class nationalism has survived on the surrogates of imperialism and foreign war for nearly a century'[42] that racism occupies such a central fissure in the edifice of Englishness because imperialism and foreign war have been explained and legitimated by the idea of the inevitable biological struggle for survival between discrete and hierarchical 'races'.

Racism is not a new, centrally defining element of an English nationalism undergoing transformation to fit new economic and political circumstances,[43] but is, rather, a long-established core element. The definition of England in this nationalism is one in which

> to be English is to be *against* necessary outsiders, a member of an occult secret society diffused throughout the merely legal collectivity of liberal democracy.[44]

But in the context of the declining fortunes of English capitalism, it has been brought forward to play a new role in a partially reconstituted form.

RACISM AND NATIONALISM IN CONTEMPORARY ENGLAND

Since the early twentieth century, there has been a significant change in the political and economic world context within which the ideas of 'race' and 'nation' articulate. Colonial empires that were once won and maintained using racism as an ideology of legitimation have broken up. The nineteenth-century doctrines of scientific racism have been widely discredited, both politically and scientifically, by the

events and consequences of the rise of fascism in Germany. These, and other, changes make the explicit expression of nineteenth-century forms of racism in the formal political arena very difficult, and this applies just as much to England. A number of Marxist writers have observed and commented on this,[45] and Barker claims to have identified a 'new racism'[46] which presumably supersedes the 'old racism'.

This ideological construction dispenses with the notion of the world's population being divided into 'races' in a hierarchy of superiority/inferiority but claims that it is natural for individuals to wish to form exclusive groups. Barker identifies the core of this 'new racism' as follows

> It is a theory of human nature. Human nature is such that it is natural to form a bounded community, a nation, aware of its differences from other nations. They are not better or worse. But feelings of antagonism will be aroused if outsiders are admitted. And there grows up a special form of connection between a nation and the place it lives.[47]

Barker's argument has been influential amongst writers in the Marxist tradition, and his conceptualization of racism has been uncritically incorporated into a number of accounts of the current ideological and political crisis of British capitalism.[48] Indeed, in the case of *The Empire Strikes Back* text, the reference to Barker's thesis is the nearest that the authors come to defining the concept of racism, a concept which occupies a central position in their argument. Upon reflection, I believe Barker's argument to have raised as many problems as it resolves and that an uncritical incorporation of his assertions leads to misleading conclusions. I outline my reservations about Barker's thesis as a prelude to making some comments on the more recent articulation of racism and nationalism in England.

First, the notion of the 'new racism' presupposes an analysis of an 'old racism'. Yet Barker fails to offer any such analysis. Indeed, he seems to deny the existence of what might be thought to be the 'old racism' when he claims, without adducing any evidence, that it is 'a myth about the past that racism has generally been of the superiority/inferiority kind'.[49] In the light of the vast bulk of historical evidence to which so many people have contributed,[50] one is tempted to conclude that this constitutes a rewriting of history which abolishes a whole chapter of European thought. With this claim, Barker dispenses with over two hundred years or more of racist theorizing without as much as a single citation to sustain this radical illumination of supposed mythology. Moreover, with no indication of what distinguished the 'old racism', his assertion about the formation of a 'new racism' is vacuous.

Second, Barker's own conceptualization of racism is vague. It is poor philosophical logic to deny the validity of other definitions of racism while retaining the term as a key analytical category in the absence of a clear alternative explanation of what it is to refer to. The closest that Barker comes to providing an analytical content for his concept is in a claim that an assertion about the naturalness of xenophobia is a form of racism because 'it sees as biological, or pseudo-biological, groupings that are the result of social and historical processes'.[51] For Barker, therefore, a racist assertion appears to be one which incorrectly identifies any socio-historically constituted group as being the product of biological causation. This is an extremely broad definition which, for example, offers no means of differentiating racism from sexism. Moreover, we are not offered any account of how or why this conceptualization relates to or improves on others.

Third, the empirical object of Barker's analysis is confined to the speeches of leading members and supporters of the Conservative Party in Britain. This is a very limited terrain upon which to erect a theory about the emergence of a 'new racism'. It is a myopic conceptualization because it leaves out of account a vast range of ideological reproduction. For example, Billig has produced a detailed analysis of National Front propaganda and other related literature published during the 1960s and 1970s which demonstrates that the racism of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (a racism characterized by a hierarchical theory of 'race') continues to be articulated.[52] He has also analysed the political ideology of a sample of National Front members in order to demonstrate the extent to which such ideas are reproduced within the organization.[53] Barker also ignores the imagery of the English working class, where more 'classical' forms of racist expression abound.[54]

Moreover, the significance of the political discourse of the leadership of the Conservative Party lies not only in its content but also in its object. Of necessity, it is engaged in a process of political and ideological mobilization in a context where 'old racism' is a significant ideological force but where there are strong pressures to prevent its reproduction within the formal political arena. For a variety of reasons, the 're-born' Conservative Party of the 1970s wished to legitimate and incorporate that racism but it was necessary to do so in a way which did not involve the open articulation of the explicitly racist constructs voiced in the bus queue and the workplace.[55] Barker has identified part of the discourse with which this was achieved, but has largely ignored the wider conceptualization which created the space for such an incorporation.

A crucial dimension of that context has been the way in which successive British governments since 1945 have responded to political agitation to impose immigration controls on the entry of those who used to be called 'coloured' Commonwealth citizens.[56] The political

discourse employed has been overtly and covertly racist, although within the formal political arena there have been few references to inherent biological inferiority to legitimate the demand for such a specific exclusion. Rather, the migrants have been simultaneously racialized and signified as the cause of economic and social problems for 'our people'.[57] Equally to the point, the actual legislation passed by successive governments draws in effect a distinction based on phenotypical difference as a basis for removing the right of entry and settlement of people who were previously entitled to do so under the British Nationality Act of 1948.

This amounts to an institutionalization of racism in the practice of the British state, and constitutes a legitimation of widespread commonsense racism. Thus, during the 1960s and early 1970s, the intervention of the state to redetermine who had the right to live within the boundaries of the British nation-state was a concession to, and a legitimation of, racism. Moreover, by removing the right of entry to and settlement in the United Kingdom from certain categories of British Commonwealth subject, this legal intervention by the state served to establish new (racist) criteria by which membership of the 'imagined community' was determined.

How, then, can one interpret the political discourse of the Conservative Party since the mid-1970s? Barker identifies that discourse as one which refers to 'human nature' to explain why people constitute 'nations' within a defined territory, within which a common way of life and a sense of national consciousness can be maintained. Within this discourse, it follows that it is equally 'human nature' that members of this 'imagined community' should seek to exclude those with a different way of life and, therefore, with a 'natural home' elsewhere. This is an argument which more closely resembles the classic claims of nineteenth century nationalism. To redefine this nationalist argument simply as a 'new racism' requires a conceptual shift which results in a dissolution of any formal distinction between nationalism and racism. Indeed, Barker's analysis is completely silent about nationalism.

The centrality of nationalism to the Conservative Party's creation of a populist unity[58] was revealed in the political discourse of the Prime Minister during and after the Falklands War. During this short phase of political history, Nairn's reference to the 'surrogates of imperialism and war' were shown to have a continued capacity to redefine and reinvigorate a sense of Englishness/Britishness. The Prime Minister argued in July 1982 in the aftermath of the military conflict

> When we started out, there were the waverers and the fainthearts, the people who thought that Britain could no longer seize the initiative for herself . . . that Britain was no longer the nation that

> had built an Empire and ruled a quarter of the world. Well they were wrong. The lesson of the Falklands is that this nation still has those sterling qualities which shine through our history.[59]

For Thatcher, the task was to maintain and redirect this positive sense of national identity attained through military conflict to reorganize civil society and correct the comparative decline of the economy. In other words, this was a speech which explicitly connected the contemporary with the past in order to identify a future project for an entity whose social identity was reconstructed as a result of an external threat. The burning hulk of Sir Galahad was used to simultaneously illuminate and reconstruct the boundary of the imagined community of the English/British.

But if nationalism is a better term to refer to that part of the political discourse of the Conservative Party analysed by Barker, what of racism? My historical argument is that English nationalism is particularly dependent on and constructed by an idea of 'race', with the result that English nationalism encapsulates racism. In other words, racism is the lining of the cloak of nationalism which surrounds and defines the boundaries of England as an imagined community. The *observed centrality* of the idea of 'race' was revealed during political debate in Parliament. In the course of the emergency debate in the House of Common on 3 April 1982, Margaret Thatcher drew upon the idea of 'race' to sustain a sense of 'nation'

> The people of the Falkland Islands, like the people of the United Kingdom, are an island race. Their way of life is British; their allegiance is to the Crown. They are few in number but they have the right to live in peace, to choose their way of life, and to determine their own allegiance. Their way of life is British; their allegiance is to the Crown.[60]

This claim was repeated in an editorial in the *Times* two days later

> We are an island race, and the focus of attack is one of our islands, inhabited by islanders.[61]

Thus, the idea of 'race' continues to articulate with the idea of 'nation' in order to define Englishness/Britishness. The echo of racism that arises from this articulation is evident in Thatcher's positive reference to Britain's history as an imperial power in the aforementioned speech. As Rushdie has pointed out, British people of Caribbean and Asian origin are unlikely to have such a positive view of those 'sterling qualities' which Empire was reputed to have revealed.[62] Thus, the imagined community 'revealed' by the Falklands War was one which excluded ideologically those who had not been earlier excluded

physically because they arrived before the passage of racist immigration laws. Indeed, Margaret Thatcher had herself defined this Caribbean and Asian presence as a threat to Englishness/Britishness. In 1978, she had suggested

> And, you know, the British character has done so much for democracy, for law, and done so much throughout the world, that if there is a fear that it might be swamped, people are going to react and be rather hostile to those coming in.[63]

The Conservative government reinforced this notion of Englishness/Britishness which is shaped by the idea of 'race' in its British Nationality Act, 1981, an Act which brought nationality law into line with the racist categories constructed in earlier immigration law and immigration rules. Dixon claims

> The crucial irony of the 1981 Act is that it is designed to define a sense of belonging and nationhood which is itself a manifestation of the sense of racial superiority created along with the Empire, while simultaneously it cuts the ties of citizenship established in the same historical process. The ideology of Empire is reconstructed: while Thatcherism rejects the essential expansionism of Empire in favour of 'isolationism', its supremacism, chauvinism and racism are preserved.[64]

Thus, the ideas of 'race' and 'nation', as in a kaleidoscope, merge into one another in varying patterns, each simultaneously highlighting and obscuring the other.

This ideological articulation is neither a simple, mechanical reproduction of long-established ideas and images, nor homogeneous. Both nationalism and racism require a conscious and continuous reconstruction, giving 'old' ideas 'new' meanings. 'History' has to be renegotiated and resignified in order to create a sense of the past appropriate to the particular conjuncture and the political project for the future. Traditions are invented to create a sense of historical continuity.[65] This requires that events and material artifacts from the past are selected for attention and made relevant to the present and the future. In the case of English nationalism, the events selected include those which evince a sense of external threat over which 'the English people' triumph, events of war and imperialism.[66] The continually reconstructed sense of the English past, in which 'race' is an ever present reification, signifies the English 'nation' (and therefore 'race') as an ever-present collective subject, defining the criteria of inclusion around the ability to sustain pride in bloodshed and colonial exploitation. But, in order that these reconstructions resonate, they must articulate with contemporary experience.

The centrality of racism to English nationalism is revealed once this is understood. The post-1945 Caribbean and Asian presence in Britain can be posed as a previously external threat that is now 'within', so that the 'old order' is challenged, calling for the fighting of a new war because 'our' collective existence is threatened. Its prominent and desirable features are spotlighted by virtue of being transformed from being an eternal existence to having only a very temporary one. As Wright puts it, 'objects take on the aspect of heritage as they are endangered and the basic terms of their existence come into question'[67] and this applies equally to cultural forms such as marriage norms which are supposedly 'threatened' by 'their alien ways'.

A testimony to the historical specificity of this articulation in the case of England is found by considering the example of Scotland. Here, nationalism has a specific historical and cultural content and became a significant political force during the 1960s and 1970s. Its articulation with racism is therefore, in part, also specific to the particular historical circumstances of Scotland. Individual Scots and Scottish companies were prominent in British colonial history[68] and there is evidence to suggest that this involvement in Empire played a part in sustaining the reproduction of racism in Scotland. But if this is so, it is paradoxical that the post-1945 Asian migrants to Scotland have not been the object of a systematic and hostile political agitation as happened in England.

Part of the explanation for this lies in the fact that the particular political compromise constituted in the Act of Union of 1707 between England and Scotland ensured the reproduction of a distinct proto-state apparatus and national identity. In this context, the reproduction of nationalism in Scotland has tended to focus on the perceived economic and political disadvantages of the Union. Nationalism in Scotland during the 1960s and 1970s therefore identified an *external* cause of economic disadvantage/decline, without reference to 'race', while in England the idea of 'race' was employed to identify an *internal* cause of crisis, the presence of a 'coloured' population. Thus, in Scotland, the 'national question' has displaced (although not eliminated) the influence of racism in constructing the political agenda in this period, suggesting that racism is not as central to nationalism as in England.[69]

CONCLUSION

I draw three conclusions. First, the interrelationship between the ideologies of racism and nationalism is not one of polar opposition. It may be true, as Anderson observes, that the cultural products of nationalism tend to be evaluated with positive emotional responses while those of racism tend to contain more negative emotional

reactions. A love/hate dichotomy does seem to neatly overlay a nationalism/racism dichotomy. But such a simple dichotomy and overlap leaves out of account much that also requires explanation. As I have shown above, a theory of 'race' can sustain a positive evaluation of a population which is thereby considered to constitute a distinct 'nation'.

Additionally, certain varieties of fascist ideology which incorporate a racist theory of history have advanced a nationalist project which utilizes an idea of 'race' to project a positive 'historical destiny' as well as 'eternal contaminations'. This was most clear in the example of fascist ideology in Germany where a theory of 'race' was used first to define the criterion of positive inclusion. The imagined community of the German 'nation' was therefore identified by a positively evaluated signification of supposed 'racial' characteristics.[70] In this instance, 'race' was not an 'eternal contamination' grounded in negative emotion but was used to generate a positive sense of 'nation', from which emerged a process of exclusion which led finally to the physical extermination of those considered not to belong to the imagined community.[71] Indeed, the 'race' category and the ideology of racism can be ideal vehicles for positive assertions about historical destiny because they are grounded in arguments about alleged biological determinism: nothing sustains an idea of historical certainty better than a reference to biology.

Hence, second, the ideologies of racism and nationalism have formal characteristics which simultaneously overlap and contrast. Thus, both advance claims about a naturalistic division of the world's population into discrete and distinct groups which exist independently of class relations. But the ideology of nationalism, unlike that of racism, specifies a particular political objective (national self-determination) and therefore a blueprint for political organization on a world scale.

Third, an assessment of the interrelation between racism and nationalism is better achieved by means of historical analysis rather than by ahistorical, abstract determination. The example I have pursued has been chosen to demonstrate that the parameters of an imagined community can be specified and legitimated by racism. In other words, the ideologies of racism and nationalism can be interdependent and overlapping, the idea of 'race' serving simultaneously as a criterion of inclusion/exclusion so that the boundary of the claimed 'nation' is also equally a boundary of 'race'. In the case of English nationalism, given its historical genesis, this means that racism is one of its core components.

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NOTES

1. This is a revised and shortened version of a paper presented to a Conference on 'Marxist Perspectives on Ethnicity and Nationalism' organized by the International Sociological Association at the University of Belgrade on 2 and 3 September, 1985. The author acknowledges receipt of a grant from the British Academy which made it possible for him to attend the Conference

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3. T. Nairn, *The Break-up of Britain*, London, Verso, 1981; B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections of the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, London, Verso, 1983. For a recent critique of Nairn on different grounds, see J. Anderson, 'On Theories of Nationalism and the Size of States', *Antipode*, vol. 18, 1986, pp. 218–32.

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5. Anderson, *op. cit.*, p. 136.

6. Nairn, *op. cit.*, p. 233.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 276.

8. *Ibid.*, pp. 294–5.

9. See also G. Kitching, 'Nationalism: The Instrumental Passion', *Capital and Class*, no. 25, 1985, pp. 113–15.

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11. For example, see H. Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism: a study of its Origins and Background*, London, Macmillan, 1945, p. 6; Anderson, *op. cit.*, pp. 14–16.

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13. Anderson, *op. cit.*, pp. 15–16.

14. M. Banton, *The Idea of Race*, London, Tavistock, 1977, p. 47.

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16. See A. Phizacklea & R. Miles, *Labour and Racism*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980, p. 22.

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18. See P. D. Curtin, *The Image of Africa: British Ideas and British Action, 1780–1850*, London, Macmillan, 1965, p. 383; M. Biddiss (ed.), *Images of Race*, Leicester, Leicester University Press, 1979, pp. 11–31.

19. Kohn, *op. cit.*, p. 3. For an excellent account of the subsequent development of nationalism(s), see J. Anderson, 'Nationalism and Geography' in J. Anderson (ed.), *The Rise of the Modern State*, Brighton, Wheatsheaf, 1986.

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21. *Ibid.*, pp. 180–6.

22. Kohn, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

23. R. Knox, *The Races of Men: A Fragment*, London, Henry Renshaw, 1850, p. 2.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 56.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 6.

26. *Ibid.*, p. 378.

27. Reprinted in M. Biddiss (ed.), *Images of Race*, *op. cit.*, pp. 173–86.

28. In M. Biddiss (ed.), *Gobineau: Selected Political Writings*, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

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31. M. Banton, *op. cit.*

32. H. A. MacDougall, *Racial Myth in English History*, Montreal, Harvest House, 1982.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 49.

34. *Ibid.*, pp. 31–2, 56–62; M. Banton, *op. cit.*, pp. 16–18.

35. M. Banton, *op. cit.*, pp. 18–25; MacDougall, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

36. MacDougall, *op. cit.*, p. 94; also Hayes, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

37. *Ibid.*, pp. 129–30.

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39. Miles, *op. cit.*, pp. 95–120. See also R. Miles, *Anomaly or Necessity? Capitalism and Unfree Labour*, London, Tavistock, 1987.

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42. *Ibid.*, p. 273.
43. *Ibid.*, pp. 79–80, 294.
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47. *Ibid.*, p. 21.
48. For example, Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, *The Empire Strikes Back*, London, Hutchison, 1982.
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52. M. Billig, *Fascists: A Social Psychological View of the National Front*, London, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1978, pp. 138–52.
53. *Ibid.*, pp. 261–83.
54. See, for example, A. Dummett, *A Portrait of English Racism*, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1973; A. Phizacklea and R. Miles, 'Working Class Racist Beliefs in the Inner City', in R. Miles and A. Phizacklea (eds), *Racism and Political Action in Britain*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979.
55. F. Reeves, *British Racial Discourse*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983, pp. 172–203.
56. See R. Miles and A. Phizacklea, *White Man's Country: Racism in British Politics*, London, Pluto Press, 1984.
57. For example, see R. Miles, 'The Riots of 1958: The Ideological Construction of "Race Relations" as a Political Issue in Britain', *Immigrants and Minorities*, vol. 3, 1984, pp. 252–75; and 'Beyond the "Race" Concept: The Reproduction of Racism in England', Paper presented to a Conference organized by the Sydney Association for Studies in Society and Culture at the University of Sydney, 2–4 August, 1985.
58. S. Hall, 'The Great Moving Right Show', in S. Hall and M. Jacques (eds.), *The Politics of Thatcherism*, London, Lawrence & Wishart, 1983, p. 31.
59. Cited in A. Barnett, *Iron Britannia: Why Parliament Waged Its Falkland War*, London, Allison & Busby, 1982, p. 150.
60. Cited in A. Barnett, *op. cit.*, p. 30.
61. Cited in A. Barnett, *op. cit.*, p. 97.
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63. Cited in R. Miles and A. Phizacklea, *White Man's Country: Racism in British Politics, op. cit.*, p. 5.
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66. Wright, *op. cit.*, pp. 84, 179–80.
67. *Ibid.*, p. 95.
68. See H. Smailes, *Scottish Empire: Scots in Pursuit of Hope and Glory*, Edinburgh, HMSO, 1981; A. M. Cain, *The Cornchest for Scotland: Scots in India*, Edinburgh, National Library of Scotland, 1986; J. Calder (ed.), *The Enterprising Scot: Scottish Adventure and Achievement*, Edinburgh, HMSO, 1986.
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Kathleen E. Kiernan and Sandra M. Eldridge

Age at marriage: inter and intra cohort variation

ABSTRACT

During the course of the twentieth century there have been marked variations in marriage patterns. Up to the 1960s there was an increasing tendency for marriage to occur earlier and more frequently. Each successive cohort of women born between 1920 and 1940 married sooner than the preceding cohort. This trend culminated with the cohorts born in the 1940s, all of whom had remarkably similar age at marriage patterns, which were the youngest ever recorded, since civil registration began. From the life histories of one of these cohorts, born in 1946, a wide range of background characteristics were found to be associated with age at marriage. But, only three factors were found to be of direct importance namely, educational qualifications, occupation at marriage and mother's age at marriage. Subsequently there has been a dramatic reversal in marriage behaviour; young people are marrying less and marrying at later ages. The issue of whether this is due to a change in timing or rejection of marriage is addressed, the contribution of cohabitation to this change is assessed and structural and ideological changes are discussed.

INTRODUCTION

During this century marriage has never taken place so frequently or occurred at such early ages as in the 1960s. Over the last decade or so there has been a seemingly dramatic reversal in marriage patterns; young people are marrying less, and those who are marrying are doing so at later ages In the first part of this paper we look at variation in age at marriage for cohorts of women passing through nubile ages during the last three decades. Having depicted the variation in the timing of marriage between cohorts we then identify, for one cohort born in 1946, the characteristics which distinguished between women who marry at different ages. In the final section, we

consider changes that may account for the marriage patterns of recent cohorts being different from the generation who married in the 1960s.

INTER-COHORT VARIATION

For cohorts of men and women born since the beginning of this century, the Office of Population Censuses and Surveys (OPCS) tabulates from marriage registration data for England and Wales, the proportions of each cohort that have married by a particular birthday.[1] Table I shows some summary measures derived from these data and for the more recent cohorts, projected summary measures

TABLE I: *Marriages of female birth cohorts: actual and projected median and quartile ages at first marriage and proportion (‰) married by age 30*

Year of* birth	Lower quartile	Median	Upper quartile	Inter-quartile range	Proportion married by age 30
1921	20.9	23.4	27.2	6.3	819
1926	20.8	22.9	26.0	5.2	849
1931	20.5	22.3	24.9	4.4	889
1936	20.2	21.8	24.2	4.0	906
1941	19.8	21.5	24.0	4.2	907
1942	19.8	21.5	23.9	4.1	910
1943	19.8	21.5	23.9	4.1	911
1944	19.8	21.5	23.9	4.1	917
1945	19.7	21.4	23.8	4.1	918
1946	19.8	21.5	23.9	4.1	919
1947	19.8	21.5	23.9	4.1	914
1948	19.8	21.5	24.0	4.2	911
1949	19.7	21.5	24.1	4.4	910
1950	19.7	21.5	24.4	4.7	881
1951	19.6	21.4	24.4	4.8	885
1952	19.4	21.4	24.4	5.0	889
1953	19.4	21.5	24.4	5.6	867
1954	19.4	21.5	25.0	5.6	868
1955	19.4	21.6	25.0	5.6	869
1956	19.5	21.8	25.5	6.0	855
1957	19.7	22.1	26.1	6.4	840
1958	20.0	22.5	26.6	6.6	828
1959	20.2	22.7	26.8	6.6	823
1960	20.3	22.9	27.1	6.8	816
1961	20.4	22.9	27.3	6.9	814


Notes: Figures in the boxes are projections

* The year of birth indicated is an approximation; for example, the 1901 birth generation represents a group whose dates of birth range from 1 January 1900 to 13 December 1901.

Source: OPCS Marriage and Divorce Statistics Table 3.9

based on the assumption that marriage rates stabilize in 1980.[2] Let us consider the data for the 1940s cohorts. It is apparent that women born during the 1940s had remarkably similar marriage patterns. The ages by which 25 per cent of these cohorts were married varied between 19.7 and 19.9 years, the age by which one-half of these cohorts married (with one exception) was 21.5 years and the ages by which 75 per cent married varied between 23.8 and 24.1 years. Amongst this generation of women, those who remained single through their teenage years married rapidly on entering their twenties. Marriages were highly concentrated between the ages of 19 and 23, typically 60 per cent of this generation married at these ages and typically 91 per cent were married by age 30. The great majority of this generation married during the 1960s and their marriage patterns were the culmination of a long-term trend to younger marriage and a more concentrated age pattern of marriage; a trend that had been gradual over the course of the twentieth century up to the Second World War and gathered momentum thereafter.[3] We can see some of this development in the marriage patterns of the women born in the 1920s and 1930s. The summary measures given in Table I and the more detailed data from which they are derived show that each successive cohort born during the 1920s and 1930s married sooner than the preceding cohort. For the cohorts of women born in the 1920s and early 1930s the variation in marriage timing mainly reflected the changing behaviour of women who had tended to wait until at least their early twenties to marry. Women were increasingly marrying earlier on in their twenties. However, amongst those born from the mid 1930s onwards, there was an increased tendency for women to marry in their teens. This upsurge in teenage marriage which occurred in the mid to late 1950s, evoked much comment and concern at the time.[4]

In sharp contrast to the tranquility of the marriage behaviour of the 1940s generation, the behaviour of the cohorts born since 1950 has been more volatile. This is clearly illustrated in Figure Ia. In this figure we have mapped the absolute differences in the proportions of women married by a particular age for a number of cohorts born between 1951 and 1959 against the average marriage experience of women born from 1936 to 1949 inclusive. The average experience of these four cohorts has been used as a standard for the early age pattern of marriage that came to the fore in the 1960s. Women born in the early 1950s initially exhibited a tendency to marry slightly more frequently at young ages than the cohorts included in the standard. Greater proportions of these 1950s cohorts had married by age 20 or 21. At older ages, from the 1951 cohort on, the proportions married were below those in the standard and the decline in the proportions married was more abrupt in each successive cohort. For example, at age 20 the proportions of the 1951, 1953, and 1956 cohorts that had



Proportions ever married by exact ages: average of 1946–1949 birth cohort values

Age	‰ ever married
30	913
29	901
28	887
27	868
26	841
25	805
24	754
23	678
22	571
21	423
20	281
19	151
18	64
17	18

Source: OPCS Marriage and Divorce Statistics, 1980. Table 3.9

FIGURE 1: *Marriage of birth generations: proportion of women (per 1,000) ever married before attaining selected ages, expressed in terms of the absolute deviation from the 1946–1949 birth cohort average, England and Wales.*

married were 2, 4 and 2 percentage points respectively above our standard, but at age 24 the proportions were 3, 5 and 8 percentage points below the standard. The greater proportions of the women ever married at ages 19 to 21, found especially in the 1952 (not shown here) and in the 1958 cohorts was due to the lowering in 1970, of the age at which parental consent was required for marriage from 21 to 18 years.[5] It is noteworthy that amongst these early 1950s cohorts the greatest reaction to the prior pattern of early marriage was first seen amongst women who married at later ages and we will return to this point in the discussion.

Women born since the late 1950s have been tending to avoid marriage at young ages and beginning with the 1958 cohort, the proportions ever married has been below our standard at every age. For example, 57 per cent of the cohorts included in our standard were married by age 22 but only 44 per cent of the women born in 1958 were married by this age. (It may be a co-incidence but the 1958 cohort was the first cohort to be fully affected by the raising of the minimum school leaving age from 15 to 16 in 1973). The behaviour of the most recent cohorts indicates that there is a decreased propensity to marry at early ages and the trend appears to be continuing at a rapid pace with as yet little sign of slowing down. Even if the trend towards progressively lower marriage rates at young ages had ceased in 1980, Table I shows that the pattern of marriage for those born after the late 1950s would be substantially different from the pattern observed for the 1940s cohorts. Extrapolations based on the maintenance of the marriage rates operating in 1980 imply that, for example, the median age at marriage will rise from the relatively constant level of around 21.5 years found amongst the 1940s and early 1950s cohorts to almost 23 years for those born in 1961. The proportions of women married by age 30 among these more recent cohorts will be lower than the 91 per cent observed amongst the 1940s generation. Under our extrapolation of the 1980 rates, about 87 per cent of the mid 1950s cohorts are expected to be married by age 30[6] and much lower proportions of the late 1950s and early 1960s cohorts are likely to be married by this age, unless they start marrying at a rapid rate in their late 20s. The extrapolations imply that the proportion of the 1960 cohort that might be expected to be married by age 30 would be of the order of 82 per cent, nearly 10 percentage points lower than in the 1940s generation.

In Figure Ib the trend to an earlier pattern of marriage which culminated with the 1940s generation can be seen in the changing marriage patterns of the 1926, 1931 and 1936 cohorts. The remarkable differences in the marriage patterns of these three cohorts show the rapid changes that can occur when there is a shift in the timing of marriage. The figure also illustrates another pertinent point, namely that relatively large differences in the proportions married at younger

ages do not necessarily imply that the proportions ever married at older ages will be as large. For example, 31 per cent of the 1931 cohort were married by age 21 compared with 42 per cent in the late 1940s cohorts, yet the difference in the proportions married by age 30 was only 2 percentage points. The issue of whether the declining marriage rates observed amongst recent cohorts entering marriageable ages, those born in the 1950s and 1960s, is due to a shift in the timing of marriage or whether they are rejecting the institution of marriage will be discussed in the final section.

INTRA-COHORT VARIATION

As we have seen, the cohorts of women born during the 1940s had remarkably similar marriage patterns. However, entry into marriage is not an event which is equally probably for all members of the same cohort in the years following adolescence; selective processes tend to be at work. In this part of this study we identify, from the life-histories of a cohort of women born in 1946, the major characteristics which distinguish between women who marry at different ages.

Data The data come from the Medical Research Council's National Survey of Health and Development (NSHD) which is a longitudinal study of a sample of children born throughout Britain in the first week of March 1946. Included in the total sample of 5362 births were all single, legitimate births to wives of non-manual and agricultural workers and one in four of such births to manual workers. Since birth, these children have been studied at intervals of not less than two years up until the age of 26, since when they have been contacted at longer intervals, at ages 32 (modal age 31 years 9 months) and 36. The primary focus of the NSHD has been the individuals in the cohort, and the available information covers a wide range of subjects including medical, demographic, social, psychological and educational aspects of their life histories. Over the years there have been losses from the sample but, despite the difficulties of keeping track of the sample members, between 70 and 90 per cent of those alive and resident in Britain have provided information at each contact, although the same individuals were not always successfully contacted on every occasion. Further details on the survey can be found elsewhere.[7]

At all contacts made with the survey members since the late teens, marriage and fertility histories have been collected. This analysis uses information from the first 32 years and includes women whose age at marriage is known and those who were still single at the 32 year old contact. By age 32, 94 per cent of the women had married. Figure II shows the age distribution of marriages for the NSHD cohort sample




FIGURE II: *Proportions married by exact ages for women in the NSHD cohort and for women born in 1946 from national registration data for England and Wales*

and that generated by OPCS, from marriages registered in England and Wales by women born in 1946. Despite the substantial differences in the information used to produce these distributions, they are quite similar. At most ages the difference between the NSHD data and the OPCS data is less than one percentage point. The lower proportions married at younger ages in the NSHD cohort is to be expected given the middle-class bias of the sample. For example, 25 and 54 per cent of the NSHD cohort were married by their 20th and 22nd birthdays respectively as compared with 28 and 57 per cent in the OPCS cohort data; at exact age 24 the figures are closer being 76.5 per cent in the

NSHD and 75.9 in the OPCS data. By exact age 32, 6.6 per cent of the OPCS cohort were unmarried as compared with 5.7 per cent of the NSHD cohort. It would seem that the age pattern of marriage exhibited by the survey cohort, provides a reasonable approximation to the age pattern of marriage for the generation of women born in the 1940s.

Method The marriage distribution for the survey cohort could be readily divided into four age groups: teenage brides (25 per cent of the sample), those women who married at ages 20–21 (29 per cent of the sample), those who married at ages 22–23 (22 per cent of the sample) and those who married at ages between 24 and 32 (18 per cent of the sample). The remainder of the women were unmarried on their 32nd birthday.

Logistic regression was used to construct conditional models of probabilities of marrying at these ages. The model used was

$$\log_e \rho/ (1-\rho) = \beta_0 + \beta_1\chi_1 + \ldots + \beta_\kappa\chi_\kappa,$$

where ρ is the probability of marriage in a particular age group, given that the women had not married by the beginning of the age group and $\chi_1, \ldots, \chi_\kappa$ are a set of independent variables. These are treated as categorical factors in the regressions, and the coefficients are estimated separately for each level of a factor. This permits us to estimate the probability of marriage occurring for a particular set of independent factors net of the effect of other factors included in the models. The models were fitted by using the GLIM programme.[8]

A wide range of background characteristics were associated with age at marriage.[9] Exhaustive exploratory analyses demonstrated that age at marriage could be explained most efficiently, by a few important variables; mother's age at marriage, level of highest qualification attained and occupation at marriage. Other variables, namely parents' educational attainment, number of siblings, social class of origin, levels of ability and ambition, level of parental interest in their child's education, school leaving age and type of school (co-educational versus single-sex) did not make a significant contribution to explaining marriage timing, after controlling for the three influential variables. The effects of the other background factors were largely indirect.

Correlates of age at marriage Tables II and III show how the influential variables relate to age at marriage. We can see that women whose mothers married at young ages (under 21) married sooner and over a narrower range of ages than their contemporaries whose mothers had married at later ages. This suggests that there is some inter-generational transmission of values pertaining to marriage behaviour

TABLE II: *Percentages of women married by particular (exact) ages, and quartile ages at marriage by mother's age and education*

	Number of women	Proportion married by exact age				Quartile ages at marriage			
		20	22	24	31	lower quartile	median	upper quartile	inter-quartile range
Mother's age at marriage									
17 or younger	807	34.1	66.1	85.1	97.3	19.6	21.3	23.8	4.2
21–24	598	20.3	53.7	77.8	93.6	20.1	22.1	24.8	4.7
24 or older	577	16.5	43.2	67.5	90.8	21.0	23.2	28.6	7.6
Age at completing full-time education									
15 years	971	37.2	68.0	85.7	97.1	19.3	20.8	22.7	3.4
16 years	372	23.1	57.0	78.5	93.8	20.1	21.6	23.6	3.5
17 years	195	16.9	44.6	68.7	91.8	20.6	22.3	24.6	4.0
18 years	126	10.3	34.9	60.3	90.5	21.2	22.9	25.3	4.0
19 years or older	292	1.4	22.6	56.9	86.7	22.1	23.9	25.9	3.8
Highest qualification attained[1]									
None	656	42.5	73.4	87.7	96.4	19.1	20.5	22.4	3.3
Sub 'O' level	204	35.3	61.3	84.3	97.0	19.4	21.1	23.1	3.7
'O' level or equivalent	510	20.8	56.9	76.7	94.5	20.1	21.6	23.6	3.5
'A' level or equivalent	287	9.4	32.4	61.7	89.9	21.4	22.9	25.6	4.2
Higher non degree	180	1.7	25.6	68.9	93.3	22.0	23.1	24.5	2.6
Degree or above	92	0.4	18.9	41.7	78.7	22.4	24.4	27.8	5.3
All survey members	1981	25.3	54.4	76.5	94.2	20.0	21.7	23.8	3.8

[1] Includes academic and vocational qualifications. Examples of higher qualifications are HND (Higher National Diplomas), teacher training certificates and other non-degree professional qualifications.

in that the daughters of women who married at young ages are also more likely to marry at young ages.

Two assessments of educational attainment are included in Table II; age at completing full-time education and highest level of qualification attained. This latter variable includes academic and vocational qualifications which have been equivalenced according to Department of Education and Science guidelines[10] and combined into one hierarchical set. The two measures of educational attainment are highly correlated and of the two, level of highest qualification attained was a better predictor of marriage age than terminal age of education. But we include the latter in our descriptive analysis as it allows us to examine whether additional years spent in full-time education shift marriage age by a similar amount.

Fifty per cent of the women in the 1946 survey cohort left full-time education at age 15 (the minimum school leaving age for this cohort) and these women had the youngest age pattern of marriage; one-half of them were married before their 21st birthday and 90 per cent were married by age 25. Nearly 20 per cent of the women ceased being students at age 16 and although they married on average about one year later than the 15 year old leavers they entered marriage as rapidly. For example, one-quarter of the 15 and 16 year old leavers were married just over four years after leaving school and the inter-quartile range shows that fifty per cent of the women in these two groups married over a period of less than three and a half years. The women who left full-time education at ages 17 and 18 had similar marriage patterns, except the former group started to marry on average about half a year younger. For the women who left full-time education at ages 15 and 16 (70 per cent of the sample) there are indications that one additional year spent as a full-time student puts an additional year on marriage age. However amongst the women who completed their studies at older ages there are no such indications. The data on the contrary show that, at least up to the median age at marriage, the later the age at completing education the faster the pace of entry into marriage. The women who continued studying beyond age 18 are a heterogeneous group, mainly composed of women who went to specialized teacher training colleges and graduates. These two groups of women had quite distinct marriage patterns. This can be seen when the marriage patterns of women with higher qualifications and degrees are compared.

The majority of the former group are women with teacher training certificates who typically would have completed their training at age 21 years. Table II, shows that when they had completed their studies these women married at a very rapid rate, with 50 per cent of them marrying between the ages of 22 and 24 and a half years. Graduates, who are only 5 per cent of the sample, have a markedly different marriage pattern to the rest of the highly qualified women. As well as

starting to marry at older ages they also marry across a greater range of ages than other women. Amongst women with A level qualifications and below, the lower the level of qualification the younger the age pattern of marriage, with the group of women with no qualifications exhibiting the youngest age pattern and the fastest pace of entry into marriage.

We now consider the marriage patterns of women in different occupational groups. The women have been classified according to their occupation at about the time they married. Taking occupation at marriage itself was too restrictive in that women who were pregnant, students, or between jobs because they were moving to another area after marriage would be excluded. Thus women who were not working at marriage but had a job three months before marriage have been classified according to that occupation and students have been classified according to their first full-time occupation after marriage. This leaves a small group, 4 per cent of the sample, who were unable to work due to health reasons, or who were unemployed or were of independent means.

Women are largely concentrated within a narrow range of occupations. In this cohort sample, at or around marriage, 41 per cent were employed in office work, 17 per cent were working in factories, 19 per cent were in professional occupations, mainly nurses and teachers, and 13 per cent were in retail work; shop assistants and hairdressers. The residual occupation group includes a wide range of occupations such as canteen assistants, police-women and own-account workers.

Table III shows the marriage patterns of women in these different occupational groups. The two groups with the youngest age pattern of marriage were the factory workers and shop assistants. These two groups of women married very rapidly in their teens, over 40 per cent of these women had married by about their 20th birthday and over 90 per cent had married by age 24.

Two out of five of the women in this sample were office workers. There were indications that women employed as clerks or cashiers were more likely to marry in their teens than other office workers, and secretaries were the least likely of the office workers to have married in their teens. Clerks and cashiers were also more likely to marry more rapidly in their early twenties than the rest of the women in this occupational group.

It is to be expected that women in professional occupations would be unlikely to marry in their teens as during these years they will be involved in training, for example nurses or further education, for example teachers. Seventy four per cent of the women classified as professional workers were employed as nurses or teachers. Negligible proportions of women in professional occupations married in their teens but their patterns of marriage during their twenties show some

TABLE IV: *Parameter estimates for models of conditional probabilities of first marriage in three age groups*

Age group	16–19		20–21		22–23	
	parameter estimate	standard error	parameter estimate	standard error	parameter estimate	standard error
Constant	12	14	50	.18	1.40	.31
Mother's age at marriage						
15–20	0	–	0	–	0	–
21–23	−.32	.15	−.30	.15	−.26	.21
24–26	−.59	.16	−.30	.16		
27+					−.55	.21
Highest qualification obtained						
None	0	–				
Sub 'O' level	−.17	.20	0	–	0	–
'O' level	−.79	.18				
'A' level					.07	.22
Higher	−1.67	.27	−.30	.18	.52	.38
Degree					−.78	.43
Occupation						
Factory work	0	–	0	–	0	–
Shop assistant	−.06	.21	−.05	.26	−1.01	.41
Hairdresser	−.17	.32	−.56	.38	−.59	.59
Clerk/cashier	−.32	.21	−.25	.22	−.76	.35
Other office	−.37	.25	−.31	.26	−1.22	.39
Secretary	−.51	.24	−.25	.22	−1.06	.35
Nurse	−.95	.45	−.41	.34	−1.30	.43
Other professional	−1.48	.64	−1.31	.40	−1.32	.46
Teacher	−8.29	8.4	−.66	.31	−1.17	.50
Other occupation	−.57	.28	−.55	.30	−2.07	.45
N	1567		1175		699	
X^2	273.5		105.8		56.7	
degrees of freedom	14		15		14	

Note: The parameter estimates for each model can be interpreted as follows. For women in mother's age at marriage group, i, qualification group, j, and occupation group, k, with corresponding parameters b_i, b_j, and b_k, the probability of women in this group marrying (conditional on being unmarried at the beginning of the age group) can be calculated as:

$$\frac{e^{(\text{constant} + b_i + b_j + b_k)}}{1 + e^{(\text{constant} + b_i + b_j + b_k)}}$$

marked differences. Teachers marry very rapidly and as judged by the inter-quartile range have the fastest pace of entry into marriage of all occupational groups. One-half of the teachers married within the space of 2.9 years between the ages of 22 and 25 years. Nurses started to marry at an earlier age than the teachers and they also marry rapidly in their early twenties. By age 24 nearly two-thirds of nurses and teachers were already married. The women in the residual professional group have a more protracted age pattern of marriage than the other two groups.

The noticeable feature for most occupational groups is how the timing of marriage is compressed into a narrow range of years. Over one-half of the women marry within a period of less than four years

and the differences that emerge in the age pattern of marriage between occupational groups largely arise from some groups starting to marry sooner than other groups.

The multi-variate analysis which follows allows us to assess the importance of the individual factors; mothers' age at marriage, level of highest qualification and occupation at marriage, in determining the ages at which women marry, net of the effects of the other factors.

Multi-variate analysis of marriage probabilities We start by identifying the characteristics of women who are most likely to marry in their teens. Table IV shows that for this age group, level of qualification was the most important predictor. Estimated odds ratios show that women with no qualifications were twice as likely to marry in their teens as women with 'O' level or equivalent qualifications and five times more likely to marry than those with 'A' level or higher qualifications. Women with sub 'O' level qualifications had a similar probability to the unqualified group.

Given that 57 per cent of teenage brides had no qualifications, it is important to be able to discriminate amongst this group of young brides. There are clear differences in the risk of marriage for unqualified women in different occupational groups and according to the ages at which their mothers had married. For example, unqualified factory workers and shop assistants whose mothers married under age 21 have estimated probabilities of marrying in their teens of 0.53 whilst unqualified clerks whose mothers had married at young ages had an estimated probability of 0.45. Unqualified factory workers and clerks whose mothers had married at age 24 or older had lower probabilities, 0.38 and 0.31 respectively. The importance of qualifications can be assessed from the fact that clerks with 'O' level type qualifications whose mothers married at ages 24 and older had an estimated probability of marrying in their teens of 0.17. Also, unqualified secretaries and secretaries with 'O' level type qualifications whose mothers had married in the oldest age group had estimated probabilities of marrying in their teens of 0.27 and 0.15 respectively. A similar model (not shown here) was fitted in which age at completing full-time education replaced level of qualification. In this model 15 and 16 year old school-leavers had similar probabilities of marrying in their teens, net of the effects of the other factors, which implies that qualification level and not the additional year spent in full-time education reduces the risk of teenage marriage.

The model presented here distinguished clearly between women with differing risks of marrying in their teens. It is apparent that the risk of teenage marriage is enhanced amongst similarly qualified women who entered lower status jobs or whose mothers had married at younger ages. The range of risk depicted, amongst those with below

A-level qualifications, is considerable, for example, unqualified factory workers whose mothers had married at ages under 21 have 3.6 times the risk of marrying in their teens as a secretary with 'O' levels whose mothers married at age 24 or older.

Next we consider the attributes which influence marriage chances at ages 20–21. Twenty-nine per cent of the women married at these ages and the overall probability that single women would marry at these ages was 0.39. The results of the model fitting show that women with 'O' level qualifications were the most likely to marry but their risk of marriage was similar to those with no qualifications and sub 'O' level qualifications. All these three groups have been combined in the model shown in Table IV. Women with 'A' level or higher qualifications had similar probabilities of marrying and this group of highly qualified women were less likely to marry at ages 20–21 than their unqualified contemporaries. Women whose mothers had married at age 24 or older were also less likely to marry in this age group. Secretaries and office workers were less likely to marry than factory workers, shop assistants and other retail workers or clerical workers but they were more likely to marry than teachers or nurses, or women in the residual professional group who have the lowest risk of marrying at these ages. It seems that women who marry at ages 20–21 have more heterogeneous backgrounds than their peers who married in their teens; unqualified women in low status jobs who did not marry in their teens marry very rapidly at these ages, women with intermediate qualifications and/or employed in office work marry more frequently than they did in their teens and highly qualified women in professional occupations start to marry at these ages. This is highlighted when we compare the estimated probabilities for women with different background characteristics. Unqualified factory workers or shop assistants have an estimated probability of marrying of 0.55, whilst the estimated probabilities for secretaries and office workers with 'O' levels are 0.47 and 0.42 respectively and the equivalent probabilities for nurses, teachers and other professionals with advanced qualifications are 0.21, 0.24 and 0.14 respectively. In all these estimates mothers' age at marriage was taken to be 21–23 years. The estimated probabilities were 3 to 5 percentage points lower, if their mother had married at older ages, and 3 to 7 points higher if their mother had married at younger ages.

Women who were unmarried at age 22 had a high probability, 0.48, of marrying at ages 22 or 23. Thus nearly one-half of the eligible women married at these two ages. The parameter estimates from the fitted model show that the probability of marrying was reduced for women whose mothers had married at quite late ages, 27 or older. None of the educational level parameters were statistically reliable. But, there are indications that women with 'higher' level qualifications, who were predominantly women with teaching certificates, had a

greater probability of marrying than women with 'A' level or lower level qualifications, whilst graduates had the lowest probability of marrying at these ages. The interpretation is that highly qualified non-graduates marry rapidly at these ages.

The picture that emerges with respect to occupation is that office workers, including secretaries, and professional women (particularly teachers) have similar but lower risks of marrying than women in the other occupational groups. Over two-thirds of the women who married at ages 22–23 were women in office or professional occupations and these women have broadly similar risks of marrying, but the risk is less if they are graduates or if their mothers had married in their late twenties or later.

Of the women who were still single at age 24 (24 per cent of the sample) three quarters of them had married by age 31. The marriages were concentrated at the younger end of this age range with sixty per cent of the women marrying at ages 24 and 25. There was a noticeable homogeneity in the probabilities of women with different background characteristics marrying across the age range 24 to 31, as well as earlier or later within this age range. Not surprisingly the models for this age group failed to distinguish between women who were more or less likely to marry at these ages and the fitted models were statistically unreliable and are not shown here.

Overview There can be little doubt that the factors underlying the timing of marriage are complex. The simple socio-economic models presented here, given sample size constraints, were relatively successful in explaining variation in the timing of marriage, particularly at younger ages. The effects of background factors and explained variance declined with increasing age at marriage. This may be due to decisions about employment, career advancement, training and further education and life-style considerations being more likely to affect marriage choices at younger than older ages. Amongst this cohort of women the chances of marrying appear to decrease with increases in the availability and attractiveness of alternatives to the married state up to a certain point when what might be described as a 'lemming effect' takes over. At this point eligible women plunge into marriage very rapidly. The age at which this point occurs appears to vary amongst different groups of women. For example, it is younger for unqualified factory workers and later for office-workers with low-level qualifications and later still for highly qualified women in professional occupations. What may be perceived as relatively late marriage for one group may be regarded as relatively early for another. Such perceptions and values regarding the timing of marriage are likely to be related to the frequency with which marriage occurs amongst one's peer group as well as parental values concerning the timing of marriage. We were unable to measure peer-group effects

but our analysis clearly showed the importance of mothers age at marriage in the timing of daughters' marriages.

DISCUSSION

The timing of marriage amongst the generation of women born in the 1940s was narrowly bounded. This was so for the total population, and as portrayed in our analysis of the 1946 cohort, for subgroups within the population. Women with different backgrounds started to marry at different ages but they generally married at a rapid pace which suggests that during the 1960s when the majority of the 1940s generation married, there were strong societal norms governing the timing of marriage. Marriage was seemingly inevitable and young women were expected to have married by their early twenties. Since the beginning of the 1970s, there have been dramatic declines in marriage propensity, particularly at ages under 25. Such declines raise two important questions. Firstly, why have young people born in the 1950s and early 1960s been marrying less at younger ages and secondly, will they marry in the future?

If the proportion who will ultimately marry is declining significantly, then there should be some evidence of a major change in attitudes towards marrying. The evidence to date suggests that the vast majority (around 90 per cent) of young single people still expect to marry[11] and the very limited evidence from recent surveys, albeit small scale and localized,[12] suggests that the vast majority of young people do not see cohabitation as a permanent alternative to marriage. But these same small-scale studies also show that over one-half of the young respondents thought it was a good idea to live together before marriage – as a trial run.

Evidence from the General Household Survey shows that throughout the 1970s the proportion of couples who lived together before first marriage increased. Only 7 per cent of couples who married in the early 1970s (1971–3) had cohabited before marriage but 19 per cent of those marrying in the late 1970s (1977–9) had done so. Moreover, the length of time spent cohabiting was relatively short (median = 10 months for the latter group).[13] During the 1970s cohabitation amongst young single people was largely a childfree, relatively short-lived, transitional form of behaviour preceding marriage. It is possible that, as it becomes a more common practice that more young people might decide to cohabit for longer and a minority may choose to never formalize their union. If either pre-marital cohabitation becomes more popular or the duration of pre-marital cohabitation lengthens, then marriage rates at young ages will exhibit further declines.[14]

In another study[15] which addressed the issue of whether declining marriage in the 1970s was due to postponement or rejection of

marriage we fitted various mathematical models in an attempt at separating out the timing and quantity elements in marriage behaviour. The results were not entirely conclusive but there were strong indications that much of the change during the 1970s arose from timing changes. Substantial proportions of young men and women were delaying marriage but married very rapidly after the delay. Similar models fitted to French and Swedish data had identified a constant proportion of people who were not marrying at all but we failed to identify such a group for this country.

If pre-marital cohabitation prolongs the period from meeting to the nuptial ceremony, then an increase in cohabitation would lead to a delay in marriage. This is probably one of the factors that has affected the timing of marriage during the 1970s. However the incidence of cohabitation is insufficient to account for the reduction, observed over the 1970s, in the proportions married at young ages. For example, in 1980, 49 per cent of women aged 20–24 had ever-married compared with 59 per cent in 1973. Estimates from the 1980 General Household Survey show that about 5 per cent of women aged 20–24 in that year were single and cohabiting. No comparable estimate is available for 1973. If no single women aged 20–24 were cohabiting in 1973 then the increase in the proportion of single women cohabiting over the period 1973 to 1980 would account for 50 per cent of the reduction in the proportions ever married over this period. It is unlikely that no single women in this age group were cohabiting in 1973, so this is an upper estimate of the effect of changes in cohabitation.

Cohabitation is a new element in the contemporary courtship ritual and an obvious pre-condition for the emergence of cohabitation was the increased practice and greater acceptability of pre-marital sex. Nowadays pre-marital sex is virtually universally practised and is no longer the stuff of media discussions or political debate as it was in the late 1960s – when pre-marital intercourse rates began to rise and there was a good deal of controversy over whether oral contraceptives should be made freely available to single women. During the latter half of the 1960s the pill was increasingly used by married women but it was not until the first half of the 1970s that it was used extensively by single women.[16] The provision of effective contraceptive methods, including legal abortion, liberated pre-marital coitus from its previously strong connections with marriage and procreation. As well as changing sexual mores and the emergence of cohabitation other structural and ideological changes may have impeded the continuation of the 1960s marriage pattern.

Since the 1940s cohorts passed through the educational system, there have been some major changes and developments which may have implications for the marriage behaviour of later cohorts. Young people stay on at school longer, the minimum school-leaving age has been raised to 16, the sex difference in the proportions who continue

in full-time education has largely disappeared, more young people now leave school with formal qualifications, largely as a result of the introduction of the Certificate of Secondary Education in 1965, and more women obtain degree-level qualifications. Some of these changes can be seen in Table V. Here we compare the distribution of

TABLE V: *Distribution of highest qualifications attained amongst women born in 1946 and 1958*

Level of highest qualification	Year of birth 1946 %	1958 %
None	34.0	16.0
Sub 'O' level	10.6	17.8
'O' level or equivalent	26.4	37.0
'A' level or equivalent	14.9	16.0
Higher non-degree	9.3	4.0
Degree or above	4.8	9.2
Total	100.0	100.0

Source: 1946 MRC: National Survey of Health and Development and 1958: National Child Development Study

qualifications for women in the 1946 cohort study with the nearest analogous distribution for women in the 1958 cohort study (National Child Development Study).[17] Over 80 per cent of the women in the 1958 cohort had some form of qualification, as compared with 66 per cent of the women in the 1946 cohort. Most of the change has apparently occurred at the lower end of the spectrum; O-level and equivalents and below. The proportions of women with A-level or equivalent qualifications and above are virtually identical in the two cohorts, 29 per cent in both cases, but more of the later-born cohort had proceeded beyond A-levels and a greater proportion possessed degree-level qualifications. Some of this increase in the proportions with degrees is due to the introduction of the Bachelor of Education degree, which has largely replaced the teacher training certificate.

Important changes have occurred in the labour market. Women's working lives are lengthening as attitudes to taking paid employment outside the home have changed and the period during which they are responsible for young children has lessened. These changes involve some reassessment of the roles, opportunities and responsibilities of men and women. Young women nowadays are less likely than earlier generations to view marriage and parenthood and employment outside the home as mutually exclusive. Their labour market and educational experiences as young adults may increasingly have as important implications for their future employment opportunities and

levels of remuneration, as it has for men. The prevailing ideology seems to encourage young women to seek the economic independence equivalent to that normally previously achieved by men.

In our analysis, level of qualification and occupational status were very important in distinguishing between women who married at different ages. It remains to be seen whether, at the individual level, these factors continue to discriminate in more recent cohorts between women who marry at different ages, particularly at younger ages; and at the aggregate level, whether changing educational opportunities and the espoused changes in occupational opportunities have had an impact on the age pattern of marriage. As more women obtain qualifications, and a wider range of qualifications, and enter, to a greater extent than hitherto, a wider range of occupations, qualification level and occupational status may become more powerful discriminators. On the other hand, if similarly qualified women and those in the same occupation choose to marry over a wider range of ages than in the past, its impact may be diluted.

We may recollect from our analysis of inter-cohort change that the greatest reaction to the previous pattern of early marriage was initially observed amongst women who had postponed marrying until their twenties. Several of the elements outlined here as being conducive to delayed marriage are more likely to have had a greater impact on older women than those prone to marry in their teens. Unemployment is the element most likely to make an impact on teenage marriage and it is noteworthy that teenage rates, unlike those at later ages, have exhibited further dramatic declines in the 1980s.

The generation of women born in the 1940s have the youngest age pattern of marriage ever recorded, since civil registration began in 1837, and have the highest proportions ever married of all cohorts born so far this century. Given changed sexual mores and patterns of union formation and the structural and ideological changes that have occurred over the recent past, it is unlikely that we will see a return to this pattern of marriage behaviour, at least in the foreseeable future.

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NOTES

We are indebted to Dr Michael Wadsworth, Director of the Medical Research Council's National Survey of Health and Development, for permission to use these data and to the Economic and Social Research Council for funding this project. The Centre for Population Studies is a Designated Research Centre of the ESRC.

1. Office of Population Censuses and Surveys, *Marriage and divorce statistics*, Series FM2, No 7, 1980. London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office 1982, Table 3.9.

2. The marriage rates of 1980 were used rather than later rates, as the rates post 1980 are not directly comparable with earlier rates. The denominators for the marriage rates, that is the population of single people of a given age, for 1981 onwards are greater than they were previously. This arises because the 1981 census, on which the estimates are based, included people both resident in the country and those temporarily abroad, whilst previous estimates were based on a definition of the population that only included people who were actually resident on census night. Thus part of the decline in marriage rates between 1980 and 1981 is due to definitional changes.

3. J. Hajnal, 'Aspects of recent trends in marriage in England and Wales', *Population Studies*, vol. I, no. 1, 1947, pp. 72–98. S. M. Farid, 'Cohort Nuptiality in England and Wales', *Population Studies*, vol. 30, no. 1, 1976, pp. 127–51.

4. R. M. Pierce, 'Marriage in the Fifties', *Sociological Review*, vol. 11, no. 2, 1963, pp. 215–40.

5. K. E. Kiernan and S. M. Eldridge, *A demographic analysis of first marriages in England and Wales: 1950–1980*. Centre for Population Studies Research Paper 85–1, 1985, pp. 47–8.

6. Recent data, as yet unpublished, from marriage registration statistics show that 86 per cent of the 1954 cohort were married by age 30, which corresponds closely with the projected figure.

7. Further details on this longitudinal study can be found in J. W. B. Douglas, *The Home and the School*, London, McGibbon & Kee, 1964; J. W. B. Douglas, 'The use and abuse of national cohorts', in M. Shipman, *The Organisation and Impact of Social Research*, chap 1., London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976; and in E. Atkins, N. Cherry, J. W. B. Douglas, K. E. Kiernan and M. E. J. Wadsworth, 'The 1946 British birth cohort: an account of the origins progress and results of the National Survey of Health and Development': in J. A. Mednick and A. E. Baert, *An Empirical Basis for Primary Prevention: Prospective Longitudinal Research in Europe*, London, Oxford University Press, 1981.

8. R. J. Baker and J. A. Nelder, *The GLIM System*, Oxford, Numerical Algorithms Group, 1978.

9. K. E. Kiernan, 'Teenage marriage and marital breakdown', *Population Studies*, vol. 40, no. 1, 1986, pp. 35–54.

10. Department of Education and Science, *Burnham Further Education Committee: Grading of Courses*, London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1971.

11. For example, never-married members of the 1958 birth cohort study when they were contacted at age 23 (in 1982) were asked 'Do you ever want to get married in the future?'. If the expectations of those who gave a positive response to this question are fulfilled, and taking into account the proportions already married, then the ultimate proportions of men and women marrying would be 88 and 92 per cent respectively. K. E. Kiernan, 'Transitions in Young Adulthood'. Paper presented at the British Society for Population Studies Conference on *Population Research in Britain*, University of East Anglia, September, 1986. National Child Development Study, Users Support Group, Working Paper, No. 16.

12. C. Guy, *Asking about Marriage*, Rugby, National Marriage Guidance Council, 1983.

13. A. Brown and K. E. Kiernan, 'Cohabitation in Great Britain: evidence from the General Household Survey'. *Population Trends*, no. 25, 1981, pp. 4–10.

14. General Household Survey data

for the 1980s suggests that the incidence of cohabitation amongst single women and the prevalence and duration of premarital cohabiting unions is increasing, OPCS, *General Household Survey 1983*, ch. 4, HMSO, 1985. Childbearing within cohabiting unions may also be emerging as an important dimension of family behaviour. For example, the proportion of first births born illegitimate has increased significantly during the 1980s from 17 per cent in 1980 to 28 per cent in 1985. See B. Werner, 'Trends in first, second, third and later births'. *Population Trends*, no. 45, 1986, pp. 26–33. Also new data from birth registration statistics show that 47 per cent of all illegitimate births in 1985 were registered by parents living at the same address. OPCS, *Birth Statistics 1985*, HMSO, 1986, Tables 3.9 and 3.10.

15. S. M. Eldridge and K. E. Kiernan, 'Declining first-marriage rates in England and Wales: a change in timing or a rejection of marriage?', *European Journal of Population*, Vol. 1, no. 4, 1985, pp. 327–45.

16. For evidence on trends in premarital sex and contraceptive use see: M. Bone, *Family Planning in Scotland in 1982*, Office of Population Censuses and Surveys, London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1985, ch. 9, p. 46.

17. R. Ives, *Education 16–23*, National Child Development Study, Working Paper, no. 37, 1984, Table 12.

Bernadette C. Hayes

Female intergenerational occupational mobility within Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland: the importance of maternal occupational status*

ABSTRACT

Previous research on social mobility in both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland has confined itself exclusively to the linkages between male occupational origins and destinations. In this paper, three unique aspects of the Irish occupational mobility experience is investigated. First, the question of women's intergenerational occupational mobility is considered for the first time. Second, as in some recent North American research, traditional models of male intergenerational occupational mobility are modified to allow only the occupational achievement of mothers in the portrayal of a woman's occupational origins. Third, the occupational category of housewife is included as one possible occupational outcome for Irish women. The general conclusion of this paper is that not only does a mother's occupational attainments more realistically display the influence of occupational origins on women's subsequent occupational activities, but one vital component of this influence must be the occupational category of housewife. Only via the introduction of both these elements may the notably ascriptive nature of both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland in relation to female occupational mobility become understandable.

The question of women's intergenerational occupational mobility has recently begun to command the attention of sociologists. Since the 1970s a growing body of literature continues to be devoted to this issue. However, until now no such research has been undertaken in either Northern Ireland or the Republic of Ireland. It is to this research need that this present paper addresses itself.

With an increasing interest in the question of female intergenerational occupational mobility, the methodological and theoretical validity of past research has come under serious question in recent years. As all

these previous studies have defined women's intergenerational mobility in much the same way as that of a man, movement from father's to respondent's occupational category, these male models have been found to be disregarding factors relevant to women's intergenerational occupational mobility, specifically the influence of mother's occupation (Rosenfeld, 1978; Stevens and Boyd, 1980; Pearson, 1983; Marini, 1980). For example, Rosenfeld (1978) found that mother's occupation was a significant dimension of women's intergenerational occupational mobility. In fact, in those cases where the mother had been employed when the daughter was fifteen years old, the effect of mother's occupation was relatively more important than that of the father in predicting a daughter's occupational inheritance. However, regardless of whether or not the mother worked outside the home and what occupation she held, given that she was employed, the former was found to affect the daughter's location in the labour force.

Pearson (1983), comparing national U.S. samples of white and black families, reported that for both races mother's occupational status was associated with a daughter's destination. Moreover, the

> influence of mothers on daughters generally exceeded the influence of fathers on daughters and fathers on daughter's spouses; and in the case of blacks, it clearly exceeded the influence of even fathers on sons (Pearson, 1983: 213).

Similarly Stevens and Boyd (1980), using data from the Canadian National Mobility Study of 1973, found that a daughter's occupational activity was significantly affected by her mother's occupation, even in the case of housework. In fact, when the father-daughter association was controlled for, mother's occupation retained an influence on the daughter's occupation. Not only did they find that women whose mothers worked are themselves more likely to join the labour force, but their occupations are likely to resemble their mothers.

Previous research, although not simultaneously comparative, on the effect of a number of parental status characteristics on the occupational status of men and women seems to provide further evidence for the inclusion of mother's characteristics, especially in female occupational mobility models. There is some suggestion in these earlier research studies that each parent's status may have a greater effect on children of the same gender than on children of the opposite gender (Marini, 1980). For example, father's occupational status has been shown to have a somewhat greater effect on the occupational status of sons than of daughters (Treiman and Terrell, 1975; Featherman and Hauser, 1976). The importance of gender as an influence on occupational behaviour is more likely to cause mothers to be more salient role models for their daughters than sons, and fathers to be more salient role models for their sons than

daughters. Hence, when the effects of parental status characteristics are compared for the two genders, the educational and occupational attainment of fathers are more likely to have greater effects on the occupational status of sons than daughters, and the educational and occupational attainment of mothers are more likely to have greater effects on the occupational status of daughters than sons (Marini, 1980).

DATA AND MEASURES

The data used here are from the large-scale national mobility study in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland in 1973 and 1974. The Irish Mobility Study was a survey of 2,416 Northern Ireland and 2,229 Republic of Ireland respondents. An almost identical research design and implementation was used for both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. This consistency in data collection not only allows each of the Irish samples to be analysed independently, but an additional combined all-Ireland dimension may be implemented (Jackson, 1975). Although women were not included in the main sample, the target population being limited to males aged eighteen to sixty four years (Miller, 1978), this lack of direct data coverage is compensated for by the extensive amount of information gathered on female household and family members (Jackson, 1975). This information included material on the occupational life history, educational qualifications, marital status and age of the male respondents' female relatives i.e. sisters, wives, mothers, mothers-in-law, grandmothers and daughters. Although this female sample was not collected as a directly representative sample, given both the large sample size and the representative nature of the male sample, for wives of our male respondents, sample representation is not considered a major problem (Hayes, 1985). However, all findings should be interpreted with this methodological weakness in mind.

This paper will present a series of log-linear models predicting the exchange intergenerational occupational mobility experiences of Irish wives, devoid of the influence of structural factors, as represented by differences in the marginal distributions of occupations. For these log-linear models, female intergenerational occupational mobility is operationalized in terms of a mother's occupational status versus the occupational status of her daughter. Thus, the primary subsample of reference is that of wives' occupational and educational achievement, henceforth referred to as daughters, as affected by their mother's background characteristics. The former was chosen because of the availability of parental data for this particular subgroup. However, given the absence of a direct response rate for these parental and female offspring measures, the interviewed respondents being the

daughter's husbands, interpretation of the results should be undertaken with this caveat in mind. Whereas all the analysis for Northern Ireland was carried out to detect differences through time or religious affiliation, only time differences were investigated for the Republic of Ireland.

Throughout this investigation, the Modified Hall-Jones was introduced to define the occupational groupings of both mothers and daughters of our Northern and Southern Irish sample. This is a prestige derivative (Miller, 1978) eight category scale. However, because of the importance of agricultural production in Ireland, this scale differs from the usually employed Hall-Jones scale in that the social status of farmers is not retained as a separate category, Rather,

> farmers were allocated positions on the status hierarchy in the same way as other occupations; and in any given case a farmer's status dependent not merely on his occupation, in a restricted sense, but also upon the size of his farm and the number of employees, if he had any (Hutchinson, 1969: 4).

Although originally an eight category scale, because of sample size considerations, the categories were regrouped as follows: (1) professionally qualified, high administrative, managerial and executive; (2) inspectional, supervisory and other nonmanual of both higher and lower grade; (3) routine grade nonmanual; (4) skilled manual; (5) semi-skilled and unskilled manual. Furthermore, an additional distinction, the category labelled housewife, was also included to represent the sixth category or the lowest occupational status grouping. This low occupational status placement of housewives was believed justified both on the basis of their direct non-involvement in paid occupational activity and the absence of any previous Irish research as to a more appropriate placement (Hayes, 1985). It is important to note however, as the statistical analysis did not necessitate an ordinal level of measurement, the interpretation of these results on the basis of a ranking procedure was based solely on the judgement of the researcher. However, given the problematic nature of the placement of the housewife category within this prestige scale, all interpretation of the results have to be undertaken with this unavoidable constraint in mind.

As in the case of the Modified Hall-Jones, the sample size also necessitated recoding of the age variable. To allow a synthetic cohort approach, the following three category scheme was introduced: (1) 18 to 34 years; (2) 35 to 50 years; (4) 51 to 65 years. Both the zero to 17 and the 66 to 98 year old age groups were eliminated. Finally, only in the case of Northern Ireland, given the believed importance of religious affiliation as a primary distinguishing variable (Osborne and Cormack, 1983), was religious affiliation included as an additional

measure. All other categories were treated as missing. In contrast, for the Republic of Ireland, all respondents were of Roman Catholic faith.

RESULTS

Female occupational mobility within Northern Ireland: a mother-daughter comparison Focusing initially on a Northern Ireland mother-daughter occupational comparison, Table Ia presents a series of log-linear models to account for this phenomenon. The baseline model, denoted as Model 1 in the table, is the main effects model. It allows only the marginal distributions to deviate from flat distributions. All other associations are considered zero. This model serves as the yardstick against which the subsequent fit of other more realistic models is compared. In Model 2, a mother-daughter occupational interaction is added and a substantially better fit is obtained. Moreover, for this model we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the chi-square value is zero, i.e. it fits quite well. However, 40.73 per cent of the baseline chi-square continues to remain unexplained, suggesting the need for the inclusion of further two-way or three-way interactions.

TABLE IA: *Log-Linear models of the relationship between daughter's occupational status and mother's occupational status by age cohort and religious affiliation, Northern Ireland female sample, 1973–1974. (N = 1,529)*

Model	LRX^2	d.f.	prob.	LRX^2j/LRX^2i
1. [D] [M] [A] [R]	427.[illegible]	202	.000	100.00
2. [DM] [A] [R]	174. [illegible]	177	.546	40.73
3. [DM] [DA] [DR] [MA] [MR]	98.[illegible]	147	.999	23.08
4. [DMR] [A]	85.[illegible]	122	.995	20.05
5. [DMA] [R]	60.[illegible]	97	.998	14.21
6. [DMA] [DMR]	47.32	72	.987	11.18
7. Model 3 vs model 2	75.[illegible]	30	.000	17.65

Note. Symbols are used as follows:
D = daughter's present occupational status;
M = mother's present occupational status;
A = age cohort;
R = religious affiliation.

Model 3 includes all possible two-way interaction effects, with both mother's and daughter's occupational status being allowed to vary between each other and across age levels and religious affiliations. As Table Ia indicates, this model was found not only to substantially improve the degree of fit, leaving a sizeably reduced 23.08 per cent of the baseline chi-square unexplained, but also manifested a probability

level of .999. More importantly however, as Model 7 indicates, this improvement in fit was significant and resulted in an increase in fit beyond the baseline model of 17.65 per cent.

In contrast, although Model 4 was also found to decrease the amount of unexplained baseline chi-square to 20.05 per cent, this improvement in fit was not significant. Similarly, for Model 5, despite a further improvement in fit, the unexplained baseline chi-square dropping to 14.21 per cent, again no statistically significant improvement in fit emerged. Finally, when two three-way interactions were introduced, as in Model 6, again an improvement in fit occurred, with the remaining unexplained chi-square value decreasing to 11.18 per cent. However, as in the case of the two previous models, this improvement in fit was not a statistically significant result. Thus it may be concluded that the best fitting model to explain a mother-daughter comparative occupational mobility is that of Model 3. In it the relationship between daughter's and mother's occupational status is homogeneous across both age levels and religious affiliation. Given this result, Table Ib represents parameter estimates (lambdas) for the mother-daughter occupational interaction effects of Model 3.

The parameter estimates for mother's occupational status in relation to daughter's occupational status are the interaction effects on the log odds of daughters entering the occupational categories of their mothers. Whereas a positive sign indicates a definite tendency for daughters to enter the occupations of their mothers, a negative sign has the opposite interpretation. Thus, as Table Ib demonstrates, daughters whose mothers were either professional/managerial, routine nonmanual, skilled manual, semi-skilled/unskilled manual workers or housewives, not only demonstrated a marked propensity to occupy the same occupational status as that of their mothers, but this inheritance of maternal occupational status was statistically significant at the .01 level. In fact, occupational inheritance emerged as the primary norm. Furthermore, a similar positive effect is seen for the inspectional/supervisory nonmanual category. In this instance, the log odds effect of daughters obtaining an identical occupational status position to that of their mothers was significant at the .05 level.

In contrast to these results, mother's occupational status also demonstrated a significant negative effect on the various occupational attainment levels of daughters. For example, unlike professional/managerial, inspectional/supervisory and routine nonmanual mothers who were found to positively affect a professional/managerial work status among their female offspring, the maternal occupational status of either semi-skilled women or mothers who were housewives, significantly negatively affected the chances of their female offspring in attaining a professional/managerial status. Thus, lower status occupational positions of mothers were found to significantly handicap the attainment of a professional/managerial career among their

TABLE IB: *Effects (λ's) of mother's occupational status on the log odds of daughter's occupational status, Northern Ireland female sample, 1973–1974*

	Daughter's occupational status					
	Professional/ managerial	Inspectional/ supervisory non-manual	Routine non-manual	Skilled manual	Semi-skilled/ unskilled manual	Housewife
Mother's occupational status						
Professional/ managerial	1.276*	−0.188	−0.379	0.124	−0.510	−0.324
Inspectional/ supervisory non-manual	0.255	0.405*	0.089	−0.063	−0.379	−0.259
Routine non-manual	0.633*	0.233	0.400*	−0.578	−0.607*	−0.082
Skilled manual	−0.326	−0.118	−0.179	0.589*	0.353*	−0.318
Semi-skilled/ unskilled manual	−0.888*	−0.233	0.131	0.263	0.937*	−0.210
Housewife	−0.951*	−0.099	−0.112	−0.353*	0.205	1.192*

* Coefficients significant at the .01 and .05 level

daughters. Similarly for semi-skilled/unskilled manual daughters, having a routine non-manual mother seriously undermined their chances of being employed in this former manual occupational position. However, for a skilled manual daughter, it was the maternal occupational status of housewife which significantly hampered her chances of obtaining a skilled manual occupational position.

Female occupational mobility within the Republic of Ireland: a mother-daughter comparison Turning to the question of the Republic of Ireland, as Table IIa illustrates, again a series of log-linear models were introduced to investigate mother-daughter occupational mobility. However, in contrast to Northern Ireland, only Roman Catholics were considered. The baseline model, denoted as Model 1 in the table, is the main effects model. As for Northern Ireland, it permits only

marginal distribution variations, with all other associations being considered zero. This model serves as the baseline model against which the fit of all subsequent models is compared. For Model 2 a mother-daughter interaction was added which resulted in a sizeably better fit, with only 16.17 per cent of the baseline chi-square remaining unexplained. Furthermore, as in the case of Northern Ireland, this model also resulted in a failure to reject the null hypothesis that the chi-square was zero.

TABLE IIA: *Log-Linear models of the relationship between daughter's occupational status and mother's occupational status by age cohort, Republic of Ireland female sample, 1973–1974 (N = 1,115)*

Model	LRX^2	d.f.	prob.	LRX^2j/LRX^2i
1. [D] [M] [A]	468.34	95	.000	100.00
2. [DM] [A]	75.74	70	.299	16.17
3. [DM] [DA] [MA]	28.00	50	.995	5.98
4. Model 3 vs. model 2	47.74	20	.000	10.19

Note: Symbols are used as follows:
D = daughter's present occupational status
M = mother's present occupational status
A = age cohort

When all two-way interactions were added, as Model 3 demonstrates, not only did the improvement to fit increase, only 5.98 per cent of the baseline chi-square remaining unexplained, but this model manifested a probability level of .995. Moreover, more importantly, this improvement in fit was not only statistically significant, but as Model 4 demonstrates, resulted in a 10.19 per cent improvement in fit beyond the baseline model. Thus, the best fitting model to account for this female comparison of occupational mobility must be viewed as Model 3. Consequently, as in Northern Ireland, the relationship between daughter's and mother's occupational status remains homogeneous across age levels. Given this finding, Table Ib presents the parameter estimates for the exclusive mother-daughter occupational interaction effects of Model 3.

Focusing initially on the diagonal, as Table IIb depicts, mother's occupational inheritance also emerges as the primary pattern for daughters within the Republic of Ireland. Furthermore, with the exception of mothers in the inspectional/supervisory nonmanual and skilled manual occupations, each of these maternal occupational inheritance categories for daughters were statistically significant at the .01 level. Thus, for these daughters the log odds of occupying these various occupational categories are significantly greater if their mothers were also identically employed. In contrast to Northern Ireland, the only two negatively significant maternal effects to emerge

in relation to daughters occupational status was the maternal semi-skilled/unskilled manual and the housewife occupational status category. That is, mothers who were either housewives or semi-skilled/unskilled manual workers significantly reduced the chances of attaining either a respective skilled manual or a housewife position for their female offspring.

CONCLUSION

In agreement with the earlier presented literature review on female intergenerational mobility, as in North America, mother's occupational status emerged as a decisive determining factor in relation to the occupational status attainment of their female offspring. Not only

TABLE IIB: *Effects (λ's) of mother's occupational status on the log odds of daughter's occupational status Republic of Ireland female sample, 1973–1974*

	Daughter's occupational status					
	Professional/ managerial	Inspectional/ supervisory non-manual	Routine non-manual	Skilled manual	Semi-skilled/ unskilled manual	Housewife
Mother's occupational status						
Professional/ managerial	1.391*	0.097	−0.957	0.833	−0.591	−0.803
Inspectional/ supervisory non-manual	−0.461	0.191	0.153	0.320	−0.529	0.346
Routine non-manual	0.318	0.179	0.736*	−0.515	−0.062	−0.657
Skilled manual	0.063	−0.500	0.204	0.650	0.012	−0.430
Semi-skilled/ unskilled manual	−0.876	0.226	0.107	−0.089	1.351*	−0.719*
Housewife	−0.435	−0.194	−0.253	−1.199*	−0.181	2.263*

* Coefficients significant at the .01 level

were daughters in Northern Ireland found to significantly inherit the occupational status of their mothers, the inspectional/supervisory category being the only exception, but an almost identical result occurred in the Republic of Ireland, with only the additional category of skilled manual labour proving to be an exception. Furthermore, as the log-linear models attest, this maternal inheritance pattern remained homogeneous across age levels and religious affiliation. Thus, regardless of the society investigated, maternal occupational ascription, even in the case of housewives, remains a primary force in determining the occupational mobility experiences of our married female Irish sample. In fact, this result of pervasive immobility, or maternal occupational ascription, was found to be even more pronounced than a father-daughter occupational attainment comparison (Hayes, 1985).

Thus, for both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, no fundamental trend towards universalism or values of achievement (Blau and Duncan, 1967), may be discerned. In contrast to the conclusions of Stanworth (1984) and Heath and Britten (1984), not only may the increasing labour force participation of married women within Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland further sharpen prestige divisions, as opposed to the blurring of these prestige lines, but this result will remain even more pronounced with the inclusion of a housewife occupational status category. Thus, gender inequality rather than challenging prestige inequality may very well end up reinforcing it. Given these projections, the problem of inequality of opportunity from a gender and prestige perspective will remain a continuing and widespread issue within future Northern and Southern Irish society. However, mindful of the methodological caveats associated with this analysis, any further investigation of this problem must not only directly sample women as the target population, but, if possible, develop a prestige scale which not only directly includes the occupational category of housewife, but also takes into account the gender-segregated nature of female occupations.

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NOTES

*This data set was collected as part of the project: 'Determinants of Occupational Mobility in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland', and supported by the Social Research Council London, under grant number HR 1430/1. I am grateful to Professor John A. Jackson, Trinity College Dublin, and Professor Robert Miller, Queen's University Belfast, for allowing me access to this data.

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Kassian A. Kovalcheck

Catholic grievances in Northern Ireland: appraisal and judgment

ABSTRACT

From 1981 until 1985 the *British Journal of Sociology* published a debate on the significance of Catholic grievances in Northern Ireland. Consisting of a series of five articles from Christopher Hewitt and Denis O'Hearn, this exchange considered the importance of those grievances as a causal factor of the violence that took place in Northern Ireland between 1968 and 1971. This essay is designed to estimate the quality of that debate and make a judgment about its conclusions. The conclusion is that the debate failed in four distinct areas: (1) in some instances a direct clash of ideas did not take place; (2) when a direct clash of ideas did take place, inadequate evidence made a rational conclusion unlikely; (3) in other instances, when clash and evidence were present, inadequate reasoning made logical judgment difficult; (4) in some instances both a failure of evidence and of reasoning prevented a reasonable decision.

THE PROPOSITION FOR DEBATE: A FAILURE TO CLASH

In the initial article in 1981, Christopher Hewitt argued that the conventional view which claims that Catholic grievances (housing, voting, employment) led to violence in Northern Ireland during the period 1968–1971 was in error and that a position closer to the northern Irish Protestant argument that the violence was caused by Irish nationalism was correct. To establish this 'revisionist' position he set out to prove that, for the most part, Catholic grievances were exaggerated. Denis O'Hearn responded to this article in 1983, arguing that the Catholic claims of discrimination were accurate. Hewitt then replied to this article in the same issue, O'Hearn offered an additional response in 1985 with Hewitt, in an additional comment, having what is assumed to be the final word. Such is the order of the debate.

From the outset Hewitt and O'Hearn failed to provide a direct clash of ideas. Hewitt in his first response to O'Hearn, properly rebukes O'Hearn for not arguing against his (Hewitt's) thesis: 'the northern Irish disturbances of 1968 were caused by Catholic Nationalism *rather* than by discrimination against Catholics.' (Hewitt, 1983, p. 446) O'Hearn was not entirely to blame, however, since this thesis had not been stated earlier. In the original article, Hewitt offered two views of violence in Northern Ireland, one having the cause as discrimination and the other having the cause as nationalism. He did not explicitly state either view as his thesis and only came close in the conclusion when he noted that 'nationalism was a much stronger force in the Catholic population and the civil rights movement than is generally acknowledged.' (Hewitt, 1981, p. 377)

The effect of this inability to pit advocacy on opposite sides of a clear proposition for debate meant that the participants often argued at cross-purposes and had a difficult time focusing responses on specific arguments. This argumentative deficiency breeds an inability to understand why certain issues were raised or why others were ignored. Most of O'Hearn's problems rested in ignoring certain critical arguments in favour of proving that discrimination was endemic in northern Irish and British policy, while Hewitt wandered around selecting theses at random. This initial lack of focus in argumentation compounded the later problems where deficiencies of direct evidence were evident.

CATHOLIC GRIEVANCES: MISSING ISSUES AND EVIDENCE

The debate suffered even more when its participants failed to discuss the primary question to be resolved. Hewitt began his argument by noting that 'there is general agreement as to Catholic grievances.' (Hewitt, 1981, p. 365) He cited as his authorities the Cameron Commission and the report of the *Sunday Times* Insight Team. He then isolated the issue of gerrymandering, seeking to determine if it was undemocratic and if it affected employment and housing. Both Hewitt and O'Hearn failed to perceive that Hewitt's own sources did not see this as the paramount grievance. The Cameron Commission, for example states

> Much of the evidence of grievance and complaint which we heard, when analyzed, was found, as might be expected, to be concentrated upon two major issues – housing and employment. 'Jobs' and 'Houses' are things that matter and touch the life of the ordinary man much more than issues of 'one man one vote' and the gerrymandering of ward boundaries.[1]

The *Sunday Times* report noted the importance of employment to the fabric of the state when it quoted Brian Faulkner, Stormont MP eventually to be Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, as saying in 1954

> There is no reason why Orangemen individually and collectively should not interest themselves in the economic welfare of the community. I mean by that statement, we should be anxious to find employment for our brethren.[2]

Employment, in fact, is the missing issue in this debate. It could have been the decisive factor for either participant. Hewitt did not actually dismiss employment, but chose not to consider it as serious a problem as gerrymandering and occupation. To assist the reader in deciding what caused violence in Northern Ireland O'Hearn should have pushed Hewitt to justify such selectivity, particularly when O'Hearn had several potentially powerful arguments at his disposal

1. Hewitt has no justification for not considering unemployment as the major grievance. His sources consider it as such, and it was a major area of debate among the leaders of the Unionist Party. Bew, Gibbon, and Patterson in *The State in Northern Ireland* provide a Marxist interpretation of this as a dominant social class maintaining their position with a divided working class.[3] Richard Rose, in *Northern Ireland: Time of Choice* simply argues that this was the central issue facing Terence O'Neill.[4]
2. Such unemployment could not be due to poor work habits or 'laziness' on the part of Catholics, since Hewitt maintains that his 'own close observations of Northern Irish Catholics suggest they have a remarkably "Protestant" work ethic.' (Hewitt, 1981, p. 379) O'Hearn might have questioned why this was so remarkable.
3. When Hewitt discusses violence, he notes that both the *Sunday Times* and *The Economist* blame violence on unemployment. (Hewitt, 1981, p. 375) His own evidence then proves this conclusion reasonable, for he correlates violence to both unemployment *and* nationalism but chooses to conclude that nationalism is the cause. The correlation proves neither as causal and Hewitt's choice is pure assertion, ignoring the results of his own study. (Hewitt, 1981, pp. 376–7)

It is unfortunate that Hewitt was never forced by O'Hearn to explain why he chose nationalism rather than unemployment as the cause of violence when he admits that both are related to violence at the .001 level. Unemployment fails to become a major issue in this exchange, except for some comparisons between American blacks and

northern Irish Catholics that somehow diminish and cheapen both struggles.

GERRYMANDERING: AN ISSUE WITH LIMITED RESPONSE

On the issue of gerrymandering Hewitt and O'Hearn come closer to serving the purpose of debate; they often clash on opposite sides of a clearly defined point, but fail to respond to arguments. Hewitt set out to establish that Catholics were not systematically disenfranchised by offering two primary arguments: (1) That, because of the peculiarities of Northern Ireland election law regarding the franchise, those who are lodgers, servants, and children of voting age living at home, 28 per cent of adult Catholics and 18.5 per cent of adult Protestants were unable to vote in local elections. According to Hewitt this meant that 'Protestants made up almost 60 per cent of the disenfranchised,' and could not prove an example of discrimination against Catholics. (Hewitt, 1981, p. 365) (2) A perception of gerrymandering existed because of ignorance of fertility rate differences between Catholics and Protestants, higher Catholic fertility meaning that the 'proportion of Catholics in the voting age population is noticeably lower.' (Hewitt, 1981, p. 365) Appearing outraged, O'Hearn launched a statistical attack. Hewitt, in turn, responded: 'As the data show the number of Catholics affected was just over 101,000; the overwhelming majority of the inhabitants of Northern Ireland lived in areas where local elections resulted in democratic outcomes.' (Hewitt, 1983, p. 446) O'Hearn missed the crucial admission of Hewitt's statement that 20 per cent of the Catholic population, 1 in 5 Catholics in Northern Ireland, were denied democracy. O'Hearn overlooked this amazing admission.

In disregarding this argument, O'Hearn overlooked the response that would have revealed to readers the fallacy of Hewitt's position. In his initial argument, Hewitt focused on the fact that 60 per cent of the disenfranchised were Protestant, and cited this to support his claim that Catholics did not suffer disproportionately. If the purpose of the disenfranchisement was to make sure Catholics could not become a political majority, thereby controlling council houses and employment, and permitting more Catholics to remain in Northern Ireland where their 'natural fertility rates' might eventually make them a majority, then the purpose of the laws was to make sure the Catholics did not have political power and did not remain in Northern Ireland. That laws designed to do this might also disenfranchise working-class Protestants is irrelevant, and, even if 80 per cent of those affected were Protestant, would remain irrelevant as long as the Catholics did not have power.

CATHOLIC OCCUPATIONAL STATUS: VARIABLES WITHOUT EVIDENCE

The occupational status of Catholics provided one of the more interesting issues in this exchange, for it is one of the few arguments that was sustained throughout the debate. It also highlighted deficiencies because both writers failed to consider all available evidence. Initially, Hewitt raised the issue as a minor subset of his position on the level of discrimination by Protestant-dominated councils. Buried in the midst of this argument is a claim that raised O'Hearn's ire. Hewitt maintained

> Furthermore, the assumption that Catholics, if not discriminated against, would have a similar socio-economic position to Protestants is perhaps invalid. Many writers have argued that there exist differences between religious groups in their educational aspirations, work habits, etc. The larger family size of the Catholics may be a disadvantage. One test of the significance of discrimination in Northern Ireland is to examine the relationship between occupation and religion in other religiously mixed industrial societies. In Table [A] the data are presented for four such countries. *Discrimination against Catholics is not alleged in any of them* [reviewer's italics] . . . Equally apparent is the similarity between the position of Catholics in Northern Ireland and other countries. In all cases Catholics are over-represented in the working class and under-represented in the upper-middle-class occupations. This implies that one must abandon the position that Catholics were severely discriminated against in Northern Ireland, and explain why socio-economic disparities in these societies have not led to sectarian violence. (Hewitt, 1981, p. 368)

Hewitt's table is as follows.

TABLE A *Occupation by religion*

	Upper middle class			Manual working class		
	Prot.	Cath.	Diff.	Prot.	Cath.	Diff.
Northern Ireland (1968)	16	9	+7	48	58	−10
Great Britain (1963)	13	8	+5	58	63	−5
USA (1957)	24	17	+7	48	55	−7
Australia (1971)	21	16	+5	54	62	−8
New Zealand (1976)	29	24	+5	46	49	−3
	White	*Black*		*White*	*Black*	
USA (1960)	23	6	+17	53	75	−22

Notes: (1) Figures refer to percentage of community in specified category.
(2) Upper-middle-class category includes 'Business and Professional' in Northern Ireland, and USA, 'Managerial, Professional and Administrative' in UK, 'Professional, Managerial, Graziers, Wheat and Sheep Farmers' in Australia, 'Professional, Technical, Administrative, Managerial, Proprietors and Farmers' in New Zealand.

O'Hearn responded to this argument with vigor. In his 1983 response he attacked Hewitt at three levels: (1) that the category 'manual working class' is too broad, with the median Catholic a semi-skilled manual worker and the median Protestant a skilled manual worker; (2) many Catholics are well-educated skilled workers but are unemployed or underemployed; and (3) that the hiring practices of the largest Northern Irish employers are discriminatory, Harland and Wolf being a chief example. (O'Hearn, 1983, pp. 442–3) [an example that Hewitt earlier claimed was cited *ad nauseam*] (Hewitt, 1981, p. 364)

Hewitt's response to O'Hearn was lengthy. He specifically attacked O'Hearn on unemployment and underemployment, stating that O'Hearn overlooked that the survey asked 'what kind of job do you have now?' (Hewitt, 1983, p. 448) He accused O'Hearn of confusing 'median' for 'mode' on the question of skilled and semi-skilled manual worker. (Hewitt, 1983, p. 448) Finally, Hewitt returned to his original claim about comparison with other countries where 'nobody would seriously argue that religious discrimination existed' and extended the argument that the Catholic-Protestant difference might be accounted for by the different standard of education and the different sizes of families. (Hewitt, 1983, pp. 449–50)

Much of O'Hearn's final response to Hewitt consisted of suggesting racist or sectarian motives. He chose to structure two arguments: (1) that within occupations Catholics suffer discrimination, (O'Hearn, 1985, pp. 97–8) and (2) Hewitt ignored 'collinearity' – that is the other four countries might not be anti-Catholic but are anti groups made up of Catholics such as Hispanics in the USA. (O'Hearn, 1985, p. 99) Hewitt answered by repeating initial arguments, adding that even O'Hearn's arguments tend to support his original position – 'that Catholics tend to have a lower occupational position than Protestants, but the difference should not be exaggerated.' (Hewitt, 1985, p. 103) He concluded that O'Hearn's 'collinearity' argument was 'absurd' because by 1973 only 4.6 per cent of the US population was of Hispanic heritage and his [Hewitt's] occupational data referred to 1957. (Hewitt, 1985, p. 104)

In the original article, Hewitt maintained that examples of discrimination by occupation essentially did not exist in Northern Ireland because the figures for Catholics in Northern Ireland, in relation to Protestants, in upper-middle-class occupations was essentially the same as for Great Britain, the USA, Australia, and New Zealand. This argument does provide a focal point of dispute, with most of the relevant issues overlooked by both parties, but the initial question is how the figures could be compared in the first place. In Hewitt's table only the figures for the USA and Northern Ireland mean the same thing, and they are for 1957 in the USA and 1968 in Northern Ireland. How this can be justified as testing the same

variables is a mystery, even if Hewitt's assertion that 'discrimination against Catholics is not alleged' for the USA is accepted. It would certainly be more accepted in 1981 than in 1957. O'Hearn tried to counter this argument by noting that Hispanics account for 18 per cent of the Catholic population of the USA, to which Hewitt replies they only constituted 4.6 per cent of the US population in 1973. That either argument is relevant is questionable, for there is no explanation, and no challenge, for why 1957 was a good year. Certainly, O'Hearn should have questioned the selection of 1957, indicating that the major impact of the post World War II educational advance by Catholics would not yet have registered.

O'Hearn should also have questioned Hewitt's selection of all Catholics as a variable. Irish Catholics in Northern Ireland form one part of the variable. Why not compare them to Irish Catholics in the USA? The findings would be striking since, in his 1981 book *The Irish Americans: The Rise to Money and Power*, Andrew Greeley reports that, based on the 1977 and 1978 General Social Survey of the National Opinion Research Center, 'Irish Catholic occupational prestige, on a scale of 100, was 42.0, as compared to 39.8 for all American white families, 38.6 for Italian families, and 42.1 for British Protestant families.' He added that, while Irish Catholics 'lag somewhat behind Jews in occupational prestige and education, their average income in the years from 1975 to 1978 is slightly ahead of both the British Protestants and the Jews.' Greeley also reported that: 'Of the Irish Catholics, 32 per cent were professionals or managers, as compared to a national average of 25 per cent, an Italian figure of 22 per cent, a British Protestant figure of 33 per cent, and a Jewish figure of 40 per cent.'[5] In another book based on statistics provided by the National Opinion Research Center, *Ethnicity in the United States*, Greeley notes comparisons between Irish Catholics and Irish Protestants in the USA. Irish Catholics tend to have the highest levels of education: Irish Protestants tend to be among the lowest. Irish Catholics tend to have the highest levels of income; Irish Protestants among the lowest. Irish Catholics tend to have among the highest occupational status; Irish Protestants among the lowest.[6] Marjorie R. Fallows summarized much of the data supplied by NORC and concluded

> When the Irish Catholic and Irish Protestant groups in the Super-NORC composite sample were compared with the national averages for education, occupational prestige, and family income, it became apparent that Irish Catholics consistently ranked above, and Irish Protestants below, the national averages. Moreover, Irish Catholics were above all other white Gentile ethnic groups in education and income, and were only marginally below the top-ranking British Protestants in occupational prestige.[7]

For the USA, at least, Irish Catholics do not seem to lag naturally behind other ethnic groups because of something inherent in their Catholicism.

Greely's books were published by 1981, as was Fallows', and the evidence of the National Opinion Research Center has been available for some time. That Hewitt was unaware of this information, or chose to disregard this information in favour of a generalized statement from 1957, is surprising. Of course, he might argue that NORC evidence is inferior for some reason, but that too would cause wonder since Richard Rose, who established the Loyalty Survey that forms so much a part of Hewitt's evidence, used the NORC to establish and support some of his findings.[8] No explanation can be offered here as to why O'Hearn ignored this information. It may fairly be argued that any variable can be isolated, so that Catholics can be compared to Catholics. But if the Catholics are Irish, why not compare them to other Irish who are Catholic, even though the results would suggest blatant discrimination on the part of people in Northern Ireland.

VIOLENCE AND NATIONALISM: A FAILURE OF REASON

One of the clearest failures in this debate came over the issue of violence. Both Hewitt and O'Hearn displayed defects of argument in this area. Hewitt initially argued that violence is directly related to nationalist sentiment and support rather than to grievances against discrimination and injustice. In short, he rejected 'social and economic grievances or abuse of political power' as a cause of violence and suggested that nationalism is the dominant cause. (Hewitt, 1981, p. 375) O'Hearn completely ignored this argument in his first response (which is surprising because, even given the confusion on thesis, this is the heart of Hewitt's argument) and devoted his second response almost exclusively to an effort at establishing discrimination. Had O'Hearn looked at Hewitt's evidence in this area he should not only have been able to disprove Hewitt's initial claim but he would also have found additional support for discrimination as a causal factor.

Two separate arguments highlight Hewitt's difficulty and O'Hearn's failure to perceive the difficulty. At the outset Hewitt examined the violence in Northern Ireland from 1968 until 1971 as outlined in Deutsch and Magowan's *Chronology of Events*. He concluded that 'nationalism provides a good explanation of the distribution of violence.' (Hewitt, 1981, p. 377) Rather than ignore this issue, O'Hearn should have explored three individual responses: (1) Hewitt had no justification for selecting this time frame. Hewitt said it was traced from the beginning of the Civil Rights movement to the beginning of the Provisional Irish Republican Army. It might be that

it coincided with Volume I of Deutsch and Magowan. In either event it was arbitrary as a question of violence versus grievance and other dates might reveal different conclusions. (2) Hewitt ignored the crucial variable of the introduction of British troops into Northern Ireland. While it is difficult to determine the 284 incidents Hewitt found, (Hewitt, 1981, p. 375) even a casual glance at Volume I of Deutsch and Magowan reveals a striking difference in the level of violence before and after the British Army was introduced in force in August of 1969. Since even the most deeply buried of nationalist feeling might react strongly to the presence of British soldiers in nationalist areas, ignoring such a presence throws off the validity of other variables. For example, during the 120 days before 500 British soldiers were flown into Northern Ireland on 25 April, 1969, only 20 incidents took place; during the 120 days after the soldiers arrived 39 incidents took place.[9] If an arbitrary time scale is permitted, this one is as good as any. (3) Other sources provide different statistics on violence. for instance, in his book *Protest and the Urban Guerrilla*, Richard Clutterback, citing British government sources, indicates there were 363 incidents in 1970 and 3,227 incidents in 1971.[10] This is hardly comparable to Hewitt's 284 incidents for the period 1968 to 1971, and suggests another potential argument against Hewitt's position. O'Hearn ignored all these refutative possibilities.

Secondly, Hewitt's own evidence and correlations support the idea of grievances contributing to violence. The use of evidence could almost provide a case study for the difference between correlation and causation. In his original article, Hewitt claimed

> The correlations between nationalism, Catholic unemployment, gerrymandering and violence are shown in Table [B]

TABLE B *The relationship between nationalism, Catholic grievances and violence*

	Riots	Terrorist incidents
Nationalist voters	.91*	.88*
Catholic males unemployed	.87*	.82*
Gerrymandering	.22	.07

* Significant at the .001 level.

> The lack of any significant correlation at the .01 level between gerrymandering and either rioting or terrorism strongly suggest that this grievance, despite the attention that it received, was not a cause of violence. *Unfortunately the data do not permit us to choose between nationalism and Catholic unemployment as factors in Catholic violence. The correlations between nationalism and violence are marginally higher, but both*

> *nationalism and Catholic unemployment are significantly related to rioting and terrorism at the .001 level.* [reviewer's italics] (Hewitt, 1981, p. 376)

This evidence actually suggests that (1) nationalism is correlated to violence; (2) unemployment is correlated to violence; (3) nationalism is correlated to unemployment; (4) gerrymandering is linked to neither nationalism nor violence. The conclusion could be that some common cause linked nationalism, unemployment, and violence. (The presence of a British military establishment might provide a simple answer.) The conclusion also could be that unemployment is the major grievance and that it leads to violence and nationalism. This was, of course, the conclusion of the people Hewitt disagreed with in the beginning.

CONCLUSION

The final judgement on this exchange must remain in a state of limbo. Hewitt's final claim was that 'violence' was a result, not of Catholic grievances over discrimination, but of Catholic nationalism (i.e. aspirations for a united Ireland.)' (Hewitt, 1985, p. 102) This is some distance from Hewitt's initial position that 'nationalism was a much stronger force in the Catholic population and the civil rights movement than is generally acknowledged.' (Hewitt, 1981, p. 377) The latter claim might be true, but the former claim must be declared unproven. Unfortunately, for the quality of the debate, the claim cannot be said to be disproven by O'Hearn. What O'Hearn demonstrated was that Catholics were treated unfairly. Even granting O'Hearn's declarations on discrimination does not disprove the importance of nationalism.

In *Elements of Rhetoric* in 1828, Richard Whately, Church of Ireland Bishop, provided the classic explanation of the concept of 'presumption' in argument. Presumption, he explained, is like a fortress on a hill. If it is unattacked, then it remains standing, so those who wish to attack fortress presumption must assume the 'burden of proof' for the attack. Equally, if a fortress is undefended it can succumb to a weak attack – therefore defenders of fortress presumption have the 'burden of rebuttal.' If it can be assumed that the conventional view of Northern Ireland – that discrimination against Catholics was a causal agent in creating violence – has the advantage of presumption, then it can be argued that neither the 'burden of proof' nor the 'burden of rebuttal' were well met. It may take as long to resolve the issue on the causes of violence as it will take to resolve violence itself.

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NOTES

1. *Disturbances in Northern Ireland: Report of the Cameron Commission*, (Cmd. 532), Belfast, 1969, p. 56.

2. *Sunday Times* Insight Team, *Ulster*, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1972, p. 30.

3. Paul Bew, Peter Gibbon, and Henry Patterson, *The State in Northern Ireland, 1921–72: Political Forces and Social Classes*, New York, St Martin's Press, 1979, pp. 75–101.

4. Richard Rose, *Northern Ireland: Time of Choice*, Washington, D.C., American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 176, p. 21.

5. Andrew Greeley, *The Irish Americans: The Rise to Money and Power*, New York, Harper & Row, 1981, p. 111.

6. Andrew M. Greeley and William C. McCready, *Ethnicity in the United States*, New York, John Wiley, 1974, pp. 35–89.

7. Marjorie R. Fallows, *Irish Americans: Identity and Assimilation*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice Hall, 1979, p. 66.

8. Richard Rose, *Governing Without Consensus: An Irish Perspective*, Boston, Beacon Press, 1971, pp. 195, 261, 266, 272.

9. Richard Deutsch and Vivien Magowan, *Northern Ireland: Chronology of Events, Volume I, 1968–71*, Belfast, Blackstaff Press, 1973, pp. 16–42.

10. Richard Clutterback, *Protest and the Urban Guerrilla*, New York, Abelard-Schuman, 1973, p. 145.

Christopher Hewitt

Explaining violence in Northern Ireland

I am not quite sure how to respond to Professor Kovalcheck's first section in which he claims that my thesis is not clearly stated, and that I 'wandered around selecting theses at random'. Strangely he makes no attempt to document any way in which my thesis is ambiguous nor specify any point at which it changes. Indeed his first sentence presents my position quite adequately. I shall discuss his objections under four headings.

CATHOLIC GRIEVANCES

Kovalcheck disagrees with my assessment of what the grievances were. I list them as

> the franchise, gerrymandering, the allocation of houses and jobs by local councils, discrimination by private firms, and a lack of economic aid leading to high rates of unemployment in Catholic areas (p. 363).[1]

I discuss *each one in turn* detailing the claims which were made (pp. 363–4) and matching them against the evidence (pp. 364–9). Therefore Kovalcheck's claim that I 'isolated the issue of gerrymandering' and treat it as the 'paramount' grievance is puzzling.

As to ignoring or dismissing Catholic unemployment, I refer to it on pp. 363, 364, 368–9, stating without qualification that it was a genuine grievance (unlike some of the others), and it is one of the three variables that I examine in my test of the distribution of violence (pp. 375–7). How can any reasonable appraisal consider this as a 'missing issue'?

I certainly would not consider 'unemployment as *the* major grievance'. Kovalcheck's thesis is unclear and apparently rests upon a misreading of his sources. The statement he quotes from the Cameron Commission obviously refers to the allocation of *council* houses and *council* jobs, not to unemployment *per se*. Why, since Cameron refers to

both jobs and housing, does Kovalcheck focus solely on the former? Is the 'major grievance' unemployment in general, or Catholic unemployment resulting from the unwillingness of Unionist councils to hire Catholics? If the latter then all the evidence is against Kovalcheck. Even the nationalist writer Gallagher[2], who carried out an exhaustive study of the matter in 1951, notes that of all 3476 council employees the proportion of Catholics was 31.5 per cent – virtually identical to their proportion in the working age population! In 1968, Rose found a similar proportion of Catholics and Protestants reporting that they or someone in their family was employed by the council (4.3 per cent vs. 5.6 per cent).[3]

If he is claiming that unemployment in general was 'the' grievance, the evidence is also against him. The civil rights movement certainly didn't treat it as such. Their manifestos, slogans, speeches and demonstrations did not focus on unemployment any more than, for example, gerrymandering or the franchise. Survey evidence shows few Catholics (less than 10 per cent) thought religious discrimination an obstacle to finding a job.[4]

My position on the franchise is abominably misstated. I certainly would not claim 'that Catholics did not suffer disproportionately,' since a higher proportion were disfranchised and that is what 'disproportionately' means. What I said (p. 365) was that the charge 'that Catholics constituted the majority of those disfranchised is . . . incorrect'. Furthermore if the franchise was designed to prevent Catholics becoming a political majority it was peculiarly ineffective. According to Whyte, it made 'only the slightest difference to election results', and only one council (Armagh city) fell to the Unionists because of this factor.[5] (Indeed in Ballycastle and Limavady rural districts it appears that the franchise favoured the Nationalists).

THE DISTRIBUTION OF VIOLENCE WITHIN N. IRELAND

Given that both discrimination and nationalism were present in the situation how does one choose between them as causes of the violence? I think one could examine the connection between discrimination, nationalism and violence either within Northern Ireland or cross-nationally.

Let us first consider Kovalcheck's criticisms of my analysis of the geographical distribution of violence. As to the time period, the opening of the IRA campaign is an obvious watershed since the nature and the amount of violence changes dramatically from that date. This can be seen by anybody who looks at the monthly violence statistics[6]. Before February 1971 violence was unorganized, associated with civil rights demonstrations, and there were few fatalities. From February the level of violence, especially deaths, increases sharply

and most of it is due to republican terrorism. This fact explains (rather obviously) the discrepancy between Clutterbuck's statistics and my own. Clutterbuck's total includes the whole of 1971 and shows the abrupt increase due to the IRA campaign, whereas my period ends in February of that year. The claim that the introduction of British troops increased the level of violence is most peculiar. The troops were sent in *because* of escalating violence and probably prevented a genocidal massacre of the Catholics. Far from provoking violence, 'the soldiers were received rapturously in Catholic areas'[7] and 'the Army had no great difficulty in working these areas (the Catholic ghettos), because of the cooperation of local citizens defense groups'[8]. Both Darby and Rose note that good relations between the Army and the Catholics lasted until the latter part of 1970. I am sorry that Kovalcheck found it so 'difficult to determine the 284 incidents' I examined, but he could have looked at footnote 54 where they are described. Had he done so, he would have seen that only seven involved attacks on police or soldiers.

On the correlation – causality issue, the idea that 'the presence of a British military establishment' was a 'common cause [that] linked nationalism, unemployment and violence' has little to commend it. The strongly nationalist areas have been so for decades. My measure, in fact, is the 1964 election, five years before the arrival of the Army. Does Kovalcheck believe causality operates backwards in time, and could he explain how the British military presence caused unemployment?

As to the claim that 'unemployment ... leads to violence and nationalism' and that 'this was, of course, the conclusion of the people Hewitt disagreed with', it is unsupported by a single citation of anybody holding this particular view. In fact, most English writers took a very different position, which I describe and evaluate in detail (pp. 396–74). As I show, the conventional wisdom was that protests over discrimination were a sign that Catholics were *moving away* from nationalism.

Considered empirically the view that nationalism is a result of deprivation and discrimination is easily refuted by survey data. Rose shows that acceptance of the constitutional position of Northern Ireland among Catholics is not correlated with class, income, self-rated economic wellbeing nor unemployment.[9] The geographical overlap between unemployment and nationalism is probably due to the fact that both are characteristics of the heavily Catholic areas on the periphery of the province. Some civil rights publications[10] argued that nationalist areas were deliberately neglected by Stormont; that nationalism led to unemployment (rather than *vice versa*).

One point about correlation that Kovalcheck slides over is that while correlation does not prove causality, a lack of correlation damns any attempt to assert causality. Thus regardless of O'Hearn's

diagrams on gerrymandering and even my 'amazing admission' that 20 per cent of the Catholic population lived in gerrymandered areas, the important fact is that gerrymandering is not correlated with violence, and therefore cannot be claimed as a cause of violence.

CROSS NATIONAL COMPARISONS AND DISCRIMINATION

I use cross national data to make two points. The first is that much of the occupational disparity in N. Ireland can be attributed to factors other than discrimination. Kovalcheck asks how, since I use 1957 data for the US and 1968 data for N. Ireland, 'this can be justified as testing the same variables.' Why this 11 year difference should upset him is not clear, since he goes on to compare Northern Irish Catholics in 1968 to Irish-American Catholics in 1977–8. What can we conclude from a comparison of the relative economic status of Irish Catholics in the two societies? Kovalcheck says 'the results would suggest blatant discrimination . . . in Northern Ireland.' Greeley, a careful and sophisticated scholar notes that ethnic differences may result from 'social, cultural, psychological, historical and racial discrimination factors' and in his analysis examines the effect of city size, region and education[11]. Rather than holding that 'Irish Catholics lag naturally behind other ethnic groups because of something inherent in their Catholicism,' I specify two factors as explaining Catholic disadvantage, their lower education and their larger family size. According to Greeley, Irish Catholics in the USA have families of almost average size (2.8 vs. 2.6) and a better than average education (12.1 vs. 10.9 years), so why is their better than average economic status a point against my argument? Indeed the remarkable improvement in the economic status of American Catholics from 1957 to 1977 is worth examining. As Kovalcheck says the period was one of 'educational advance by Catholics'. It was also characterized by a 'sharp decline in Catholic fertility that began in earnest around 1963–4', so that by 1973–5 Catholic family size was only marginally higher than that of Protestants.[12] Table I compares Protestant-Catholic fertility differences in Northern Ireland to those in the USA in the early 1960s (when there were significant economic

TABLE I: *Differences in fertility by religion*

	Catholic	Protestant
Northern Ireland 1961	4.76	2.45
USA 1961–5	4.46	3.36
USA 1973–5	2.20	2.10

disparities between the two groups) and in the 1970s (when they had disappeared).

Perhaps the simplest conclusion to be drawn is that if Catholic family size is significantly greater than that of Protestants, they will be economically disadvantaged, but when it is similar they will not.

CROSS-NATIONAL COMPARISONS AND VIOLENCE

I also maintain that the degree of discrimination in N. Ireland was not sufficient to explain the violence. Now insofar as many writers (including O'Hearn) use occupational differences between Catholics and Protestants as a measure of discrimination, my crossnational data challenges them to explain why socio-economic disparities in these societies have not led to violence.'

O'Hearn claims that there is discrimination against the Irish in Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand and against Hispanics in America. Kovalcheck seems to imply that there was discrimination against US Catholics, at least in 1957. Fair enough, then how do they deal with my challenge. If there was discrimination in these societies, and if discrimination causes violence, then where is the violence by the Australian Irish or by American Hispanics? This is not a trivial point and I made it again (1985:105) citing still other societies where there are much greater disparities between ethnic groups yet little or no violence.

Looked at in cross-national perspective, militant nationalist movements are not usually associated with economically deprived minorities. Indeed it is often prosperous and relatively advantaged ethnic groups, such as the Spanish Basques and Greek Cypriots, that support nationalist violence. I suggest that those who wish to understand ethnic conflict (in Northern Ireland or anywhere else) should examine such situations to see what common elements are present.

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NOTES

1. To avoid excessive citations, references to my original article are not footnoted but page references are given in parentheses.

2. F. Gallagher, *The Indivisible Island*, London, Gollanez, 1957, p. 208.

3. See my original article for differences by council type.

4. R. Rose, *Governing without Consensus*, London, Faber, 1971, p. 298.

5. J. Whyte, 'How much discrimination was there under the Unionist regime.' in Gallagher and O'Connell *Contemporary Irish Studies*, Manchester University Press, 1983.

6. See Steve Wright 'A Multivariate

Time Series Analysis of the Northern Irish Conflict' in Y. Alexander, *Behavioural and Quantitative Perspectives on Terrorism* New York, Pergamon Press, 1981, pp. 318–28.

7. J. Darby, *Conflict in Northern Ireland*, Dublin, Gill & Macmillan, 1976, p. 22.

8. Rose *op. cit.* p. 150.

9. *Ibid.* pp. 281–92.

10. For example, Campaign for Social Justice, *Northern Ireland: The Plain Truth*, Dungannon, 1969, pp. 14–15 and Fermanagh Civil Rights Association, *Fermanagh Facts*, 1969, pp. 31–2.

11. A. Greeley *Ethnicity in the United States* New York Wiley and Sons 1974, p. 53. See pp. 35–40 for some caveats on the data.

12. See C. F. Westoff and E. F. Jones 'The End of Catholic Fertility' *Demography* vol. 16 no. 2 May 1979 and R. E. Kennedy 'Minority Group status and Fertility. The case of the Irish.' *American Sociological Review* vol. 38 (February 1973). Neither article sees fertility differences as a result of class differences but rather due to ideological causes. Westoff and Jones suggest 'the moral ambiguity surrounding the oral contraceptive' and Fitzgerald the minority status of Irish Catholics.

Denis O'Hearn

Catholic grievances: comments

I am thankful to Kassian Kovalcheck for his insightful contribution to our 'debate.' Many of his criticisms about the quality of the debate are well taken. In (only partial) defense, may I suggest that part of our failure to reach a 'direct clash of ideas' was the result of the medium of discourse. In the journal format, any rebuttal has the advantage of responding only to specific points on which the author feels confident. Other points of debate are ignored. The result is very much like the interviews we have all seen on the nightly news where the interviewer asks an embarrassing question; the interviewee answers an obliquely-related and less embarrassing one; the interviewer fails to press for an answer to the original question and the television viewer gets annoyed and throws his shoe at the screen. Kovalcheck has just thrown his shoe at the TV screen.

Kovalcheck's first criticism of the debate concerns our failure to provide a 'direct clash of ideas.' He rightly claims that I ignored Hewitt's central thesis, the 'heart of his argument,' about the relationship between nationalism and violence. In Hewitt's words,

> my discussion of the role of Catholic grievances as a *cause* of Catholic violence was totally ignored in his first comment, and receives only passing mention in the second (Hewitt, 1985, p. 102).

I agree. Hewitt's thesis, as Kovalcheck points out, took the following *specific* form: 'the Northern Irish disturbances of 1968 were *caused by* Catholic Nationalism *rather than* by discrimination against Catholics' (Hewitt, 1983, p. 446). I took issue with the words 'rather than,' and attempted to rebut Hewitt's lengthy assertions that 'the old system' in the North of Ireland was not particularly inequitable' (Hewitt, 1981, p. 377). Kovalcheck acknowledges, 'what O'Hearn demonstrated was that Catholics were treated unfairly.' Fine. That is all I tried to do.

Kovalcheck makes some interesting points about 'missing issues and evidence.' He says that Hewitt and I both overemphasized gerrymandering, and should have concentrated instead on more critical areas of discrimination: housing and employment. I couldn't

agree more. I believe, however, that Kovalcheck overstates his case by claiming that 'employment, in fact, is the *missing issue* in this debate.' Indeed, I spent more words in my first comment on employment than on gerrymandering, and concluded that

> discrimination in employment is probably the most important form of discrimination. Therefore, it is unfortunate that Hewitt admits higher Catholic unemployment, but then dismisses its importance by giving the subject a mere three sentences (O'Hearn, 1983, p. 442).

Perhaps I should have even 'pushed harder' on the question of discrimination in employment, particularly given Hewitt's evidence of a high correlation between Catholic unemployment and nationalism.

Kovalcheck's most important *concrete* contribution to the debate on discrimination is his presentation of evidence on Irish Catholic status in America. He is correct about the critical nature of this evidence and, quite rightly, criticizes me for not questioning Hewitt's use of 1957 data of American Catholic status. The Greeley data confirm that there is no inherent deficiency in Catholics or Irish Catholics that makes them 'low achievers.' I cannot agree, however, that I overlooked 'most of the relevant issues' with respect to occupational discrimination. The Greeley data *complement* the *vital* data about occupational inequality *in the North of Ireland*, which shows significant differences between Protestants and Catholics.

Finally, Kovalcheck returns to the subject of violence, which I (admittedly and perhaps wrongly) avoided. He is right about the unreliability of evidence about violence. But I don't believe this is the central issue. Rather, the critical shortcomings are in the statement of the problem by Hewitt, and in his misrepresentation of the data that he used.

Since Kovalcheck and Hewitt both insist that I should have joined this debate on violence (to provide a 'direct clash of ideas'), I will address some of the issues they raised. First, they both accept a simplistic and false model of the relationship between nationalism, inequality and violence: *either* nationalism *or* inequality caused 'the disturbances of 1968.' The identification of nationalism and inequality as mutually exclusive, unrelated variables is a false dichotomy. This is confirmed by the high correlation that Hewitt finds between nationalism and unemployment. Kovalcheck correctly asserts that Hewitt's choice of nationalism *rather than* unemployment as his explanatory variable is arbitrary and self-serving. Yet he falls short of recognizing the organic link between discrimination and nationalism. He insists that I should have, in classical debating fashion, taken the diametrically opposite position to Hewitt, and argued that *unemployment* 'caused violence.'

Hewitt and Kovalcheck should have placed nationalism (and this is hardly an exclusively Catholic phenomenon) in its historical context. Irish nationalism is a product of hundreds of years of oppressive British colonial rule and settler ascendancy, of industrialization of the Belfast area and forced *de*industrialization of the rest of Ireland. Inequality is a consequence of these same historical processes, and so is the northern state. Thus nationalists, particularly *Republicans* have historically struggled against inequality by struggling against the institutions that promote inequality: British colonialism and, more recently, the northern Irish state.

It is surprising that this whole debate has taken place without mention of Ted Gurr, Chuck Tilly, collective action, resource mobilization or the many theoretical and methodological contributions that have been made regarding the precise question of the relationship between deprivation, resources, nationalism, social organization, state repression and facilitation, and armed struggle. It is instructive to compare Hewitt's thesis on nationalism and violence with the responses to Ted Gurr's famous book, *Why Men Rebel*[1] in which he argued that rebellion was a response to social and economic deprivation. Critics rightly claimed that Gurr failed to explain why some deprived groups rebel while others don't. The 'collective behaviour' school argued that rebellion occurs when 'established organization' (e.g., the state) breaks down, and fails to supply alternative channels of action. The 'resource mobilization' or 'political process' perspective, on the other hand, argues that social organization is normal among classes or groups, and that these groups naturally use purposive violent action when they feel it will help them to attain their goals. But *none* of these perspectives divorce political violence from some degree of inequality in a group's access to material, social or political resources.

Hewitt, too (and I think Kovalcheck implies this), would have a much stronger case if he placed his analysis in terms of resource mobilization. If we forget his attempts to downplay discrimination, we are left with an interesting proposition; the nationalist population after 1968 increasingly became involved in purposive action, which was aimed directly at taking control of the state or, in other words, establishing a United Ireland. The addition of unemployment and other variables as indicators of the exclusion of these groups from centres of power, would add a very powerful element to this kind of argument. But without some kind of concrete analysis of material conditions, 'nationalism' is a confusing and inexplicable concept.

We are still left with a problem: why the 1960s? Why not 1930, or 1990? The answer lies, in historical developments which both Hewitt and Kovalcheck ignore. It also lies as much in the relationship between *loyalism*, Britain and violence – which Hewitt chooses to expunge from his analysis – as in the relationship between *nationalism*

and violence. The post-war period coincided with the decline of industry in Ulster. Belfast's shipyards were threatened by world competition and slumping demand, while its linen was replaced by synthetics. The north of Ireland was an area in rapid decline. Not even Britain, which was itself in decline, could ensure loyalist jobs and opportunity. Chronic armed Republican campaigns added to the cost of maintaining the failing colony.

Britain's response was to try and minimize its losses in the north of Ireland by encouraging some rather weak reforms and a closer economic and political relationship with the south. After all, Britain and Ireland were closely involved in the process of European integration, and were soon to join the EEC together. The ongoing conflict in the north was a running sore that destabilized the process of integration. But Britain's attempts at *limited* reforms (through a sort of 'puppet' Unionist government led by O'Neill) invited two opposite reactions.

(1) Some Catholics and liberal Protestants saw the possibility of inciting progressive change by forming a civil rights movement and 'egging on' the partial reform process. They were encouraged by the new state policy of limited *facilitation* of their demands. Admittedly, a part (perhaps a majority) of this movement was nationalist-oriented, and hoped to transform the limited reform movement to a full-blown nationalist movement. Yet the Civil Rights Movement was by no means monolithic.

(2) The majority of loyalists saw reforms and 'civil rights' as a threat, and supported the anti-reform movement led by Ian Paisley and Minister for Home Affairs William Craig, who controlled the police. Reform was *particularly* repugnant to loyalists at this time because of the province's economic difficulties and the threat that equality in employment and housing posed to *loyalist* jobs and *loyalist* houses.[2]

With this (unfortunately brief) historical context in mind, we can re-examine Hewitt's analysis of violence from 1968–71. In doing so, I will argue that the critical problem is not, as Kovalcheck states, Hewitt's data source or his choice of dates. Rather, it is his selective use of the data that he has at hand and, in particular, his concentration solely on nationalist violence.

Let us take a closer look at those seventeen months between the start of Hewitt's analysis in January 1968 and the introduction of British troops and fall of the reformist government in April 1969. (Actually, the main civil rights organization was formed in early 1967, and the several years before 1968 saw quite a bit of violence: almost entirely by Paisleyite mobs against reformist government officials and the Catholic population, and by loyalist death squads against randomly-picked Catholics.) During the whole of 1968, when numerous civil rights meetings took place – mostly concerning

the housing issue – Deutsch and Magowan[3] record ten violent incidents:

– a crowd of *loyalists* stone the Prime Minister;
– the (Protestant) police baton-charge a peaceful civil rights march;
– the police baton-charge a peaceful civil rights march;
– the police baton-charge a peaceful civil rights march;
– later that night, nationalists riot and stone the police (*shops are looted*!);
– two days later, nationalists attack police landrovers with petrol bombs;
– Protestants with sticks attack a 'small group' of Civil Rights marchers;
– the police baton-charge a civil rights march;
– Paisleyites attack reporters and sing 'No Pope Here' at a crowd of civil rights marchers, stones are thrown, police baton-charge the crowd;
– a loyalist group throws stones and bottles at a civil rights group.

In January of 1969 police and loyalists together attack seventy peaceful civil rights marchers with stones and sticks, studded with nails. A Catholic church is blown up. A Hibernian hall is burnt down. In April 1969, Paisleyites stone a civil rights march and police baton-charge the march. Later that night, the police break into a number of Catholic houses, including that of Samuel Devenney, whom they beat up in front of his children. Devenney dies some time later and, along with a 66-year-old man who dies in a police baton-charge, becomes the first victim of 'the troubles' since the Ulster Volunteer Force murdered a Catholic in 1966.

In all this time, up to the introduction of British troops, what 'terrorist events' were recorded by Deutsch and Magowan? Shots at a police land rover in South Armagh. Three water pipelines and an electricity pylon are blown up. The explosions, we now know, were carried out by loyalists 'to make it appear that O'Neill's reforms were encouraging IRA violence' (Hewitt, 1981, p. 376). O'Neill resigned three days after the last explosion.

The early violence in the civil rights period, then, was not 'Catholic violence,' although it often took place in nationalist areas. It was *repressive* violence by the police and loyalist mobs *against* the civil rights marchers who were, at that time, pushing the state to introduce wider reforms. The IRA campaign did not really get under way until 1970/71. What occurred in 1967–71 was a retrenchment by the northern Irish regime from partial *facilitation* of a contending group's claims, to *repression* of that group. It is hardly surprising, then, that the Civil Rights Movement's demands rapidly changed from limited

reforms to outright 'nationalist' ones – state/police repression convinced more and more participants that their aspirations for a share of power would never be granted within the context of the northern Irish state. *State* violence is the key to understanding why attacking the 'symbols of the state' was decidedly *not* 'strange behaviour for people concerned with "civil rights"' (Hewitt, 1981, p. 377). Identifying the state as a target was made even easier since the government sector was the most blatant discriminator in employment throughout the province, as even Hewitt admits (1983, p. 450). The addition of an alien army, internment without trial, and torture of uncharged detainees[4] – as Kovalcheck suggests – intensified this 'nationalist' response and ensured the popularity of the IRA.

Unfortunately, these comments on Kovalcheck's appraisal have been brief, considering the complex historical processes that underlie the relationships between nationalism, deprivation and violence. Kovalcheck does a very good job, I think, of pinpointing some critical omissions and mistakes in our debate about discrimination. But in relation to Hewitt's thesis on violence the answer is not, I believe, to follow Kovalcheck's advice and try to 'disprove the importance of nationalism.' Nor does it lie in generalizations like 'violence by deprived minorities typically takes the form of looting, as occurred in the black ghettoes of the USA throughout the 1960s' (Hewitt, 1981, p. 377). I agree that nationalism was and is a strong force in a large section of the northern Irish community. But Irish nationalism is not a somehow unnatural, inferior and morally indefensible position. In the face of a sectarian loyalist state that refuses to share power and opportunity ('Ulster Says No!'), nationalism is indeed a quite logical response.

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NOTES

1. Ted Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1969. For an excellent discussion of the literature and an exposition of the 'political process' perspective, see Charles Tilly, *From Mobilisation to Revolution* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1978).

2. Employment inequality was particularly effective in minimizing loyalist unemployment during the 1970s. Catholic male unemployment increased from 17.3 to 30.2 per cent between 1971 and 1981, while Protestant male unemployment increased from 6.6 to 12.4 per cent. Not only is the unemployment gap widening, but high Catholic unemployment helped Protestants to maintain an unemployment rate that was below all depressed British regions, and barely higher than the British average of 11.3 per cent. See, Bob Rowthorn, 'Unemployment: the widening sectarian gap,' *Fortnight*, no. 231,

Aaron Cohen and Chanoch Jacobsen

The power of social collectivities: a follow up study

The analysis and measurement of social power, particularly that of social collectivities, continues to present difficulties to theorists and researchers alike.[1] In a recent attempt to resolve some of these problems, Jacobsen and Cohen[2] have suggested an integration of four major theoretical approaches to the study of power, and derived from that a 'predictor measure' for assessing power relationships between social collectivities. The utility of the integrated approach was then demonstrated by the high correlations they had found between the predictor measure and the parties' stated readiness to use their potential power. But there is still a great difference – conceptually as well as empirically – between an expressed willingness to act and actual behaviour. This note reports a follow-up of the same organizations, that traced power events as they occurred over a four-year period following the original study, and compared them with what had been predicted. The results are thus to be seen as an attempt to empirically validate the integrated approach suggested in the earlier article.

The predictor measure for each party had been defined as the ratio of its relative resources to its relative position *vis-à-vis* the contended issues. Questionnaire responses from the managements and shop committee of 16 organizations in Israel constituted the data base for computing this measure. The original hypothesis was that the extent to which the predictor measure exceeds unity for a given party indicates that party's propensity to use its relative advantage in resources in order to improve its relatively low position by enacting its potential power. Conversely, the extent to which the predictor measure is below unity indicates that party's propensity to exploit its relative advantage in position unobtrusively, that is to say, not to initiate a confrontation.

The raw scores in Table I, taken from the original study, would lead us to expect that the committees generally will be more willing to enact their power potential than the managements, but also that, among the managements, those with higher predictor scores will be

TABLE I: *Raw scores and Z-scores of predictor measure*

Organization	*Raw scores* Committee	Mangmt.	*Z-scores* Committee	Mangmt.
01	19.39	.05	2.77	−1.13
02	1.79	.56	−0.89	1.22
03	10.78	09	0.98	−0.94
04	1.71	.58	−0.90	1.34
05	8.03	.12	0.41	−0.79
06	2.70	.37	−0.70	0.35
07	7.05	.14	0.20	−0.71
08	8.30	.12	0.46	−0.81
09	6.74	.15	0.14	−0.68
10	8.08	.12	0.42	−0.80
11	10.17	.10	0.85	−0.92
12	3.25	.31	−0.58	0.06
13	1.64	.61	−0.92	1.46
14	3.79	.26	−0.47	−0.15
15	2.14	.47	−0.82	0.81
16	1.82	.66	−0.94	1.69
Mean	6.07	.30	0.00	0.00
S.D.	4.82	.21	1.00	1.00

more willing to enact power than those with lower scores, and that indeed was what was found.[3] On the other hand, to predict the actual initiation of confrontations between management and committee in each organization, we have to have a common denominator for comparison. Therefore the raw scores were converted into standardized z-scores, as shown in Table I. Our prediction now is that more confrontations will be initiated by the side with the higher standardized score than by the side with the lower score.

METHOD

Managers and shop committee leaders from the same organizations (in many cases also the same persons as in the first study) were asked about any confrontations that occurred between them in the years 1982 to 1985. In particular, they were asked for dates, the contended issues, the reasons for these confrontations and, most importantly, which side initiated the action. In addition, records in the union locals were reviewed for further details and to corroborate the responses.

To enable us to decide which side initiated the confrontation, we looked for evidence that pointed to the side that first threatened or harmed the other, or whose actions could reasonably have been perceived by the other side as threatening or harmful. Thus even strikes, which usually are interpreted as obvious power plays on the

workers' part[4], were not necessarily all coded as confrontations initiated by the committees, but each case was carefully analyzed on the basis of the available evidence. We should add, that respondents from both sides generally agreed as to who actually provoked the confrontation.

FINDINGS

All in all, 62 cases of confrontation between managements and committee were reported (Table II).

TABLE II: *Contended issues in power confrontations between shop committees and managements*

Issues	Number	PCT %	Initiated by: Comm.	Mgmt.	Not clear
Dismissals, layoffs	13	21	2	9	2
Management practices	13	21	7	5	1
Wages	12	19	8	3	1
Fringe benefits	10	16	7	1	2
Hire, transfers, promotions	9	14	4	3	2
Contract interpretation	2	3	0	2	0
Union rights	2	3	0	2	0
Other	1	2	1	0	0
Total	62	100	29	25	8

The interviewers' reports were then analyzed to arrive at definitive conclusions as to which side initiated each confrontation. This proved possible in 54 (87 per cent) of the 62 cases. Twenty-nine of these had been initiated by the committees, and 25 by the managements. Subtracting the smaller number of initiated confrontations in each organization from the larger number, we have an index for whichever side in that organization initiated more confrontations than the other. This index should correlate positively with that side's predicted propensity to enact its potential power.

In 13 of our 16 organizations, we found 30 confrontations, which had been initiated by one of the two sides over and above those initiated by the other. 13 of these came from managements, and 17 from shop committees. In 21 out of the 30 cases the predictions were correct, and in the other 9 they were not. Table IV shows in detail how the actual events compare with what had been predicted.

TABLE III: *Initiating parties and excess in initiated confrontations of shop committees and managements*

Organization	Confrontation initiated by committee	Confrontation initiated by management	Not clear	Excess in initiated confrontations
01	0	0	1	None
02	2	8	1	6 Management
03	3	2	1	1 Committee
04	0	1	0	1 Management
05	0	0	1	None
06	4	0	1	4 Committee
07	1	2	0	1 Management
08	6	2	1	4 Committee
09	3	0	0	3 Committee
10	2	0	0	2 Committee
11	0	1	0	1 Management
12	3	1	1	2 Committee
13	1	3	0	2 Management
14	2	2	0	None
15	0	2	1	2 Management
16	2	1	0	1 Committee
Total	29	25	8	17 Committee 13 Management

TABLE IV: *Predicted power enactments and differences in initiated confrontations (Organization nos. in brackets)*

		Predicted power enactments		
		Committee	Management	Total
Difference in initiated confrontations	Excess committee	10 (3, 8, 9, 10)	7 (6, 12, 16)	17
	Excess management	2 (7, 11)	11 (2, 4, 13, 15)	13
	Total	12	18	30

Chi-squared = 5.79; $.01 < p < .02$; 1 d.f.
Adjusted contingency coefficient C = 0.57

CONCLUSIONS

While the correlation is far from perfect, a strong and statistically significant association may be seen in Table IV between the predictions and subsequent events. As always, more tests are needed

before we can claim predictive validity. However, the mounting evidence suggests that we are on the right track to the development of an operational measure for the power of social collectivities.

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NOTES

1. Barbalet, J.M., 1985, 'Power and resistance', *British Journal of Sociology*, vol. XXXVI, pp. 531–48. Kirkbride, P., 1985, 'Power in industrial relations research', *Industrial Relations Journal*, vol. 16, 1, pp. 44–56. Hackman, J.D., 1985, 'Power and centrality in the allocation of resources in colleges and universities', *Administrative Science Quarterly*, vol. 30, pp. 61–77.

2. Jacobsen, C., and Cohen, A., 1986, 'The power of social collectivities: towards an integrative conceptualization and operationalization; *British Journal of Sociology*, vol. XXXVII, pp. 106–21.

3. Jacobsen and Cohen, op. cit., Table II, col. 3.

4. Britt, D.W., and Galle, R.Q., 1972. 'Industrial conflict and unionization', *American Sociological Review*, vol. 37, pp. 46–57. Roomkin, M., 1975, 'Union structure, internal control and strike activity,' *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, vol. 29, pp. 198–217.

K. M. Macdonald

Professional Formation: a reply to Briston and Kedslie

The thoughts of Briston and Kedslie[1] on my paper *Professional Formation*[2] are welcome especially as they are accompanied by some research findings of their own. Their paper contains seven main headings, some of which contain sub-sections and this response is structured accordingly. Following their example I shall refer to my paper as KM and theirs as B and K.

1. SOURCE MATERIAL

B and K point out that KM has used incomplete data from secondary sources. It is only 'wrong to use such data' (B and K p. 123) if it is demonstrably biased or inaccurate. B and K data for Edinburgh confirms KM's, as indeed does Stewart 1977,[3] which has no omissions from the population studied. B and K's Glasgow data supplies much of the missing information and shows that with the exception of merchants and manufacturers the data is proportionately distributed over categories as shown in Table A (where 'Gentry' has been collapsed with 'professionals' because the former contains only two cases.)

TABLE A: *KM and B & K data compared: percentage increase in cell numbers*

	%
Gentry and professional	19
Lower professional	17
Merchants and manufacturers	36
Tradesmen, etc.	13
Farmers	15

KM's expectation that the missing data would be largely in working-class occupations is not borne out. On the other hand the notion of the 'aspirant middle class' (KM p. 173) is strengthened. The other point that these new data raise is why, if merchants had as high a status as

lawyers (B and K p. 125), were their sons so reticent about their background?

2. DEFINITION OF ACCOUNTANT

While KM does not include a specific definition, there is nothing in the paper to suggest that it deals with anyone other than accountants in public practice to the virtual exclusion of other activities (KM p. 179). Scottish accountants certainly engaged in other activities (e.g. stockbroking) but the newly-formed societies eliminated these over time. Why the definition of accountants as 'control agents' (a reference to Johnson, 1977[4]) shows a 'lack of understanding' (B and K p. 123) is not clear; dealing with bankruptcy is just as regulative of capitalism as auditing.

3. THE NUMBER OF ACCOUNTANTS

This is clearly tied up with the matter of definition, which probably explains the discrepancies between KM's Table I and B and K's figures. Their point is largely vitiated when they argue that the combined number of accountants in Edinburgh and Glasgow – 'corrected' figure – was equal to the number in London – 'uncorrected' figure (p. 125). This seems unlikely in view of the fact that the population of London was about five times that of Edinburgh and Glasgow combined.

4. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ENGLAND AND SCOTLAND

(a) *History as Ideology* It is hard to believe that many sociologists would take issue with KM p. 184 first paragraph. B and K's notion that this constitutes unfair criticism is rather strange (*de mortuis nil nisi bonum* it seems!) and their charge that 'it is unprofessional' is (unconsciously) ironic. It is not clear why they take issue so strongly with the suggestion (no more) that the works of accountants writing as amateur historians should have an ideological function – unless it is because Mr. Briston is himself a practising accountant.

(b) *England and Scotland, Glasgow and Edinburgh* KM is very cautious about such differences and much that is said was put in to suit an editor who wanted comparison. B and K, however, are quite categorical in their statements about the differences between England and Scotland and between Edinburgh and Glasgow; for example

> . . . as far as social characteristics are concerned the real distinction lies between Glasgow and Edinburgh accountants (though it is a distinction of environment rather than of status) rather than those of England and Scotland.

The problems with this statement are:
(a) what terms like 'social characteristics' and 'environment' refer to;
(b) the logical difficulty of showing small differences between England and Scotland when there are large differences between Edinburgh and Glasgow;
(c) the absence of either data or references.

5. SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS

This section starts with the statement 'KM virtually ignores the effect of bankruptcy legislation'. KM refers to the matter quite explicitly four times (pp. 180, 182, 185 and 188). In addition, the source of the threat to accountants' bankruptcy work (to which B and K refer, rather mysteriously, on p. 125), is given (KM, p. 185).

B and K appear to have noticed, quite correctly, an elision in the argument on pp. 182–3 where it is stated that Table II supports the view that Scottish accountancy was an outgrowth of law, actuarial practice and stockbroking. In fact, Table II supports the claim earlier on (p. 182) about accountants' links with gentry and professionals. B and K's data amplifies KM's and their Table II does no more to disprove the claim than KM's to prove it, because it deals with fathers' occupations, not the accountants!

6. COLLECTIVE SOCIAL MOBILITY

(a) The first of B and K's four points (secondary sources) has already been dealt with.
(b) The second, while correct, is far less substantial than they make out because the proportions with known social origin in military/gentry/professional remains much the same (see Table B).

TABLE B

	Edinburgh	*Glasgow*
KM	60%	20%
B&K	56%	29%

(c) The third point brings to the fore the major problem with B and K's paper which is the failure to read the KM data in relation to its

theoretical concern and to make their points in that context. If they had done this they would not read KM as saying 'the main aim of incorporation was *to secure respectability* for Scottish accountants' [my italics]. The point is that Scottish accountants put great emphasis on their respectability, which some of their members certainly possessed, in order to establish their market position (KM p. 187); and that Glasgow accountants, with fewer 'respectable' members, put more emphasis on it. It cannot be claimed in relation to the repeated used of 'respectable' in petitions to the Privy Council, that 'the actual wording is surely unimportant', unless it can be shown that in the context the word meant something else. KM's actual words, which were central to the paper were

> The advantages of social status and 'market control' are closely linked. Accountants wanted to control their 'market' by establishing their distinctive claims to specialist competence, especially in the eyes of the Courts. This recognition was obtained by the successful claim that all designated members were 'respectable', were trained in their specialism, and that their specialism included such esoteric and high status skills and knowledge as law, actuarial practice and accounting. This claim would be more likely to be accepted by the public in general and by the legal profession in particular, if it were made by men of acceptable middle class characteristics, who could vouch for the other members admitted to the professional body. Thus the technique of closure was employed by accountants to gain the acceptability required *to achieve market control* [my italics].

7. CONCLUSIONS

1. The 'defective data' is similar to B and K's and their improvements do nothing to alter KM's cautious conclusions.
2. Their mistake about the direction of KM's argument relating respectability and market control is repeated on pp. 128 and 129. The argument about closure has been elaborated in a further paper.[5] Given this failure to understand the argument presented and the concepts derived from Larson,[6] Johnson[7] and Portwood and Fielding,[8] B and K's assertion that theory is 'unsupported by the facts' (p. 129) collapses. Once KM's argument is stated in its original form, it is clear that it does not lead to 'incorrect conclusions' (p. 129).
3. Scottish accountants had a strong specific motivation in 1852–5 to obtain incorporation. However, it must be emphasized that (a) Edinburgh and Glasgow accountants had been considering it for some time; (b) Aberdeen did not obtain it until 1867; (c) so far as can be judged from Millerson,[9] these were the only charters granted to *local*

professional bodies in modern times. These events are not explicable by some mechanistic force exerted by the Bankruptcy Act.

The tentative hypothesis (p. 129) cannot be dismissed as 'absurd' when there are no data. It is in line with the paper's theoretical reasoning which remains intact.

To conclude by reviewing the points B and K make in their abstract, and the responses to them:

(i) KM's assumptions regarding the social characteristics of early Scottish accountants are wrong;

KM's findings (not assumptions) are the same as B and K's, with the exception of a greater proportion of merchants among the fathers of Glasgow accountants.

(ii) KM's inferences about the motivation of Scottish accountants to professionalize are mistaken;

B and K are themselves mistaken about what KM wrote.

(iii) KM's assertion of the importance of the difference between Scottish and English accountants is misguided;

KM asserts nothing but puts forward a tentative hypothesis for testing.

(iv) The distinction between the social environment of Glasgow and Edinburgh carried much more influence;

it is not clear from this what it was that was influenced.

It is useful when critical interest is shown in a paper, especially when accompanied by new data. It would have been more useful still if the critics had appreciated the theoretical framework and the line of reasoning employed.

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NOTES

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2. K. M. Macdonald. 'Professional Formation: The Case of Scottish Accountants', *British Journal of Sociology*, vol. XXXV, 2, pp. 174–89.

3. J. C. Stewart. 'Early C. A. Appren-

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REVIEW ARTICLE

Sociology as a vocation: a Weberian analysis of the origins and subsequent development of American sociology

ABSTRACT

It is argued herein that Vidich and Lyman offer a novel, Weberian-inspired analysis and critique of the history of American sociology that makes particular use of his sociology of religion and is undergirded by Weber's understanding of what it means to have a vocational commitment to scientific inquiry. The authors contend that on the whole American sociology bears the imprint of persistent linkages with Protestantism. As a consequence of what they term the 'transvaluation of values', the result has been a pervasive tendency to substitute theodicy with various secular surrogates that they refer to as 'sociodicies'. This article positively assesses the persuasiveness of their claims, pointing to certain problems with their argument, and raising questions about what, ultimately, they believe the sociological vocation entails.

Sociology is the most expansive of the social sciences and the most self-conscious. Its practitioners have felt compelled to not only cast their net outward over the entire social universe, but, cognizant of the need to contextualize their own work in time and space, they have turned inward, as well. It is a discipline that has not dared to follow Whitehead's injunction to forget its founders. Indeed, in the past two decades, during a period for the discipline variously described as a crisis, a transition, or, more recently and perhaps more appropriately, as an interregnum, sociological and historical inquiry into the discipline has constituted something of a growth industry. Even Tom Bottomore, who once referred to the sociology of sociology as an experience in navel gazing, turned his sights inward when he co-edited, with Robert Nisbet, *A History of Sociological Analysis* (1978).

The earlier survey histories offered by practitioners of the discipline such as Harry Elmer Barnes (1948), the Bernards (1943), the Hinkles (1954), and Howard Odum (1951) have tended to give way to studies

that are often more historically delimited but which seek to look at the history of the discipline as a genuine topic of research. Thus, Mullins (1973) and Oberschall (1972) are examples of researchers who have focused attention on the institutionalization of sociology in the academy, while there are numerous instances of writers who have concentrated on ferreting out aspects of the intellectual origins of the science of society. Some have sought to employ new theoretic models for comprehending sociology, witnessed, for example, in Fuhrman's (1980) use of critical theory and Roscoe Hinkle's (1980) efforts expended at developing a structuralist sociology of sociological theory. Added to this is a steady stream of solid monographs on particular schools (e.g., Fred Matthews (1977) and Martin Bulmer (1984) have both written fine books on the Chicago School) and on individuals (within the past decade, for instance, I am aware of four books on C. Wright Mills alone). A popular genre is the critique – with Gouldner's *Coming Crisis* (1970) being the best known, and due to the author's verbal pyrotechnics being the one that created the most colourful fireworks, but also included in this would be the Schwendinger's (1974) moral indictment of the formative period of American sociology from the vantage of a one-dimensional Marxism.

I note all of this only to indicate the publishing thicket that Vidich and Lyman's extraordinarily important and challenging book inhabits. However, even with the plethora of work on the history of American sociology, the distinctiveness of this volume should be immediately evident: it is, quite simply, the first Weberian-inspired critique, making particular use of Weber's sociology of religion (indeed, the subtitle is a conscious reformulation of his famous essay on 'religious rejections of the world'). Furthermore, it is undergirded by Weber's understanding of what it means to have a vocational commitment to scientific inquiry (more on this last point later).

Sociology in the USA emerged as a discipline at that historical juncture when, in the words of Edward Alsworth Ross (1901: 432), Gemeinschaft gave way to 'the rivets and screws of Gesellschaft'. In three distinct, but interrelated ways – theoretically, methodologically, and praxiologically – its practitioners sought to develop a distinctive response to the attendant problems of industrial civilization. To a large extent, they did so by sharing an abiding faith in the efficacy of reason and in historical progress. Viewing themselves largely as heirs of the Enlightenment, the founding figures in American sociology sought to fashion an image of the sociologist as the 'destroyer of myths'. However, as Vidich and Lyman attempt to illustrate, by calling into question taken-for-granted explanations provided by religion concerning the bases of societal order and the individual's place in the scheme of things, sociologists found themselves moving towards a state of anomie. In shattering the idols, they undermined the efficacy of operative theodicies. The authors assume (something evident in

Lyman's articulation of an existentialist 'sociology of the absurd') that we do not willingly enter the limbo-land of meaninglessness and we exit it readily by seeking out answers to the dilemmas of our human condition capable of convincing us that we live in a purposeful cosmos. In the American context, this occurred in spite of the pervasive imprint of Protestant culture on the American mind, an imprint that the authors detect in the discipline despite its overt secularism. This is, indeed, the crux of their argument. Conceived as 'neither a history nor an exegesis' (Vidich and Lyman 1985: xi), the book is, instead, a hermeneutic effort to ferret out the linkages between Protestantism and the variegated forms of sociology that took root in American soil. Underpinning it is a conviction that it is impossible to simply cast off the cloak of one's culture at will. Though not made quite so explicit, it seems to me that this assumption serves to distinguish this analysis from more conventional treatments, which tend to treat the history of the discipline as entailing a unilinear progressive emancipation from religion. Put another way, the book casts doubt on the belief, held not merely by American sociologists, but by Enlightenment intellectuals in general: namely, that it was possible to illumine the world, to construct a world free from myth, by severing any connectedness from tradition.

The thesis of the book can be stated quite simply, though its complexity and subtlety may not make its implications immediately evident: simply put the authors contend that most of the major figures in American sociology have replaced theodicy, a vindication of the ways of God to humans, with sociodicy, which they define as 'a vindication of the ways of society to man' (Vidich and Lyman 1985: 1). While for some in particular those affiliated with the Social Gospel movement, this might have resulted in an attempt to treat sociology as the handmaiden of theology, for the most part major figures in American sociology have sought, implicitly or explicitly, to construct their discipline as a surrogate for Protestant theology. This occurred for some as a consequence of a crisis of faith or, as in the case of William Graham Sumner, who put his religious beliefs in a desk drawer, and when he returned, discovered there was nothing there, it apparently occurred without being plunged into the morass of existential *angst*.

To this point, one might suggest that this account differs little from numerous other treatments. Many have treated not only the religious roots of the discipline's founders, but have viewed sociology as a religious surrogate. To describe sociology, religious imagery has often been invoked, as with Friedrich's (1970) distinction between prophets and priests, Gouldner's (1970) treatment of the 'piety of functionalism', and Dynes's (1974) characterization of sociology as a 'religious movement'. One additional example relevant to this appeared in a monograph by William Swatos on *The Faith of the Fathers* (1985: 3), in

which he concurs that Protestantism played a singularly important role in shaping the intellectual milieu of the founders of the discipline. However, he argues, they managed, *qua* sociologists, to sever their connectedness to this culture, contending, instead, that 'their operating principles were those of scientific humanism'. At this point one can detect the distinctiveness of Vidich and Lyman's work: though the directions of individual rejections of religion varied, they argue that, in the main, sociologists did not dispense with the spirit of Protestantism. Rather, they reformulated the elements of a systematic theology – faith, repentance, election, redemption, and the like – into the linguistic discourse of science.

In 1980, the *American Journal of Sociology* would most certainly not publish an article that it did publish in 1908 which dealt with the 'redemption of the unfit' and predicted a growing cooperation among sociologists, theologians, and philanthropists in, in the words of the author, 'the making of the world and the transformation of society' (Batten 1908: 233). In the ensuing decades after this piece was published, scientific discourse replaced religious discourse rather than joining with it and private philanthropy yielded to an expanded governmental role in the administration of an incipient welfare state (in this regard, the authors provide a fascinating account of the roles played by the Rockefeller and Russell Sage Foundations and the Social Science Research Council during that transitional period). None the less, Vidich and Lyman are intent on illustrating how the transvalued values of Protestantism have remained, in varied guises, deeply embedded in the discipline.

And here we come to the crux of their argument, and, from what I can gather on the basis of the few reviews I have read, the major stumbling block confronting those attempting to understand the central claims being made. The key concept is the 'transvaluation of values'. While it is clear that this is meant to suggest something other than either the tenacious preservation of Protestant values or the evaporation of such values in confrontation with the cool, clear light of scientific rationalism, it is unfortunate that the authors do not provide an explicit discussion devoted to their understanding of this term.

The subject is addressed with broad brush strokes, painting a panorama that ranges temporally from the pre-Civil War defenses of slavery offered by Henry Hughes's 'warranteeism' to Goffman's incisive and acerbic analyses of the human predicament in the modern world. The emergence of different strains of sociological thought is treated, in part, in regional terms. On the east coast, the institutionalization of sociology at Harvard and Columbia is scrutinized, with similar treatments for the midwest focusing on Wisconsin and Chicago brands of sociology. The discussion of the west coast differs insofar as it pays less attention to particular academic institutions, though Berkeley, Stanford, and the University of Southern California

are discussed, focusing, instead, on linkages between the study of race and missionary efforts directed towards the Pacific, seen as a key illustration of the tension built into the universalizing mission of American Protestantism.

In addition to extended treatments of those generally accorded a place in the sociological pantheon, such as Sumner, Ward, Ross, Park, and Parsons, they also discuss both thinkers who have not been regarded as enduringly important figures and figures who had an impact on the social sciences in general, such as Hugo Musterberg, Josiah Royce, and Edward Cummings. In this connection, every reader can supply a full of particulars regarding thinkers who were not allotted space between the covers, or who were not accorded the attention it is thought they merited, but the range of coverage is, none the less, impressive. What is missing is a discussion of selection criteria, a discussion that could have anticipated criticisms that imply that those who were selected were done so because they supported their case while those omitted may have been so because they tended to undermine the thesis. In their assessments of distinct schools of thought and individual thinkers, the authors seek to discern the precise transvaluation of values that occurred and the intellectual and praxiological implications of such transformations. Central targets of criticism include those who seek comfort in secular teleologies made possible by the appropriation of evolutionary theories or system theories predicated on concepts of homeostasis.

It is not surprising that Parsons is a running target of their critique since his work sought to incorporate both of these approaches. In this regard, I would like to note that in Dennis Wrong's (1986: 92) recent *Times Literary Supplement* article, more a bludgeoning, really, than a review, he suggests that this volume indicates the authors' 'perverse penchant for flogging dead horses'. Wrong contends that functionalism has vanished – at least, he says, no one has confessed to being one during the last ten years. If so, I have no idea how he would characterize the rehabilitation of Parsons currently underway. Using the religious imagery of Vidich and Lyman, one might suggest that this project amounts to an attempt to resacralize functionalism. How else can I explain the fact that aside from the Bible, the only other volumes on my bookshelves with built-in white ribbons as a bookmark are Jeffrey Alexander's? Similarly positivism, be it in the form of the scientific management of society or the mathematical quest for certitude regarding social destiny (they refer to this as the 'frightful symmetry of statistics' in their analysis of Gidding's missionary zeal on behalf of quantification), is challenged, in part, for propounding a form of sociological determinism, and, in part, for efforts expended at severing sociological inquiry from moral inquiry – seen clearly in the demand for a value free science. They contend that these various strains have come to constitute orthodox sociology and they suggest

that, albeit variable, it has failed insofar as it resorts to secularized versions of a world that is embedded in the Protestant notion of history as a progressive movement towards the Kingdom of God. Even the hard-headed positivist George Lundberg (1947: 104) could be led to conclude that science can save us, that the social sciences could be the basis for achieving 'social salvation'.

The book is clearly not an apologia for sociology, but neither is it a condemnation of the entire enterprise. Rather, it is a sustained and careful critique from the vantage of two senior scholars who are, simply put, 'for sociology'. To better understand their complaints with sociological orthodoxy, it is useful to identify who among the heterodox they identify with as well as to determine what it is about the work of these thinkers that suggests a promising basis for an alternative sociological vision. At the very end of the book, they cite the following figures as offering the basis for a post-Protestant sociology: William Graham Sumner, John Cummings, Frederick Teggert, Robert Park, Herbert Blumer, and Erving Goffman. What do they have in common that suggests such promise? Charles Page (1986), for one, is surprised that Vidich and Lyman would have such a favourable assessment of Sumner. It is interesting to speculate about the intellectual linkages that connect Sumner, the *laissez-faire* advocate who argued that you cannot legislate the mores, with the hostility of Park to a sentimental reformism and Goffman's coy avoidance of spelling out the political implications of his own work. What are we to make of this trio? According to the authors these are figures who swam against the current and in so doing created sociologies that are increasingly severed from Protestant eschatology and its secular surrogates. When Wrong (1986: 92) argues that they pay too much attention to sociologists hostile to the disadvantaged, subordinate members of society, and too little attention to the Protestant undergirding of reformist thought (e.g., the abolition movement), he misses the point. Vidich and Lyman would contend that in both instances, what we have is the imprint of the Protestant notion of universal salvation. In this regard, they conclude by arguing that in the work of Goffman (and Blumer) we finally reach a stage where we have the material that can serve as a basis for a new sociology – one that appreciates human freedom and historical contingency, seeing human failure and achievement as a drama in which the script, to large extent, is yet to be written.

One major question about their critique, that, indeed, has been raised by Charles Page (1986: 209) is this: by, in his words, driving their thesis home 'relentlessly' do the authors ultimately succumb to a religious reductionism? I think not, though I also think I understand why someone might raise this concern. Vidich and Lyman could have addressed this potential concern if they had provided a clearer portrait of the similarities and differences between American sociology

and its European counterparts. To address this would have entailed a treatment of two interrelated issues. First, what role did religion play in the formation of European sociology and what religion was most significant? If Protestantism contained the seeds of secularization, as Weber contends, one could look at the Enlightenment as an experiment in the transvaluation of religious values. If so, American sociologists are rooted in a lengthier process of intellectual change, themselves the inheritors of transvalued values, and not simply the generators of such values. In this context, what was Catholicism's role, particularly the Catholicism of Counter-Enlightenment intellectuals, in shaping the form and content of not simply some of European sociology (one thinks, obviously, of France), but American sociology, as well? Thinking, for instance, of Steven Seidman's (1983) recent book on the origins of European social theory, which, in emphasizing the Enlightenment attacks on religion implies that continental theorists had managed to sever theory from the imprint of religion, especially Catholicism, it would be useful to know how the authors view this thesis. Second, what was the precise imprint of European social theory on American sociology, and, particularly in the post-World War II period, what was the countervailing effect of American social science on European sociology? While it is certainly the case that national cultures have made for rather different sociologies, there is perhaps a tendency to underplay the interactive and international character of sociology.

Related to this, it is important to recognize that Vidich and Lyman's target, American Protestantism, was itself more variable than they would sometimes seem to fully appreciate. One example will suffice. In their discussion of Bernard and Lundberg, they are interested in locating their work in a rural midwestern Lutheran background. However, I don't think they succeed in adequately distinguishing Lutheranism from hegemonic Calvinism. While their description of the strict codes of public morality that they see emanating from rural America is accurate, it is not clear whether they see this as distinctly Lutheran in terms of the forces that shaped it. Indeed, if one were interested in wrestling with the way in which Lutheran values were transvalued, it might have been wise to look at two important features of Lutheranism that have played key roles in creating a distinctive type of Protestantism: the doctrine of justification by faith rather than by good works, which can have important implications in terms of attitudes regarding social activism in general and reform in particular; and the doctrine of the two kingdoms (God's and Caesar's), with its obvious relevance to discussions of political sociology. In their discussions of Bernard's hostility to centralized government and Lundberg's isolationism, and their view of populism in general, grappling with these doctrines would have resulted in a greater sensitivity to Protestant diversity. Furthermore, Protestantism

was a moving target over time. The Protestantism of Dwight Moody was quite different from that of Walter Rauschenbusch, which, in turn, was quite different from that of Reinhold Niebuhr. There are instances in the book where one might suggest that the diversity within Protestantism over time is also not adequately taken into account. Parenthetically, an interesting question arises which takes us beyond the scope of this book, but, in effect, addresses the other side of the coin. To what extent has sociology served to influence and shape Protestant thought?

Finally, we are left with a lingering question. What are the political/praxiological implications of this work? Given the importance they attach to Goffman's work, one might be led to ask whether or not they concur with his understanding of the purpose of the discipline, of its *raison d'être*. At the conclusion of his ASA presidential address, Goffman (1983: 16–17) raised this issue and answered it in the following way: 'We all agree, I think, that our job is to study society. If you ask why and to what end, I would answer: because it is there. Louis Wirth, whose courses I took, would have found that answer a disgrace. He had a different one, and since his time his answer has become the standard one'. Readers might have suspected, while reading the book, that Vidich and Lyman were in full agreement. However, at the very end they seem to point the discipline in another direction. Building on the work of the heterodox, linked as they are by their distinctly anti-utopian perspectives, the authors suggest that we can catch a glimpse of a sociology that can guide us in creating a vision of a moral community. Rather than eschewing any effort aimed at contributing to social change, they offer the possibility of constructing a new sociodicy. The task in a post-Puritan America is to build upon their work in the process of constructing an appropriate sociodicy, one that meets the demands of the day in our errand in the industrial wilderness. Seen in this light, this exceptional book is a prolegomenon to that task.

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Arthur J. Vidich and Stanford M. Lyman. *American Sociology: Worldly Rejections of Religion and Their Directions*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985.

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BOOK REVIEWS

The Contemporary Soviet City *Henry W. Morton and Robert C. Stuart* (eds) The Macmillan Press Ltd. 1984 262 pp. £27.50 (£8.95 paper)

In 1984 the Soviet city sheltered some 179 million souls, or about 65 per cent of the total population of the USSR, so it well deserves on-going investigation. For outsiders like ourselves, however, this is no easy matter. The nature of Soviet reality excludes independent visits, protracted stays with friendly inhabitants, or informative interviews with helpful officials. One must glean what one can from the inadequate published sources, and at best, superficial observation in street or library.

Despite these difficulties, the eleven contributors to this volume have aimed to cover, in some degree, most major dimensions of Soviet urban life. Professor Henry Morton leads with a general essay on the topic. This includes a brief survey of Soviet urban growth, and a discussion of what he perceives as its three major problems – labour, housing and food supplies. He touches on the generally unsuccessful attempts to establish cohesive, one-centre planning, and the long-standing problem of who really governs, the point here being that local authorities are often over-ruled by ministerial prerogative. He offers three interesting typologies as a focus for further study – 'the enterprise city', 'the bureaucratic-political city', and 'the party-government' city. Robert C. Stuart, whose contribution follows, concerns himself with such matters as natural increase, administrative control and migration, within a general historical context.

The next essay, by Henry J. Raimondo and Robert C. Stuart, takes us deep into the finances of the Soviet urbs, or at least into the framework which is supposed to contain them. This essay is one of the most specific in the book; the authors demonstrate firstly, that there has been a dramatic growth in city revenues and expenditures; secondly, that these revenues derive largely from indirect taxation (as indeed do state revenues); and thirdly, that there is a wide variability of city expenditures throughout the country. The authors emphasize that these factors are also characteristic of American cities, – though Soviet society surely abounds in parallels with the capitalist west.

William Moskoff's contribution encompasses urban labour drift, redundancy, labour exchanges, part-time work and student employment. Given the nature of the Soviet labour market, these topics are potentially of considerable interest, but they are treated in a rather summary manner, excluding developments over recent years. Peter H. Juviler, who comes next, is a long-term observer of the Soviet family, and his review of its problems in the urban context is among the most thought-provoking in the book. Miss L. I. Shelley concludes the section with a brave attempt to bring together scarce Soviet revelations about crime in the cities. Soviet-type socialism does not seem to have brought about any significant reduction in crime levels, but Soviet cities, partly as a result of growth, partly through government residence policies, seem to have developed their own specific patterns.

The third section of the book begins with Mark G. Field's essay on urban health services. Professor Field is another acknowledged expert in his field, and the exposition expands and updates his earlier writings on shortcomings in the system, not least the poor quality of service and inequality of access. Richard B. Dobson's essay on education begins with an overview of the Soviet school, and then proceeds to a rather perceptive account of its main problems. They include forward planning, inequality of access, the vexed position of special schools for more gifted youngsters, the part-time

sector, private coaching, discipline and vocational training.

A review of urban transport problems provided by Sigurd Grava is one of the best concise treatments I have seen, not least because of the few statistics it provides on private vehicle ownership. Towns are also important for the goods and services available in them, and Soviet trade figures indicate massive increases in sales and services over recent years. Here Gertrude E. Schroeder's essay provides some sobering comparisons, and an understanding of the distance which Soviet towns still have to cover if they are ever to catch up with western counterparts. The final contribution, by Zvi Gitelman, covers the urban dweller's contact with various urban bureaucracies, particularly in the matter of housing, pensions, residence permits, ethnic identity, education and work. This work incorporates the results of a careful survey among emigres.

A study of the Soviet city by western scholars cannot, as we have suggested, yield anything like the insight one would normally expect to get from study of a West European or American town. Given this fact, the contributors to this volume have not done too badly. They have presented the problems in a fair and concise manner. Having said that, however, I must add that I thought some of the contributions to be a little under-researched; the existing body of Soviet sociological information on urban living could in some cases have been exploited more thoroughly. Nevertheless, the book contains much useful material, and deserves a respectable place on one's bookshelf.

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Sociological Interpretations of Education: Social Analysis Series in the Social Sciences *David Blackledge, and Barry Hunt* Croom Helm London 1985 353pp. £17.95 (£8.9- paper)

The book under review presents a quick and critical review of broad trends in the sociology of education. It is, however, confined to presenting a critique of Durkheim and the Functionalist tradition, the Marxian perspective and the Interpretive approach. A critical appraisal of these three perspectives lead the authors to conclude that the Weberian perspective of a macro-interpretive approach is the right response to the deficiencies of the above three principal sociological approaches to education.

While the functionalist approach states that all social institutions have specific functions, there are unacceptable assumptions and logical problems associated with it, such as the 'reification' which appears as some sort of entity with its own wants and desires while people are thought of as programmed puppets with no creativity.

The authors also find problems with Marxist theory – both the original and modified versions – which emphasize the deterministic relationship between education and society and which ignores the way people shape the social system of which they are a part as well as being shaped by it.

On the other hand, while the micro approaches which the authors prefer to call 'micro interpretive' approaches, rightly view people as agents it underemphasizes typicality and social constraint.

Blackledge and Hunt opine that the Weberian approach is free from all these limitations. The authors explain this with the help of the writings of Ronald King on organizational changes, Ronald Collins on group conflict and education and the credential role of education, and of Margaret Archer on the social origins of education systems.

The main contribution of the book under review is three fold: the book presents the ideas of the three approaches in a readily intelligible manner, which will be of unquestionable use to all students of the sociology of education; more importantly, the authors make a critical assessment of their validity in the form of extensive commentary on each approach, and, finally they also present what can be called an answer if not an 'alternative' to the weaknesses of the three familiar approaches. On all the three aspects, the author's attempt is

commendable. Students of the sociology of education will undoubtedly find the book highly useful.

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Bringing the State Back In *P. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer and T. Skocpol* (eds) Cambridge University Press 1985 390pp. £27.50 (£9.95 paper)

This is an excellent book. The editors present their collection of original papers as a defense of existing work and a plea for further work in a particular theoretical tradition: comparative historically-grounded theorizing on the state. The papers collected together in this book cover a wide range of topics ranging from Keynesianism in the USA and western Europe, to military governments in South America, to the growth model of Taiwan, to labour movements in nineteenth century England and the USA to colonialism in Africa. The range is wide and each chapter is intrinsically interesting and of high quality. All seek to explore the interrelationships between states, the wider political economy, and the internal societal dynamics of the countries in question. There is a refreshing absence of abstract theorizing about the state, such as has characterized a great deal of recent work, particularly in the Marxist tradition. The contributors have opted instead to provide case studies of the state and to leave much of the theorizing implicit.

Despite the wide range of the papers, there are some major omissions. One, noted by the editors, is the absence of any study of Communist states. Another, surprisingly, given the professed historical orientation of the contributors, is the absence of any study of pre-industrial states. True, there are in this book studies of Third World states, and many of the essays deal with the nineteenth as well as the twentieth century, but there is no sustained analysis of any state before the emergence of the capitalist world system. (The one possible exception to this is Charles Tilly's intriguing chapter on war in early modern Europe.) These omissions seriously restrict the claim of the book to move in the direction of general theorizing about the state. The focus, it turns out, is the analysis of a particular kind of state, those in the capitalist world economy. And this indicates one of the underlying concerns of many of the contributors: their primary interest is in the analysis of the international political economy, and states figure in this analysis as constituent parts of this larger scheme. There is, of course, nothing wrong with such an interest, and the chapters by Peter Evans on the relationships between states, transnational corporations and dominant classes and by Alice Amsden on the development model of Taiwan, are really excellent pieces of work. It is not, however, clear that such chapters have a great deal in common with the concerns of other contributors.

What the essays do all have in common is a belief that the state is central to the explanation of certain sorts of social change. But over and beyond this there are the further questions of whether there is any other element of theoretical convergence among the contributors to the book, and whether such convergence is implicit in this sort of state-centred theorizing. These claims will be subject to dispute, in particular the notion that a common belief in the centrality of the state constitutes a unifying element in terms of social theory. It is unquestionably true that – at least for the sorts of questions tackled in this book – the state must constitute a central part of any adequate analysis. But does it follow from this that the state-centred view constitutes a unified theoretical approach? It is possible to take a variety of positions on this: that there is an emerging theoretical synthesis, and as part of this sociologists have increasingly come to recognize the importance of state-centred as well as social-structure-centred explanations; or alternatively, that there are a number of rival, contending paradigms, more than one of which considers the state to be centrally important. At first sight, I was inclined to consider this book as an

example of the latter. But the editors claim that there is an emerging synthesis – a Tocquevillian one. The essays in this book, then, represent a particular theoretical approach to the state, one heavily orientated in the direction of seeing states as autonomous from class forces and which sees states as initiating and directing social change. It is hardly surprising, then, that the authors call for further research into the role played by intellectuals, and the impact of their ideas, in state policy-making.

It is not unreasonable to wonder what would have happened to the editors' belief in emerging theoretical consensus around the state if any one of the chapters had been contrasted with an alternative explanation of the same substantive material. For the various substantive topics covered there are clearly controversies about the appropriate framework of analysis. Among these alternative explanations, many of which consider the state to be a central part of the analysis, there may well be major differences in the way in which the state is conceptualised. Ignoring this presents what is possibly a false image of an area of broad intellectual agreement. In sum, this book has succeeded admirably in raising important questions, but not everyone will agree with the editors' answer that there is an emerging consensus.

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Capitalism and Social Democracy *Adam Przeworski* Cambridge University Press 1985 269pp. £25. •

This is a stimulating breath of fresh air. It will also be controversial. The major point made in the book is that social democracy is a rational option for workers under capitalism. While sometimes socialism may be a sensible choice for workers, this need not always be the case. The rational pursuit of their collective interests may under certain circumstances, lead them to strike a bargain with capitalists in which both parties stand to gain. Indeed, Social Democracy is the only political force that can demonstrate a record of reforms in favour of workers. Przeworski does not see this sort of social democratic compromise (in the framework of Keynesian intervention in the economy) as automatic. The fact that the game is not zero-sum does not imply that it must necessarily be cooperative. The achievement of a workable compromise depends on the strategies pursued by the players and the resources available to them, and on a number of technical parameters having to do with the behaviour of the economy. Players have choices and face dilemmas. As a result they can make mistakes and optimization is not always achieved. When this happens there may well be a crisis. The theory, then explains both stability and its breakdown.

The principal way of achieving agreement between workers and capitalists is via intervention in the economy along Keynesian lines. State regulation of key macroeconomic variables could determine the rate of investment and the trade-off between current wage rises and future wage increases. As a result, the old socialist goals of nationalization of industry have become redundant. Social democrats have been able to work capitalism to their advantage and to establish the material basis for class compromise. Przeworski sees the current monetarist efforts as part of a capitalist counter-revolution.

The author considers the dilemmas facing Social Democratic parties and goes on to consider the consequences of these choices for long-term conflict and consensus. When the working class is in a minority in society, attempts by Social Democrats to maximize their vote involve the possibility of losing their 'natural' social basis by diluting their appeal from one couched in class terms to one couched in terms of the general interests of the citizenry. Indeed, this tension between class organization and universal interests informs much of Przeworski's thinking.

Przeworski has presented his arguments with great clarity and economy. Indeed, for some readers the main interest of the book will be his attempt to develop

formal, game-theoretic models to clarify, and at times test, his propositions. For some propositions, the formalization of the argument is very helpful in that it enables Przeworski to bring empirical data to bear on them. With other propositions, key variables are not easily operationalized and the formalization – given the clarity of the author's exposition – is largely redundant. This is particularly the case when it comes to the analysis of crisis behaviour. So much depends on the balance of political power; and uncertainties figure so largely in actors' calculations that outcomes are difficult to foresee. Rational actor models here have little predictive capacity.

Although the book is essentially a collection of previously-published articles, there is little overlap between chapters and considerable coherence from one chapter to the next. The exceptions are the final chapter, which is a critique of Roemer, and the conclusions, where Przeworski very briefly and sketchily sets out what he understands by socialism. This conclusion raises a large number of issues; and they are not all addressed, let alone satisfactorily resolved, in a few pages.

There are many points at which one might disagree with Przeworski. In fact, I found most of his arguments convincing, with the major exception of his methodological individualism. While agreeing with Przeworski that classes are most usefully defined as *effects* of social action, I found his discussion of why social conflict should be structured around class axes (rather than any other conceivable set of axes) disappointing. Przeworski's position leads him to say that there are no non-random reasons why conflict should be structured along class lines; it just happens like this in contemporary societies. Classes are the result of the choices made by individual actors. Why actors should make these choices, rather than define their interests in more universal terms, is something that cannot be answered within the author's theoretical framework. I suspect that this conclusion stems from Przeworski's methodological individualism, which downplays the importance of culture and class inheritance.

This is an important book. There is a great deal of thought-provoking discussion covering a wide range of topics. It will excite, puzzle and irritate. Whatever may be said of it, it cannot be said that it is dull.

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Macro-sociological Theory: Perspectives on Sociological Theory, vol. 1, *S. N. Eisenstadt* and *H. J. Helle* (eds) London: Sage Studies in International Sociology 1985 196pp. £25.00 £9.95 (paper)

The above volume consists of a collection of papers presented at the Symposium of Macro-sociological Theory at the 1983 World Congress of Sociology in Mexico. According to the editors, the papers included reflect a theoretical shift in sociological theory from Parsonsian functionalism and early reactions to it (symbolic interactionism, conflict and exchange theory) to a new emphasis on individual and collective actors as not merely the products but producers of social institutions, of whole societal systems, and even of the larger international environments within which these systems are embedded. Within this 'constructionist' perspective, particular stress is laid on the symbolic and power dimensions of social life. Moreover, according to Eisenstadt and Helle

> 'the cleavage between different methodological schools, and certainly the confrontation between micro and macro theory, belong to the past, and the following pages are designed to help us recognise this in our future projects as students of society.' (p. 3)

As is usual in works which merely bring together conference papers, the contributions to this volume are disparate and uneven. The papers which in my view stand out are Jeffrey Alexander's ('The "individualist dilemma" in phenomenology and interactionism'), Margaret

S. Archer's ('Structuration versus Morphogenesis'), and Göran Therborn's ('The rise of social scientific Marxism and the problems of class analysis').

J. C. Alexander argues that early interactionism and phenomenology had focused on the importance of empirically studying social processes and interactions related to the individual consciousness without adopting a methodological stand that would have set these approaches apart from conventional sociology. It was only in later developments (as seen in Blumer's symbolic interactionism and Garfinkel's late ethnomethodological work) that there was a shift from 'empirical' to 'presuppositional' individualism. The latter, by explicitly refusing to accept the existence of a supra-individual/collectivist order, created an unbridgeable epistemological rift between itself and mainstream sociology – and this, according to Alexander, was to the detriment of them both.

Margaret Archer's paper consists of a powerful and sophisticated critique of Anthony Giddens' structuration theory in the light of Walter Buckley's 'morphogenetic approach'. Archer argues that whereas Giddens' *duality of structure* approach leads to a conflation of structure and action, Buckley's *analytical dualism* allows one to see these two dimensions as separate variables. This permits one to ask questions as to what conditions render the enabling/constraining influences of structures more or less important, and that in turn leads to the possibility of theorizing about variations in voluntarism and determinism' (p. 82).

Göran Therborn's paper develops the argument that the recent decline, particularly in Latin Europe, of a philosophically-oriented Marxism has coincided with the impressive growth of what he calls 'social-scientific Marxism'; an approach which adopts a rapprochement between Marxism and the more empirically-oriented Anglo-Saxon social sciences. Within this context Therborn examines the contribution to class analysis found in the work of such writers as Erik Olin Wright and Adam Przeworski. He also takes a very perceptive look at some of the major difficulties posed today by Marxist-oriented empirical class analysis.

Other contributions in this volume focus on the relationship between social symbolism and consensus (François Bourricaud), on the significance of the de-differentiation concept for an evolutionary theory of change (Edward Tiryakian), on the type of sociological theory that could be of use to holders or aspiring holders of state power (Torcuato Di Tella), and on the construction of a typology of recent theories of change, based on their underlying methodology (Ken'ichi Tominaga).

As the above list suggests, the present volume has no specific underlying theme to bring these papers together, other than a general interest in sociological theory. Neither does Eisenstadt's introductory chapter ('Macro-societal analysis – background, development and indications') help very much to endow the various contributions with some kind of unity. It consists of (i) a rather vague account of recent theoretical developments (the author, for 'reasons of space', cites only his own works, and readers wishing to discover what other theories he might have in mind when he refers to recent trends are urged to look at the bibliographies provided in his previous publications); and (ii) of an even vaguer attempt to synthesize the old and the new in sociological theory by injecting, in rather *ad hoc* fashion, a dose of 'constructionism' into the familiar, Parsonsian-oriented Eisenstadtian vocabulary.

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Against Fragmentation: the Origins of Marxism and the Sociology of the Intellectuals *Alvin W. Gouldner* Oxford University Press 1985 333pp. £22.50

This is a thought-provoking and readable study which analyses and criticizes Marxism from the standpoint of a sophisticated and imaginatively deployed sociology of knowledge. In the course of carrying out this exercise Gouldner produces many insights and discusses other commentators on Marx. Of course, as one would expect, his aim is not just to

look at Marxism historically and academically. Gouldner has his sights firmly set on the present day and the current state of politics and social theory.

The book is divided into three parts. The first discusses the relationship between Marxism and the Intellectual Stratum. Marxism is studied with respect to Gouldner's concepts of the New Class of Intellectuals and the Culture of Critical Discourse. After a rather slow beginning, this section picks up pace as the author moves into his stride. In the second part of the analysis Gouldner broadens his focus by looking in greater detail at the cultural and intellectual context of Marxism, as well as at the political struggles taking place within the organizations of the Left in the nineteenth century. He discerns a recurring pattern to Marx's political conflicts, arguing that Marx was embroiled in competition against other intellectuals and artisans within the Labour movement. This is, perhaps, the most stimulating individual part of the book. In the final section, Gouldner shifts his attention to a more theoretical level, looking at the fundamental principles underlying Marxist discourse. The book concludes with an examination of the dangers of the dynamic of 'recovery' and 'holism' that Marxism brings into play and by setting out some guidelines for contemporary analysis to follow.

The most interesting feature of the analysis, as a whole, is the attempt to take seriously the dictum that 'social being determines consciousness'. However, starting from this position does lead Gouldner to focus on Marx and Engels' own social locations, their struggles in the workers movement and the intellectual and social background. This means that what they were struggling *against*, in the broader sense, is relatively neglected. Consequently, the fact that their work was affected by the fight against the bourgeoisie and capitalism is not as emphasized as it could be.

In some places Gouldner becomes over-involved in polemics against other commentators in this field, most notably Hal Draper. At these points, one wishes that Gouldner could carry on with the development of his own insightful views and spend less time in discussing those of others. It is also the case that the connection that Gouldner wants to make to present day theory and practice is insufficiently developed. Despite these criticisms, this is a clearly written and welcome book. It has been edited and organized by Janet Gouldner and Cornelis Disco.

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Marxism and Historical Writing *Paul Q. Hirst* London Routledge & Kegan Paul 1985 184pp. £20

This is a useful collection of essays, scholarly and polemical, from a prominent Marxist 'whose Marxist theory is crucial to their socialism'. (p. 129) Hirst is above all a theoretician: thus Leninism is acknowledged, not as a political practice or authoritarian political ideology but, rather, for its 'rejection of the essentialism of politics' and 'insistence on the analysis of the current conjuncture'. Hirst recommends Leninist anti-essentialism in his critiques of E. P. Thompson (*The Poverty of Theory*), Perry Anderson (the two volume study of the Absolutist state) and G. A. Cohen (*Karl Marx's Theory of History*). Further chapters explore the work of Collingwood and the possibilities for socialist advance in modern Britain.

Hirst is clearly addressing momentous issues. He is an able and perceptive critic quick to point to the 'speculative historicism' of Anderson's project and to Cohen's reduction of complex wholes to 'a series of discrete components causally related through relations of functional dependence and entailment'.(p. 31) For Hirst, Marx's concept of totality constitutes a complex structure that can neither be dissolved into an essence nor disarticulated into specific determining elements. Against Anderson and Cohen, Hirst is surely right but he goes much further in defending a rigorous anti-humanism against the subject-centred humanism of Thompson. Hirst is clearly upset by Thompson's 'abusive polemic', the 'ignorant jibes' and the contemptuous dismissal of the English Althusserians as 'a bourgeois

lumpen-intelligentsia'. But, in comparison with Thompson, Hirst is a decidedly dry and humourless writer. Thompson's work evokes a sense of the complexity and richness of history in which historical structures are made and remade through human practices, through an active collective subject which shapes the specificity of tradition and culture – especially the libertarian intellectual tradition of British socialism and radicalism. Hirst will have none of this; and Thompson is ridiculed for lapsing into vulgar essentialism. But it is difficult to understand how an historical tradition which is never given, but constantly undergoing complex structuration through human practice, is essentialist. In place of a living and complex and open historical process Hirst advances an abstract and formal analysis of the social formation drained of human involvement. Life is elsewhere, so much so that it is history and knowledge, not human subjects, which ask questions: 'Knowledge develops by working over the past products of its activity, by asking new questions . . . and marshalling new evidence relevant to those questions'. (p. 51) One can see what Hirst means when he writes of the need to 'problematise the subject'.

The relation between Hirst's Marxism and Leninism is now clearer: it is not the working class, or any class for that matter, which produces the conditions, structural and cultural, for socialist advance, but rather an elite of theoreticians who, standing above the hurly burly of actual history, note the increasing fragmentation of the proletariat and the necessity to challenge 'parliamentary cretinism' (p. 144) in the name of a 'theoretically informed socialism which in effect is a Marxism' (p. 29). And this, it should be noted, is to be done within the framework of the Labour Party. Are these banalities really the product of an informed and historically aware theory? Perhaps it might be noted that a significant absence from the British political tradition is working class support, in any real significant form, of Leninism.

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Racial Conflict in Contemporary Society *John Stone* Fontana Press 1985 91pp. £3.50 paper

Until recently, there was a notable absence of good introductory textbooks on race relations in advanced industrial societies. Numerous monographs and empirical research have been produced over the last decade which deal with particular aspects of race relations or with specific issues of public policies in relation to race and immigration. But here have been few attempts to draw together the findings of such research within a more analytical framework or to bring together the basic aspects of race relations as a field of study for the undergraduate student.

This slim volume can be seen as partly an attempt to fill this gap in the market. It is written in a style and format which lends itself to use either in specialized race relations courses or as a component of broader courses on contemporary sociology and politics. Consisting as it does of six short chapters, it provides a synoptic overview of such issues as what is meant by a 'society of race relations', the role of power inequalities and class in reproducing racial inequalities, explanations of the changing pattern of race relations, and the problems faced in the quest for racial justice and equality of opportunity. Each chapter provides a brief review of existing literature and research, but includes a clear statement of Stone's position in relation to other approaches. This style works quite well on the whole, largely because the reader is taken through each argument step by step. A good example of this approach is the introductory chapter on 'race relations without races?' which provides a crisply written guide to what are in fact complex debates within the sociology of race relations. Another is the concluding chapter on 'the quest for racial justice', which provides a useful account of the ways in which power relations influence the structure and processes of race relations.

The value of this volume can only be judged fully when it is used as a teaching text. My own feeling is that there are

some notable gaps in the analysis which may reduce its value in this regard. The chapter on race relations and class is at best a limited and partial account of the Marxist contribution to this field of study. Similarly, there is only a limited discussion of the role of political institutions in the management of race issues, both locally and nationally. Perhaps even more glaring is the relative absence of discussion about the modalities of political action and protest which may coalesce around 'racial' symbols.

Bearing these weaknesses in mind this volume will no doubt help introduce new generations of students to the subject and encourage them to study it more deeply. This in itself will be an achievement.

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Leisure, Mass Media and Social Structure *Ishwar Modi* Rawat Publications Jaipur 1985 316pp. Rs 225

It is entirely appropriate and pleasing, in the year in which the International Sociological Association Conference is being held in New Delhi, to be reviewing a product of Indian sociology. The increasingly sophisticated work of colleagues from developing societies is too little attended to in the west, especially in view of the high quality of much of it.

Ishwar Modi's book is a good example. It is based on a modest, competent empirical study of leisure behaviour and attitudes in Rajasthan. The main source of data was a series of interviews, including a stratified sample of 480 in the city of Jaipur and a sample of 160 from the village of Garhi Mamur. In addition he undertook observational work, documentary analysis, and a fascinating study of fasts, feasts, and festivals.

After chapters on conceptual and historical issues, he examines: the nature of the two communities; relations between social structure and leisure; patterns of income, occupation, and leisure; the development of leisure groups and associations; cinema; radio; and the press.

As the distinguished sociologist Yogendra Singh says in the Foreword, Rajasthan constitutes 'a laboratory of transition from feudalism to democracy with its concomitant cultural and social structural correlates.' In consequence the book provides fascinating first-hand insights into what we spend much of our time telling our students about at third-hand. It would be as useful in general introductory courses in sociology as in specialist programmes in the sociology of leisure.

Among much else, I was particularly interested by the following findings: participation in religious activities is higher among urban than among rural people; pace de Grazia and Dumazedier, leisure is neither a product of Greek civilization nor of industrialization but a general phenomenon of social life however organized; leisure in India is becoming rapidly commercialized and individualized – yet remains faithful to deep-seated Indian values; education has a bigger differential effect on leisure than does income.

Ten books by Indian sociologists are listed on the cover, all published by Rawat since 1980. This is a remarkable achievement which deserves the support of colleagues in the west in the way of purchase, use, and citation. Modi's is a very good book to start with.

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Religion and Ideology *Robert Bocock and Kenneth Thompson* (eds) Manchester University Press (in association with the Open University) 1985 320pp. £5.70 (paper)

This reader is designed for an Open University course on beliefs and ideology. Within its covers it contains a good sample of the classic statements: Marx and Engels, Freud, Durkheim and Weber are all there. There is a nice section on rationality and religion which concentrates on the Evans-Pritchard 'Are chicken poisoners rational?' problem, and which includes, in addition to Evans-Pritchard himself, Lukes on rationality and Hirst and Wooley on 'Witchcraft, rationality and other cultures'.

The second section of the reader deals rather skimpily with religion and social control in only two selections: E. P. Thompson on Methodism, and T. Lacquer on Sunday schools and social control. The third contains three selections on the theme of religion and social cement and the fourth section – on 'Religion and Resistance' – contains just two papers: S. Hall on 'Religious ideologies and social movements in Jamaica' and B. R. Wilson's 'A typology of sects'.

All collections are open to the criticism of selecting the wrong items. In this case the choice of classic statements seems better than that in other sections. One of the main values of this book for people who are not taking the Open University course in question is the bringing together of the appropriate bits of Marx and Engels and the other late greats. For the other sections, it is not obvious why these items, rather than some others, have been brought together. Does Geertz really deserve two items when Peter Berger is omitted? One also wonders whether it is worth introducing a broad topic such as 'Religion and Social Control' when it will only have two readings allocated to it.

Nothing in this collection is novel or surprising but it may have a use to sociology of religion teachers who want to recommend one cheap (and large) book which contains clear statements of most of the basic theoretical positions on religion and ideology.

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Consciousness and the Urban Experience: Studies in the History and Theory of Capitalist Urbanisation, Volume 1 The Urbanisation of Capital, Volume 2 *David Harvey* Basil Blackwell 1985 vol. 1 293pp. £17.50 vol. 2, 239pp. £17.50

This is a book for believers. It is also an ambitious book, for it seeks nothing less than the construction from first principles of a historical geography of capitalism which, 'far from disrupting the Marxian vision . . . enriches it beyond all measure' (vol. 2, p. 164).

Harvey's first major contribution to urban studies came in 1973 with *Social Justice and the City*, a book remarkable for the Saul-like conversion of the author to Marxism in mid-text. His more recent *The Limits to Capital* (1982) represented an attempt to 'fill the empty boxes in Marxian theory', the building blocks of a full-blown theory of capitalist urbanization, which these two volumes represent. Harvey has no doubt about the relevance of Marxian analysis to this project. Indeed, these works reaffirm his faith (sic) (vol. 1, p. xi) in Marxian categories, and he castigates erstwhile believers such as Castells for defecting 'from the Marxian fold' (vol. 2, p. 125). He does not seem impressed either by the more sceptical analysts of urban issues, such as Saunders who 'naturally tend to view any version of the Marxist theory with jaundiced eye' (vol. 2, p. 125). So, this is the work of a true believer who returns to the tablets of *Capital* for the way, the truth and the light.

What does his exegesis reveal, and what are its lessons for social analysis? Harvey has divided his work into two volumes; the first, *Consciousness and the Urban Experience*, sets out to rehabilitate space as a concept in the unfolding of capitalism, alongside money and time. These, he argues, have been allowed to mask the importance of the spatial dimension of capitalism, and all three represent equally concrete abstractions framing daily life. The capitalist mode of production separates out production and consumption, while reintegrating them in complex ways.

To show just how this happens, Harvey's first volume is dominated by an analysis of Paris from the 1848 Revolution to the Commune of 1871, although why this is selected from a range of alternative case studies is not clear. He shows how central spatial issues were in reconstituting Paris in the interests of finance capital under the state direction of Haussman. In this way, capital solved its problem of surplus, and set about reproducing itself under the most favourable conditions. Finally, class, community, individualism and the state are key loci in forming social (and urban) consciousness, and

capital manages to obfuscate its operations behind these.

The second volume, *The Urbanisation of Capital*, is where Harvey builds up his understanding of urban processes under capitalism. In essence, these processes are vitally important to capital, which 'represents itself in the form of a physical landscape created in its own image, created as use values to enhance the progressive accumulation of capital' (p. 25). Capitalism requires fixed and immobile infrastructures to facilitate production, exchange, transportation and consumption. Harvey's aim, then, is virtually to re-write Marx in order to integrate geography and space relations into his general social theory. He tries to do this by analysing land rent under capitalism, reconstituting a theory of residential differentiation, relocating urban politics in capitalist development, and treating planning simply as an aid to social reproduction.

Does Harvey succeed in his ambitious scheme? I suspect it depends upon whether or not you share his initial act of faith. His precept that the answer is to be found in Marx's own writings jars with much of the rethinking of Marxian categories which has taken place in the last two decades, particularly in urban studies. Harvey has little truck with revisionists and sceptics, who have found that the social world has changed considerably since Engels and Marx were writing. Possibly this is heresy to Harvey. This ambitious project will convince those who probably need little convincing. Those within and outwith the Marxist fold who are of a more sceptical disposition will find its immediate relevance to an understanding of contemporary issues somewhat wanting.

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Marital Violence (Sociological Review Monograph: 31) *Norman Johnson* (ed.) Routledge & Kegan Paul London 1985 195pp. £8.95 (paper)
The Family, Politics and Social Theory *D. H. J. Morgan* Routledge & Kegan Paul London 1985 320pp. £7.95 (paper)

At first glance these two books are an 'odd couple' to review together. Morgan's is a wide ranging sociological textbook concerned with a variety of intellectual and practical questions and aimed at a diverse readership. Johnson has edited a narrowly focused, interdisciplinary collection of papers on a topical social problem. Yet, upon closer inspection, not only do these two books share the same point of departure, state intervention in family life, but they overlap and complement each other in several interesting and instructive ways.

Johnson's book contains ten papers; nine discuss different aspects of male violence towards women and one reviews the lack of evidence to support the notion of a battered husband syndrome. The picture of Mr Punch striking Judy with a club on the cover of the paperback edition is entirely apt, whereas the title, Marital Violence, is not entirely accurate.

The quality of the papers is uniformly high and each one includes a useful abstract. I was especially impressed by the two research reports by three members of the Cleveland Refuge. Both contributions highlight some of the implications of male economic and physical power within marriage. More specifically, Homer, Leonard and Taylor found that 'the husband's exercise of the power of the purse and the force of the fist coincided in the lives of the vast majority of the women interviewed'. This disturbing finding is in keeping with the rest of the monograph, which basically shows that wife battering is widespread and that insufficient help is available informally and formally, hence the increase in refuges in Britain in recent years.

Notwithstanding the exceedingly brief introduction and the lack of an index, this book is a valuable contribution to an important issue that deserves to be widely read.

Morgan's book is divided into two parts; issues and themes. The former is essentially policy oriented in that it considers some of the main marital and family issues as defined by practitioners and politicians, including divorce and the medicalization of marriage. This part

also examines issues that have been neglected in the 'public' debate, issues such as class and gender inequality and conflict in family life. This part ends with an interesting, but all too brief, consideration of the social construction of divorce as a public issue. The second and longer part of Morgan's book deals with themes raised by sociologists working within different theoretical perspectives. Morgan emphasizes that he finds something of value in every approach but that his preference is for phenomenological, feminist and historical accounts of family life rather than Marxist, positivist or systems-functionalist accounts. The long and stimulating concluding chapter attempts firstly to demonstrate the links between the two parts and secondly to suggest that 'it is high time that the study of the family . . . regained a place at the centre of sociological theorising'. This view is advanced on the grounds that 'the study of the family takes us to the heart of some of the key issues in sociological theorising', issues such as the relationship between the 'individual' and 'society' and the reproduction of social formations.

Although I am not convinced about the issues/themes distinction, after all the whole text is concerned with the social construction of the family by different kinds of sociologists and non-sociologists, Morgan has written a clear, thoughtful and scholarly textbook.

In Morgan's terms male violence towards women within the family is a relatively neglected public issue. The papers edited by Johnson show that it is not so much neglected as transformed by state intervention into a manageable, depoliticized social problem. It is within this context that social scientists in general, and sociologists in particular, on the evidence of these two excellent books, have a critical and significant contribution to offer the 'public' debate on family life.

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Max Weber and German Politics 1890–1920 *Wolfgang J. Mommsen* University of Chicago Press 1985 498pp. £47.50

Theory of Liberty, Legitimacy and Power: New Directions in the Intellectual and Scientific Legacy of Max Weber *Vatro Murvar* (ed.) Routledge & Kegan Paul 1985 264pp. £20.00

A Weber-Marx Dialogue *Robert J. Antonio and Ronald M. Glassman* (eds) University Press of Kansas 1985 334pp. $29.95

Books on Max Weber keep rolling in. Fortunately, judging from those under review, their ever-mounting number is not associated with a decrease in the competence and relevance of the work producing them. On the contrary, my general impression is that the 'costs of entry' into Weberian scholarship, as it were, have been increasing, and that the great majority of the contributors to the two collections listed above have paid them in full. Their knowledge of the Weberian *corpus* is, on the whole, impressive, and they seem aware of the attendant difficulties of interpretation, as well of the wider theoretical bearing of those specific questions they have chosen to address.

The Mommsen book, of course, has long since been recognized as a milestone in the critical reconstruction of Weber's intellectual biography. Its first edition appeared in 1959, and caused considerable controversy; by the time he produced its second edition (1974), the author was able to amplify and strengthen the argument, noting that it been largely confirmed both by new primary evidence and by recent secondary work, and restating it at some length against his critics in an important Afterword. The present translation is based on that edition, whose bibliography it reproduces photostatically. While regretting its shattering price, I can only salute it as a boon to those students of Weber who would not otherwise have access to this important work (which I reviewed in the *BJS* in 1975).

One strength of both the other books under review lies in the fact that each possesses a *relatively* distinctive theme, and thus counters the tendency of such collections to wander all over the place. Murvar, who at the University of

Wisconsin (Madison) runs a unit which organises colloquia and symposia about Max Weber, and who has recently edited a valuable bibliography on 'the living legacy' of Max Weber, has selected 'liberty, legitimacy and power' as the theme of his collection. As he observes, the first of the three terms has not attracted the same attention as the others from students of Weber; but his introductory statement and his own two other contributions to the volume (one on the concept of patrimonialism, one on its application by Weber to the study of China and Islam) suggest that a systematic attention to 'liberty' can pay dividends in the re-examination of the other two terms. Of the other contributions to this volume, I found particularly valuable Thomas Burger's restatement of Weber's conceptual treatment of stratification (11–39), and particularly stimulating David C. Yu's exploration of the bearing upon *Maoism* of Weber's views concerning *Confucianism* (141–167) and K. Peter Etzkorn's restatement (and application to some contemporary musical tendencies) of Weber's views concerning the rationalization of the arts (125–138). Antonio and Glassman reflect in their Introduction that among the numerous interventions in the so-called 'dialogue of Weber with the ghost of Marx', most 'use Marx as a baseline for interpreting Weber's contributions', and commit their volume to reversing that perspective 'by viewing issues in Marxist thought against a Weberian backdrop'. The distinction is perhaps an overly subtle one, for a few of the contributions Antonio and Glassman have assembled do not reflect that reversal, but are none the worse for that. The important points are on the one hand that the average quality of the contributions is high; and on the other that in their different ways most of them avoid 'Weberian and Marxian orthodoxies, which too often have perpetuated a totally oppositional view' of the two principals in question.

Here, I will just mention those contributions to this volume I have found most rewarding to read. Gerd Schroeter reviews the express indications in Weber's writings of his awareness of and interest in Marx (2–19). Stephen Kalberg distances himself somewhat from the book's eponymous theme to inquire into the nature and types of those 'ideal interests' which, according to a famous statement of Weber's, together with 'material interests,' power the actions of individuals (46–67). Johannes Weiss provides a preview of the English edition of his study of the reception and critique of Weber on the part of eastern European Marxists (117–133). Jurgen Kocka's excellent comparison of the meta-methodological assumptions and strategies of Marx and of Weber was well worth reprinting (134–166). Guenther Roth has collated a number of texts of the two authors which bear (in sometimes striking ways) upon the contemporary situation of the USA, and gives some indication of the results of his current inquiry into the persistence of patrimonialism in contemporary political systems (215–233). (In his collection, Murvar makes the same point – but, to my mind, does not differentiate sufficiently between traditional and modern patrimonialism). Ira J. Cohen correctly perceives 'the underemphasis on democracy in Marx and Weber', and suggests that its correction may mobilize insights produced, instead, by Tocqueville and Durkheim (274–295).

Even this bare listing of topics may suggest to the reader what a substantial contribution these two volumes make to the advancement of Weberian (and, in one case, Marxian) scholarship.

Gianfranco Poggi
University of Edinburgh

Relativism and the Social Sciences
Ernest Gellner Cambridge University Press 1985 200pp. £22.50

This latest volume of Gellner's collected writings contains seven items, mostly on philosophical themes. Included are two previously unpublished essays. The first and longest of these, *Positivism against Hegelianism*, considers the strengths and limitations of positivist/empiricist approaches to the understanding of social phenomena, and discusses various themes in the philosophy of Karl Popper, especi-

ally in relation to the question, is Popper a positivist? (answered affirmatively). Other essays deal with the concept of rational behaviour; with the problem of relativism (can there be universally and objectively valid explanations of human behaviour?); and with the scientific status of the social sciences. Also included are a useful expository piece: *What is structuralism?* and two reviews of books on anthropological theory and Wittgensteinian philosophy, by Jack Goody and Saul Kripke respectively.

Although most of these essays deal with philosophical issues they are not philosophical papers in the narrow sense. They were written for mainly non-specialist readerships, and are discursive and often chatty in style. Gellner's own views are trenchantly expressed, and he uses some colourful metaphors to dramatize his arguments. Philosophers, it is claimed, do not know the secret of science', which is the 'Sacred Fire' of our civilization, guaranteeing the 'totally unique' cognitive growth of the modern era.

These essays include, among other things, some thought-provoking counter-arguments to some currently fashionable tendencies (e.g. the tendency to 'sociologise' scientific progress). They provide some entertaining and instructive reading for philosophically-inclined sociologists, and a useful introduction to some of the central questions in the philosophy of the social sciences.

Phil Bacon
University of Hull

New Jerusalem: the Labour Party and the Economics of Democratic Socialism *Elizabeth Durbin* Routledge & Kegan Paul 1985 341pp. £16.95

Labour Party revisionists are usually presented – indeed often present themselves – as the grey pragmatic realists in contrast to their utopian, sometimes millenarian, comrades to the left. This applies *a fortiori* to the field of technical economic policy. It therefore comes as an interesting surprise to find a book on the development of revisionist economic thinking in the 1930s that conveys the sense of fervour and excitement implied by its title. This is possible, at least in part, because of the work's unusual provenance. The author is not an historian or political biographer, the usual sources of studies of this kind, but a professional economist, for whom developments in Marshallian or Pigovian theory are genuinely engrossing and communicable matters. Further, she is the daughter of one of the main protagonists in the story. Evan Durbin, the economist and friend of Hugh Gaitskell. He became a junior Minister in the 1945 Labour Government and had a bright political future ahead of him when, in 1948, he drowned trying to save the life of his daughter, the author's sister.

This book is therefore itself a poignant event. The author, having spent several years as an academic economist in the USA, returned to Britain in the mid 1970s to rake over the papers of her father, Gaitskell, Hugh Dalton, John Maynard Keynes and others, and to talk to several of their associates, like Douglas Jay or James Meade, who are still very active. Not only was she seeing in letters, hand-written notes, conference jottings and the reminiscences of elderly men the living development of theories and ideas that she and the rest of her generation had already come to know through text-book distillations; she was also doing this at the very time that the Keynesian politico-economic framework whose erection she was studying was coming under severe, perhaps fatal, strain. And the form of democratic socialism whose emergence was being described was being rejected, at least temporarily, by the Party that had been its traditional custodian.

It probably takes a fairly dramatic context to render enthralling an account that draws heavily on half-century-old minutes of Fabian Society research committees, but such a context is certainly here. Dr Durbin conveys to us something of the experience of those earnest young upper-middle-class socialist dons when they began to realize the implications for their adopted cause of the new developments in economic theory. In 1931 the Labour Party had suffered the nightmare

of the Macdonald-Snowden split, an election disaster and the realisation that it really had no policies to deal with the crisis of capitalism that should have given it its central appeal. Similarly bereft of policies, colleagues in central Europe were about to suffer the onslaught of Nazism. But then Keynes and his associates began to circulate early drafts of their ideas; a little later Scandinavian social democracy began to put similar ideas into practice. There was scope for democratic socialism; it was possible to start discussing the myriad of detailed, technical policies that could construct the route to a better world.

It is often claimed that Keynesian policies only found their way into British political practice by accident, as a result of war-time experience after 1940. This book demonstrates conclusively that the rising generation of Labour economists and politicians had grasped the detailed implications of the Keynesian revolution and its adaptability to democratic socialism as soon as the ink of the *General Theory* was dry. Less convincing are her claims for socialist planning. Neither during Evan Durbin's lifetime or since has the Labour Party really produced detailed ideas for economic planning that either integrate government involvement with innovation and active marketing, or reconcile planning targets with autonomous trade unions under full employment. Perhaps it is in the nature of New Jerusalems to evade attainment.

Colin Crouch
Trinity College, Oxford

Skilled Workers in the Class Structure
Roger Penn Cambridge University Press 1985 259 pp. £25

Roger Penn aims to fill a gap left by studies of the British class structure. Whereas empirical surveys, on the one hand, have investigated with great thoroughness groups like unskilled manual workers and white-collar workers, but have unaccountably over-looked the upper level of the manual working class itself, various classical accounts of class structure, on the other, have defined skilled workers as some sort of labour aristocracy, but have often been unevenly researched. Hence Penn's intention to provide a soundly based empirical account of the class location of skilled manual workers. His research compiles data on a single town, Rochdale, over the period 1856–1964, and focuses on skilled workers in the town's two main industries, cotton and engineering. Economic and social dimensions of class are examined — the former indicated by trade union structure and wage differentials, and the latter by patterns of intermarriage.

Rather than put forward a central hypothesis, Penn's method is to derive models from the literature – on homogeneity versus sectionalism in the working class, on deskilling, and so forth — and test these against his data. He is particularly hostile to those (mainly Marxist) theories which argue for sweeping rhythms of change. And, indeed, his own findings show a marked stability over time as regards the defence of skills and pay differentials, together with a similarly continuous pattern of marital endogamy within the manual working class as a whole. Thus the notion of a 'traditional' working class that has declined as regards homogeneity is rejected, as is the Braverman deskilling thesis, while versions of the labour aristocracy thesis — that skilled workers would merge with the lower middle class, or conversely be submerged into the working class — are also opposed. Penn notes that though skill and pay differentials have not narrowed, neither has the tendency declined for skilled workers to marry within the manual working class — thus disposing of what is taken as a common Marxist position, that economic structuring translates into social structuring.

This said, I think one must have certain reservations principally about the representativeness of the data. The lack of any evidence of decline in the market situation of skilled workers — one of the chief findings — has to be set against very clear evidence in the engineering industry at least of massive deskilling nationally. Yet on Penn's own account Rochdale is exceptional, a sort of backwater where competitive small firms

and traditional practices survived (at least until the 1960s). So the challenge to the deskilling thesis amounts to little in the end. Deviant cases cannot be used to disprove the rule.

Nevertheless, many of the other findings stand up much better, while the study as a whole provides useful material on key theories in the sociology of industrial society. It will certainly become an important source for analyses of class, labour market and labour process alike.

Robin Fincham,
Napier College, Edinburgh.

Consensus and Conflict: Essays in Political Sociology *Seymour Martin Lipset* Transaction Books New Brunswick New Jersey USA 1985 375 pp. n.p.

This book brings together eleven articles written by Lipset, two in collaboration, over the last fifteen years or so. Analysing social and political conflict constellations in the west during the past two centuries in comparative perspective, Lipset examines the structural conditions which have influenced both political processes and party systems as well as social movements and the values and ideologies they articulate. Taken together the articles propose an explanatory schema for political behaviour in industrial and post-industrial societies. Both types of society are distinguished by Lipset in terms of the technological level of production and the resulting occupational structure, and their stratification is analysed in terms of economic life chances and status while neglecting power-relations encompassing and influencing stratification.

In industrial society the conflict constellations within which party politics, party systems, and specific types of voter alignments emerged are constituted by the struggle over the distribution of income and wealth, together with religious denomination and the nature of the Church–state relation, the importance of agriculture *vis-à-vis* industry and centre-periphery conflicts. The timing and character of the extension of the franchise, the structure of the system of interest representation and the 'public' in general, the electoral system, the form of the decision-making arena, and the internal structure and organizational capacity of the parties made for the transformation of these social cleavages into nationally distinct party systems. When the working-class parties entered into the political arena demanding political and economic rights, the decisive contrasts among the party systems had already emerged around the other three cleavages. According to Lipset, the social and political structure already in existence before the last phase of mass mobilization influenced the character of the working-class parties and their position within the party system. To explain the radical or reformist character of working-class politics, for example, Lipset points to the decisive importance of status rigidity and the timing of suffrage and union recognition. He concludes that the more ossified the status system of a society and the later the economic and political integration of the working class the more likely is a radical working-class politics.

By the 1920s each country had developed a specific party system and a distinct type of voter alignment that remained frozen until the 1960s. The development of a new occupational structure produced a revamped political constellation in 'postindustrial society'. While in industrial society the different contenders in the increasingly important struggle over the distribution of wealth and income shared a common cultural commitment to material welfare, this value consensus broke down in post-industrial society with the growing importance of intellectual occupations. As the intelligentsia pressed for implementing postmaterialist values, the conflict over social issues polarized the left. While the old left is still concerned with bread-and-butter issues over the material standard of living of the less prosperous, the new left is concerned with the quality of life. The key issue dividing these two groups is economic growth, with the former emphasizing the material benefits of growth and the latter decrying its harmful consequences for the quality of life.

The overall argument that class posi-

tion is not the decisive causal factor in political behaviour is also put forward in Lipset's analysis of social movements. In particular Lipset points to status deterioration as explaining 'backlash politics': groups whose position and status are threatened by social and cultural change harken back to the values of an idealized past in an attempt to protect their interests and soothe their anxiety in a troubled world. In this analysis the 'world view' of those involved in a reactionary revolt against modernity is related to their position and interests within society at large. This concern for the structural conditions under which specific groups in society come to hold specific values not shared by all members of society is also manifest in Lipset's analysis of the ideology of working-class movements and the postmaterialist values of the new left. Here value systems and value commitments are seen as a sociological problem that has to be explained. On the other hand, however, Lipset also has the notion of a dominant value system as an explanatory variable. In answering the question, for example, why Americans who wish to be politically dramatic so often resort to violence, Lipset points to the 'ends-oriented' American culture that positively sanctions the achievement of socially accepted goals and is less concerned with the means by which they are achieved. This disregard for means is also linked to the prevalence of moralist attitudes among Americans, stemming from the country's Protestant sectarian origin, which lead to a desire 'to attain and institutionalize virtue or destroy evil people and wicked institutions and practices' (319).

We may surmise that the notion of shared values also underlies Lipset's thesis that 'serious social scientists of diverse theoretical persuasions tend to find comparable answers to similar questions' (p.5). In particular, he argues that there is a convergence of views on concepts such as change, conflict, equilibrium, functional analysis, structural contradiction, evolution, and social stratification, with occupation and status identified as the key dimensions of the latter. He sees the difference between Marxist and non-Marxist social thinkers as simply a moral cleavage between those with and those without a 'revolutionary orientation'. Lipset feels this moral conflict operates within an overall consensus on 'comparable answers'. This argument for convergence in social science, advanced through the application of a value consensus approach to the social science community, ignores, however, all methodological differences. In summary, Lipset appears to posit a dualistic role for value systems. He tends to invoke value consensus as an explanation for social phenomena, while employing social phenomena to explain particularistic value commitments.

Lipset employs a deductive method. His chapters begin with a model or hypothesis which proposes a specific relationship or relationships between a small number of variables. Logical categories are then deduced from the model or hypothesis. The historical evidence is then presented as fitting the logical categories. Lipset provides no tests to alternative models or hypotheses against the evidence. He therefore runs the danger of construing empirical reality to fit the logical categories of his model, rather than the other way around.

The publication of these articles as a collection reminds us of Lipset's willingness to take on the daunting task of explaining western political developments. He is able to introduce a kind of system into the bewildering complexity, reducing the vast array of political behaviours into a relatively small number of descriptive categories, and identifying the structural variables which underlie these categories. In sum, Lipset's work, although examining the past, is not properly speaking an historical analysis but may be characterized as an investigation of structural variables to explain politics in mobilized western polities.

Roland Axtmann
and Benjamin Wall

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
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


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Published quarterly by the Proprietors
ROUTLEDGE & KEGAN PAUL LTD
11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE
and 29 West 35th Street, New York, N.Y. 10001
for the LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE
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Second Class Postage paid at Rahway, NJ. Postmaster: send address corrections to *British Journal of Sociology* c/o Mercury Airfreight International Ltd Inc., 101 Englehard Avenue, Avenel, NJ 07001, USA

Note

Subscription rate for Volume 38, 1987 is £32.00 (US $55) for institutions, £26 (US $38) for individuals. Special rates are available for members of the BSA and ASA. Single copies and back issues £9.50 (US $17). American subscription rate includes air service.

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Printed in Great Britain by
Redwood Burn Ltd., Trowbridge, Wiltshire, and
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Subscription Rates Volume 2, 1987
Individuals: £9.50 (UK) £12.50 (overseas) US$19 (N. America & Japan)
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Vic Duke and Stephen Edgell

The operationalisation of class in British sociology: theoretical and empirical considerations*

ABSTRACT

This research note is a contribution to an important on-going debate in British sociology on the operationalisation of class. A comprehensive framework is proposed based on three interrelated choices. All three choices have both theoretical and empirical elements. First, researchers must choose which conceptual scheme to employ — conventional occupational class or neo-Marxist social class categories. Second, what is to be the unit of analysis — the respondent or the household? Third, what is to be the degree of coverage? — whether or not to include the economically inactive. Consideration of all three choices is followed by a discussion of their interrelations and consequences. We suggest an extended version of Erikson's solution which incorporates not only the unit of analysis decision but also the degree of coverage decision. Thus a respondent based measure covering the economically active only is appropriate for studies of production behaviour and attitudes (work position).

Alternatively, a household based measure inclusive of the economically inactive is appropriate for studies of consumption behaviour and attitudes (market or class position). Acceptance of the extended Erikson solution leaves only the choice of conceptual scheme. Our indicated preference is for social class on both theoretical and empirical grounds. Finally, we recommend several ways of improving the quality of datasets with regard to the problem of operationalising class.

During recent years a lively and important debate has developed in British sociology concerning the operationalisation of class, arguably the most central concept in the discipline. So far the debate has fragmented theoretical considerations and the empirical appraisal of them. Thus neo-Marxists have revived the issue of social versus occupational class and feminists have stimulated discussion of the

unit of class analysis. In addition, contributions to both these and related issues have tended to ignore each other at the empirical level.

As part of a wider research project concerned with changes in the social and political effects of the public expenditure cuts in Britain (Edgell and Duke 1981 and 1985), we have considered the relative advantages and disadvantages of various ways of operationalising class. Our investigations to date suggest that in order to operationalise class, researchers need to make three interrelated fundamental choices. At the theoretical level each choice involves both conceptual and technical considerations (see Figure I).

The first choice is which *conceptual scheme* (and, by implication, theoretical framework) to employ, i.e. conventional occupational class or neo-Marxist social class. The second and third choices concern to whom the class categories should be applied. This entails two linked but distinct decisions: (a) should the *unit of class analysis* be the respondent/individual or the household/family?; and (b) what is to be the *degree of coverage* of the population? In other words, should the classification be based solely upon the economically active respondents/household members or on all adult respondents/ household members? Each of these three key choices will be considered separately and in terms of their interrelationships. The purpose of this research note is to provide a comprehensive and integrated account of all the issues that are relevant to both theoretical and empirical levels of analysis. Inevitably the choices prove to be not as simply dichotomous as they have appeared in the ongoing debate of the operationalisation of class in British sociology.

I THE CONCEPTUAL SCHEME: OCCUPATIONAL CLASS VERSUS SOCIAL CLASS

There is a confusing and annoying tendency in the presentation of British empirical research to use the label '*social class*' when the data employed are based on *occupational class* categories (i.e. the Registrar General's social classes). We use the term *social class* exclusively to refer to the neo-Marxist categories such as those advocated by Erik Olin Wright that are based on divisions within the social relations of production (see Wright 1985). By *occupational class* we mean the use of categories based primarily on positions within the technical relations of production (i.e. occupations) and comprising a small number of classes, e.g. the Goldthorpe seven-class scheme or the Butler and Stokes six-class modification of the Institute of Practitioners in Advertising's social grade classification (for both see Reid 1981 and Marsh 1986a). The term *occupational status* we reserve for occupational prestige scales usually comprising several hundred categories, e.g. the full Hope-Goldthorpe scale.[1] Kelley and McAllister (1985) recently

FIGURE 1: *The three choices in operationalising class: conceptual and technical elements*

Choice	*Conceptual element*	*Technical element*
1. Conceptual scheme	*What is the basis of class?* Occupational class based on divisions within technical relations of production *versus* Social class based on divisions within social relations of production	*Which particular operational scheme?* Occupational class, e.g.s = Registrar General, Butler and Stokes, Goldthorpe. *versus* Social class, e.g.s = Erik Olin Wright mark I, II and III
2. Unit of analysis	*What is the appropriate unit of class analysis?* The household or family *versus* The respondent or individual	*Which method of measuring household class?* Single indicator, e.g. head of household or combinations or dominance *versus* Multiple indicators
3. Degree of coverage	*Who is included in class analysis?* Economically active only *versus* Include inactive as well	*Which definitions of economically active and inactive?* Economically active: full/part time boundary *versus* Economically inactive: same or different rules for retired, housewives, unemployed, etc.

presented an almost identical distinction between three separate aspects of class: (a) the categorical blue/white collar cleavage; (b) an occupational status continuum; and (c) conflict aspects, e.g. ownership and authority (i.e. social class).

The conceptual scheme decision is a fundamental theoretical choice between opposed schools with different views as to the nature of class in advanced capitalist society. Generally, occupational class schemes give primacy to the manual/non-manual boundary and then further subdivide according to varying skill levels within each category.[2] By contrast, social class schemes emphasise the owner/ non-owner distinction and then further subdivide on the basis of control over labour.[3]

Many sociologists have argued that the manual/non-manual cleavage is the basic structural fault in advanced capitalist societies (e.g. King and Raynor 1981; Roberts *et al.* 1977). Similarly, Kelley and McAllister (1985) have stated that the blue/white collar distinction is the dominant conception of class in political science. Occupational class dominates empirical social research in Britain. For example, the vast majority of articles (90 per cent) containing empirical data with class as a variable in the three main British sociology journals (*British Journal of Sociology*, *Sociological Review* and *Sociology*) over the period 1980–84 utilise some form of the conventional conceptual scheme based on occupational class categories.[4]

However, following a mounting tide of criticisms, a recent literature review by Newby *et al.* (1985) concluded that there is much less confidence that the manual/non-manual boundary is the most salient or meaningful distinction. Westergaard and Resler (1975) have pointed out that the conventional distinction worked better for some variables than for others. More specifically, Parkin (1979) has suggested that it is only within the framework of factory conflict (a declining fraction of work situations) that the traditional cleavage corresponds to the line of social confrontation. Several authors have stressed the inadequacy of conventional occupational scales for women (e.g. Dale *et al.*, 1985; Dex 1985; Heath and Britten 1984). Stewart *et al.* (1980) have also challenged the conventional use of occupation as an indicator of class, but their argument centres on the failure to accommodate the dynamic nature of career structures.

Which particular operational scheme? The choice between whether occupational or social class is most consistent with the researchers' theoretical position is not the end of the decision making. Each of the two conceptual schemes has given rise in practice to a variety of alternative operational schemes. Interestingly, some researchers recently have even advocated a combination of the two.

(a) *Occupational class* The three occupational class schemes most

commonly used by British social scientists in recent years are the Registrar General's 'social' classes (Boston 1980; Leete and Fox 1977), derivations from the Hope-Goldthorpe class scheme (Goldthorpe and Hope 1974; Goldthorpe *et al.* 1980) and Butler and Stokes' social grade classification as used in the British Election Study (Butler and Stokes 1974; Kahan *et al.* 1966). Just as the Registrar General's scheme has come to dominate official statistics, so political science has tended to follow Butler and Stokes and sociology some form of Goldthorpe. All three require information on both occupational unit group and employment status. In each case the final class categories involve some merging of different employment statuses into the same class category. For instance, social grade A contains large employers, large managers, higher professionals and higher administrators.

(b) *Social class* Wright has had a profound influence on the development of social class categories based on the *social relations of production* as an alternative to occupational class categories based on the *technical relations of production.* This is partly because his theoretical scheme is more readily operationalised than those of Carchedi (1977) and Poulantzas (1975). Wright's original formulation, utilised in his earlier empirical work (Wright and Perrone 1977; Wright 1978), comprised four basic locations — employer, petty bourgeois, controller of labour (i.e. manager or supervisor) and worker.[5] Subsequently Wright mark II introduced further elaborations such as the subdivision of manager and supervisor, and the introduction of small employer and semi-autonomous worker categories (Wright *et al.* 1982).[6]

In his latest book, Wright mark III (1985) has considerably revised his typology of class locations in a capitalist society. The revised typology is divided into two parts; one for owners and one for non-owners of the means of production. Within the latter part locations are distinguished by two subordinate relations of exploitation characteristic of capitalist society, i.e. 'organisation assets and skill/credential assets' (1985:87). This reconceptualisation considerably increases the complexity of 'new middle class' contradictory locations and their theoretical-political status in his neo-Marxist general theory and introduces a neo-Weberian element (Giddens 1985; Carter 1986; Rose and Marshall 1986).

(c) *Social class and occupational class combined* Recently attempts have been made to combine elements of both conceptual schemes. Dunleavy and Husbands (1985) use the basic Wright scheme of four classes but then subdivide the controllers and workers by the traditional manual/non-manual cleavage. Penn and Dawkins (1983) similarly amend the basic scheme by (i) placing professionals and administrators in the intermediate coordinators' category along with

managers and supervisors, and (ii) subdividing workers into routine white collar and skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled manual.

2. THE UNIT OF ANALYSIS: RESPONDENT OR HOUSEHOLD

This choice forms the first part of the decision as to whom to apply the occupational class or social class categories. Is the appropriate unit of class analysis the respondent/individual or the household/ family?

The case for a *respondent* based indicator is a simple one. It is argued that a study of respondent attitudes and behaviour should logically be analysed in terms of the direct experience of the respondent. For instance, Stanworth (1984) suggests that the direct occupational experience of working wives is more relevant to their class action than the occupational experience of their husbands.

On the other hand, several prominent British theorists on social stratification are insistent that the *household* (family) rather than the individual is the appropriate unit of class analysis (e.g. Giddens 1980; Goldthorpe 1984; Parkin 1971). The main argument advanced in favour of a household measure is that the family/household acts as the basic unit of economic strategy both in terms of production (i.e. whether or not the spouse works) and consumption. It is in this sense that Goldthorpe (1983) asserts that lines of class division run between rather than through families.

Interestingly, our open-ended qualitative data on respondent reactions to the spending cuts clearly reveal that such reactions are based not only on direct personal experience but also on events in the life of *significant others* in the household. The class and sectoral locations of both the respondent and others in the household proved important (see Edgell and Duke 1986b). For instance, the fact that the respondent's husband was an employer or that the respondent's wife was a nurse in the public sector had a marked influence on attitudes and behaviour. An analogous point can be found in Stanworth (1984), who argues that the conditioning of employment experience can occur from wife to husband as well as from husband to wife (see also Dex 1985).

In our view, the most instructive contribution to the respondent versus household debate has been that of Erikson (1984). His solution suggests that both measures are appropriate but in different circumstances. Erikson proposes two class concepts, one work-related with individuals as the unit of classification, and one market-related with families as the unit of classification; he calls these work position and class position respectively. He argues that the work position relates uniquely to the individual and thus empirical research concerned with production behaviour/attitudes should use a respondent based indicator of class. By contrast, the class position refers to the family or

household, so that the relevant indicator in studies of consumption behaviour/attitudes should be a household measure.[7] His empirical evidence from Sweden corroborates that taking the occupation of both spouses into account explains more of the variation in family class position than merely taking one of the spouses (however defined).

Which method of measuring household class? Application to the *respondent* is the most straightforward procedure to operationalise, although some authors have suggested the complication of employing different occupational categories for women than for men (e.g. Arber *et al.* 1984; Murgatroyd 1984). Selection of the *household* option involves the further decision of which indicator is most appropriate, i.e. whether to utilise head of household (usually male), a joint classification (or combinations in Erikson's terminology) of household members, or the dominant member of the household (not necessarily male).[8] Alternatively, Dex (1985) has advocated recently the use of multiple indicators to accommodate the influence of different members of the household.

Where there is only one adult in a household the operational procedure is unproblematic and indeed identical to a respondent based indicator. However, where there is more than one adult in the household, and if the two (or more) adults are in different class locations, the question arises as to which should determine the household class measure.

There has been no shortage of advocates for basing household class location on the *male head of household* (e.g. Bechhofer 1969; Goldthorpe 1983). We reject this option on the grounds of sexist bias. Where the male head procedure is combined with the use of occupational class (as has frequently been the case), many critics have argued that this tends to conceal the extensive sex discrimination in the labour market (e.g. Delphy 1981; West 1978). This is not to argue against household measures *per se* but merely that there is no inherent *a priori* reason why the household location should always be determined by the male. Stanworth (1984) reveals that significantly only 19 per cent of men in the labour force now provide sole financial support for a wife and dependent offspring.

An alternative procedure which takes both spouses into account is to employ a system of *joint classification*. Britten and Heath (1983) utilise a scheme where the occupational locations of both spouses are incorporated into the classification. They thereby enumerate that 20 per cent of the British class structure is comprised of cross-class families in terms of the manual/non-manual divide. Goldthorpe (1983) is strongly critical of the notion of cross-class families. He cites the frequency with which women move between manual and non-manual jobs as support for the view that this movement does not represent a shift in class location. Moreover, movement of one of the

spouses into/out of the labour market adds to the amount of spurious class mobility generated by the joint classification system. It is possible that a joint classification system based on social class categories may be of more utility but we share the reservations outlined above regarding such a system based on occupational class.

The third possibility is to consider all adult members of the household and then locate the household/family according to the principle of *dominance*. In the USA, Haug (1973) argued for the allocation of families to the 'social' class level (in fact the indicators were occupation and education combined) of the higher of the marriage partners. More recently, Erikson (1984) has advocated classifying households according to the highest occupational class in the family unit. Application of the dominance principle for household measures of class allows the husband *or* wife *or* significant other in the household to determine the class location of the household. Support for Erikson's dominance approach has been advanced on both theoretical and empirical grounds in the context of the debate on women and class analysis (Goldthorpe 1984; Goldthorpe and Payne 1986). Criticism of Erikson has been directed at the many assumptions he makes in the construction of his class index (Roberts 1986). We have extended the use of the dominance method to social class categories in previous papers (Edgell and Duke 1986a and 1986b). The 'highest' is classified in descending order from employer, through petty bourgeois and controller to worker.

There are, however, several important arguments against the dominance method. *First*, the method requires a hierarchical class scheme with a clear order of dominance. It is thus appropriate for the Butler and Stokes social grade scheme but less so for Wright's social class mark III and for Goldthorpe's seven-class scheme. Both of the latter schemes are comprised of qualitatively distinct class locations, with top and bottom classes clearly defined but the dominance order in the contradictory locations/intermediate class is less apparent. *Second*, a single dominance measure of household class loses information on the distinctive components of the household, as Dex (1985) has pointed out. For instance, a three petty bourgeois household is qualitatively different from a household with one petty bourgeois and two workers. *Third*, the empirical effect of using the dominance method is to reduce the size of the working class. This is because the dominance principle is applied upwards rather than downwards. For example, in the case of our panel sample, Wright's working class category decreases from 56 per cent of respondents to 37 per cent of households when the latter are classified on a dominance basis and Goldthorpe's working class decreases to only 10 per cent!

The final alternative is to include the class location of *both respondent and others in the household* in the form of multiple indicators. Dex (1985) has argued that a set of variables are preferable to a single household

indicator in that they describe more accurately the location and circumstances of a household. This solution allows the influence of either or both to be displayed in the analysis. The use of multiple indicators also copes better with the frequent existence in research data sets of more detailed information on the respondent than the spouse, and more detailed information on the spouse than on others in the household (cf. Wright, 1985). Often the respondent does not know the finer details of the work position of others in the household. The number of categories can be varied with multiple indicators to accommodate the differing levels of information. In short, the multiple indicator approach has many advantages and is therefore now our preferred method.

3. THE DEGREE OF COVERAGE: ALL ADULTS OR THE ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE ONLY

A second element in the choice of whom is to be classified is whether to include or exclude the economically inactive. The decision is complicated further by the existence of different degrees of economic activity/inactivity. Economic activity is divided conventionally into full-time and part-time work with a variable boundary line depending on the purpose of the research. There are even more types of economic inactivity which range from the permanently inactive (i.e. retired and disabled), through the possibly temporarily inactive (i.e. unemployed and housewife) to the temporarily inactive (i.e. student). Interestingly, the practice of excluding unpaid housework (and therefore women) from the official definition of economic activity dates from the 1881 Census in Britain (Hakim 1980).

A pragmatic justification for the *economically active only* option rests on its convenience and comparability; the former in that it obviates the necessity to decide what to do with the various inactive categories and the latter because of the preponderance of previous research employing this option. A case can also be made for this option on more valid theoretical grounds by extending the Erikson solution outlined previously in section 2. Thus, where the purpose of the research is to examine production behaviour/attitudes the appropriate class operationalisation procedure is to include economically active respondents only.

A general criticism of all studies that exclude economically inactive adults is their resultant restrictive and distorted view of the class structure. If only the economically active are included in class analysis, then just over 40 per cent of the adult population in Britain are excluded (Central Statistical Office 1985). Similarly, restriction to economically active males excludes fully 65 per cent of the adult population. Generalisations about the class structure and class

relationships are likely to be less than 'totally' valid when they are based on such a small and unrepresentative section of the adult population.

The case for classifying the *economically inactive* (wherever possible) by their previous class location is thus a strong one. With regard to housewives, Heath and Britten (1984) have documented their attachments to particular kinds of work such that their potential labour market participation is identical to their previous occupational class position.

We therefore support the view (cf. Erikson) that all households are implicated in the class structure. Movements into/out of the labour market should not automatically change the class location of the household (cf. Goldthorpe 1984). Thus a move into domestic labour, unemployment or retirement does not result in the respondent/family 'falling off' the edge of the class structure to become 'non-persons' and thereby be excluded from the empirical analysis of class. The current record numbers of both unemployed and retired in Britain serve to underline the salience of the point.

We are now in a position to extend the Erikson solution to incorporate the degree of coverage decision as well as the unit of analysis decision. In his article the latter is explicitly stated whilst the former is only implicit. Thus empirical research into production behaviour/attitudes (work position) should employ a respondent based measure of class *and* also cover the economically active only (hereafter REA, i.e. respondent economically active). On the other hand, empirical studies of consumption behaviour/attitudes (class position) should utilise a household measure of class *and* also include the economically inactive (hereafter HALL, i.e. household all). Depending on the purpose of the research, the extended Erikson solution provides answers to two of the three choices involved in operationalising class. The remaining choice is that of occupational class versus social class, to which we will return later.

Which definition of economically active and inactive? Studies which utilise a respondent based measure for the *economically active* only must decide straightforwardly whether or not to include part-timers. Equivalent household based measures may face the additional problem of households where one (or more) adult is working full-time and one (or more) part-time. Erikson (1984) discusses the possibility that the occupations of those that work full-time should dominate the occupations of those that work part-time. However, in his empirical analysis, this household full-time dominance indicator fared slightly worse than a dominance measure ignoring the full-time/part-time distinction.

Dale *et al.* (1985) propose that occupation is not an appropriate basis for the allocation of class location to those not directly involved

in the labour market. An alternative proposal is to classify the *economically inactive* by their previous occupational or social class location. Such a method is readily applicable to the retired and housewives/unemployed who have worked previously but not to students or housewives/unemployed who have never worked.

There is a strong case for classifying the *retired* by their previous occupational or social class. Since pensions are occupationally related, earned inequalities are perpetuated beyond retirement (Reid 1981). Bechhofer (1969) underlined the importance of classifying the previous main job rather than simply the last job which may have been a part-time semi-retirement position. Erikson (1984) categorises his retired Swedes by their previous main occupational class. We have applied the same principle to social class categories on the grounds that retired employers retain their material advantages over, and different values from, retired workers (Edgell and Duke 1985 and 1986b).

Less agreement is apparent over the classification of *housewives*. Erikson does not include housewives' previous occupation in his household measure. It has been argued that last occupation is a good predictor for unwaged women (Heath and Britten 1984), although others have suggested that 'when only the most recent occupation is available this provides a poorer indication of class position than the occupation held prior to their first child's birth' (Arber *et al.* 1986: 58).

A similar dilemma exists regarding the classification of the *unemployed*. Bechhofer (1969) suggested a distinction between the temporary and long-term unemployed with only the former to be categorised by previous occupation. More recently, some researchers have treated the unemployed as a separate underclass in their operationalisation. This strategy has been applied with both the Hope-Goldthorpe classes (Lovatt and Ham 1984) and social class categories (Hagan and Albonetti 1982). The growth in the number of teenagers on some form of state work training scheme (e.g. YTS) has highlighted the need for a separate category of economic status to cover this group.

SUMMARY OF INTERRELATIONS BETWEEN CHOICES AND OF THE EXTENDED ERIKSON SOLUTION

It is important to recognise the interrelatedness and consequences of the operational choices. The alternative procedures have different implications for the shape and character of the class structure. For instance, the size of the working class is larger when using social class than it is with occupational class, whatever the combination of unit of analysis and degree of coverage. Furthermore, REA procedures provide a much narrower definition of what constitutes the class

structure than do HALL procedures, irrespective of which conceptual scheme is employed. For instance, with our panel we are able to allocate 59 per cent to a class category using REA compared with fully 100 per cent using HALL.

Even more restrictive is the frequent practice of sampling REA males only. The dominance of this procedure in recent British sociology is corroborated by the fact that four of the major book length empirical studies of stratification in Britain employ it (Goldthorpe *et al.* 1969; Goldthorpe *et al.* 1980; Roberts *et al.* 1977; Stewart *et al.* 1980). The feminist critique that much of British sociology in the area of stratification is based on partial analyses of economically active males has therefore considerable empirical support.

As a final example, the restricted procedure based on economically active males only will *either* relatively increase the proletarian character of the class structure with occupational class (i.e. excluding predominantly non-manual 'middle-class' females); *or* conversely relatively decrease the proletarian character of the class structure with social class (i.e. excluding females who are predominantly non-managerial employees).

Our extended Erikson solution suggests the use of alternative indicators depending on the focus of the research. Thus if the emphasis is on work position REA should be the unit of classification, whereas HALL is the appropriate unit when concentrating on class position. Dale *et al.* (1985) have similarly advocated a distinction between relationship to the labour market measured at the level of the individual and patterns of consumption measured at the level of the family. With two of the three choices determined by the nature of the research problem, this leaves only the fundamental theoretical choice between occupational class and social class.

On the basis of completed analyses of our large scale panel survey, our preference is for social class categories rather than occupational class. There are five main reasons for this preference. *First*, the employer and petty bourgeois categories have emerged as highly distinctive in our research on economic, social and political variables (see Edgell and Duke 1985, 1986a and 1986b). In occupational class schemes, however, these categories are submerged with other occupations, which dilutes their theoretical and empirical substance. The distinctive identity of the petty bourgeoisie has been supported by other researchers in Britain (Penn 1981; Lovatt and Ham 1984; Heath *et al.* 1985), although the diversity of employment situations covered by this class category needs to be recognised (Dale 1986).

Second, there is a greater congruence between social class categories (based on ownership and control) and theoretical treatments of class than there is between the latter and occupational class schemes. The existence of a hiatus between theoretical controversies and operational definitions of class was documented by Weinberg and Lyons (1972).

Moreover, Marsh (1986b), Penn (1981) and Westergaard and Resler (1975) have stressed the folly of employing an indicator of class (occupation) which fails to identify the capitalist class (a point which relates back to our first reason above). More specifically, it is inappropriate to test Marxist inspired theories/hypotheses regarding class relationships by operationalising class in an essentially non-Marxist, positional way (see Edgell and Duke 1986b).

Third, sectoral cleavage theory fits better with social class categories than with occupational class. This is largely because the sectoral category of self-employed coincides with the employer and petty bourgeois classes. The worker and controller of labour classes can then be divided neatly into public and private sectors. Given the increased salience of sectoral conflict (Dunleavy 1979, 1980a and 1980b), the ability to accommodate both class and sectoral effects in the same model is a marked advantage. We have employed such a model successfully in previous analyses which demonstrate the fragmentation of the worker and controller classes by both production sectoral cleavages (Edgell and Duke 1983) and consumption sectoral cleavages (Duke and Edgell 1984). Indeed, the principle of fragmentation may be extended to accommodate the manual/non-manual cleavage within the worker and controller classes as Dunleavy and Husbands (1985) have shown.

Fourth, social class categories are less contaminated by gender effects than occupational class categories. Gender has an important influence on the occupational structure and who occupies which jobs (Murgatroyd 1982; Dex 1985). Dunleavy and Husbands (1985) have argued that gender as a variable is logically and empirically prior to occupational class, and moreover five out of every six employed women are located in the routine non-manual or unskilled manual categories. Previous contributors to the current debate on class have stressed similarly that the manual/non-manual divide has little relevance for women's jobs (Dale *et al.* 1985; Heath and Britten 1984). Using respondent occupational class (cf. Butler and Stokes 1974) the majority of women are middle class (65 per cent non-manual), whereas the majority of men are working class (58 per cent manual). However, respondent social class (Wright mark I) indicates that the majority of both sexes are working class (employees with neither ownership nor authority), but with women more proletarianised than men (79 per cent and 59 per cent respectively).[9]

Fifth, social class classifications are less vulnerable to processes such as professionalisation and deskilling compared to occupational class classifications. For example, in the British censuses, nurses were upgraded three times between 1861 and 1891 (Davies 1980), and clerks were downgraded three times between 1911 and 1931 (Hakim 1980). Thus, in these respects the occupational class structure is subject to greater change than the social class structure.

Discussion of the relative merits and demerits of social class and occupational class schemes is the neglected element in the current debate on the operationalisation of class in British sociology, although it is discussed briefly in Crompton and Mann (1986). The relevance of this choice to the issue of women and class analysis, an issue that has tended to dominate the wider debate, is readily apparent above, though the implications of the choice are far broader than this issue. The importance of the distinction between occupational class and social class has been further highlighted by the work of Robinson (1984), who demonstrates that occupational mobility is not the same as (social) class mobility for five countries including Britain.

Other researchers of a more neo-Weberian persuasion may prefer some form of occupational class scheme but the extended Erikson solution applies equally in their case. It is, of course, a separate empirical issue as to which of occupational and social class works better, and indeed which of REA and HALL works better, in explaining various dependent variables.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Class is arguably the most central concept in sociology but the debate on its operationalisation in Britain has been fragmentary. The recent contributions to the debate, though useful in some respects, have tended to present only partial treatments, e.g. concentrating on the unit of analysis decision in relation to occupational class.There is an urgent need for a comprehensive approach that considers all the interrelated issues in both theoretical and empirical terms. This research note has presented a comprehensive review of the theoretical and empirical issues involved in the operationalisation of class. A framework has been proposed based on three operational choices; the conceptual scheme, the unit of analysis and the degree of coverage.

Our proposed resolution of the operational choices rests on what we have termed 'the extended Erikson solution'. Erikson proposed that analyses of the work position (i.e. relating to production) should employ the respondent as the unit of analysis. On the other hand, the household should be the unit of analysis in studies of the class position (i.e. relating to consumption). We have extended this dichotomy to incorporate the degree of coverage decision. Work position research should be based on economically active respondents (REA), whereas class position research should include all households (HALL). The final decision is then a matter of which theoretical framework to adopt, i.e. occupational class or social class. However, Erikson's empirical data is limited in the sense that all his dependent variables are concerned with aspects of consumption. The corollary that

respondent measures more adequately explain production related behaviour/attitudes therefore needs to be demonstrated.

The extended Erikson solution to the operationalisation of class provides a clear guideline on the unit of analysis and degree of coverage choices. It is difficult to justify only surveying the economically active, except when researching production behaviour and attitudes. The retired, unemployed and housewives may not be involved currently in the work position but this does not mean that they are not implicated in a class structure. The importance of significant others in the household to class position has been clearly demonstrated in our previous empirical work.

As to the two conceptual schemes, our indicated preference is for social class on both theoretical and empirical grounds. To opt for social class is basically to assert that the owner/non-owner distinction is more important than the manual/non-manual cleavage for the purposes of our research in an advanced capitalist society. Whilst this choice bypasses the manual/non-manual issue, the boundary problem shifts to that between and within the worker and the controller of labour categories. The strength of Wright's most recent work is his empirical adjudication of contending class definitions. None the less, he too falls prey to the REA syndrome, notwithstanding his recognition of the problem (Wright 1985) thereby excluding significant others in the household and the economically inactive from the class structure.

Interestingly, the most popular procedure in recent British sociology, namely the conventional occupational class/REA combination, is the easiest to operationalise in that it avoids the problems of taking into account others in the household and the economically inactive. For research on production it is an appropriate choice, but when dealing with consumption we would argue that it is not. More generally, the predominance of the conventional procedure may reflect an overriding concern with the sociology of production to the neglect of the sociology of consumption (cf. Duke and Edgell 1984; Edgell and Duke 1986b; Moorhouse 1983; Rose *et al.* 1984).

Regarding much of the previous debate on women and class (e.g. Crompton and Mann 1986), we agree that analyses based on males only are inadequate representations of the class structure and sexist. Women have been increasingly integrated into the formal economy but have yet to be adequately integrated into class analysis. Much of the dissatisfaction with male based categories and male only procedures can be overcome by a combination of social class and HALL. The problem of the inadequacy of the manual/non-manual cleavage to women can be resolved by using social class categories, and a household measure based on dominance (i.e. can be a male *or* a female) or multiple indicators avoids the sexist reliance on male head of household.

There are few British datasets which contain the necessary

information adequately to operationalise HALL measures in relation to social class categories. We suggest therefore that future empirical social research should be more comprehensive at the data collection stage and be more explicit about research methods at the reporting stage. This would facilitate secondary analysis and replication beyond the restrictive confines of any one single operational procedure. Thus class data should encompass both occupational class and social class categories. Second, information should be collected on both the respondent and other adults in the household. Third, it should be routine to obtain relevant data for the economically inactive as well as the economically active. There is a need for comprehensive nationwide data of this kind to complement more specific local studies. Finally, more qualitative open-ended data are required to assist in clarifying marginal borderline categories.

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NOTES

* The research was funded by SSRC 1980–1, CAMPUS 1982–3, ESRC 1983–4, and the Nuffield Foundation 1985.

1. The recently developed Cambridge scale (see Stewart *et al.* 1980) is different in that it is based on occupational friendship choices but similar in the sense that the end result is an interval scale comprising hundreds of occupations. We are excluding from consideration in this article the following: (i) occupational scales as previously defined; (ii) composite indicators of socio-economic status, e.g. Osborn and Morris (1979); and (iii) analyses of subjective class self-image.

2. Interestingly the Goldthorpe 7-class scheme has 3 non-manual and 4 manual classes but also retains the petty bourgeoisie (manual *and* non-manual) as a distinctive class. This is in effect to incorporate one of the social class categories into a basic occupational class structure.

3. Similarly, the mark III version of Wright's social class scheme introduces the criterion of credential assets, which is akin to incorporating an element of 'skill level' into a basic social class structure.

4. This is unlikely to change in the future for reasons connected with comparability nationally and over time (Bechhofer 1969; Crompton and Mann 1986).

5. Following Dunleavy (1980a) we prefer the term 'controllers of labour' to that of 'managers' (cf. Duke and Edgell 1984).

6. The semi-autonomous worker category came in for a great deal of criticism (e.g. Carter 1985) which Wright mark III has acknowledged by abandoning this category.

7. Erikson regards market situation more generally than Lockwood as life chances in that they stem from the individual's position in the division of labour. Market situation thus depends heavily on the work positions of the various individuals in the household.

8. On alternative ways of indexing household class position in the form of a single indicator see Erikson (1984:503).

9. These figures and the preceding

occupational class figures are based on economically active respondents in the 1979 British Election Study. These data were obtained from the ESRC Data Archive at Essex.

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The tough test and the thin theory: the minimal conditions required for capitalism to exist*

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this paper is to test the proposition that a common set of norms and values or a dominant ideology is necessary for capitalist societies to exist. The argument is that, if this proposition is subjected to the most rigorous test possible, it does not hold. The test is constructed by concentrating on the minimal conditions required for the existence of capitalism in its pure form. The work of Talcott Parsons is taken as the starting point for the argument. In the later stages I expand the analysis to consider some common claims about social classes.

Sociologists and political theorists often seem to assume that either a common set of norms and values or a dominant ideology is a necessary condition for the existence of a stable capitalist society.[1] This assumption is of considerable importance and is common to much non-Marxist and Marxist theory and empirical research.[2] Despite this, the claim about values and ideology that underpin this assumption has, with a few exceptions, gone largely unchallenged.[3] It is, therefore, worthwhile subjecting it to the most rigorous test possible. I shall attempt to provide such a test in this paper.

The claim that a common set of values or a dominant ideology is necessary for capitalism to exist will be subjected to a tough test by interpreting it in the strictest sense possible. This will be done by taking it as a claim about what is logically required for any capitalist society in its pure form.[4] The 'pure' form of capitalist society is one which has no other features except those necessary for capitalism to maintain itself. The strict interpretation of the claim about common values or dominant ideologies may be more than many of the proponents of this claim would wish to support. None the less it is implicit in the concept of necessity.

The argument of this paper will be that this claim cannot be sustained for a pure form of capitalist society. This argument supports

the conclusion reached by Abercrombie, Hill and Turner in *The Dominant Ideology Thesis*. It is a formal addition to their more empirically based analysis.

Before I start I shall launch a pre-emptive strike. To say that a common set of values or an ideology is not necessary for capitalism in its pure form only refers to the requirements of the thinnest form of capitalism that could plausibly exist. It does not mean that they are not necessary for some other society or to support phenomena that may be found in historically existing capitalist societies. Examples of such phenomena would be patriarchy, or nationalism, or institutions such as the church or the family. Finally, it does not mean that they are not historically important.

The argument will be developed by concentrating on the work of Talcott Parsons. The reasons for concentrating on Parsons is that his work contains the most interesting basis for the claim that a common set of norms and values is necessary for the maintenance of capitalist society (or of any other form of society). The claims he makes in this respect have also had a major influence on non-Marxist and more recent Marxist social theory.[5] As I shall show the dominant ideology argument can be treated as a species of his more general argument about values.

I have deliberately used 'contains' in the previous paragraph to show that I am dealing with a particular interpretation of Parsons's work. I do not claim that this is the only possible interpretation, nor that it is definitive. I only claim that it is influential and central to the argument that I intend to criticize.[6]

I shall begin with an outline of the general problem to be solved in explanations of social order and of my interpretation of Parsons's solution. This will provide the framework for my analysis of capitalism.

OUTLINE OF THE PROBLEM AND OF A PARSONIAN SOLUTION

The problem of explaining the way in which societies maintain themselves can be specified in its simplest form as that of showing how they maintain a stable social structure and their material conditions of existence. The problem of explaining how capitalist society maintains itself is a sub-set of this more general problem. This specification of the problem is consistent with one of the extended meanings of what Parsons calls the problem of 'order' in the *Structure of Social Action*. It has the advantage of focusing attention on the minimal conditions that are of concern for my argument.

To simplify the exposition, the problem I have specified will be referred to as 'the problem of order'. This is in keeping with a common practice in the literature, although it can lead to considerable

confusion because of different interpretations of order. I shall briefly consider some of the interpretations.

The specification of the problem given above is more precise than an abstract interpretation of order in terms of social and systems integration. This interpretation is also found in Parsons's work and variants of it have been supported by writers such as Giddens and Habermas.[7] Social integration refers to the processes whereby the world view of individuals is maintained and their actions are co-ordinated. Systems integration refers to the processes whereby the functional prerequisites for the existence of society are met. The first refers to the subjective world of communication and action. The second refers to the objective imperatives of the social system. This interpretation of the problem is not satisfactory for my purposes, however, because it does not tell us what functional imperatives have to be met, nor which world views have to be maintained, nor what happens to the society if they are not maintained. How much social integration is needed? What form must it take? Are social integration and normative integration the same? As I shall show, if the answer to this last question is affirmative the common value and dominant ideology theorists are presenting a tautology as an argument. If not, what is the difference?

My interpretation of the problem also excludes a number of other possibilities that could be extracted from Parsons's work and that are often encountered in discussions of order. The most important of these are

(i) Absence of force and violence
(ii) A normative pattern. That is a set of (or an orientation towards, some set of) values, ideals and beliefs.
(iii) A pattern of behaviour or predictability.

Definition (i) is consistent with some of the concerns of classical political theory. This definition is not adequate if taken by itself, however, for two reasons. The first is that absence of force and violence is only one condition entailed in the maintenance of social order because it is also necessary to assume that the material requirements of social life are provided. Since this point is obvious, and Parsons seems to be aware of it, I will not pursue it further. The second is that it does not tell us much about any particular society. The conditions that would have to be met for force and violence to be absent depends on the characteristics of the social structure. Similarly, different types of society could tolerate different degrees of force and violence without becoming unstable.

Definition (ii) is often used by Parsons and it is central to the idea of social integration.[8] This definition is also inappropriate on two grounds. The first is that it makes his argument circular, as I said above, it reduces claims about a common set of values and a dominant

ideology to a set of tautologies. The argument that a common set of values is necessary to establish order is a solution to the type of problem outlined at the beginning of this section. If order is defined in terms of values and norms the conclusion is contained in the specifications of the problem. Normative order can only be brought about by normative means.

The second ground for rejecting definition (ii) is that it is too impoverished. The concept of a normative order can only be specified with reference to the conditions of existence of a particular society. The existence of a common set of values is not sufficient to ensure either the maintenance of a society or of order. People may slaughter each other even though they have a common set of values. In fact they often do.

Definition (iii) is used by such writers as Giddens and Alexander.[9] It presents some difficulties if taken seriously, because predictability is not necessarily social order in a meaningful sense. As Parsons points out, war or chaos may obey statistical laws that allow us to predict death tolls per x number of people or large scale movements.[10] Similarly, predictability of outcomes for an individual is not the same as social order. Individuals in a war zone may be able to predict the consequences of their actions with a higher degree of accuracy than individuals in a society that does not suffer from internal violence. If pattern means predictability in this sense it is clearly inadequate. If it has some other sense it must be linked to maintaining the material and social conditions of existence. The concept of a pattern may imply more than the maintenance of these conditions, but it cannot exclude them. And if it implies more it is not clear what it implies that is not covered in (ii). This brings us to my original definition.

My interpretation of order as the maintenance of a stable structure and production of the material conditions of existence is justified because it is more comprehensive and coherent than (i) taken in isolation. It is also more fundamental than (iii).

The problem of order has been specified in a minimal sense in that it only includes the conditions that are necessary for society to maintain itself. No attempt will be made to deal with order in the more extended sense of maintaining a particular set of manners and customs, such as those governing dress, or the side of the road on which to drive or etiquette. Such customs are an important aspect of any society. They do not have to be explained, however, in an account of order in the minimal sense: they are mostly solutions to co-ordination problems and a society could survive even if the rules of etiquette or dress customs were changed. Parsons also excludes these micro-customs from his discussion of order.

Parsons says that the concept of a common set of values is necessary to explain how social order is maintained because society would collapse if people acted rationally in the absence of such values.[11] It is

the inadequacy of explanations in terms of rational acts that makes the concept of common values necessary. His argument can be interpreted as follows.

i. Explanations of social order must be able to show how force and fraud is restricted and how social life has some regular pattern. Parsons calls the problem of force and fraud the Hobbesian problem.[12] He includes material production in the concept of a regular pattern.[13]
ii. To meet these conditions it is necessary to show that people pursue whatever ends are required to maintain social order.
iii. It is not possible to meet the requirements of (i) and (ii) by constructing a theory in terms of rational action. This is because, if rationality is the only determinant of action, it is not possible to explain why there is any constraint on the ends that actors pursue. It is not possible to show that these ends would not be random and interactions between individuals chaotic.
iv. From (iii) social order must be explained in terms of a common pattern of values. Q.E.D.

The term 'value' is used by Parsons to refer to something that is desired for its own sake because it embodies the attitudes and sentiments of the actors. Normatively oriented action is action governed by values.[14] Rational action is defined as action that is calculated to achieve some end in an efficient manner.[15] Explanations in terms of rational action need not deny the existence of all values; they need only suppose that people respond to their circumstances by calculating an efficient course of action and that the ends they adopt take account of these circumstances. Such values as fellow feeling, altruism and sympathy are consistent with rational action.

Since Parsons defines values as what are not rational, and bases his argument in favour of a common value system on the inadequacy of explanations in terms of rational action, the question becomes, is it possible to account for order in terms of rational action?

I said in the introduction that I am concerned with the pure form of capitalism. This is specified as follows.

si. There is a free market for goods and services.
sii. The purpose of production is profit.
siii. There is a class of people who own the means of production and a class of people who sell their labour power on the market.

I take this to be consistent with most standard definitions of capitalist society.[16] The existence of variations from these specifications is irrelevant for my argument.

The previous question about rational action is now applied to a society with these characteristics. What must be noted is that I am

concerned only with explaining how these conditions are maintained once they are in existence. This is not the same as the Weberian problem of explaining how these conditions came into being in the first place. Even if a particular set of values are necessary to bring some specific social order into being, they may not be necessary to sustain it.

RATIONAL ACTION AND ENDS

The argument that capitalist society could continue to exist if people acted rationally in the absence of a common set of values will now be defended. In order to do this I shall start with the question of material production. This is the easiest question to deal with and it provides the best starting point for attacking Parsons's claim that ends would be random if actors were rational.

The material production process in capitalist society can be explained if we can account for production and distribution, in the narrow economic sense, and for the institutions necessary to support this process. These institutions will be considered in the next section. As regards production and distribution, Parsons says that economic theory can account for the internal dynamics of this process. He says that economic theory is 'correct within its own framework'.[17] This theory shows that, if individuals act as rational economic agents, it is possible to conceptualise the process of production and exchange as a 'self-regulating competitive system.'[18] If so there is no difficulty in accounting for the purely economic side of the question.

Now, the point that Parsons makes here is that economic theory is unable to establish its own framework.[19] It is unable to explain non-economic institutions and the ends pursued by rational actors. Since I am concentrating on the internal dynamics of the system of production, it is the point about ends that is important. It will be noted that this is a restatement of Parsons's more general argument about rationality and order.

Summing up Parsons's argument, material production can be explained by economic theory only if we have a theory of common values to explain the ends (or propensities?)[20] of rational economic agents. This argument would collapse, however if

a. It could be shown that rational actors are constrained to pursue certain ends in the system of production.
b. The pursuit of these ends is sufficient to account for the operation of the production process.

The dominant ends that individuals pursue within the system of production do not have to be explained in terms of common values

because they can be derived from the constraints of that system. By 'dominant ends' I mean those ends that provide the boundaries of the set within which other ends are selected. Whenever there is a contradiction between a dominant end and some other end, the dominant end will prevail.

Suppose that a capitalist system is operating. Within this system capitalists will be compelled to maximise profits and workers will be compelled to sell labour power for a return that satisfies their need for security. These ends will be imposed regardless of the values of the individuals.[21] They do not have to be desired for their own sake.[22] They are dominant in that any individual who adopts ends that are inconsistent with this set will either cease to be an effective actor in the system or will suffer some form of penalty. Capitalists who do not maximise profits will, in the long run, be eliminated from the system of production. Maximisation of profits is, by definition, the behavioural rule characteristic of a long term viable capitalist. Workers must sell their labour power for a return that is sufficient to cover their needs or they will be penalized by both absolute and relative deprivation. If capitalists and workers pursue these ends we have the very minimal conditions required for both Marxian and neo-classical economic theory. Parsons accepts that neo-classical theory does explain the economic aspect of production and distribution and we are entitled to take his word for it. If so, conditions a and b are met.

The capitalist production process will also automatically reproduce the objective constraints that define the owning and the non-owning classes. Marx shows that by entering into the production process workers increase the value of capital and maintain capitalists as a class. They also reproduce their existence as workers. From this and the previous paragraph the characteristics of capitalism set out as (si), (sii) and (siii) will be maintained.[23]

There are several objections that might be raised at this point. The first objection is that profit seeking and the maximisation of returns from the sale of labour power are simply means to some other ends, and only make sense with reference to those ends.[24] This claim is central to Parsons's attack on explanations in terms of rational choice. If it is taken as an assertion that action is only subjectively meaningful in relation to some ultimate end held by the actor, and derived from a set of cultural values, it is trivially true.[25] This assertion is not sufficient to support Parsons's position under the conditions of the tough test, however. The reason is that neither the immediate ends pursued by owners and non-owners of the means of production, nor the means they use, have to be derived from an ultimate value system. The ends and the means are both rational, given the objective constraints of the capitalist process of production. These ends and means would not be adopted only if individuals held a value system

that was inconsistent with them. In this case it would be the non-adoption of such ends that would require explanation.

The second objection is that workers typically pursue more than minimal food, clothing and shelter. This objection can be met by noting that consumption above a subsistence minimum is rational, and that consumption is frequently non-discretionary. The standard of minimal consumption must cover more than subsistence since physical comfort and security are no less a rational desire than mere existence. It may also be rational to acquire more goods than are required for immediate comfort in order to guard against future uncertainties and to provide for others, such as children, parents and friends. Workers may value children or friends for a large number of reasons that are not derived from a common value system. The standard of consumption is frequently non-discretionary because consumption goods are often lumpy; they may have to be consumed within a determined range, if they are to be consumed at all. Income is derived from a job and working hours may be non-flexible. Jobs require transport and private means may be the only option.

The third objection is that I am playing dirty pool by interpreting Parsons's argument too narrowly. 'Surely', it might be said, 'what Parsons is claiming is that a theory of values is necessary to explain the specific preferences individuals have for bundles of goods and leisure. It is these preferences that cannot be derived from the constraints of the capitalist system'. I do not think that this move is open to a defender of Parsons. The capitalist production process depends on a reasonably stable set of preferences, but it does not depend on a unique set. It is possible to explain a stable set without relying on a common pattern of values. The preferences of individuals may tend to converge on some mixture of consumption goods, savings and leisure because of the objective circumstances in which they are placed. These circumstances and the preferences may vary between income groups and over time. In addition individuals may consume certain goods because it is in the interests of someone else to persuade them to do so.

Fourthly, it might be objected that the capitalist production process cannot be treated as a self-reproducing system. It must again be stressed that Parsons does not object to the claims of either neo-classical economic theory or Marxian economics in this regard. None the less, the objection might be thought to provide a possible means of supporting his position. This objection could have two variants. The simplest is based on the claim that the process of production does not tend towards a reproducible equilibrium and can only be stabilized by the actions of the state. The second is a more global attack on political economic theory.

The state supports and stabilizes the production process in a number of ways: it maintains the rights of private ownership; it

provides infrastructural inputs such as transport, education and welfare; it attempts to influence economic activity in order to ensure an acceptable rate of profit and so on. It is not necessary, for my purposes, to consider the attempts that have been made by writers such as Downs, O'Connor, Poulantzas and Offe to explain these activities. The only question that is of concern is whether they must be accounted for in ideological or normative terms.

The answer to this question is that there is no obvious reason why the actions of individual politicians and bureaucrats to stabilize the economy have to be explained in non-rational terms. For example, Offe's statements about the necessity of the state providing the functional conditions of capitalist accumulation[26] could be translated into statements about the rational strategies for a vote maximising political party. If material standards of living decline as a result of disruptions to the accumulation process there is good reason for such a party to stabilize this process. Naturally, a complete explanation would require a great deal more detail. But there is no *a priori* reason why it could not be constructed.

The second variant of the fourth objection is that Marxian and other forms of political economy are based on a misunderstanding of the nature of the capitalist system. Lefebvre argues, for example, that capitalism does not have an internal logic and that it only reproduces itself as the result of strategies and political struggles.[27] This claim does not carry much weight as a criticism of political economy or economic theory more generally. One of the specific historical characteristics of capitalism that is captured in these theories is that the process of production and exchange has its own dynamics. Even if Lefebvre's argument were correct, it would still fall far short of the requirement of the common value and dominant ideology theses. Political struggles may be part of a rational pursuit of individual and group interests.

It might also be objected that rationality is itself a value.[28] This objection is self defeating: it destroys the distinction between actions that are dependent on values and those that are rational and, along with them, the point of the common culture and dominant ideology arguments. I need not pursue this point because Parsons's argument rests on this distinction.[29] If the distinction is denied his argument would lose its force.

It follows that the capitalist process of production imposes ends on actors. It is rational to accept these as ends even if they are not valued and, if it is assumed that they are accepted, the process of production can be explained. Is it possible to explain social stability on this basis?

THE PROBLEM OF STABILITY AND CLASS STRUGGLE

The stability of capitalist society can only be explained if it is also possible to deal with the questions of

i. freedom from force and fraud
ii. class struggle
iii. maintaining the institutions required for capitalist production
iv. destructive unintended consequences

I shall consider these questions in this order.

i. Rational actors can reduce force and fraud to tolerable limits by increasing the costs associated with such activities. This can be done either through an all embracing collective agent such as the state, by private enforcement, or by some combination of both. This is the well known Locke-Nozick solution.[30] There does not seem to be any obvious merit in the argument that, if people acted rationally within capitalism, the degree of trust and safety required for the system to operate would be destroyed. There are good prudential reasons for honouring contracts and keeping promises. In those cases where the potential gains from default are large contracts are enforced by the state. Such contracts are usually not left to the precarious mercies of shared values and mutual trust. In a like manner it is in the interest of individuals to support institutions that retaliate against those who threaten their security.

It might be argued that the threat of retaliation would only be successful if there were common values to prevent the widespread use of force and fraud. The empirical evidence suggests that this is not the case. Mafia gangs seem to be able to enforce territorial claims and trading restrictions with a tolerable degree of success.

ii. The question of class struggle arises because Marxists assume that it would be rational for individuals to enter class coalitions and to transform the social structure. The analysis of the question extends the scope of my argument to Marxist claims about dominant ideologies and hegemonic cultures. This extension is required to support the claim made about the relation between Marxist and non-Marxist theory in the introduction. It is also the logical corollary of my previous arguments. This is because, even though Parsons says little about classes in the political economic sense, the ends derived from the economic system are those associated with the owners and non-owners of the means of production. It is therefore appropriate to examine the actions of individuals with those ends.

Stated briefly, the question of class struggle entails something like the following proposition. If non-owners of the means of production understood what was in their interests, they would prefer a different social structure and they would realize that they have a common

interest with other members of this class in acting on this preference. It would therefore be rational for them to bring about the required changes. Since they do not attempt to change the structure of society one of the following must be true: their capacity to understand their own interests must be distorted; their preferences must be distorted; their ability to act rationally must be blocked. Therefore the system depends on preference distorting or rationality blocking values.

To test this proposition it will be assumed that there is no preference distortion or rationality blocking, and that capitalism is a sub-optimal solution for all the members of the non-owning class. This means that there exists at least one feasible alternative social arrangement that is preferable. Since this assumption is unfavourable to my argument it needs no further justification.

The simplest way to prove the proposition that capitalism would not be destroyed under these conditions is to reconstruct the whole argument in game theoretical terms.[1] This will link the analysis to an already established body of theory that provides a precise method for testing the proposition and a basis for possible future developments. It will also help to avoid any ambiguities about precisely what is to be tested. The game can be constructed as follows.

Suppose that a capitalist society K is divided into owners and non-owners and let N stand for the non-owners. W is the minimum size coalition of non-owners required to bring about a transition to society S. Owners are allowed to disrupt production. Non-owners only have the choice of joining or not joining W. If they join they have the choice of voting for a change to society S or attempting to improve their material conditions in K. Let S* and K* stand for these strategies.

Let: The payoffs for all N in W be $x = (x_1, x_2 \ldots, x_n)$ if they remain in K and the payoffs for all N outside W be $m = (m_1, m_2 \ldots, m_n)$
The payoffs for all W in the more desirable society S be $y = (y_1, y_2, \ldots, y_n)$.
The payoffs to W during the transition from K to S be $z = (z_1, z_2 \ldots, z_n)$.
y dominate x for all x. This means that society S gives more payoffs of all kinds than K.
Side payments can be made so that individuals can be bribed to join coalitions.
The values of x, y and z be given in some bundles of goods such as money, leisure, a secure future.
The time period for the transition from a fully operating capitalist society K to a fully operating alternative S be significant. That is, such a transition could not be made in months. I take this assumption to be obvious.

The minimum condition that must be met for the non-owning class to destroy capitalism is that the coalition W is stable for the time period of the transition from K to S. This requires that

a. $z_i > m_i$ and $z_i + y_i(d) > m_i$, where d is a function that discounts the value of future payments in society S in accordance with the time rate of discount schedule for each individual.
b. $(z,W) + (y,W)(d) > (x,W)$

These two conditions can be interpreted as follows. Condition (a) refers to individual rationality. It says that it is only rational for an individual to join coalition W and assist in making the transition to S if the payoffs available in W are greater than or equal to the payoffs available to every non-owner acting alone in K or in some other coalition that is a sub-set of W. I have specified this condition in two ways. The first requires that the payoffs z during the transition be greater than those available by acting alone or in a sub-coalition in K. The second is a much weaker stipulation. It only requires that the sum of z and the future payments y in S be greater than m_i.

Condition (b) says that coalition W must be able to do better in the transition to S than it can in K. This has only been stated for the weaker case that requires it do better in the combined payoffs from the transition and from S.

Regarding (a), the requirement that $z_i > m_i$ is a statement of the well known free rider or Olson problem.[32] On the assumption that we are dealing with large numbers, the free rider theorem demonstrates that it will not be rational for each member of N to join the coalition unless (a) is met, or some appropriate inducements can be offered. This free rider problem could be avoided by an entrepreneur by offering present and guaranteed future payments to the individuals in N. I have some serious doubts about the mechanisms that would be required to make this possible. For the sake of the argument I assume that the appropriate institutional arrangements could be made.

Even if $z_i + y_i(d) > m_i$, it would be necessary to meet condition (b) that $(z,W) + (y,W)(d) > (x,W)$. Unless this condition could be met, it would be rational for the individuals in coalition W to ensure that it maximised the payoff in K and did not attempt to move to S.

The proposition that $(x, W) > (z, W) + (y,W)(d)$, and that the above condition cannot be met, seems the more plausible. Przeworski has argued in *Capitalism and Social Democracy* that any attempt to make the transition from capitalism to socialism (K to S) involves a monotonic increase in $(x,W) - (z,W)$ with time and with the extent of the move away from K until material production under the transitional system begins to accelerate.[33] This would be the result of such factors as disruptions to the process of production and

investment strikes. Such disruptions have a number of consequences. During the time in which (x,W) − (z,W) increases there will be a continuous increase in the pressure to defect from W with strategy S*, or to alter the strategy. These pressures can only be offset by greater side payments. The capacity of the coalition to make these payments will continually decline as (z,W) decreases. This will further increase the pressure on W to move to strategy K*.

It appears, then, that even if the free rider problem could be overcome, W with strategy S* is not stable and is not a solution to the game. This takes me to the question of the institutions and conditions required for capitalist production. What if we discard the assumption that these are maintained?

iii. The best way to approach this question is to start with a list of a minimum set of social conditions that must be met if the production process is to operate. I presume that these conditions are

a. reproduction of the population in the physical sense
b. willingness of the workforce to participate (I dealt with the state in the previous section of the paper).

The physical reproduction of the population is a problem only if it would not be rational for individuals within capitalism to reproduce at a sufficient rate to maintain the system. It is not obviously true that this rate of reproduction would not be sustained without some common set of values. Individuals may choose to reproduce for a number of reasons: among these are affection, sympathy, the desire to create a stable emotional life. Such desires are not irrational, nor are they necessarily derived from a common set of values.

The argument that the population would be reproduced if people act rationally could be supported in a number of ways. The most extreme test of this argument would be to assume that all individuals followed a narrowly defined form of rational self interest, and that child bearing and rearing has no intrinsic value. I have shown in another paper that it is possible to construct a rational choice model that accounts for the required rate of reproduction when the reproduction process is totally commodified under these conditions.[34] The game that is central to this argument will be briefly summarised.

The game used to support my argument is played between a coalition of capitalists and a coalition of workers. For simplicity it is assumed that these coalitions can be formed. It is also assumed that, if the reproduction rate is such that the population falls below the levels required to operate the production technology, standards of living will decline. Let the strategy set for the capitalists be $s = (s_1, s_2, s_3)$. The payoffs for the capitalists for each strategy are $s_1 = b, c$; $s_2 = b - pk$; $s_3 = b - f(pk)$.

Where: b = benefits of reproduction
c = costs of no reproduction
pk = capitalists' share of the per capita costs
f(pk) = some proportion of this share where f(pk) < pk

Strategy s_1 is played when capitalists do not contribute to reproduction and attempt to get the full benefits, b. The workers' best reply to this is not to contribute. This means that reproduction does not take place and both classes suffer. If workers follow this strategy the return for s_1 is held down to the undesirable payoff, c. S, therefore, has two outcomes, b or c, and c is the equilibrium point. The capitalists play s_2 when they contribute some arbitrated fair share towards the cost of reproduction. This assures reproduction up to the level that is required to maintain the existing productive technology and to hold the standard of living constant. The capitalists play s_3 when they push the rate of reproduction to the level where labour is in excess of demand. This allows them to lower the value of labour and to transfer some of the reproduction costs to the workers. Because s_3 reduces the bargaining strength of the workers they do not have a strong blocking strategy.

It follows from the game as specified that capitalists will tend to use strategy s_3. This means that the reproduction rate will be at the minimum level required to maintain capitalism and it may exceed this level.

Regarding the second condition, willingness of the workforce to participate may be taken to refer to actual participation, consent or motivation. The minimal participation required can be accounted for in terms of the previous arguments. If the workers are under some compulsion to sell their labour power, and it is not rational to form a revolutionary coalition, then participation is the most appropriate strategy.

Consent can be taken to mean that the workers accept the system in some sense. They may participate simply because there is no reasonable option, given their opportunity set. In order to consent they must see the system as offering some acceptable set of opportunities. By an acceptable set I mean a set that corresponds to the interests that are generated within the capitalist system.

The question of consent has been analysed in some detail by Przeworski.[35] He argues that the necessary material conditions for workers to consent to the capitalist system can be given in terms of a rational choice model that captures the relation of present wage levels to wage levels and profit ratios in the past. This is modelled as $W(t) = W(t-1) + rp(t-1)$ where W = the level of wages, t = time, p = the rate of profit, r = the rate at which past profits are transformed into wages. The condition for consent is that r must be near the level which provides maximum wage level over time. Where this condition cannot be met the system has to be maintained by coercion.

What must be noted here is that, although Przeworski claims that the model sets out the necessary conditions for consent, he does not say that it captures the sufficient conditions. The 'objective conditions may be present and yet hegemony may not be established because of autonomously political or ideological reasons.'[36] If so workers may not consent. Does this lend support to Parsons's contention that a common set of values is necessary for capitalism to operate? Does it support the Marxist contention?

The answer to both questions is no. The statement about political or ideological factors cannot be used to support Parsons's position because it is based on a chain of reasoning that is illegitimate within his theory. It involves the contradictory argument that a common set of values is necessary for the system to exist because a partial set of values has developed which cannot be sustained within the system. If the first part of the statement is true, the second part is false.

The Marxist argument that a dominant ideology is necessary to prevent workers following their own self interest and destroying capitalism could not be supported for similar reasons. What could be supported is the argument that such an ideology is needed to prevent non-owners developing a value system that is opposed to capitalism. This would require that the values assigned to z and y would have to be altered. But this still does not support the contention that capitalism would collapse if workers acted rationally. In this case the collapse is predicated on the formation of ideologically loaded preference schedules.

The third possible interpretation of willingness is motivation. It is often assumed that workers must be motivated to do more than the bare minimum in order for the production process to operate with a reasonable degree of efficiency and that these motivations depend on values.[37] This assumption does not support the argument for a common value system, however. In the first place organizations go to considerable lengths to design systems of coercion and rewards to prevent shirking. In the second place, it is not obvious that it is collectively rational for workers to shirk if their own material well being is tied to the success of the firm. This leads to the speculation that the often observed peer group pressure amongst workers not to underproduce could be explained in terms of an attempt to avoid free riding and to attain a collectively optimal outcome. If so motivation need not be explained in terms of a common set of values. More precisely, the values, if any, could be explained as embodying a rational response to a free rider problem.

iv. The question of the destructive unintended consequences of rational action refers to two main possibilities. These are that the long run tendency of the rate of profit to fall and that demands from individuals will cause the state to disrupt or transform the capitalist system. The theory of the long run tendency of the rate of profit to fall

cannot be said to hold in a form relevant to this discussion.[38] Demands from individuals could cause the state to intervene in and disrupt or transform the system in a number of ways. Elite groups may use political power to maximise their wealth at the expense of accumulation. These elites may also distort the market or use state agencies to take over or control production. In a liberal democratic state individuals may use their rights to pursue their interests in a way, or to an extent, that interferes with capitalist accumulation or requires state direction of this process.[39] An obvious example would be pressures for a level of welfare expenditure that eroded profits and reduced work discipline.

The possibility of such distortions and of the eventual transformation of the system does not lead to the conclusion that a dominant ideology or a common value system is necessary. Elites may be as effectively held in check by the power of other groups as by good will. In the case of liberal democracies there are a number of strategies available to a vote maximising political party that wishes to reduce demands on the state. These include isolating sections of the population and withdrawing welfare benefits, or appealing to the self interest of larger groups such as coalitions of capitalists and employed workers. Moreover, if my previous argument is correct, excessive pressures on the welfare system may cause a decline in overall material standards of living. If so the optimal strategy for a political party may be to aggregate the interests of voters wishing to prevent this decline.

CONCLUSION

These arguments should be sufficient to undermine the claim that a set of common values or a dominant ideology is necessary for capitalism to exist. I accept that my arguments in relation to the state are fairly speculative. I have not looked at the mechanisms at work, nor have I taken into account such phenomena as persistent economic crises or political and economic changes that may systematically transform the structure of capitalist society. Since these phenomena are not central to the positions I am criticising they need not be considered in this paper.

It might be objected at this point that tough tests and theories of minimal conditions are too thin and abstract. Since the general response to this objection is well covered in the literature on game theory and rational choice theory, a brief sketch of the substantive implications of my argument should be sufficient. The point is that the distinction between what exists and what is necessary makes a great deal of difference to theories and models of the social world and arguments based on it have some explanatory relevance. If Abercrombie, Hill and Turner are correct in claiming there is no evidence

of a dominant ideology my argument helps explain why this might be the case.

Finally, I do not claim that my argument destroys all Parsonian sociology or removes the need for studies of ideology. However, if it holds, both Parsonians and dominant ideology theorists need to modify their claims. They also need to be more precise about the propositions they are defending.

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NOTES

* This paper was presented at the Australian Political Science Association Conference in 1986 and at a Sociology Seminar at the University of Tasmania in 1986. I would like to thank those who made comments. I would particularly like to thank Professor E. Dowse and Professor R. Crook.

1. The statement 'a necessary condition for the existence of a stable capitalist society' is shorthand for 'a necessary component in any theoretical model of a capitalist society that is able to account for the stability of the society modelled'. I make no attempt in this paper to discuss the relation between models and whatever it is they model.

2. See N. Abercrombie, S. Hill, and B. Turner, *The Dominant Ideology Thesis*, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1984, pp. 9–58 for a discussion of common culture and dominant ideology theories.

3. The most important examples are *ibid.*, B. Barry, *Sociologists, Economists and Democracy*, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1978.

4. The field of possible capitalist societies is, of course, restricted to those that are theoretically interesting. By 'theoretically interesting' I mean those that could exist in a world which has similar resources and natural laws as this world and in which human beings face essentially the same physical and psychological constraints.

5. See Abercrombie, Hill and Turner, *op. cit.*, pp. 30–6 for some notes on the origins of the common culture and dominant ideology theses and the importance of Talcott Parsons. The work of Parsons has probably had the greatest influence on Marxists through the writings of Habermas. See A. Giddens, 'Reason Without Revolution?' R. Bernstein, *Habermas and Modernity*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1985 for a recent discussion of Habermas's interpretation of Parsons.

6. To put it another way, this is the interpretation of Parsons's work that is frequently accepted. See Abercrombie, Hill and Turner, *op. cit.*, Barry, *op. cit.*, B. Jessop, *Social Order, Reform and Revolution*, London, The Macmillan Press, 1972, for example.

7. See A. Giddens, *A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism*, London, Macmillan, 1985, especially pp. 159–60 for the application of this schema to capitalism. Habermas's use of the schema is discussed in Giddens, 'Reason without Revolution?'

8. See Parsons, *The Structure of Social Action*, two vols., New York, The Free Press, 1968, pp. 91–92, for example. Parsons sometimes speaks as if 'normative order' were synonymous with 'order' and sometimes as if 'normative order' were the precondition for order. For example

i. Without the normative elements of action order in the normative sense becomes meaningless (p. 113).

ii. Thus a social order is always a factual order in so far as it is susceptible of scientific analysis but, as will be later maintained, it is one

which cannot have stability without the effective functioning of certain normative elements. (p. 92)

9. A. Giddens, *New Rules of Sociological Method*, London, Hutchinson and Co., 1977, p. 98; J. Alexander, *Theoretical Logic in Sociology*, London, Vol. 1, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982, p. 92.

10. Parsons, *op. cit.*, pp. 91–2.

11. *Ibid.* p. 59, pp. 92–4, 96–7, 100–3, p. 493, 701, 768.

12. Parsons also refers to the problem of showing that actors pursue the appropriate ends as the Hobbesian problem. See p. 94, 102 for example. This reference to Hobbes seems to be misplaced.

13. See Parsons, *op. cit.*, pp. 100–2, 702–8, 766–7 for the importance of the economy and its relation to the problem of order.

14. *Ibid.* p. 75, 167, 768.

15. *Ibid.* p. 19, 56, 58.

16. See Baechler, *The Origins of Capitalism*, trans, Cooper, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1975, pp. 51–9 for an interesting discussion of the specifications of capitalism.

17. Parsons, *op. cit.*, pp. 765–8, p. 772.

18. *Ibid.*, pp. 492–3.

19. See S. Savage, *The Theories of Talcott Parsons*, London, Macmillan, 1981 pp. 167–72, for a discussion of Parsons's critique of economic theory.

20. Is it necessary to explain ends at all? Might it not be sufficient simply to explain the propensities of capitalists and workers?

21. K. Kosick, *Dialectics of the Concrete*, Dordrecht, D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1976, pp. 50–6 for a discussion of this point. Kosik writes that 'man becomes a reality only by becoming an element of the system. Outside the system he is unreal. He is real only to the extent to which he is reduced to a function of the system and to which the requirements of the system define him as homo economicus' (p. 54). Egoism and rationality are not psychological postulates that precede the analysis of capitalism. They are patterns of action that are produced by the capitalist system.

22. See Parsons, T., Smelser, N., *Economy and Society*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972, p. 179, for this claim that these ends are internalized and thus desired.

23. See Marx, K., *Capital*, Vol. I, Harmondsworth, Penguin, especially pp. 1060–5, for the concept of reproduction of the relations of production.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 703.

25. See Savage, *op. cit.*, pp. 89–111 for a discussion of the importance of ends for Parsons's theory of action.

26. See Offe, C., *Contradictions of the Welfare State*, Keane, J. (ed.), London, Hutchinson, 1984, especially pp. 120–1.

27. H. Lefebvre, *The Survival of Capitalism*, trans. F. Bryan, London, Allison & Busby, 1976.

28. Parsons argues this in *Economy and Society*, p. 176.

29. See M. Hollis, *Models of Man*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1977, pp. 107–41, for the argument that 'rationality is its own explanation.

30. R. Nozick, *Anarchy State and Utopia*, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1974, especially pp. 10–17.

31. The techniques I have used and the definition of a solution for the n person class coalitions game that follows are standard. I have not used the standard notation in all cases to make the argument easier to follow. See M. Shubik, *Game Theory in the Social Sciences*, Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press, 1985, pp. 127–78 for the techniques.

32. M. Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1965.

33. A. Przeworski, *Capitalism and Social Democracy*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp. 176–8.

34. B. T. Coram, 'Exploitation in Child Bearing and Child Rearing', Working paper, Chisholm Institute.

35. Przeworski, *op. cit.*, pp. 133–69.

36. *Ibid.* p. 136.

37. Parsons, *Structure*, pp. 180–4.

38. See J. Roemer, *Analytical Foundations of Marxian Economic Theory*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981 and B. T. Coram, 'Marx, Roemer and the Theory of the Falling Rate of Profit', *Australian Economic Papers*, December, 1986.

39. See Offe, *op. cit.*, for a discussion of this possibility.

John Hutchinson

Cultural nationalism, elite mobility and nation-building: communitarian politics in modern Ireland

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this article is to show that, although generally ignored by scholars, cultural nationalism has been a significant ideological force that, promoting a distinctive communitarian vision of the nation, has regularly been adopted by a rising intelligentsia as a political option against the state.

Taking Ireland as my case study, I first examine the three major cultural nationalist 'revivals' in order to delineate the distinctive character of cultural nationalism, the leadership role of the intelligentsia, and its recurring emergence in alternation with political nationalism. I go on to argue that the attraction of the intelligentsia to nationalism can be explained in terms of the patterns of recruitment practised by the British state in Ireland. I then identify an alternating cycle in which the communitarian goals of cultural nationalism periodically challenge the state-oriented objectives of political nationalism to provide a matrix of national development in opposition to the British state.

INTRODUCTION

Although the literature on nationalism is vast, little attention has been paid to the role of cultural nationalism in the formation of nations since the eighteenth century.[1] Analysts have chosen to concentrate on the apparently more significant political nationalist movements, their mass mobilizing strategies against the state, and their attempts to build a representative citizen-state. It is true that cultural nationalism is usually little more than a small-scale coterie of historical scholars and artists, concerned to revitalize the community by invoking 'memories' of the nation as an ancient and unique civilization. But periodically it has expanded into a major ideological movement that, challenging both established political nationalist movements and the existing state, has sought to 'regenerate' the nation on communitarian

lines. Indeed, in many contexts (for example, in Eastern Europe and Asia) this 'grass roots' movement has played a central part in nation-building.[2]

I have attempted elsewhere to demonstrate the importance of cultural nationalism in the formation of modern nations and to explain its genesis and consequences.[3] I wish here, examining the case of Irish cultural nationalism, to focus on two more limited questions

(1) What causes the transformation of a small-scale forum of intellectuals into a significant socio-political movement?
(2) Why is cultural rather than political nationalism periodically chosen as a locus of opposition to the state?

In seeking to answer these questions, I have divided this article into three parts. Since cultural and political nationalism have often been conflated, in the first section I have sought to identify cultural nationalism as a distinctive movement and to outline its relationships with political nationalism and the state. Here we will see that cultural and political nationalism represent two competing conceptions of the nation and strategies of nation-building, each of which feeds off the other. To give some concreteness to my analysis, I have chosen modern Ireland as my field of investigation, a country with a long-established Gaelic civilization but which since the twelfth century was gradually incorporated into the British state. Here, as Figure I indicates, there have been three major cultural nationalist 'revivals' since the eighteenth century, each of which displays a common pattern. For my purposes I will concentrate in this paper on the (third) Gaelic revival of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

After thus delineating the recurring patterns in the development of cultural nationalist movements, in part two I relate the 'politicization' of cultural nationalism to the changing impact of state-led modernization on the Irish social structure. In the final section I argue that we must explain the periodic preference for a cultural rather than a political nationalist politics by reference to an alternating cycle between two very different types of movement — communitarian and statist — that is generated by the modernizing state.

IRISH CULTURAL NATIONALISM: ITS RECURRING MOTIFS AND POLITICS

Let me now turn to the task of identifying Irish cultural nationalism as a distinctive vision and politics and its relations with political nationalist movements.

As in other societies, Irish cultural nationalism emerged first among historical scholars and artists, then journalists, and put forward an historicist ideology. It perceived Ireland as a nation in a

world divided by nature into similar nations, each with its unique origins in space and time, its distinctive evolutionary path, and its special creative contribution to make to human progress. With this vision came a set of moral prescriptions: individuals must cherish and play an active part in the life of their 'natural' community: its language, religion, customs and politics, all of which were an outgrowth of its unique history, and they must reject a subservience to other cultures. Only by this means could they, individually or collectively, realize their human potential and participate as equals in world civilization.

Turning now to Figure I, we may see that cultural nationalism was a modern phenomenon in Ireland, emerging first in the eighteenth century. It was a recurring force, and each of its three major revivals developed according to a common pattern. Each, rejecting the hegemony of English values over Irish life, looked back to ancient Gaelic models in order to regenerate a native civilization and evolved in similar stages, of *gestation*, *crystallization*, and *socio-political articulation*.

All three revivals there were preceded by a period of *gestation*, during which clusters of historical scholars and artists began to form (col. 1). What triggered the *crystallization* of these informal groups into historical and cultural institutions was the eruption of intense internal conflict between rival groups — religious and political — about the definition of the nation (cols. 2 and 3). Cultural nationalism should be seen as an integrative force that sought to unite warring groups by 'reviving' within them a love and knowledge of their common Irish history and culture. For example, the Gaelic League, the dominant institution of the third revival, was founded by Douglas Hyde and Eoin MacNeill during the prolonged struggle between secular and clerical nationalists in the 1890s. They hoped to banish the demoralizing influence of English culture and to recreate that integrated Irish language civilization which, as a centre of both religious and secular learning in the early Middle Ages, had played an important part in the rise of Christian Europe after the fall of Rome. By returning the Irish to their true heritage, they could unite the discordant groups and propel Ireland into a new stage of progress.[4]

If Irish cultural nationalists then looked back to the past, it was not in an atavistic spirit. Like their counterparts elsewhere, they put forward a mobile vision of the nation interacting with the wider world, in which its culture, assimilating scientific and technological advance, was continually renovated according to the needs of each generation. National decay came from an ossification of tradition. Indeed, conflict between the generations was perceived to be an inevitable part of national progress. The return to history, counselled by cultural nationalists, provided, therefore, not an escape to Arcadia, but rather a means of catapulting the Irish nation from present decline to a higher stage of social evolution that would embody a higher synthesis

FIGURE 1: *The stages of Irish cultural nationalism*

	Gestation	*Crisis*	*Major crystallizations*	*Socio-political articulation*	*First social base*	*Outcome*
	1	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*	*6*
First revival	Antiquarians of mid 18th century	Conflict between conservative and radical nationalists after 1782	Royal Irish Academy 1785	Society of United Irishmen (1791) and Belfast weekly journal, *Northern Star* (1792)	Protestant lawyers and doctors	Failed revolt 1798
Second revival	Historians, philologists and artists of 1820s	Tensions between Catholics and Protestants and liberal and traditionalist Catholics after Catholic Emancipation (1829)	Revival of Royal Irish Academy, *Dublin Penny Journal* (1832), *Dublin University Magazine* (1833)	Young Ireland journalists in the *Nation* (1842)	Chiefly Catholic lawyers and journalists	Failed revolt 1848
Third revival	Historians, folklorists, poets from 1880s	Conflict between Parnellites and clerical and secular nationalists in 1890s	Gaelic League (1893) and Irish Literary Theatre (1899)	Arthur Griffith's *United Irishman* (1899) and D. P. Moran's *Leader* (1900)	Catholic lawyers, doctors, civil servants, teachers, students	Failed revolt 1916 followed by successful war of independence

of both the 'traditional' and the 'modern'. This message was addressed to the educated young who had to break with established authority and regenerate the nation from within.[5]

This was an activist, indeed, a political vision of the nation, and, in fact, it regularly inspired groups of journalists who, rejecting British models of political development as responsible for Irish demoralization, promoted a return to 'authentic' Gaelic values and modes of organization. In doing so, they looked to other cultures for their political models, but these were adapted so as to build a distinctive Irish nation, capable of competing economically, socially and politically, in the modern world.[6] In the 1790s the United Irishmen were impressed by republican France; in the 1840s Young Ireland by Prussia; and in the early twentieth century Griffith and Moran by Belgium, Germany and Hungary. On three occasions, these political intellectuals attracted the support of a younger intelligentsia, drawn largely from the professions and university students and graduates. This stratum, rejecting established religious and political authority, on each occasion provided the leaders of a multi-class movement designed to create an autonomous national community (cols 5 and 6).[7]

Cultural nationalism is thus an anti-traditionalist and a political movement. But it should not be conflated with political nationalism. Cultural and political nationalism represent two quite different conceptions of the nation, and form distinctive organizations and political strategies.

Political nationalists perceive the nation in rationalist terms as a homogeneous collectivity of educated citizens. They wish for a state representative of the nation which will break with tradition and raise the people to the level of the advanced 'scientific' cultures. They tend, like O'Connell in the early nineteenth, and Parnell in the late nineteenth century, to construct centralized mass organizations which aim to break all traditionalist barriers and to subordinate all intermediate groups in order to achieve one overriding goal — political autonomy. Although essentially modernist, they appeal to historic ethnic sentiments in an instrumental fashion in order to mobilize religious and rural support for their goal.[8] Not surprisingly, we see internal conflicts regularly breaking out between traditionalists and modernists (col. 2).

By contrast cultural nationalists perceive the nation not as a state but as a distinctive historical *community*, which continuously evolving, embodies a higher synthesis of the traditional' and the 'modern'.[9] Since a community is a spontaneous order of different groups and individuals, knit by common sentiments, it cannot be constructed like a state from above, but can only be re-animated from below. Cultural nationalists are primarily educators, establishing a decentralized set of informally organized agencies, designed to instill the creative vision

of the nation in each sector of life. In the early twentieth century the Gaelic League was just the hub of a loosely-related set of societies — industrial associations, agricultural co-operatives, temperance leagues, and athletic clubs — which attempted to embed a progressive national identity in everyday life and differentiate Ireland from other cultures.[10]

Judged by their own communitarian goals — the creation of a distinctive Irish civilization — Irish cultural nationalist movements failed. For the communitarian self-help movements were unable to challenge the power of the state over society because of the latter's control of coercive, financial and communicative resources. Increasingly in order to institutionalize their ideals in the social order they were forced into state-oriented strategies. In this guise, however, they were of considerable import, for one of their effects was to create a counter culture, socializing through their organizational networks a cohesive elite, dedicated to a distinctive Irish status order.[11] They thereby provided a powerful matrix of political identity, capable of serving as a focus of opposition for other aggrieved groups and as a revolutionary strike force against the state at times of national crisis, when the dominant political nationalist institutions seemed to be helpless. Generally these rebellions failed, but the third revolt in 1916 set off a guerilla war that was successful in establishing an independent Irish state, intensely Catholic and populist in its ethos (col. 6).

To summarize then, cultural nationalism was a recurring force in modern Ireland directed towards the moral regeneration of the historic community rather than the achievement of an independent state. Each of the three revivals reveals a common pattern. Cultural nationalism was an integrative movement formulated by historicist intellectuals, which crystallized at times of social conflict, frequently created by political nationalist movements. It became of major significance when, mediated through political journalists, it was adopted by a younger intelligentsia which challenged not only the state but also established political nationalist organizations.

The conjunction between cultural nationalism and the intelligentsia was of great importance, for in Ireland as elsewhere they formed its first constituency, and, acting as its cadres, raised it to socio-political prominence. Thus, in the early twentieth century, Catholic barristers, solicitors, doctors, and higher civil servants served as first level organizers of the Gaelic revival, while teachers, customs officers and postal clerks provided leadership in the localities.[12]

This, however, should be no surprise since the intelligentsia have supplied the cadres of all ideological movements. One should stress here the modernity of the intelligentsia and that they are to be distinguished from the intellectuals, the formulators of cultural nationalism.[13] Whereas the intellectuals may belong to any social class and are defined by their concern with meaning and purpose, the

intelligentsia constitute a novel social stratum of knowledge specialists that emerged since the eighteenth century from educational systems and professional colleges, established or licensed by the state, and that owed its rise to the growing hegemony of scientific rationalism in social life.[14] Both groups perceive themselves as knowledge elites, but the intelligentsia, because they derive their identity from their technical training and social function as 'problem solvers', are less concerned with abstract questions of identity than with the leadership and organization of movements and the practical reconstruction of the community. Of course, the intelligentsia have their precursors in the traditional professions, but with the rise of science they are imbued with a new secular activism. With their elitist sense of vocation to the community, their critical rationalism and their suspicion of all received authority and status divisions, they represent the political class *par excellence* in the modern world.

Two major questions, therefore, arise from this analysis

(1) Why the specific attraction of the intelligentsia to nationalism?
(2) Why are they periodically attracted to cultural nationalism rather than political nationalism, as if acting out a recurring cycle of elites operating *within* nationalist politics?

In the following two sections, I propose to argue that the preconditions for the politicization of Irish cultural nationalism were set by the patterns of recruitment and exclusion of rising educated strata by the British state in Ireland. For the purposes of this paper I will concentrate on the period 1870–1914. But we may see the periodic preference on the part of the younger intelligentsia for cultural rather than political nationalism as part of an alternating cycle between communitarian and legal-rational modes of organization that is set in motion by the modernizing state.

THE BRITISH STATE, ELITE MOBILITY, AND IRISH NATIONALISM

The state and the rise of the intelligentsia Since we wish to explain the attraction of the intelligentsia to cultural nationalism, we have to understand the character of this stratum. I have argued that it is the creation of educational and professional institutions underpinned by the post-eighteenth-century state, and that it is politically activist. But why have states, often controlled by traditional power groups, created such a dangerous stratum, and how have they shaped its character?

There are two major theses put forward to account for the state-sponsored expansion of the modern professions

(1) It is driven by the needs of capitalist industrialization.[15]
(2) It is compelled by the exogenous military and political

> pressures exerted on rulers by a competitive interstate system that is given a new dynamism by the scientific revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.[16]

These two theses are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but I suggest the primary motor is geo-political rather than economic. For educational expansion has occurred in many countries lacking any significant industrialization — for example in the Habsburg territories of early nineteenth-century eastern Europe. Moreover, it is the military expansion of the modern European states that has compelled traditional rulers in the 1860s as far apart as Ottoman Turkey and Japan to begin programmes of civil and military rationalization and educational expansion to maximize the human and material resources of the territorial polity. As states have perceived their rivals becoming increasingly efficient, so the pressures have intensified to replace recruitment on personalist lines by meritocratic selection through competitive examinations and the extension of government positions to former 'outgroups' — ethnic, religious, sexual and class-based.[17]

In Ireland the beginnings of this process dated from the 1830s, but not until the late nineteenth century was there a major transformation. Then British governments, concerned to preserve the Empire in an era of increasing great power rivalry and to integrate Ireland within the Union, began extensive reforms which opened up participation by educated Catholics within the British state.[18]

In Ireland there was a notable expansion of the Irish civil service with a ten-fold increase in officers and clerks (from 990 to 9,821) between 1861 and 1911, as the state intervened on a wide front to advance economic and social development.[19] Four major departments were established which required a considerable technical staff of lawyers, medical officers, surveyors and engineers: the Land Commission (1881), the Congested Districts Board (1891), the Department of Agriculture and Technical Instruction (1899), and the National Insurance Commission (1911). By 1914 these departments employed over half the staff of the Irish civil service.[20] To these positions must be added the growing numbers employed by branches of the British civil service in Ireland.[21]

As demand for the training of ever greater numbers of the Irish people increased to sustain the goals of the state, so opportunities were extended to previously excluded groups: to Catholics, women and the lower middle classes. In 1855 the Imperial civil service was opened to competitive entry, then in 1870 the British (or Home) civil service, and sections of the Irish service.[22] At the same time educational and professional facilities were expanded for Catholic male and female youth, with the Intermediate system (1878) financing Catholic secondary education, the Royal University (1879) then transformed into the National University (1909), and the

funding of seven training colleges to establish a qualified teaching profession.[23]

Table I indicates that between 1881 and 1911 (and particularly between 1891 and 1901) there was a considerable increase in Catholics — probably from small farming and shopkeeping backgrounds — attending secondary schools both in absolute numbers in a declining population and as a proportion of the secondary school pupils. Catholics attended university colleges in much more limited numbers, but the better schools prepared students for university degrees and entrance examinations for the prestigious professions.[24]

TABLE I: *Catholic pupils attending superior schools and colleges*

Year	*1871*	*1881*	*1891*	*1901*	*1911*
Catholic pupils	12,274	12,064	15,430	25,647	31,742
% of the secondary school pupils	50%	50%	55%	68%	73%

Source: Census of Ireland for 1911 General Report.

In the period 1871–1911 it is clear from Table II that Catholics, both from an upper-class and from a lower-middle-class rural background, were taking advantage of these educational and occupational opportunities to make advances in the legal, medical and teaching professions, and, above all, in the civil service.

Educational expansion, however, is only one of the state contributions to the making of an intelligentsia. It powerfully moulds its character as a group imbued with a competitive meritocratic ethos, alienated from local attachments and oriented instead to the welfare of the political collectivity as a whole. It does so because it requires not only skilled but also *loyal* functionaries who can be trusted in times of internal or external crisis. It thus actively seeks to eliminate sub-state loyalties — religious, ethnic, class — by two means: normative and institutional.

In the first place rulers seek through a state educational system to induct the young into an *official* standardized culture based on the values and requirements of the political centre. This also serves to estrange them from the informal dialects, genres and customs of their kindred and locality. But normative factors alone would be insufficient. What is equally essential is the creation through its bureaucracies of mobile territory-wide career paths, competitive in structure and rising in predictable success-related stages towards the administrative centre, which identify the detached but upwardly aspiring individual with the goals of the metropolitan polity. Benedict Anderson has described these career pathways as administrative pilgrimages. By this he suggests that individuals from different backgrounds discover a common allegiance to a territorial polity as they are brought

TABLE II: *Numbers of Roman Catholics in selected professions (1861–1911) and their percentage of the total*

	1861	*1871*	*1881*	*1891*	*1901*	*1911*
Legal. Barristers and Solicitors	873	736	837	848	975	999
	34%	35%	40%	41%	44%	44%
Medical	971	830	968	887	951	1,092
	35%	34%	39%	39%	43%	48%
Civil Service Officers and Clerks	420	2227	2707	3324	4875	5998
	39%	50%	54%	53%	59%	61%
School teaching	11034	12350	13535	13015	12689	12721
	57%	62%	64%	62%	62%	69%
Architects, Accountants, Civil Engineers	498	1050	1261	1038	1450	1618
	31%	43%	45%	42%	42%	46%
RC population	4,505,265	4,105,867	3,960,891	3,547,307	3,308,661	3,242,670
% of total	77.69%	76.69%	76.54%	75.4%	74.21%	73.86%

Extracted from the Census of Ireland for 1861 and from Tables showing the Occupations of Males and Females by Age, Religions, Profession and Education in the Census of Ireland (General Report) for 1871, 1881, 1891, 1901 and 1911.

together on occupational-*cum*-geographical journeys whose routes and meanings are determined by the political centre.[25]

We find both normative and institutional factors at work in Ireland. The school curriculum, taught in English even in the Irish-speaking districts, was not only purged of references to Irish history and culture, but was also notorious for equipping the young for service in the Imperial administration rather than for the improvement of the local agrarian economy.[26] One also sees the territory-wide bureaucratic career hierarchies in Ireland which, as officials moved in ascending arcs from locality to locality, attached power and value to the Imperial British state.

The net effect of this state recruitment in Ireland was an attachment to British Imperialist values that in the late nineteenth century suffused educated Catholic society. Irish national sentiments, of course, lived on, but in reality Irish educated society was geared to English cultural and political norms and tacitly held its Gaelic heritage in contempt. This is noticeably so in university colleges like Blackrock and prestigious Catholic schools like Castleknock and Clongowes, which highlighted the successes of their students in the service of the Empire.[27] Even in the independent Christian Brothers schools, whose curriculum was nationalist, pupils were 'crammed' for British civil service examinations.[28]

By the late nineteenth century, therefore, the British state had created a confident secular educated stratum, meritocratic in ethos, impatient with traditional Irish culture and assimilating to British social and political values.

Blocked Mobility If this is so, how is one to explain the conversion to Irish nationalism at the beginning of the twentieth century by the young Catholic intelligentsia? The standard answer to this question consists in identifying what are *perceived* by the intelligentsia to be checks on their vocational and occupational aspirations by the bureaucratic state. This answer, we shall see, is too simple as it stands, but it sets the necessary preconditions for the nationalization of the intelligentsia.

Nevertheless, it is not clear why a modernizing state which, I have argued, is compelled by external and internal pressures to open opportunities to previously excluded groups should *appear* to introduce such restraints. I suggest the answer is that the very policies, designed by state elites to safeguard their power and prestige, regularly threaten to subvert the established order on which they stand. They do so in three ways.[29]

First, modernization is a risky business. It requires planning for future administrative, military and economic needs. These, however, are inherently unpredictable due to contingencies such as technological innovation, political disaster (loss of empire) or falling birth rates.

The oversupply of specialists by educational institutions is a regular problem for modern states, which then become objects of resentment by these groups.

Second, there are inherent tensions between the power elites and the intelligentsia, imbued by its rationalist training with a suspicion of received authority. Political elites seek to subordinate the talents of the professionals to the needs of the existing regime. The intelligentsia, on the other hand, socialized as a knowledge elite in the course of its professional education, believes that the full realization of its vocational skills is essential for collective progress. These tensions are visible within state bureaucracies between relatively unqualified superiors and technically expert juniors, and also in the wider political arena where the state may seek to control the intelligentsia through censorship and political repression.[30]

Third, modernization threatens the monopolies enjoyed by traditionally dominant ethnic groups in multi-ethnic polities when it opens entry to public offices to previously excluded groups. In response, these elites have often defended their privileges by distorting the universalist rules of competition. For example, they may demand certain attributes (financial security or good character) as a precondition of competitive entry, or culturally load examinations to favour the dominant group, or use subjective criteria after employment to determine promotion to higher grades in the bureaucracy.[31]

Whether one or other of these factors is operative, the effect is to produce in the excluded intelligentsia, which has internalized expectations of upward mobility by merit, a collective resentment against an order, now perceived as inefficient, traditionalist, or actively malign.

The question is: can one identify such factors in early twentieth-century Ireland? I believe one can, whether one examines the match between expectations and reality on the part of scions of the Catholic social elite, who attended the prestigious Catholic schools and university colleges, or those of the Catholic lower-middle class, who passed through secondary schools and perhaps teacher training colleges or civil service academies. Both groups suffered to differing degrees from a sense of overcompetition, technical and vocational frustration and ethnic discrimination.

Although the era was one of educational and occupational advance for Catholics, the expectations far outran the openings available. The sons of the social elite had veered towards the professions of traditional prestige — law and medicine — which dominated University College, Dublin, in the early twentieth century.[32] But the number of positions remained static.[33] It is possible that Irish doctors could find alternative outlets in Britain and the Empire, but this was not so for lawyers, who became especially prominent as leaders in the Gaelic League.[34]

The closure of opportunities was not counterbalanced by comparable outlets elsewhere. Access to the Indian civil service was increasingly difficult,[35] and although the Irish civil service was in rapid expansion, it was not an attractive alternative. It had for historical reasons few first division positions, and, unlike the Home civil service, direct competition was restricted to certain positions, nominally to safeguard the loyalty of the British administration but in reality to prop up the Protestant interest.[36] The position of young Catholic women graduates was bleaker still as they were faced with low status, insecure and poorly paid positions as teachers or with minor clerkships in the civil service.[37]

Catholic graduates were confronted therefore, with unemployment, under-employment, or accepting low status posts in the civil service or schools.

Amongst the Catholic lower-middle classes, despite genuine advances in social mobility, there was evidence also of over-competition, technical frustration and ethnic bias. Competitive entry into the British Home and sections of the Irish civil service had produced an immediate response from Catholic schools which set up special classes for the entrance examinations.[38] As Table II demonstrates, in numerical and percentage terms Catholics did very well. The problem was that a much higher proportion of the Catholic Irish population was competing for such posts than their Irish Protestant or British equivalents,[39] for they had few alternatives to government employment. The Irish economy was underdeveloped and the private sector was largely in Protestant hands.[40]

Under these circumstances, Catholics were likely to react against 'artificial' barriers to their entry and career prospects within the Irish civil service. There were three such obstacles. The first, mentioned above, was the restriction of competition over key areas in the Irish civil service. The second was a cultural loading of the criteria of entry. To stem Catholic successes, Lord Ashbourne added Latin, modern languages and law as examinable subjects in the mistaken belief that this would favour Protestant graduates from Trinity College, Dublin, over Catholic school leavers.[41] The third was the practice of allocating many top offices to 'outsiders' from Britain in a service whose promotional opportunities were unusually constricted.[42]

In the other field of lower-middle-class employment — teaching — the story was one of frustration. In addition to problems of oversupply, there was Irish irritation at their inferiority to their English counterparts in terms of status, salary, career structure and security of tenure.[43] There was, moreover, a vocational resentment against a curriculum from which Irish history and culture had largely been excised.

In the early twentieth century, then, at both the higher and lower levels of the Catholic intelligentsia there were obvious objective

grounds, both occupational and vocational, for hostility to a state which refused the educated the central role in public life to which their qualifications 'entitled' them.[44]

The nationalization of the intelligentsia Sudden and (to the intelligentsia) arbitrary blocks on expectations of upward mobility may supply the preconditions for an anti-state movement. They do not explain in themselves the intelligentsia's turn to nationalism, let alone to cultural nationalism. So why nationalism rather than a universalist ideology?

I cannot provide a complete explanation here. But it is worth noting that state-led modernization not only creates new secular mobile strata, it also threatens the existing status order (religiously based in Ireland) and thereby generates, as it extends its effects through society, a pervasive crisis of identity and conflicts between modernist and traditionalist strata. Some scholars have interpreted nationalism as an attempt to integrate the sense of unique identity, given by historical tradition, with the secular activism promoted by science by projecting the nation as an evolutionary community which embodies a higher synthesis of tradition and modernity.[45] But if this is so, why does nationalism gain its first social constituency amongst this novel stratum, the intelligentsia?

A plausible answer suggested by A. D. Smith is that it is this very novelty (and its anti-traditionalism) which creates a desire for roots and a wider legitimation as a social group. As long as it finds recognition and function as a knowledge elite, dedicated to raise 'scientifically' the welfare of the community, this anxiety is held at bay. But its sudden exclusion from power and status by state policies triggers a crisis of identity and purpose. For now it is *doubly* isolated, alienated from a localist traditional order by its socialization and, at the same time, denied recognition by the bureaucratic state. Moreover, because of its activism it is unable either to return to the traditional order or to accept its rejection by the state. At this point nationalism provides a new source of meaning and social function, identifying the intelligentsia with a unique community that is both historically rooted and continuously mobile. Nationalism caters to the vocational ideal of the intelligentsia, for it locates the rising educated strata as the natural leaders of the community. It is they who have the task of breaking with decaying tradition and assimilating scientific advance to the nation's historic culture, thereby guiding the people to ever higher stages of individual and collective realization.[46]

CULTURAL NATIONALISM AND THE CYCLE OF ELITE MOBILITY

This analysis, however, does not by itself explain the adoption of a

cultural nationalism by the intelligentsia, for, as we have seen, they have two options against the bureaucratic state, cultural and political, with their very different conceptions of national identity and nation-building. From section I, it is clear that either a communitarian or a state-directed nationalism may serve the drive of an intelligentsia to integrate into and lead a distinctive community, and in fact we find different generations of the intelligentsia regularly shifting between the options which rise and fall as in an alternating cycle. So why, after a period (between 1370 and 1900) dominated by Irish political nationalism, did a rising intelligentsia veer towards a communitarian cultural nationalism?

Historians have responded to this question by pointing to the disincentives to participation in political nationalism faced by this intelligentsia after 1900. They have referred to the exclusion of the young from leading positions in the Irish parliamentary party on the part of an older Catholic intelligentsia of lawyers and journalists, and also to the dousing of national hopes of achieving political autonomy in the foreseeable future, after a British Conservative government, committed to the parliamentary union of Britain and Ireland, was re-elected in 1900.[47] This, however, is inadequate as an answer. For while political disincentives may create a disillusionment with established political nationalism, they cannot alone explain the *positive* attraction of the rising intelligentsia to a cultural rather to an alternative political nationalism. They also fail to account for the dynamics of this long-term alternating cycle in which one nationalist enterprise is regularly superseded by another.

I suggest we should explain the periodic choice of cultural nationalism within this alternating pattern by analysing the two movements as *partial*, competing and complementary solutions to the problems of identity and function into which the intelligentsia are driven, by the repeated challenges of state-led modernization to the existing status order. Each movement promotes as its solution the 'recreation' of a distinctive integrated political community, but on different lines. Each solution has its strengths, but each also regularly breaks down against the power of the state and in turn elicits the other. Political disincentives, we shall see, do play a part in orienting the intelligentsia between the two options, yet only when they coincide with the failure of the existing nationalist strategy to unite the community and successfully oppose the state. The motor of this cycle is powered by the competitive interstate system, for this, given dynamism by technological innovation, recurrently compels polities into policies of internal modernization that create upwardly aspiring young educated generations, discontented with the state and eager to assume the nationalist leadership from their fading elders.

Let me conclude by elucidating the interactive relationship of

cultural and political nationalism as rival strategies against the bureaucratic state. Cultural nationalism, we saw, perceives the nation as a spontaneous order and operates as a movement of communal self-help, throwing up informal agencies in order to 'recreate' the nation from the grass roots up. But in its own terms it fails against the state and paves the way for the rise of a political nationalism for two reasons. First, it is contradictory, for, while in theory it promotes the vision of a decentralized nation, in practice it is driven to construct a unitary image of the nation to counterpose against the state, in order to revive a common identity amongst its diverse constituency and to preserve it against the pressures of an exogenously inspired modernization. Secondly, since the state is the locus of political, economic and cultural power in the modern world, any self-help movement is bound to be of limited effect. Cultural nationalism then, unable to unite the group, is increasingly forced to engage in a state-oriented politics in order to embed its vision in the social order. On three occasions Irish cultural nationalism culminated in a political revolt (see Figure I, col. 6).

As a communitarian nationalism is perceived to fail to unify the nation and is forced to concede the primacy of the state, so a later intelligentsia is drawn to a political nationalism and to formal modes of organization in order to regenerate the nation. They establish, we saw, political machines run on legal-rational lines which using ethnic sentiments are capable of uniting large and divergent groups round a single aim of political autonomy. By wielding this threat they are able to extract concessions from the state on behalf of their members. How then does it happen that these apparently effective mass machines are regularly challenged by subsequent communitarian movements?

I believe that the very strengths of political nationalism — its capacity to construct a permanent apparatus uniting different groups and to channel communal energies towards one single goal — also become its weakness. For unless it can overcome the state quickly, it has the tendency to engender internal conflict within the nation and to wither into a bureaucratic machine remote from the national community, thereby creating the preconditions for the re-emergence of cultural nationalism.

We can break this process into two stages. In the first place, despite the use of ethnic sentiments to mobilize divergent groups (including traditionalists and modernists) in a coalition against the state, there are inbuilt antipathies between these groups which periodically erupt into conflict (Figure I, col. 2), and result in the secession of traditionalist elements from the movement. This not only leads, as we noted earlier, to the crystallization of an integrative cultural nationalism as an alternative matrix of national development, it contributes to the incorporation of political nationalism within the metropolitan

state. For, with the secession of the traditionalists, political nationalists are alienated from a powerful source of national identity and lose an indigenous lever against the state.

Among a rising intelligentsia, 'excluded' by the state and searching for roots in the community, political nationalism becomes increasingly 'unauthentic'. But though political nationalism loses its dynamism, there is still no switch by the young to a cultural nationalism. For the political nationalist movement with its co-ordinated leadership, affiliated press, and constituency networks remains the only credible proponent of national grievances against the state. At this point, a second factor comes into play to account for the growing attraction of cultural nationalism as a *political* option for the intelligentsia. This is the tendency of political nationalism to ossify into a bureaucratic oligarchy, remote from the community it purportedly serves. As Michels observed, this 'iron law' applies to all large-scale organizations.[48] Its effects, however, are particularly visible in nationalist parties because of the logic of political nationalism: namely, to set up as a counter to the state a unitary organization, subordinating all intermediate groups, in support of its claim to be the single voice of the nation.[49] As it ossifies, therefore, political nationalism not only reflects the norms of the dominant state, but also imposes a dictatorship of the old over the young and lays a 'dead hand' on the nation, stifling any social movements outside its control.

The rising young nationalist intelligentsia, already disillusioned by the divisiveness of political nationalism, now perceives itself to be excluded from power and status in the community, not just by the state but also by an oligarchic machine that has lost legitimacy as the national leader, because of its distance from the concrete problems of the country, its apparent accommodation to alien norms, and its impotence against the state. At this time in its isolation the intelligentsia seeking a vocational outlet is increasingly attracted to the dynamic integral vision of cultural nationalism, as reformulated by its political intellectuals. For this offers both a return to roots in the historical community and a modernizing alternative to the worn-out legislative panaceas of political nationalism.

Rejecting the statist strategies of political nationalism as reinforcing national decay by diverting communal energies into a sterile political agitation, cultural nationalists promote a popular economic, cultural, and political revival by allying with all those community-based movements outside the political nationalist umbrella. Indeed, as in early twentieth-century Ireland, the cultural nationalist intelligentsia in its revulsion against 'over-rationalist' conceptions of the nation, may join with religious fundamentalist forces, also disaffected with secular political nationalists. By thereby re-appropriating for the cause powerful ethnocentric sentiments, cultural nationalists are able to inject a fresh dynamism into nationalism and to sustain the in-

dividuality of the community against those who favour its assimilation to a cosmopolitan modernity.

To conclude then, I have argued that cultural nationalism has been a recurring and significant political movement in the modern world, and I have linked its regular adoption by secular elites to an alternating cycle between informal-communitarian and formal-bureaucratic modes of organization, generated by the modern state. It must be stressed that the pattern I have found in Ireland is not universal. It cannot occur in those countries where formal political activity is repressed. Here cultural nationalism, if it is permitted at all, may become a surrogate political nationalism. But I suggest that, where an open politics is permitted as in nineteenth and twentieth century colonial India,[50] we can find a similar interactive relationship between the two nationalisms.

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NOTES

1. An exception is H. Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism*, London, Macmillan, 1967.

2. *Ibid.*; M. Matossian, 'Ideologies of "delayed industrialization": some tensions and ambiguities', *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, vol. 25, no. 3, 1958, pp. 217–28.

3. J. Hutchinson, *The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism*, London, Allen & Unwin, 1987.

4. D. Hyde, 'The necessity for de-anglicizing Ireland' in D. Hyde, *Revival of Irish Literature and Other Addresses*, London, Fisher & Unwin, 1901; E. MacNeill, 'Why and how the Irish language is to be preserved', reprinted in F. X. Martin and F. J. Byrne (eds), *The Scholar Revolutionary, Eoin MacNeill (1867–1945)*, Shannon, Irish University Press, 1973.

5. On MacNeill's historical vision, see D. McCartney, 'MacNeill and Irish Ireland', in F. X. Martin and F. J. Byrne (eds), *op. cit.*

6. The Gaelic dimension was weakest in the case of the eighteenth century political movements, but its influence on prominent radicals such as Drennan shows that it cannot be entirely discounted.

7. On the social composition of the United Irishmen, see M. Elliott, *Partners in Revolution*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1982, pp. 24–5; on that of the Young Ireland movement, see J. R. Hill, 'The intelligentsia and Irish nationalism in the 1840s', *Studia Hibernica*, vol. 20, 1980, pp. 73–110; on that of the political movements of the (third) Gaelic revival, see J. Hutchinson, *op. cit.*, chs 5 and 8.

8. On O'Connell's use of history, see D. McCartney, 'The writing of history in Ireland (1800–50)', *Irish Historical Studies*, vol. 10, 1956, pp. 347–62.

9. See F. M. Barnard, 'Culture and political development: Herder's suggestive insights', *The American Political Science Review*, vol. 63, 1969, pp. 379–97.

10. J. Hutchinson, *op. cit.*, ch. 5.

11. On the role of the intellectuals and counter cultures, see R. J. Brym, *Intellectuals and Politics*, London, Allen & Unwin, 1980, ch. 2.

12. J. Hutchinson, *op. cit.*, ch. 5.

13. A. D. Smith, *The Ethnic Revival*,

Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981, pp. 108–112.

14. On the intelligentsia as knowledge specialists, see A. W. Gouldner, *The Future of the Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class*, London, Macmillan, 1979.

15. For example, E. Gellner, *Thought and Change*, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964; A. W. Gouldner, *op. cit.*; T. Nairn, *The Break-up of Britain*, London, New Left Books, 1977.

16. A. D. Smith, *Theories of Nationalism*, London, Duckworth, 1971, ch. 10.

17. *Ibid.*: B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, London, Verso, 1983, pp. 73–4.

18. J. Hutchinson, *op. cit.*, ch. 8.

19. R. B. McDowell, *The Irish Administration (1800–1914)*, London Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1964, p. 35.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 27.

21. They numbered over 24,000 in 1914, and of these nearly 20,000 were employed in the postal services. *Ibid.*, *Loc. cit.*

22. This is best analysed by K. Flanagan, 'The rise and fall of the Celtic ineligible', unpublished Sussex D. Phil., 1978. I was influenced by this work in constructing Table II.

23. T. J. Durcan, *History of Irish Education for 1800*, Bala, Dragon, 1972, pp. 76 ff.

24. T. Corcoran (ed.), *The Clongowes Record 1814–1932*, Dublin, Browne & Nolan, 1932, pp. 147–51; St Vincent's College, Castleknock, *Centenary Record (1835–1935)*, Dublin, At the Sign of the Three Candles, 1935, pp. 173–94.

25. B. Anderson, *op. cit.*, p. 111.

26. T. J. Durcan, *op. cit.*, pp. 40–1; T. J. McElligott, *Secondary Education in Ireland (1870–1921)*, Dublin, Irish Academic Press, 1981, p. 81.

27. That outstanding product of Castleknock College, D. P. Moran, confessed that in his youth he could not conceive of any enterprising Irishman being content to make his career in Ireland. *The Leader*, 26 September 1935.

28. R. Taylor, *Michael Collins*, London, Hutchinson, 1958, pp. 44–ff.

29. See Smith's analysis in *The Ethnic Revival*, *op. cit.*, ch. 6.

30. R. J. Brym, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

31. For a discussion of other forms of discrimination experienced by subordinate ethnic groups within such polities, see B. Anderson, *op. cit.*, ch. 6.

32. J. Meenan, 'The student body' in M. Tierney (ed.), *Struggle with Fortune. A Miscellany for its Centenary of the Catholic University of Ireland (1854–1954)*, Dublin, Browne & Nolan, 1954.

33. Between 1871 and 1911 the Census of Ireland (General Report) records only a small rise in those Catholics employed in the legal profession from 2215 to 2246, while in the same years there was a decline in the numbers in the medical profession from 2441 to 2259.

34. On the hardships facing those wishing to enter the legal profession, see the views of the Lord Chief Justice of England, Lord Russell of Killowen, in 'The Bar as a profession', *The College Chronicle, Castleknock*, June 1896.

35. K. Flanagan, *op. cit.*, pp. 630–3.

36. R. B. McDowell, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

37. One of the women's activists, Hannah Skeffington, herself a teacher, exclaimed bitterly: 'I have known university graduates — exhibitioners, scholars, gold medallists — accept salaries which a competent cook would have scorned' (quoted in T. J. McElligott, *op. cit.*, p. 93).

38. *Ibid.*, p. 80.

39. For example, despite the huge disparity between the Irish and British populations, the Irish supplied 43 per cent of the candidates for the 1,918 customs posts offered in 1878. *Ibid.*, p. 35.

40. The Census of Ireland (General Report) for the years 1871–1911 records a rise in Catholics employed as commercial clerks from 5,769 to 13,156, but as a proportion of the total employed they declined from 51 per cent to 48 per cent.

41. M. Tierney, *Eoin MacNeill: Scholar and Man of Action (1867–1945)*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1980, p. 9.

42. R. B. McDowell, *op. cit.*, pp. 35–7.

43. T. J. McElligott, *op. cit.*, pp. 93–113.

44. In addition, civil servants and teachers were forbidden by the terms of their employment to engage in political activity beyond exercising the right to vote. See T. J. Durcan, *op. cit.*, p. 76.

45. See, in particular, A. D. Smith, *Theories of Nationalism*, *op. cit.*, ch. 10.

46. A. D. Smith, *The Ethnic Revival*, *op. cit.*, ch. 6.

47. This is pervasive in the literature. It can be found even in a recent highly sophisticated analysis by T. Garvin, *The Evolution of Irish Nationalist Politics*, Dublin, Gill and MacMillan, 1981, pp. 94, 100.

48. R. Michels, *Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy*, tr. E. C. Paul, New York, The Free Press, 1962.

49. P. R. Brass, 'Ethnic groups and nationalities in the formation, persistence, and transformation of ethnic identities', in P. F. Sugar, (ed.), *Ethnic Diversity and Conflict in Eastern Europe*, Oxford, ABC-Clio, 1980. For a discussion of oligarchic tendencies in Irish political nationalism, see A. O'Day, *The English Face of Irish Nationalism*, Dublin, Gill and Macmillan, 1977, pp. 30–41.

50. On this, see J. Hutchinson, *op. cit.*, ch. 1.

R. J. Holton

The idea of crisis in modern society*

ABSTRACT

Crisis has become such an all-pervasive rhetorical metaphor that its analytical utility for contemporary social thought has become devalued and confused. The normalisation of a sense of crisis has however blurred the conventional distinction between crisis as a decisive moment in the resolution of a narrative or illness and normality. This paper responds to this 'crisis in crisis theory' by reaffirming the distinction between crisis and normality. Starting out from the axiom that only subjects can be involved in crisis, a number of reasons are presented for the pervasiveness of crisis-talk, hinging on a western loss of faith in European Enlightenment rationalism. Attention then shifts from problems of cultural meaning to the development of a modern sociology of crisis within the system-theories of Parsons and Habermas. This enterprise involves an approach to crisis and crisis-resolution in terms of problems of social differentiation and institutionalisation. The delimited accounts of crisis that emerge are capable of distinguishing between crisis and normality, while yet retaining a critical sense of the provisionality and problematic nature of the 'normal'. They are therefore more compatible with the politics of this-worldly social reform than other-worldly utopianism.

In the contemporary world we are told that 'crisis' threatens us on all sides. Sociology it seems is dominated by crisis-talk. At the most general level notions of 'global crisis'[1] and 'international crisis' or 'crisis of international order'[2] may be found. Crisis-tendencies are also located in relations between 'the international market' and economic crises in the nation-state[3] while a more fundamental economic, political and cultural 'crisis of the nation-state' is spoken of.[4] Individual western societies meanwhile are faced with the 'accumulation crisis',[5] 'legitimation crisis',[6] 'fiscal crisis of the state',[7] 'motivation crisis',[8] and, to make matters even worse the 'crisis of crisis management'.[9]

Further dimensions of crisis have been detected in both space and time. Spatially we are faced with the 'crisis of economic relations between north and south'[10] and crisis-tendencies arising from 'an underlying shift in the centre of modernity from Northern America to East Asia'.[11] In historical terms, the western world at least is diagnosed to be suffering a 'crisis of industrial culture'[12] accompanied by a crisis of socialism[13] and calls to bid 'farewell to the working class'[14] as a force for social change. It is widely held that we live in a transitional epoch leading beyond 'industrial' and 'capitalist' social relations, but quite where we are heading and by what route we will arrive there is uncertain. If capitalism is still seen to persist as that surprisingly sprightly geriatric 'late capitalism' it is said to do so in a 'disorganised' crisis-ridden fashion.[15] What is clear is that the orthodox Marxist view of the final crisis of capitalism, conceived in largely economistic terms, has been overtaken by a broader and multi-dimensional set of differentiated crises.

In the midst of these pervasive perceptions of crisis it is not surprising to find social thought itself to be diagnosed as crisis-ridden. Thus we not only face a 'crisis in economic theory'[16] but the coming crisis of sociology, forecast by Gouldner is now said to be fully apparent.[17] To make matters even worse, catastrophe theory is itself said to be in a catastrophic state[18] as a result of the normalisation of crisis perceptions, though quite where this leads us is uncertain. For many it remains more comforting to refer to a shorthand notion — namely 'the crisis'. This concept resounds with all-embracing yet diffuse allusions to some multi-faceted yet unitary phenomenon,[19] without the need to clarify exactly what is meant. Once things reach this unsatisfactory state it is perhaps time to pause and take stock of the intellectual value of crisis theory itself.

Is crisis-talk an example of 'fashionable semantic predispositions looking out for supporting theories' as Luhmann[20] puts it? Or is it a piece of rhetoric functional to academic publishing strategies in a dwindling market? Or, alternatively, are we dealing with debates of profound significance for social analysis and political change?

The aim of this paper is neither to diagnose some new and exciting version of 'crisis', nor to evaluate and adjudicate between the relative merits of the existing multiplicity of crisis-concepts. Instead I want to examine the analytical utility of the crisis metaphor for an understanding of the contemporary western world. This question emerges out of the strong suspicion that the idea of crisis has become so massively over-inflated with rhetorical significance, as to have become de-valued in its analytical specificity. Once virtually everything is perceived to be in more or less unending crisis the possibility arises that we are losing the capacity to discriminate between social pathology or breakdown, on the one side, and social normality and social order on the other.

The metaphoricality of the language of social crisis draws of course on older aesthetic and medical usages. In the aesthetic structure of drama, for example, crisis is manifest through a key moment or moments in a narrative wherein the dilemmas of human life and the fate of human actors are dramatised. This structure presupposes that crisis is an abnormal and discontinuous feature of narrative rather than a permanent fixture. Similarly in medical discourse, crisis refers to a particular stage in the development of an illness which is decisive for the future. The resolution of the 'crisis' will determine whether the 'patient' will recover or die. Crisis is not a permanent state.

The crisis metaphor has of course been translated into social enquiry as a means of dramatising perceptions of social pathology, social breakdown and disorganisation, and to give full vent to feelings as to the intolerability of the present. Its use is thus embedded in discourses about social change and debates about appropriate forms of political action. The assumption is that crises are unacceptable, and that they can and ought, sooner or later, to be resolved. The crisis-idiom is thus closely connected with the practice of social criticism, involving both standards of cultural evaluation, and preferred modes of political mobilisation. Such standards usually take one of two forms.

First there is what might be referred to as an immanent perspective on crisis and crisis-resolution. This is typically deployed within the politics of social reform. Here the function of social analysis is to explain the origins of crisis and the conditions for its resolution, typically through accounts of the capacity of existing social organisations to institutionalise conflict and reconstruct relationships under stress. Here crisis is not a permanent state.

Alternatively, there is what might be termed the transcendental deployment of the crisis metaphor. Here crisis pathologies are set within a more utopian politics calling for thorough-going change in the social totality. Utopianism, as Mannheim and others have indicated, may well represent a fertile source of social innovation, by projecting alternative possibilities of social organisation, not rooted in observable social trends. The problem with this transcendental form of crisis-talk is the tendency for the idea of crisis to be extended in such an indiscriminate manner that it becomes virtually synonymous with modern social life itself. This allows the idea of crisis no bounds, denying the sense of a separate delimited stage in a narrative or illness found in drama and medicine. The idea of the potential normalisation of crisis is not thereby eliminated, but usually suspended as a matter not demonstrable by reference to immanent social trends or practical feasibility.

It is arguable that some versions of Marxist critical theory, equipped with a utopian social ontology of the community of free producers, are forced to maintain a more or less permament sense of

the final crisis of capitalism (or late capitalism) in order to protect their transcendent evaluative assumptions against the disconcerting evidence of lack of mass resistance to social normality. Similar criticisms might be made of thorough-going conservative forms of social theory, which, while diagnosing the almost complete collapse of social bonds, are none the less faced with the equally disconcerting evidence of the continuing everyday reproduction of what are taken to be pathological and crisis-ridden relations. In both cases excessively utopian transcendental social theories may tell us more about the alienation of intellectuals from the normative bases of the modern world, than about the dynamics of social change.

While the use of the crisis metaphor in social criticism is not without pronounced disadvantages, it does retain a considerable degree of utility. In the first place it underscores the refusal to accept all features of social life as necessarily 'given' and 'unproblematic'. In so doing any notion of 'normality' is itself brought into question. The social pathologies identified by crisis theory pre-empt the 'normal' functioning of social life, while yet leaving space for successful recovery, if the appropriate social changes eventuate. This critical standpoint is a useful foil to those forms of functionalism which hold that society necessarily tends to equilibrium as a result of the functional inter-dependence of its component parts. Such arguments usually founder on the dubious proposition that because certain social institutions perform certain current functions, those functions must necessarily be performed by the institutions in question. This proposition merely encourages an apologetic defence of the status quo as the only possible way of organising social cohesion. In this manner the importance of dysfunctional inter-relations between social institutions as manifest in conflict and protest is under-valued. The metaphor of crisis clearly offers an alternative means by which the systemic sources and developmental potential of such dysfunctions may be recognised.

A second advantage of the notion of crisis is that it helps to conceptualise social change as a discontinuous process in both time and space. Change is far from being smooth and gradual and cumulative. It is also expressed through dislocating and de-stabilising moments of transition. This framework helps in turn to capture the sense of change as open-ended, not the pre-determined result of an evolutionary master-plan, but rather a process mediated through cultural agency and conflict. The metaphor of crisis is suggestive of both a critical theoretical standpoint and of social discontinuity dependent on the outcome of key moments of cultural drama.

CULTURAL DIMENSIONS TO CONTEMPORARY CRISIS-TALK

The classic and highly influential Marxist theory of crisis was founded

on the structural contradictions of economic life, manifest in processes like the falling rate of profit. Although Marxism also claims that structural crises or 'contradictions' in the mode of production at some stage tend to become manifest in class consciousness and class struggle, it was already clear to late nineteenth-century observers that no automatic connection of this kind could be sustained. Revolutions did not automatically accompany crises. From this viewpoint came a sense of divergence between the 'objective' character of crisis and a 'subjective' or 'cultural' failure to perceive crisis. This kind of divergence produced notions such as 'false consciousness' which were both critical of and often disdainful towards what might be called cultural normality. In this idiom, diagnosis of crisis and the prescription of therapy is a matter for experts, theorists and the like.

In the more recent crises theories of Jurgen Habermas by contrast, it is a central axiom that 'only subjects can be involved in crisis. Thus only when members of a society experience structural alterations as critical for continued existence and feel their social identity threatened can we speak of crisis'. The point here is not, of course, to deny the salience of changes in material life to social experience or to set up an arbitrary distinction between material and cultural explanations of crisis. It is rather that crisis-perceptions are necessarily manifest in cultural terms, and hence can never be simply read off from ostensibly objective indicators of economic breakdown (or any other structural trends). The analysis of the pervasive contemporary mood of crisis-talk, especially within western life, has therefore to be adequate on the level of meaning. Of course, manifest cultural perceptions may form only one element in theories of crisis, alongside the often unacknowledged structural determinants of breakdown, and the organisational capacity of social institutions to manage or resolve crises. None the less, Habermas' cultural 'starting point' has the advantage over 'objectivist' theories of crisis in delimiting the scope of social pathology by reference to observable cultural perceptions. By this means the trap of exclusively transcendental 'other-worldly' modes of utopian criticism of normality may be avoided.

At the level of meaning we might begin by saying that the pervasiveness of crisis-talk in contemporary western thought reflects a complex cultural malaise. This seems to stem from a massive discrepancy between previous historic expectations of the inevitability of social progress and global dominance, and a weakening of cultural confidence in what might be termed European Enlightenment rationalism. While this malaise is uneven in incidence, being felt more strongly in western Europe than the U.S.A., Japan and Australia, it has three aspects of general significance within the western world.

Firstly there is the continuing loss of faith in historicism and evolutionism, in the inevitability of progress. In the aftermath of the Two World Wars, Auschwitz, the Gulag, Hiroshima and Pol Pot

there are few takers for social philosophies of optimism. In this context it was left to American scholars to revive post-war versions of (neo)-evolutionism[21] with rather more muted forms of evolutionism being evident in Europe.[22] The erosion of evolutionary optimism is reflected in the fatalism engendered by the threat of nuclear annihilation, and also by a growing awareness of the ecological limits to social capacities to improve the human condition. Whereas among American commentators, the recent disasters at Cape Canaveral and Chernobyl have produced widespread calls to place scientific priorities above public relations, political expediency and marketing strategies — re-connecting science with the possibility of an heroic individual moral posture — the tone of much debate elsewhere has been increasingly critical of the conceits of scientism and an engineering approach to the conduct of human affairs.

One major component of the collapse of evolutionism, largely peculiar to European opinion, is the crisis of communism and socialism. Whereas the epoch of 1914–50 has often been described as the crisis of capitalism, the period 1950–86 appears just as strikingly as an epoch of crisis in both socialism and communism. Crises of communism as a system of government — as experienced within western thought at least — stem from the repressive record of totalitarian government, including the 'suppression of' internal revolt and dissent within the U.S.S.R. and eastern Europe. Meanwhile, problems of Soviet economic management, and the recent shift of Chinese economic policy towards a greater element of market-based resource allocation, have engendered a loss of confidence in social planning strategies based solely on state initiative.[23] Overall such developments have contributed to the increasing realisation among western Marxists, of the increasing remoteness of an immanent transition to socialism and communism on the lines of Marx's original scenario. They have also helped to erode any *a priori* claims as to the moral superiority of 'communism' over capitalism and liberal individualism, that once may have existed.[24]

It is somewhat harder to speak of a crisis of socialism in that a number of values associated with the idea of socialism retain a wide appeal. Bottomore's recent definition of socialism as 'A social order in which there is the maximum feasible equality of access, for all human beings, to economic resources, to knowledge, and to political power, and the minimum possible domination exercised by any indvidual or social group over any other',[25] would have a wide resonance in contemporary western opinion where links between demands for participatory democracy and social justice are strong. Yet if we look more closely at the problem, there are evidently very significant disagreements about how much 'equality' is feasible, and of what kind, while the minimum level of political domination is again contested.

A crisis of socialism as practised within western electoral politics at least, has been increasingly apparent in the last decade. Part of this, stemming from the electoral victories and intellectual elan of the New Right, is manifest in a loss of confidence in state planning and in socialist modes of crisis-management and crisis-resolution, such as nationalisation and the welfare state. Another major symptom of the crisis of socialism is the faltering and in some cases decline of class-based politics and labour movements in Europe. While it is still plausible to specify electoral alliances that may bring Labour Parties to Government,[26] and to find instances of sectional industrial conflict, the possibility of a class-based socialism becomes increasingly improbable.

These multiple challenges have encouraged many western commentators to re-define 'class' in terms of social action strategies, social movements and political cleavages thereby severing any necessary ties between economic structures and class action.[27] They have also led others to deny the salience of class altogether to radical social reconstruction, as in radical feminism, and also the work of Gorz.[28] In all of this the spectre of revolution has been replaced by that of seemingly unending crisis. While the patient is diagnosed by some as suffering from 'late capitalism', the therapeutic of revolution seems increasingly remote and disreputable. A spectre may indeed be haunting Europe, but it is certainly not the liberating revolutionary elan of socialism or communism. The spectre is either nuclear annihilation through non-class based geo-political conflict or, failing that, a future in which international relations are conducted between Imperial blocs.[29] Within western nation-states, meanwhile, hopes of socialism and communism face the spectre of 'withering away' in the face of the more resilient institutions of the private household and the bureaucratic state, and a cultural climate stressing value-pluralism. *Gemeinschaft* definitions of community seem increasingly outmoded.

A second element in western cultural malaise — again more evident in Europe than in the USA — is the west's loosening cultural and political grip over the remainder of the globe. This process involves a long-term shift in the balance of global economic political and cultural influence from Europe to the USA and, more latterly, East Asia and the Pacific Basin.[30] From this perspective there is no longer any guarantee that developments within Europe necessarily define and pre-figure future processes of social change. The cutting edge of modernity may have moved elsewhere, reflecting a continuing spatial shift of 'lead' sectors.[31]

A further aspect of the relative decline of Europe's global centrality is the collapse of European colonialism in the face of successful colonial revolt. While it remains the case that European economic dominance over many post-colonial nations remains strong, such economic controls are no longer combined with the strong often racist

sense of cultural superiority of Europeans over the rest of the globe that intensified in the nineteenth century and persisted up until the post-1945 period. Post-colonial ideologies of nationalism and socialism have done much to reverse the previous status hierarchy which placed the 'white races' above all others. In the process post-colonial socialism has weaker and weaker connections in European Enlightenment rationalism.

While the contrasts between Europe and the USA should not be stretched too far, it is arguable that American opinion retains a far stronger sense of cultural confidence *vis-à-vis* the rest of the globe than is evident in Europe. Although this opinion is not monolithic, part of this confidence is manifest in support for interventionist American actions as 'world policemen', most recently in Libya. One way of explaining the continuing global confidence of U.S. culture has been suggested by Tiryakian.[32] He links this trend to the cultural traditions and social imperatives of American puritanism. This not only fostered individual striving to harness the forces of science and technology to control nature, but also a collective striving to bring the rest of the world within the pale of salvation. Paradoxically, puritanism served not only to legitimate a universalistic democratic political system, but also to encourage a global distinction between members of the 'community of saints' identified by their acceptance of norms of liberal-individualistic activism, and a 'community of wretched' outside. Thus 'the flagrant contradiction of American foreign policy is that the domestic commitment to equal participation in the policy is vitiated by an adamant unwillingness to have the Third World participate on an equal footing in the world community'.[33]

A third related component of the western cultural malaise is a growing perception of the lack of success in creating a stable moral consensus. How far society actually needs such a moral consensus to function[34] and whether such a consensus ever existed in the past, around a 'dominant ideology'[35] or the 'work ethic'[36] are themselves debatable questions. It is also very difficult to provide over-arching characterizations of the moral climate in the west since the data base is very patchy[37] and national variations seem important. If commitment to the work ethic is to be regarded as a component of a moral consensus, for example, its importance seems far weaker in Europe than in the USA and Japan.[38] A more embracing conception of moral consensus might be identified in the neo-Durkheimian type of 'civil religion', identified in the American culture of the early 1960s dependent on traditions of liberal republicanism and Protestantism.[39] In the changed climate of the 1970s, however, Bellah shifted ground, detecting a 'post-modern' and highly problematic melange of values associated with interest-based utilitarian hedonism.[40]

Whatever contrasts may exist between the moral characteristics of various national cultures within the western world, there would seem

to be at the very least a loosening of the moral bonds inherited from the natural rights philosophies of the Enlightenment. Although the diffuse values of universal citizenship rights, egalitarianism, scientism and rationalism remain important, it is not at all clear that they offer a sufficiently stable basis for moral cohesion.[41] Social conflicts involving the New Right suggest that neither egalitarianism nor an expanded sense of citizenship rights as reflected in welfare state philosophies of entitlement are uncontested 'givens' In addition, labour movements and other interests on the 'left' often have an ambivalent respect for liberal-democratic rules of industrial and political procedure. Meanwhile the value of scientific rationality is itself under attack both from Green ecology parties and segments of the radical women's movement.[42] In this context, core notions such as 'justice', 'community', and 'the rule of law' have neither a clearly defined meaning, nor an uncontested status as values.

One indicator of the unsettled nature of moral life is the diffuse and/or contested character of the so-called 'post-bourgeois'[43] or 'post-materialist'[44] values. Each of the five posited values of imperative self-actualisation, hedonism, entitlementalism, anti-productivism, and anti-intellectualism may be seen as problematic. Some are so diffuse as to transcend any stable institutional expression (e.g. imperative self-actualisation and hedonism). Others are profoundly contested (e.g. anti-productivism, entitlementalism, and anti-intellectualism). Clashes between these values seem endemic. Where imperative self-actualisation is expressed through the labour market in a search for job satisfaction and responsibility, for example, it may clash with hedonism and anti-productivism.[45] Similarly, where hedonism and imperative self-actualisation are sought through private consumer strategies they may clash with entitlementalism as expressed through an expanded welfare state financed through taxation from private income producers and consumers. In general, it is not at all clear that the post-bourgeois values represent a unified package, the alternative being that they represent disparate and potential conflictual bases for social action and political mobilisation.

The foregoing discussion provices an analysis of contemporary western crisis-talk from the viewpoint of cultural meaning. The construction of a sociology of crisis that is simultaneously causally adequate, as well as adequate on the level of meaning, requires a considerably broader framework of analysis. To be more specific, the explanation of discrete crises in terms of processes of political breakdown and normative conflict remains incomplete without some reference to the analysis of normalisation, institutionalisation and the management of crises. In contrast to the earliest Marxist prognosis of economic crisis leading to social breakdown, revolution, and the possibility of a world finally liberated from crisis, recent theorists of crisis have been more concerned with the capacity (or incapacity)

of modern institutions to incorporate and defuse endemic crisis-tendencies, and with the efficacy of crisis-management structures.

TOWARDS A SOCIOLOGY OF CRISIS: THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF TALCOTT PARSONS AND JURGEN HABERMAS

There is a sense in which the entire history of sociological thought has been preoccupied with the crisis-tendencies associated with the transition to urban-industrial capitalism, and the possibility of the reconstruction of some form of normative order or community. At the same time there are good grounds for emphasising the discrete contribution of recent post-war theorists to crisis theory. Of particular interest here is the attempt to integrate crisis theory within the emergent body of systems theory in general, and with action-systems theory in particular. This is most clearly seen in the work of Jurgen Habermas, but Habermas' explicit theories of crisis and normative order can be seen in turn as a critical commentary on Talcott Parsons' earlier version of system theory.

Where Parsons and Habermas depart from most previous sociological work on order and disorder is in the attempt to locate 'crisis' or 'strain' within an historically-informed action-oriented systems theory. A major theoretical feature of their work is the emphasis on modes of social differentiation (both structural and cultural), together with processes of re-integration and problems attending them. The scope of crisis theory is thus set simultaneously within theories of social evolution towards more complex forms of social differentiation and within theories of the immanent basis (if any there be) of social integration.

Talcott Parsons' theories of social action and social systems stress, as is well known, the decisive importance of solving the Hobbesian problem of order if society is to remain coherent and conflict integrated within the ongoing evolutionary development of society. It is also becoming more widely appreciated that Parsons' theories do not entail an essentially harmonious equilibrium achieved through inter-action between effectively socialised individuals.[46] His overall emphasis on patterns of normative order does *not* prevent a concern for problems of social conflict and disequilibrium. Although Parsons tends to speak of 'strain' and 'instability' rather than breakdown, he is quite prepared, on occasion, to diagnose 'crisis' of fundamental proportions.[47]

The main reason why Parsons believes modern society cannot necessarily be expected to be harmonious and trouble free is the existence of social differentiation. This poses considerable potential problems for the integration of different social sub-systems. Within his four function (AGIL) paradigm,[48] such potential problems of

differentiation are manifest analytically in relations between the adaptation, goal-attainment, integration and latent pattern maintenance sub-systems of the social system.

At one level, crises of integration had been manifest since the French and Industrial Revolutions as the rising tide of egalitarianism struck against traditional forms of ascriptive stratification based on hereditary privilege, ethnicity etc. By the mid-twentieth century, however, Parsons believed that equality of opportunity — based on egalitarian and communitarian norms of inclusion — had solved most problems created by the differentiation of the market economy and the democratic polity from the traditional undifferentiated *Gemeinschaft* community. Within the 1970s, however, he diagnosed a 'storm centre of crisis' within the societal community or integration sub-system. Here considerable tensions were arising between the values of equality of opportunity and community. For while equality of opportunity encouraged the competitive search for educational credentials leading to improved labour market access and life-chances, the inequalities of outcome that emerged, undermine the communitarian basis of solidarity which egalitarianism had earlier seemed to promise. This undermining of community in turn threatens motivational loyalty to society itself.[49]

While the normative compatibility of the values of individualistic equality of opportunity and 'community' solidarity within nation-states is seen as particularly problematic, Parsons also came to believe that struggles for inclusion were likely to become exceptionally acute within international relations. Here as yet no stable normative framework of integration and inclusion existed on a par with the evolutionary universals mentioned above. This lack of order is reflected in the weakness of the United Nations in the face of super-power politics and the spectre of nuclear annihiliation.[50]

Presented in this way, Parsons encourages us to think of social evolution not as a process in which social crisis could finally be eradicated, whether by some redemptive structural change or as the result of the learning of a universalistic set of substantive ethics. Although he rarely used an explicit concept of crisis, the thrust of his argument is that social conflicts may occur wherever rights of inclusion are denied or to the extent that sub-system imperatives cannot be integrated with each other.

From the crisis-preoccupied viewpoint of the 1980s, Parsons' interesting but rather limited sense of emergent crises would scarcely seem adequate. To be sure, his discussion of tensions between equality of opportunity and community solidarity has in a sense been taken up in debates around the New Class theory[51] and perceptions of contemporary tensions between principles of 'democracy' and 'competence'. It is also true that problems of international normative disorder remain of widespread concern. European 'crisis theory' has

none the less a far wider provenance. One major thrust of this approach is the proposition that under certain conditions, ostensibly universalistic institutions like the market or bureaucratic administration may actually increase conflict and generate or amplify crisis and normative disorder. While Parsons believed that

> the salient foci of tension and conflict . . . do not seem to be mainly economic in the sense of the nineteenth century controversy over capitalism and socialism, nor do they seem political in the sense of the problem of the 'justice' of the distribution of power (*Ibid.*)[52]

quite contrary views are expressed in Habermas' influential notion of legitimation crisis. Here the legitimacy of both private capitalism, state modes of tension-management and motivational commitment to what he calls 'civil and family-centred privatism are seen as problematic. The emphasis on crises within specific modes of tension-management, such as the welfare state is particularly corrosive of Parsons' standpoint. Both Habermas and Offe, in particular, seek to identify the limited room for manoeuvre of the welfare state in managing crises in the context of the fiscal crisis of the state. This line of argument entails a far more systematic analysis of the sociology of organisations than Parsons' blandly optimistic analysis of the institutionalization of conflict provide. In general terms, the thrust of European crisis theory may seem to render Parsons' neo-evolutionism somewhat dated.

The importance of Parsons' general legacy to crisis theory including the theories of Habermas should not however be lost sight of. In the first place he grounds crisis theory within an analysis of normative order whereby the analysis of crisis must be de-limited by some sense of normality. By this means he avoids the utopian problem of rejecting social totalities as comprehensively crisis-ridden and hence pathological. Second he encourages the over-arching notion of crises in modernity as crises of differentiation and integration or inclusion. Third he is prepared to accept that 'universalism' may actually increase and exacerbate conflict, in the case of potential conflicts between equality of opportunity created by the educational revolution and functional inequality of outcome.

The main problems with Parsons' discussion of differentiation and integration are not that he neglected the possibility that modern differentiated nation-states might move into a new phase of internal normative conflict. As we have seen, his view was that the 'completion' of the egalitarian struggle against ascriptive inequality, would be succeeded by problems connected with the justification of functional inequality between social groups. The major difficulties with his differentiation and integration theory are first of all that he developed an unduly narrow association of differentiated social institutions with those of post-war America, and secondly that he

neglected the possibility that strategies of de-differentiation might possess evolutionary advantages.[53]

In the case of Soviet Russia for example, Parsons' confident assumption that the lack of a differentiated democratic polity would generate political instabilities in the Soviet system has not so far proved accurate. Against Parsons' prognoses of Soviet convergence with the west — or failing that of retrogression — Russia has managed to expand as a global military power without political pluralism and economic freedom of choice. Lane[54] has argued that the relatively un-differentiated Soviet Union represents an alternative basis to the inclusive integration of the social system in the west. Above all else modern Russia lacks the differentiated inter-relation between sub-systems found in western society. In Parsonian terms, the goal-attainment function remains predominant and is intimately linked to the adaptive economic functions. Links between the pattern-maintenance sub-system and the goal-attainment sub-system involving value commitment to the legality of power in office are weak. This not only suggests the possibility of relatively non-differentiated solutions to the problem of reconciling social change with social order, but also indicates that crisis-tendencies may not be so easily thematised where the differentiated institutions of western civil society are lacking.

The general lack of concern for alternative differentiated or de-differentiated modes of social change in Parsons' American-centred crisis-theory helps to create grave problems when we try to apply the differentiation model outside a limited range of western societies. Even within such societies, however, Parsons does not face up to the problem that crises may occur not only at moments of conflict over rights of inclusion, but also as a result of excessive or inappropriate modes of differentiation. It is at this weak-point that Parsons' work can usefully be compared and to a certain extent synthesised with that of Habermas.

The major crisis theories of Jurgen Habermas have of course been presented as a critical commentary on the emphasis on order and equilibrium within Talcott Parsons. Whereas Parsons' 4 function paradigm had been assumed, somewhat simplistically to require more or less frictionless exchanges between the adaptation, goal-attainment, integration, and latent pattern-maintenance sub-systems of the social system, Habermas has recast the theory of relations between the differentiated sub-systems in 'crisis' terms. For Habermas, Parsons' adaptation sub-system is afflicted by an 'economic crisis', the goal-attainment sub-system suffers a 'rationality crisis', the integration sub-system exhibits a 'legitimation crisis', while the latent pattern-maintenance sub-system displays signs of a 'motivation crisis'.[55] In contrast with Parsons' tendency to portray the differentiated structure of twentieth century western societies as possessing fundamentally

upgraded forms of evolutionary advantage, Habermas offers a systematic and comprehensive theoretical specification of the crisis-tendencies inherent in what he regards as late-capitalist modes of differentiation. What is vital here is the argument that boundary inter-changes between differentiated sub-systems may involve significant deficits in input-output relations between them. For example, the idea of legitimation crisis, involves the idea that the (differentiated) integration sub-system within the social system will produce a legitimation deficit — or shortfall of loyalty to the social system — wherever (a) the adaptation sub-system (or economy) remains dominated by private profit maximisation, and (b) the goal-attainment sub-system (or polity) cannot achieve sufficient manipulation of cultural norms to offset the public thematisation of legitimate resistance.

In a more general manner Niklas Luhmann has also identified the crisis potential as well as the integration-consequences of social differentiation. His argument is that 'more or less permanent crises in some of the subsystems' should be regarded as a probable consequence of the functional differentiation of social systems. This probability is a result of 'structural characteristics which at one and the same time involve high sub-system autonomy of self-organisation, with high levels of interdependencies'. Of particular interest here is the differentiation 'between societal and interactional levels of system-building'. This had created a situation in which inter-action 'is not likely to provide . . . experience and knowledge concerning the total society'.[56] This pin-points the problem of attempting to restore *Gemeinschaft* forms of social solidarity under modern differentiated conditions. It also suggests a major condition for the resurgence of economic liberalism. Instead of the restoration of *Gemeinschaft* bonds on the model of the traditional Right, the claim of writers like Hayek and Friedman (following Adam Smith) is that the marketplace creates an impersonal system of information flows and resource allocation, whose system-characteristics emerge distinct from the private projects and partial perceptions available to individuals. Knowledge of the total society, from this viewpoint is epistemologically impossible, a casualty of the erosion of *Gemeinschaft*. For Habermas, by contrast, the possibility of a reconciliation between the 'system' and inter-personal interaction is not ruled out.

Although Habermas provides a wide-ranging 'crisis' alternative to Parsons' conception of late twentieth century relatively-integrated western differentiation, he clearly aims at a theory of social order. While accepting a sense of evolutionary pattern in the modern western world, this pattern is not for Habermas primarily identified with the orthodox Marxist emphasis on the expansion of the technical-organisational side of the economic and administrative order i.e. the productive forces. Rather, he stresses the even more

fundamental importance of the emergence of the universalistic norms of cultural order within the sphere of communication. Thus for Habermas it is 'learning processes' that occur 'in the dimension of moral insight, practical knowledge, communicative action and the consensual regulation of action conflicts' that 'make possible the introduction of new productive forces'.[57]

Although Habermas occupies the standpoint of a critical theorist his diagnosis of the 'crises' of modern society is not directed in a utopian manner against modernity as such. Whereas the critical theory of the Frankfurt School tended to rely on ontological justifications of a somewhat mystical kind for its critical standpoint, Habermas has sought to ground his critical theory in terms of certain empirically emergent features of modern society. In other words all is not 'crisis'. Rather the character of universalistic norms offering the possibility of a rational social order are based both on the everyday structure of language as it has evolved over time, and on institutional practices such as civil rights built into political constitutions and law. Jeffrey Alexander[58] has pointed out that Habermas does at times tend to de-value the latter. This is particularly evident in the dualistic contrast between the compulsive crisis-ridden 'system' world of rationalised institutional mechanisms and the 'life-world' Yet as Alexander also points out this dualism with its apparent abandonment of the universalistic significance of modern social institutions is inconsistent with the main theoretical thrust of Habermas' critique of Max Weber's spectre of the Iron Cage and of Frankfurt School cultural pessimism.

Parsons and Habermas are united therefore in their refusal to encourage a promiscuous extension of the crisis-metaphor to encompass modern society as a totality. And yet the contrasts between them should not be entirely lost sight of. While the utopian underpinning of much crisis theory implies an alternative to social differentiation — often based on recourse to communitarian social ontology — Parsons like Weber before him sees differentiation as a fundamental component of the modern western world. Without a combination of the market economy, the rule of law, and large-scale bureaucratic administration, it would be impossible to sustain a democratic, critical, and value-pluralistic society.

Habermas, by contrast, retains a utopian element in adopting the commitment of the critical theorist 'to advocacy'. This involves the comparison of existing normative structures with those that might hypothetically be arrived at by communicative discourse were it not for modes of ideological repression. This standpoint helps to give a general critical edge to Habermas' crisis theory and lies behind his criticism of private property rights in the market economy together with civil and familiar modes of privatism. Habermas also celebrates the 'life-world' in so far as it resists 'colonisation' by technical

rationality. At the same time he does not accept traditionalistic modes of morality and small-scale undifferentiated *Gemeinschaft* models of social intercourse as the basis for universalistic communicative norms. Normative frameworks evolve through time and in their modern or post-conventional form require means of adjudicating the 'truth', 'rightness' and 'justice' of propositions held by different interests. In this sense as Jean Cohen[59] points out, he provides an 'alternative to the dangerous myth of a conflict-free homogeneous society', by articulating procedures of compromise between the interest conflicts bound to emerge in any complex society. Niklas Luhmann for his part, is even more forthright in his critique of excessively utopian forms of critical theory. His claim is that while the differentiated realm of interaction 'may provide a retreat from society, the illusion of a small and beautiful world . . . [can] . . . no longer provide social security against change, and no longer social legitimation of opinion'.[60]

CONCLUSIONS

The de-limited theories of crisis derivable from the work of Parsons, Habermas and others, suggest the reason for the crisis of crisis-talk. Western society is not in total crisis. Nor is there a total break-down in the capacity of western evolutionism and Enlightenment rationalism to understand the modern world. In spite of the various symptoms of western cultural malaise — some of them more to do with the shift in the centre of gravity of the western world away from Europe rather than the collapse of the west as such — there remains a need to temper drastic diagnoses of crisis pathologies with a sense of emergent norms such as universal citizenship and equality of opportunity. It is in large measure through its faltering grip on such normative patterns and their reformist political implications that transcendental crisis-talk is in crisis.

Modern western societies may not have generated stable forms of moral consensus capable of harmonising norms of equality, community and individual freedom. They have none the less largely succeeded in overcoming ascriptive forms of social stratification in the name of impersonal universalistic normative standards. The impression that there is a crisis in crisis-talk is symptomatic, in part at least, of the exaggerated and infertile nature of transcendental utopian criticism of individual citizenship rights in the name of *Gemeinschaft*-type communitarianism. Theories of social evolutionism involving mechanisms of differentiation and integration — as developed by Parsons and Habermas — encourage a more de-limited idiom for crisis theory, setting immanent crisis tendencies against universalistic modes of normative integration.

Within this kind of framework it is possible to understand both the moral and political exhaustion of utopian Marxism and critical theory, and the vitality of political movements seeking to extend and institutionalise citizenship rights for historically excluded groups like women, children, ethnic groups and most fundamentally of all Third World nations. At the same time, popular support for that segment of New Right concerned to defend private household and consumption rights against the excessive, moral political and fiscal inroads of the Welfare State and the New Class, also reflects the resilience of the modern private household and privatised value pluralism, and the assertion that privatism is much more than amoral narcissism. In this climate we may not expect to find a diminution of social conflict. But we may expect the curtailing of excessively utopian diagnoses of pervasive crisis in favour of more delimited diagnoses of pathology entailing more this-worldly, cost-effective strategies of social action and reform.

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NOTES

* Earlier versions of this paper were read to the Sociology Research Workshop at The Flinders University of South Australia, the historical sociology seminar run by members of London University, and to the 1986 World Congress of the International Institute of Sociology at Albufeira, Portugal. I am especially grateful for the comments of Wolf Heydebrand and Michael Mann.

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Menachem Rosner and Arnold S. Tannenbaum

Organizational efficiency and egalitarian democracy in an intentional communal society: the kibbutz[1]

ABSTRACT

Kibbutzim differ from one another in democratic and egalitarian practice and in equality itself. We explore hypotheses in 49 kibbutzim that attempt to explain these differences by the opposing effects of a technological imperative that implies a rational striving for economic efficiency and an ideological imperative that implies a commitment by members to traditional kibbutz values. Cross sectional data were obtained from economic records of the kibbutz federations and from four survey research studies in kibbutzim. They suggest, with some significant exceptions, opposing effects of the two imperatives on democratic and egalitarian practices although not necessarily of one imperative on the other. Implications are discussed for theories about the inconsistency between technological progress and communality.

This research explores hypotheses regarding the conflict between the striving for organizational efficiency and the values of equality and direct democracy in the kibbutz. The kibbutz was conceived as an egalitarian society based on the principle, from each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs. Ultimate decision making power in the governance of the kibbutz resides formally with an assembly that meets weekly and all members can participate in the decisions of this assembly. Thus, the kibbutz, in principle, is an unusually egalitarian and democratic society, although whether it is as egalitarian and democratic as its ideology and formal procedures of governance imply has been a subject of controversy. Change in the kibbutz since its early years from a simple agrarian settlement to a modern, industrialized society implies increased emphasis on a 'technological rationality' that a number of authors argue is inconsistent with the traditional, egalitarian ideology of the kibbutz.

Kibbutzim, in fact, differ from one another in the extent to which they meet their traditional ideals. We explore hypotheses that attempt

to explain these differences by the opposing effects of a technological imperative on the one hand that implies a rational striving for economic efficiency, and an ideological imperative on the other hand that implies a commitment by members to traditional kibbutz values.

RATIONALE

The first kibbutzim were established about 75 years ago. They were small agrarian communities in which members were committed to the ideal of settling the land and to the values of equality and direct democracy. There were to be no differences among members in authority, status, or other social and economic rewards. Members received no wages and each member, regardless of his or her work assignment or his or her performance in that assignment, had equal access to the limited goods and facilities available in the kibbutz. Meals were eaten communally and children were raised communally. Officers were elected for short terms and officer positions were rotated among members. Basic decisions were made through meetings in which all members participated. Thus, the traditional kibbutz manifested features of the utopian communal society (Buber 1958; Manuel and Manuel 1979; Erasmus 1977; Blasi 1978; Kanter 1979).

Kibbutzim, however, have since grown in size, numbers and complexity; the kibbutz today is very much a 'modern society' as defined by Inkeles and Smith (1974), with technically advanced farms and factories operated by a skilled work force. Kibbutzim, with about 3 per cent of the Israeli population, produce about 40 per cent of the gross national farm output of Israel and about 5 per cent of the national industrial product. Although they are part of the larger Israeli society, kibbutzim have norms and rules that distinguish them sharply from the larger society. The capacity of kibbutzim to function as societies in their own right, distinct from Israeli society is enhanced by the joining of kibbutzim into four federations through which they provide mutual technical, economic, social, and political support.[2] Thus, while they are not large — kibbutzim range in size from 50 to 2000 inhabitants including children, with an average of 550 — kibbutzim have many attributes of a society. We therefore refer to them as communal societies.

As a society, the kibbutz is very much a part of the contemporary world to which it must adapt if it is to survive. A major adaptation has been industrialization and almost every kibbutz now includes at least one industrial factory in addition to its agricultural work branches. Industrialization, however, poses an ideological problem for the kibbutz since the factory, with its hierarchy of authority and emphasis on technological efficiency, appears to contradict traditional values of the kibbutz including equality and direct democracy.

Blasi (1978) argues that all communities face a 'basic Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft value dilemma' (Blasi 1978: 3) and Kanter (1972) sees an expression of this dilemma in the general criticism of all utopian societies 'that social life cannot be both "human" and "efficient"' (Kanter 1972, 148). This criticism derives partly from the objection by critics to utopistic assumptions about 'human nature.' The workability of utopian societies is premised on the assumption of human perfectability or, as in the case of religious utopian sects, on the elimination of evil (Wilson 1973: 25), and on the assumption of 'harmony, cooperation and mutuality of interests . . . (as) natural to human existence . . . rather than conflict, competition and exploitation . . .' (Kanter 1972:1). In support of these assumptions, Tonnies' (1955) theory of *Gemeinschaft*, 'starts from the assumption of perfect unity of human wills as an original or natural condition . . .' (Tonnies 1955: 42), and authors as diverse as Marx, Cooley, and Skinner argue for the proposition that 'human perfectability' (to use Kanter's term) can be achieved, given the right social conditions. Egoism, which prevails under conditions of capitalist social relations, for example, will, according to Marx (1934) be replaced by a sense of social responsibility under socialist social relations. Full self-realization, according to Cooley (1962), is achieved through social collaboration, identification with the whole and acceptance of 'the higher call of the congenial group' (Cooley 1962:38). Authoritarian need for power does not exist in these circumstances. And for Skinner (1948, 1971) persons can learn through positive (non-coercive) reinforcement to be cooperative and altruistic and they will then feel free and fulfilled when they behave cooperatively and altruistically.

Authors of the Human Relations tradition of organizational analysis such as Mayo (1945), McGregor (1960), and Likert (1961), although by no means utopists, share with utopian authors the assumption of harmony, cooperation, and mutuality of interest as natural to human existence. These authors consequently argue for an organizational design that is more personal and communitarian (and more like Tonnies' *Gemeinschaft*) than is the typical industrial bureaucracy. They see no dilemma in trying to create an organization that is both 'human' and efficient. They therefore see no conflict between the technological imperative and a humanistic, ideological imperative. Weber, however, was clear in asserting an inconsistency between a rational and a more humanistic, associational organization of work. 'Communistic systems for the communal or associational organization of work are unfavorable to calculàtion and to the consideration of means for obtaining optimum production, because . . . they tended to be based on the direct feeling of mutual solidarity' (Weber 1947:205).

Analyses of the kibbutz in the social science literature typically assume the insoluble conflict between being 'human' and being

efficient or, as did Weber, between the associational and rational organization of work. Cohen (1966), for example, notes a conflict in the Kibbutz between 'the tendency towards constant technological, economic and social "progress," and the tenet of "communality" . . .' (Cohen 1966:4). Vallier (1962) sees a contradiction in the kibbutz between principles of democracy and egalitarianism on the one hand and 'production imperatives' that lead to specialization, discipline and universalism on the othe hand. Schoeck (1971) argues that in the long run the kibbutz can not meet the rational requirement that technically competent persons serve as leaders since the kibbutz does not provide sufficient material advantages to attract and retain such persons. Nor, according to Dahrendorf (1970) is the ideological prescription in the kibbutz that managers be rotated, likely to be effective in achieving equality since such prescription conflicts with the rational requirement for stability and efficiency.

Direct democracy, according to Rousseau (1950) is possible only in a small agrarian community with a simple, relatively undifferentiated social and economic structure. Such conditions applied well to the early kibbutz, but they do not apply so well today. Kibbutzim have aged, grown and become more differentiated in their occupational and economic structures with the introduction of the factory and its hierarchical authority structure and need for persons with specialized technical skills. Furthermore, some kibbutzim now employ workers who are not members. This practice, which illustrates the effect of the technological imperative, is a rational, economically efficient way of making use of the factory's capital investment in plant and equipment that would otherwise remain partly idle given the small size of the kibbutz work force.

The implacability of the rational, Weberian tendency in the kibbutz is summed up by Rayman.

> Its technology, scientific knowledge, marketing skills and organizational format came from the outside. The imposed structures were alien to the original kibbutz ideology. In sociological terms 'Gesellschaft norms pushed against those of Gemeinschaft,' the profane against the sacred, alienation against integration . . . A new managerial class of members has been created. The Weberian image of a world dominated by obedient professional managers and bureaucrats, which had been so far from the early kibbutz ideology of practice, has come much closer to being rooted in kibbutz organization (Rayman 1981:264–265; see also Kressel, 1974).

Some students of the kibbutz have taken issue with the assertion that the kibbutz has abandoned its original communal ideals (e.g., Talmon-Garber 1972; Katz and Golomb 1974, 1975). The above general arguments as they apply to the kibbutz are, therefore, controversial. We shall explore in the kibbutz the following hypotheses

consistent with Weber's assumption of conflict between technological efficiency and solidarity.

1. The ideological and technological imperatives are related negatively to one another; kibbutzim that are high on one are low on the other.

2. The technological imperative has a negative effect and the ideological imperative has a positive effect on democratic and egalitarian practices including: a) participation by members in weekly meetings of the general assembly; b) rotation of kibbutz officers; and c) restraint by the kibbutz in the hiring of outside workers.

3. The above democratic and egalitarian practices have a negative effect on inequality of influence and of material and non-material rewards among members.

4. In part directly and in part indirectly through their effects on democratic and egalitarian practices, the technological imperative has a positive effect and the ideological imperative has a negative effect on inequality of influence and of material and non-material rewards among members.

Our data are cross sectional and we cannot therefore demonstrate causal relations. We can, none the less, explore the relationships suggested by hypotheses 2–4 through the following path diagram.




FIGURE 1: *Path diagram — predictors of inequality in the kibbutz*

METHOD

Our units of analysis are 49 kibbutzim. The measures come from: (a) data about each kibbutz supplied by the statistical and economic departments of the kibbutz federations, the Kibbutz Auditors Association, and the Kibbutz Industry Association, and (b) scores averaged by kibbutz on questions administered through questionnaires to samples of members as part of four earlier studies in which questions pertinent to the present analysis were asked. Because the present analysis includes secondary analyses of data from the above four studies, each of which had its own objective, all of the data from these studies will be standardized by study to minimize the effect of

differences in method between them. We assume that the within-study covariation among variables relevant to the present analysis does not differ among the studies.

These studies are

1. Rosner, Gluck and Avnat (1983) conducted in 1978 in 20 kibbutzim belonging to the four kibbutz federations. Questionnaires were administered to a representative sample of 40 members in each kibbutz.
2. Rosner and Cohen, (1983) conducted in 1976 in 14 kibbutzim of Artzi, the largest federation. Questionnaires were administered to a representative sample of 40 members in each kibbutz.
3. Leviatan, Orchan and Avnat (1977) conducted in 1976 in 9 kibbutzim of Artzi. In each kibbutz, questionnaires were administered to a representative sample of 33 kibbutz-born members who were between 22 and 30 years of age.
4. Leviatan, Amad and Adar (1982), conducted in 1979 in 10 kibbutzim. Questionnaires were administered to a representative sample of 52 members (on the average) over 45 years of age in each kibbutz.

Since some kibbutzim were included in more than one study, the number of kibbutzim in the final sample is 49 rather than the sum of the kibbutzim in each study. In cases of overlap we included the kibbutzim with the more representative sample.

Table I shows the distribution of kibbutzim by study and federation.

TABLE I: *Number of kibbutzim by earlier study and federation*

	Study				
Federation:	*1*	*2*	*3*	*4*	*all*
Artzi	6	14	7	2	29
Meuchad	6	–	–	3	9
Ichud	6	–	–	3	9
Dati	2	–	–	–	2
All	20	14	7	8	49

MEASURES

Several indices were constructed, first by intercorrelating individual items that we judged, *a priori*, to fit the definition in each of the concepts to be measured and then by averaging the items that intercorrelated well.

A. The technological imperative. Intercorrelations among the following

items were examined in constructing an index of the technological imperative.

1. *Economic efficiency.* We assume that the striving for productive efficiency that helps to define the technological imperative will be reflected in the economic efficiency of a kibbutz. Shashua and Goldschmidt (1974) describe the rationale for an index of the economic efficiency of a kibbutz and, using this index, they have calculated the efficiency of each kibbutz. Their scores were available through the annual financial balance of the Kibbutz Auditors Association. We have taken the average of the index for each kibbutz during the years 1974–1977. We present Shashua and Goldschmidt's formula in Appendix A.
2. *Percentage of total kibbutz income derived from industry.* This measure of industrialization, as a component of the technological imperative, was available for each kibbutz from the records of the Kibbutz Industry Association for the year 1976.
3. *Percentage of total kibbutz person-days spent in industry.* This measure, like the previous one, is taken for the year, 1976 from the records of the Kibbutz Industry Association.
4. *Age of industry.* We assume that the technological imperative and its effects become more manifest through time as industry becomes established as a normal aspect of kibbutz life. Age of industry was measured by the age of the factory in the kibbutz. Some kibbutzim have more than one factory, in which case the age of the older or oldest factory was used. This information was obtained from the Association of Kibbutz Industries.
5. *Age of the kibbutz.* We assume that the technological imperative becomes more manifest in an idealistic communal society like the kibbutz as the society ages. Information about age was obtained for each kibbutz from the statistical department of the federation.
6. *Size of kibbutz.* We assume that size of kibbutz is associated with economic efficiency because of economies of scale both with respect to the consumption and production functions of the kibbutz. Size of kibbutz, available from the statistical department of the kibbutz, is defined as the number of members plus residents who are going through a period of candidacy for membership.
7. *Education.* The technologically efficient society requires professionals and other highly skilled persons along with an educated work force. Data in the literature document a correlation between education level of the work force and level of industrial development (Russett, *et al.* 1964; UNESCO 1950). Information about years of formal education (including technical training) of members was obtained as an average score from the questionnaires administered to members within each kibbutz.

Table II presents the correlations among the above items. Each relates reasonably well to the others with the exception of education. We have therefore constructed an index of the technological imperative by averaging the standardized scores of these items excluding education. (alpha = .87) The table also shows the correlation of each item with the index. We shall retain education in our analysis as a separate item because of its association with industrialization as it is ordinarily conceptualized even though education does not relate to other aspects of the technological imperative in kibbutzim.

B. The ideological imperative. Hewitt (1977) presents data indicating how political parties with a formal commitment to egalitarian ideology may affect equality in an industrial society. Party ideology can affect the distribution of income, goods, and services through its effect on government policy and legislative action regarding taxation and welfare programs. Thus, economic equality in industrial societies is greater, according to Hewitt's data, where democratic socialist parties are relatively strong. These parties imply the operation of an egalitarian ideological imperative.

The kibbutz federations, like political parties, differ in ideological orientation and in their avowed commitment to traditional kibbutz values. We therefore use the federation affiliation of the kibbutz as the criterion of its ideological commitment and as a measure of the ideological imperative.

The federation, Artzi is the most left leaning of the federations and it distinguishes itself from the others in its commitment to traditional kibbutz values. A survey of member attitudes, for example, showed that members of Artzi, more than members of the other federations, endorsed the principle, 'to each according to his needs,' and came out on the side of democratic ideals when faced with a hypothetical choice between democracy and efficiency (Rosner, Ben David, Avnat, Cohen, and Leviatan 1978). A number of policies and practices that differentiate the federations also provide evidence of the relative strength of an egalitarian ideological imperative in kibbutzim of the Artzi federation. We mention two. Collective child rearing is one manifestation of egalitarian ideological orthodoxy. Traditionally, kibbutz children have been raised collectively, sleeping in 'children's houses' apart from their parents. This egalitarian, collective upbringing is intended as a way of avoiding social stratification. Whatever differences in power or privilege may exist among parents, the effects of such differences on children should be eliminated (or minimized) by a shared and egalitarian socialization. As a result of a growing emphasis on family, however, the federations Ichud in 1966 and Meuchad in 1972, legitimated the practice of children sleeping in their parent's cottage although these federations have maintained their commitment to other aspects of collective child rearing (Shepher and

TABLE II: *Product moment correlations among items selected to measure the technological imperative in kibbutzim (N = 49)*

	1. Economic Efficiency	*2. % Income from Industry*	*3. % person-work days in industry*	*4. Age of Kibbutz*	*5. Age of Industry*	*6. Size of Kibbutz*	*7. Education Level of members*
2. % Income from Industry	.41**						
3. % person-work days in Industry	.17	.78**					
4. Age of Kibbutz	.45**	.50**	.43**				
5. Age of Industry	.29*	.68**	.62**	.51**			
6. Size of Kibbutz	.57**	.67**	.63**	.62**	.61**		
7. Education level of members	.15	.16	−.13	−.14	−.06	.09	
8. Index	.62**	.86**	.77**	.76**	.79**	.88**	.01

*p ≤ .05
**p ≤ 01

Tiger 1975). By way of contrast, large majorities of the delegates to the 1980 and 1984 conventions of the Artzi Federation voted to maintain children's houses.

A second illustration of ideological orthodoxy in the Artzi Federation can be seen in the rejection by Artzi of formal tests to evaluate individuals in schools and in work. Schools in the Artzi Federation, unlike those in the other federations administer virtually no examinations and they do not issue grades (Rabin and Hazan 1973). We have therefore assigned a score of 2 to kibbutzim in the Artzi federation and a score of 1 to kibbutzim in the other federations as a measure of the ideological imperative. Because, however, two of the four studies in our analysis come exclusively from the Artzi federation we have no variance on the ideological imperative within these two studies. This constancy is likely to have an attenuating affect in the total data set on correlations that may exist between the ideological imperative and other variables and it is likely therefore to result in a conservative test of our hypotheses regarding the ideological imperative.

Although the Artzi Federation differs (in degree) from the others in commitment to traditional ideology, kibbutzim in Artzi are very much like those in the three other federations in important respects. They do not differ significantly in religious commitment, age, size or indices of economic wealth.

C. Democratic and egalitarian practices. Our second hypothesis proposes that the technological imperative has a negative effect and the ideological imperative has a positive effect on democratic and egalitarian practices in the kibbutz. A first such practice is participation by members in the weekly meetings of the kibbutz general assembly, the main decision making body of the kibbutz. Respondents were asked through questionnaires, 'How many of the last 8 meetings of the general assembly have you taken part in?' Answers were coded from 0 to 8 for each respondent and averaged for each kibbutz. The average member of the average kibbutz of this research attended 4.0 meetings, the range for the average member in each kibbutz extending from 2.0 to 5.6 among the 49 kibbutzim.

A second democratic and egalitarian practice is the rotation of offices among members. Each respondent was asked, 'What was the highest office that you held during the last 5 years?' Respondents checked one of the following:

1. I did not hold any office.
2. I was a member of a committee.
3. I was the coordinator of a committee or a member of the secretariat or had a similar role.
4. I was the kibbutz secretary, economic coordinator or treasurer.

Rotation is measured by the percent of members in a kibbutz who responded 3 or 4 to the above question. Thirty per cent of respondents checked 3 or 4 in the average kibbutz, the range extending from 2.5 per cent to 69 per cent among the 49 kibbutzim.

A third (inverse) measure of democratic and egalitarian practice is the percent of person-days of non kibbutz workers hired in industry during 1976. The hired workers are Jewish citizens of Israel and members of Histadruth (as are all kibbutz members) but unlike kibbutz members they can not participate in decision making bodies of the factory or of the kibbutz. Twenty one per cent of workers in the average factory of the 49 kibbutzim were hired from outside the kibbutz, with a range of 0 per cent to 79 per cent among the kibbutzim. (Hired workers are not respondents to any of the questionnaires of this research.)

The three aspects of democratic and egalitarian procedures do not correlate strongly with one another ($\bar{r} = .25$). We therefore treat them separately in the analysis.

D. Inequality. The coefficient of variation (standard deviation divided by the mean) and the gini ratio were used to measure inequality in each kibbutz for the distributions of several material and non material rewards or resources including self reported influence, size of the member's apartment, the esteem accorded the member by others, feeling of self actualization, commitment to the kibbutz and satisfaction with life on the kibbutz. We also attempted to create measures of status crystalization or consistency by computing alpha scores based on the intercorrelations among the measures of rewards in each kibbutz, but abandoned this measure for reasons that we shall describe below. The rationale for the coefficient of variation as a measure of inequality is discussed by Jencks (1972) and is similar to that for the simple standard deviation (Curtis and Jackson 1977) or variance (Tannenbaum and Bachman 1966). The gini ratio, which is ordinarily used to measure inequality of material wealth, has been shown by Whisler (1968) to work appropriately in measuring inequality in the distribution of influence measured subjectively on a 5 point scale. Thus, one might think of the total amount of influence or of satisfaction, esteem, commitment, or self actualization in a society as a form of its wealth, and compute through the gini ratio (or coefficient of variation) the extent to which this wealth is shared widely or held primarily by a relatively few.

Data about size of apartment are available for only 27 of the 49 kibbutzim. It was measured by asking respondents for the number of square meters of their apartment, a figure that members know well. The average apartment size is 42.2 square meters in the average kibbutz with a range among kibbutzim of from 24.0 to 54.0 square meters. In general, new apartments, which may be larger than older

ones, are assigned members on the basis of seniority. Data available for the Artzi federation indicate no relationship between the age of a kibbutz (one of the components of the technological imperative) and its variance in the distribution of seniority. (Kibbutz Artzi Statistical Department, 1982.)

Personal influence was measured as an index based on the average of responses to two questions. One presented concentric-circles and respondents were told, 'Here are 5 concentric circles that represent your kibbutz. The central members are situated in the small one, and their score is 5. Where do you locate yourself?' The second question asked, 'To what extent do you think that you have influence on different issues in your kibbutz?' Answers were checked on a 5 point scale from 1, 'very little influence' to 5, 'very great influence.' The alpha score of the index created by these questions is .62.

The esteem accorded by others was measured by asking respondents, 'To what extent are you esteemed by others in the kibbutz?' Answers were checked on a 5 point scale from 1, 'not at all' to 5, 'to a very great extent.' The term esteem is used in the questions of many studies as a measure of prestige (Treiman 1977). The present measure might therefore be taken as an indicator of personal prestige.

Self-actualization was reported by members in response to the question, 'To what extent does the kibbutz provide you opportunities to realize your aspirations for self-development?' This question was answered by checks on a 5 point scale from 1, 'to a very little extent' to 5, 'to a very large extent.'

The measure of member's feeling of commitment to the kibbutz was created as an index that averages the scores in response to 4 questions:

1. 'To what extent are you involved in the issues of your kibbutz?' (1, not at all . . . 5, to a very large extent)
2. 'If one of your friends were not sure about his membership in the kibbutz, would you try to convince him to stay in the kibbutz?' (1, never . . . 5, always)
3. 'If you are in a conflict situation between your own interest and the general needs of the kibbutz, how likely are you to give priority to the needs of the kibbutz?' (1, never . . . 5, always)
4. 'To what extent do you feel your fate is linked to your kibbutz?' (1, to a very little extent . . . 5, to a very large extent)

The alpha score of this index, based on an average of these questions is .66.

A measure of satisfaction with kibbutz life is based on an index of responses to the following items

'To what extent are you satisfied with,


a. the possibilities you have to influence what is going on in your kibbutz?'

b. your social position in the kibbutz?'
c. your standard of living?'
d. your occupation at work?'
e. your life in general at the kibbutz?'

Each of these questions was answered on a scale from 1, 'not satisfied at all' to 5, 'very satisfied.' The index composed of an average of these items has an alpha of .71.

The gini ratio correlates well (between .53 and .95) with the coefficient of variation for each of the above subjective variables, excepting esteem (r = .30). The gini and the coefficient of variation were therefore combined to create a 'combined index of inequality' for each subjective variable, with alphas of from .70 to .98, excepting esteem which has an alpha of only .33. The gini ratio and coefficient of variation for apartment size, however, do not correlate significantly with one another and they are therefore treated separately.

There is little consistency among kibbutzim in the way influence and the various material and non material rewards are distributed. Kibbutzim that are relatively inegalitarian on one characteristic are not predictably inegalitarian on others, the average correlation among various measures of inequality being .15. Inequality in the kibbutz, to the extent that it occurs, is not highly 'structured' or 'crystalized' (Adar 1982; Rosner and Shur 1980). Leviatan (1970) for example, found virtually no relationship between a member's professional status and his/her position in the community hierarchy or between a member's position in the community hierarchy and position in the work hierarchy. A worker is as likely to have a high position in the community hierarchy as is a manager of a work branch. Leviatan did, however, find a small, statistically significant relationship between professional status and position in the work hierarchy, although Tannenbaum *et al.* (1974) found that factory managers in kibbutz plants do not have a higher level of education than workers have. In the present study we found that level of education, which is a correlate of income and occupational status in many societies, (Curtis and Jackson 1977; Treiman 1977) relates poorly to income. Members do not receive income in the usual sense except that all receive an identical and modest monetary allowance. Members may, however, differ from one another in the material goods they receive or consume. One such good that we have measured, apartment space, might be taken as a surrogate for income. It correlates only .02 with education. Shur (1982) found a correlation in the kibbutz of only .02 between a member's level of education and self perceived consumption of material goods. He also found only very small correlations, .02 and −.01 respectively, between education and prestige (measured in terms of the esteem perceived by a member that is accorded to him/her by others) and between prestige and perceived consumption.



Because the several measures of inequality do not correlate well with one another we shall treat separately as dependent variables the combined indices (gini and coefficient of variation) of each subjective variable along with the coefficient of variation and the gini for apartment size.

RESULTS

We do not find support for Hypothesis 1; the correlation between the technological and ideological imperatives is .01. None the less, a number of the correlations in Table III appear supportive of the initial hypotheses about the opposing effects of the technological and ideological imperatives. This table presents zero order correlations between the predictors in these hypotheses (vertical axis) and the variables to be predicted. All of the data from the four studies described above were standardized by study prior to computing these correlations (*vide supra*). We have applied the conservative, two tailed test to the calculation of significance levels even though our predictions are directional, so that we could evaluate the significance of correlations that might be in a contrary direction.

According to Table III, and consistent with the initial hypotheses, the more industrialized kibbutzim are less likely to be participative, ($r = -.27$) to practice officer rotation ($r = -.40$) and to avoid the hiring of outside labor ($r = -.20$, although this correlation is not significant statistically). The more industrialized kibbutzim are also more likely to be inegalitarian, at least with respect to influence ($r = .26$) and the distribution (measured by the coefficient of variation) of apartment space ($r = .48$). Several correlations, however, are problematic for the initial hypotheses. The education level of members stands out in this regard. We conceived of education as part of the technological imperative syndrome consistent with arguments and documentation in the literature (Russett *et al.* 1964; UNESCO 1958) but the education level of members as we have seen earlier does not relate well in the kibbutz to industrialization or to other components of the syndrome and we therefore did not include it in the index. Furthermore, it yields results in Table III quite contrary to our initial hypothesis that, as part of the technological imperative syndrome, it would be related positively to inequality in the kibbutz. On the contrary, education appears conducive to equality, at least with respect to members' apartment space and satisfaction with and commitment to the kibbutz.

The correlation between participation and inequality in distribution of apartment space also yields a result contrary to the hypothesis. We shall consider in our concluding section the meaning of these contradictions.

TABLE III: *Product monument correlations between predictor and predicted variables*

	Predicted variables									
	Democratic & egalitarian practices			*Measures of inequality*						
				Apartment size				*Combined index*		
Predictor variables	*Participation in assembly*	*Rotation of officers*	*Avoidance of hired labor*	*C.V.*	*Gini*	*Influence*	*Self-actualization*	*Esteem*	*Commitment*	*Satisfaction*
	(N = 49)	(N = 49)	(N = 42)	(N = 27)	(N = 27)	(N = 49)	(N = 49)	(N = 49)	(N = 49)	(N = 49)
1 Technological imperative (Index)	−.27*	−.40**	−.20	.48**	.07	.26*	.09	.00	.09	.12
a. Economic efficiency	−.20	−.20	−.17	.43**	−.20	−.03	−.11	.02	−.09	.05
b. % income from industry	−.27*	−.38**	−.25*	.34*	.22	.32**	−.10	.02	.03	.01
c. % person work days in industry	−.20	−.28*	−.14	.39*	.30*	.30*	− 07	−.07	03	.14
d Age of kibbutz	− 24*	−.33**	.16	47**	−.16	06	−.09	.07	.27*	.14
e. Age of industry	−.20	−.30*	.18	.13	.12	.40**	−.02	−.02	.11	.07
f. Size of kibbutz	−.17	− 37**	.00	.44**	.13	.16	− 12	.01	− 03	.16
g. Education	.11	.04	−.18	−.40*	.13	−.19	07	−.07	−.24*	−.33*
2. Ideological imperative	.23*	−.11	37**	.01	.16	.04	−.52*	.00	.01	06
3. Democratic and egalitarian practices										
a. Participation in assembly				−.02	.31*	−.14	−.02	.12	−.14	−.23*
b Rotation of officers				−.24*	02	−.28*	00	−.08	−.35*	−.17
c. Avoidance of hired labor				−.05	−.22	−.29*	−.28*	.11	−.08	−.05

* $p \leq .05$
** $p \leq .01$

Table IV presents the regressions of stage 1, the technological and ideological imperatives, predicting democratic and egalitarian practices, stage 2 of the model in Figure I. Education is included as a separate predictor. These results, by and large are consistent with those of Table III suggesting opposing effects of the technological and ideological imperatives on democratic and egalitarian practices.

TABLE IV: *Standardized regressions predicting democratic and egalitarian practices from the technological and ideological imperatives*

	Democratic and egalitarian practices		
	Participation (N = 49)	*Rotation (N = 49)*	*Avoidance of hired labor (N = 42)*
R^2	.14	.17*	.17
Predictors:			
Technological imperative	−.28	−.40**	−.20
Education	.10	.03	05
Ideological imperative	23*	.11	.37**

* $p \leq .05$
** $p \leq .01$

Table V presents regressions predicting the measures of inequality from stage one of Figure I. Here again, we see some indication of the predicted opposing effects of the two imperatives although the number of significant betas is small and education shows a negative association with some measures of inequality, contrary to our initial conception.

Table VI presents the regressions of stages 1 and 2 predicting inequality. The rate of statistically significant results is lower in this table than in the previous ones, perhaps because of the fewer degrees of freedom here. Otherwise, the results are consistent in their implications with those of previous tables.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Sociologists disagree about the extent to which the kibbutz is an egalitarian society. According to some, the kibbutz has abandoned egalitarianism and has created a special 'managerial weltanschauung' among the upper stratum. (e.g., Rayman 1981; Rosenfield 1951) Our own observations lead us to conclude that the kibbutz is relatively egalitarian compared to other modern societies. Differences among members in income and wealth are small compared to such differences elsewhere. All members live in similar cottage apartments, eat their main meals together and draw more or less equally upon the

TABLE V: *Standardized regressions predicting inequality from the technological and ideological imperatives.*

	Apartment size		*Inequality*				
	Coef of var.	*Gini*	*Influence*	*Self-actualization*	*Esteem*	*Commitment*	*Satisfaction*
	(N = 27)	(N = 27)	(N = 49)	(N = 49)	(N = 49)	(N = 49)	(N = 49)
R^2	.40**	.05	.11	.28**	.00	.07	.12
Predictors.							
Technological imperative	.49**	.08	.27*	−.09	.01	.09	.13
Education	−.41**	.12	−.19	− 03	−.07	− 24	−.33**
Ideological imperative	−.00	.15	.03	−.52**	−.00	−.00	−.04

* $p \leq .05$
** $p \leq .01$

TABLE VI: *Standardized regressions predicting inequality from the technological and ideological imperatives along with democratic and egalitarian practices.*

	Apartment size		*Inequality*				
	Coef of var.	*Gini*	*Influence*	*Self-actualization*	*Esteem*	*Commitment*	*Satisfaction*
	(N = 27)	(N = 27)	(N = 49)	(N = 49)	(N = 49)	(N = 49)	(N = 49)
R^2	.44	.25	.18	.31*	05	18	18
Predictors:							
Technological imperative	.52**	.11	.15	−.08	.03	−.06	.08
Education	−.43**	.11	−.18	−.03	09	−.22	−.31**
Ideological imperative	.06	20	−.07	−.50**	−.07	− 05	− 05
Participation	19	.37**	.02	.11	17	− 02	−.16
Rotation	−.09	.00	−.17	.01	−.14	− 35**	− 10
Avoidance of hired labor	.08	−.36**	−.24	−.14	.14	− 01	18

* $p \leq .05$
** $p \leq .01$

material resources of the kibbutz. None the less, kibbutzim differ from one another in the extent to which they maintain democratic and egalitarian practices and equality itself, and these differences appear to be explained in part by the opposing effects of a technological and an ideological imperative.

The technological imperative relates negatively and the ideological imperative relates positively to two of three measures of democratic and egalitarian procedures (Table IV). Kibbutzim high on the technological imperative — kibbutzim that are older, larger, more industrialized and profitable — are likely to be relatively less participative and to have a relatively low rate of turnover among officers. In addition, kibbutzim high on the ideological imperative — those in the more ideologically orthodox Artzi Federation — are likely to be relatively more participative and restrained in the hiring of outside labor.

Furthermore, the technological and ideological imperatives do show the predicted association with several indices of inequality. However, while the technological imperative has a 'direct effect', to use the terminology of Alwin and Hauser (1975), on the coefficient of variation of apartment size (Table VI; $\beta = .52$) there is no significant 'indirect effect' of the technological imperative through any of the measured democratic and egalitarian procedures as we had proposed. Similarly, while the ideological imperative has a predicted 'direct effect' on inequality in feeling of self actualization ($\beta = -.50$) there is no significant 'indirect effect' through democratic and egalitarian practices. None the less, zero order correlations indicate associations between these practices and a number of the measures of inequality, consistent with our hypothesis. Kibbutzim with high rates of officer rotation are likely to be relatively egalitarian in distribution of apartment space (measured through the coefficient of variation), distribution of influence and feeling of commitment to the kibbutz. Similarly, kibbutzim that avoid the employment of outside labor are relatively egalitarian in distribution of influence and self actualization. And participative kibbutzim are relatively egalitarian in the distribution of satisfaction among members. One result, however, is distinctly contrary to that predicted. Participative kibbutzim are relatively inegalitarian in distribution of apartment space, measured through the gini ratio.

The concepts of participation and of equality are so much allied ideologically in the kibbutz that a negative empirical relationship between them appears, at first blush, contradictory. Participative decisions, however, can be inegalitarian in their consequences; a large number of persons can make decisions that advantage or disadvantage a small number of persons. Thus, the general assembly of the kibbutz may attract participants who have a cause to plead and who hope through participation to further their cause. Other members may be

drawn to the meetings because of the implications of that cause for their own welfare. Many members may therefore be stimulated to participate because the outcomes of the decisions imply some potential advantage or disadvantage to them. And, in fact, this highly participative procedure may result in decisions that do have inegalitarian consequences. A decision to build new cottage apartments, for example, could very well result in differences among members in the space available to them. The new cottages are likely to be larger than the older ones but the kibbutz can not replace all of its old cottages simultaneously. Some members will therefore have to reside in older, smaller cottages while others will move into newer, larger ones. Hence there may be a positive relationship between participation and some aspects of inequality. On the other hand, where there is relatively high participation, members are more equally satisfied with life on the kibbutz, consistent with our initial hypothesis.

Education, which we had conceived as part of the technological imperative, also yields several correlations that run counter to our initial hypothesis. Kibbutzim in which members are relatively high in education are more egalitarian, not less, at least with respect to the distribution of apartment space (measured by the coefficient of variation) and feeling of commitment and of satisfaction. Nor is average level of education associated with industrialization in the kibbutz as it probably is in other societies (Russett *et al.* 1964; UNESCO 1950). Industrialization in the kibbutz, unlike industrialization in many other societies, has been taking place within a population that had already achieved a relatively high level of education. Most of the founders of the kibbutz were university students who interrupted their studies to become agricultural workers. They provided a high school education for their children but they were reluctant to send their sons and daughters to universities until the late 1960s when, along with rapid industralization, large numbers of kibbutz born persons were given higher education. (Gamson 1975) Level of formal education as a variable in the kibbutz, therefore, has a historical trajectory different from that in the typical modernizing society, and while education may be a significant component of the technological imperative elsewhere its relationship to the imperative in the kibbutz is more complex.

Cross sectional data can not provide evidence concerning causality. None the less, the data of this research offer modest evidence consistent with some of the general arguments that we cited concerning effects of the technological and ideological imperatives. The evidence, we believe, is only modest partly because inequality in the kibbutz is not highly structured or crystallized. Persons who are high on one of the 'rewards' we have measured, such as apartment space, are not necessarily high on others such as influence, or

satisfaction. Similarly, kibbutzim that are relatively inegalitarian with regard to one of the characteristics that we have measured are not necessarily inegalitarian with regard to the others. Inequality within a kibbutz is therefore more elusive than it is in societies where inequality is highly structured, and a kibbutz cannot easily be characterized by a global measure of inequality. In addition, kibbutzim as a set are relatively homogeneous; they do not differ very much from one another, as, for example, they might differ from other societies in inequality and in the technological and ideological imperatives. It is partly because of this homogeneity and lack of crystallization, we believe, that the effects on equality that we have found are small and sporadic. The measurement of differences in inequality among societies is not likely to be highly reliable where the societies do not differ very much and consistently from one another in equality. The small number of sampled persons who provided the data used to measure inequality within each kibbutz also limits the reliability of the measures and therefore the likelihood of detecting relationships that exist. In spite of these limitations, however, we have found a number of relationships that can not be explained by chance. The technological imperative in the kibbutz, measured through an index of industrialization, economic efficiency and aspects of growth, does appear to have negative implications for some democratic and egalitarian practices and for aspects of equality itself. And these effects appear to be counteracted in some degree by education and by an ideological imperative that implies commitment to the traditional kibbutz values of democracy and equality.

The opposing effects of the two imperatives would seem to be consistent with the assertion that all societies face a 'basic Gemeinschaft–Gesellschaft value dilemma' (Blasi 1978) and with the criticism of utopian societies 'that social life cannot be both "human and efficient"' (Kanter 1972: 148). The lack of relationship between the two imperatives themselves, however, does not support this argument. We can not assert unequivocally that a relationship does *not* exist between the two imperatives, but the data would seem at least to suggest this as a hypothesis worth considering. If this hypothesis has validity, the practices in technologically oriented kibbutzim could conform more than they do to traditional values, given a commitment to those values.

The technological and ideological imperatives presumably have effects on egalitarian and democratic practices and on equality itself through decisions that are made and actions that are taken in the kibbutz. But each imperative implies a range of possible prescriptions for action that differ from one another in their degree of consistency with the other imperative. The variety of potential prescriptions that advance economic efficiency, for example, and that reflect the technological imperative might include some that are more and others

that are less inconsistent with equality. While most of the potential prescriptions (especially the more obvious ones) may imply a degree of inegalitarianism, some prescriptions might be inconsequential for inequality and a rare few might even be supportive of egalitarian practice. In principle, prescriptions can therefore be chosen to maximize (or satisfice) on both imperatives. For example, the striving for technical and economic efficiency might lead to the decision to introduce an industrial plant into a kibbutz. Not all plants and their sociotechnical arrangements, however, are alike in their implications for equality and democracy. Some labor intensive industries 'call for' hired labor more than do other industries. Similarly, some industries in which many of the tasks are extremely routine and boring create a strong incentive for members to hire outside workers. On the other hand, 'knowledge-intensive' industries include a large proportion of jobs that require substantial training, are relatively high in occupational prestige and provide workers opportunities to learn as they work and to exercise some influence in the work place. Such industries are, relatively speaking, consistent with kibbutz ideology. (Leviatan 1980) Similarly, some technologies more than others lend themselves to organic organization and to the use of autonomous work groups that are consistent with participative and egalitarian principles more than is typically the case in industry. Techniques of job enrichment, job rotation, and even training to enhance skills in participative leadership might also be incorporated in some plants more easily than in others as means of mitigating if not eliminating the inegalitarian effects of the industrial hierarchy — without sacrificing technological efficiency.

Where the ideological imperative is strong, prescriptions that satisfy the technological imperative will presumably be selected from among alternatives that are the least inegalitarian, including perhaps even some that do not undermine equality at all — *providing* that the decision makers are able to formulate a broad range of potential prescriptions (including some less obvious ones that are reasonably benign ideologically) *and providing* that the decision makers are able to understand and therefore anticipate the consequences of the prescriptions for equality. This crucial intellectual capacity, however, has been and is limited in the kibbutz (as elsewhere) and the rationality of decisions concerning these issues is therefore highly 'bounded.' Thus, historically, the prescriptions designed to enhance technical efficiency, having been selected from the obvious set that includes predominantly inegalitarian formulations, and having been chosen partly in ignorance of consequences has led to a drift toward inequality. The drift may be continuing, although perhaps not inevitably. If a commitment to traditional values can coexist with the striving for efficiency, the problem is one of enhancing the capacity of the kibbutz to understand and to formulate prescriptions that further the objectives of each

imperative and that are relatively benign with respect to the other. The fact that the education level of members is associated with equality in the kibbutz, contrary to our initial conception, may be a clue indicative of the effect of such understanding.

Kibbutz members have recognized the need for greater sophistication in their effort to reconcile the striving for technical efficiency and the maintaining of practices consistent with traditional values. They have turned in part to social science to help solve this and related problems that the kibbutz faces as it grows and modernizes. (Leviatan and Rosner 1980) If the effort should prove successful, this fact itself will illustrate how technical rationality might contribute to the realization of 'human ideals' like democracy and equality in a communal society.

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Notes

1. Both authors contributed equally to this article. We are deeply grateful to Yacov Gluck for his help in the data analysis and to Ephriam Yuchtman Yaar for his helpful comments to an earlier draft. This study was supported by the National Science Foundation, grant no. SES – 8112280.

2. At the time of the data collection for this study, the kibbutzim were formed into the federations, Artzi, Meuchad, Ichud, and Dati. More recently, two of the federations, Meuchad and Ichud have merged.

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APPENDIX A

Formula for the Computation of the Economic Success Score of a Kibbutz (Shashua and Goldshmidt, 1974)

$$\bar{Y} = 15 + 0.41\,x_1 + 0.83\,x_2 + 0.15\,x_3 + 0.11\,x_4 - 0.15\,x_5 + 0.2\,x_6$$

where, $\bar{Y}$ = Economic success

$$x_1 = \frac{\text{Income} - \text{Expenditure}}{\text{Income}}$$

$$x_2 = \frac{\text{Income} - (\text{Expenditure} + \text{Paid Interest} + \text{Depreciation})}{\text{Income}}$$

$$x_3 = \text{Net profit (after taxation)} + \frac{\text{Amount spent on Consumption}}{\text{No. of Families}}$$

(Weighted to the 1968 cost of living index and rounded to 100 lira)

x_4 = % of accumulated capital out of total fixed assets

x_5 = 'Liquidity Gap' as % of production (How much of the fixed assets are financed with short term loans)

x_6 = % of production that is obtained from borrowed money on which interest is paid

Barbara Ballis Lal

Black and blue in Chicago: Robert E. Park's perspective on race relations in urban America, 1914–44*

ABSTRACT

Robert E. Park noted with approval the emergence of separate black institutions in cities. He also celebrated the creation of an urban, black culture believing that group identity and solidarity were advantageous to the collective mobility and political mobilization of Afro-Americans as well as immigrants. He thought that Afro-American culture was rooted in the experience of slavery and its racial aftermath rather than in Africa. The migration of large numbers of blacks from the rural south to the urban north presented an opportunity for creating a cosmopolitan black culture and the emergence of Afro-Americans as a national minority.

In their own research, Park's students developed his ideas about race relations in new ways. However, these same students also challenged his belief that the progress of black Americans would depend upon their efforts alone rather than the co-operation of white Americans as well. They also pointed out that there were features of the emergent black community that contributed to social fragmentation and disorganisation rather than to social solidarity and concerted political action.

INTRODUCTION

Robert E. Park, a dominant force in the 'Chicago School' of sociology, and his colleague, W. I. Thomas, were among the first to identify the 'ethnicity paradox' — the finding that the development of parochial immigrant institutions and a strong cultural identity actually hastened the incorporation of minority groups into the mainstream of American Life (Lal 1983). Park also noted with approval the emergence of separate black institutions in northern cities. He believed that heightened group identity, solidarity and cultural activities would benefit the collective mobility and political mobilization of Afro-Americans.

Neither Park nor other members of the Chicago School (of sociology) were naive enough to believe that all ethnic neighbourhoods had once been ghettos, like the so-called 'Black Belt of Chicago', or that blacks were 'just another ethnic group, whose segregation was largely voluntary and would prove to be temporary' (Philpott 1978:139–40). Park was always aware that '. . . the chief obstacle to the assimilation of the Negro and the Oriental are not mental but physical traits' (Park (1913) 1950:208). Coloured Americans differed from white immigrants because they could not obliterate their 'racial uniform'; skin colour became the symbol of moral and cultural differences (Park (1926) 1950:252). Park did sometimes discuss the spontaneous character of segregation (Park (1913) 1950:214).[1] However, the dominant motif of his essays was that the black American 'has had his separateness thrust upon him, because of his exclusion and forcible isolation from white society' (*ibid.*:218).

Park's analysis of the migration of southern, rural blacks to cities, especially northern cities, although not analogous to his work on immigrant communities, was certainly influenced by it (Park and Miller (1921) 1969; Park (1922) 1970; Matthews 1977:160–70; Higham 1984:216–19). He saw a similarity between immigrant cultures based on 'old world traits transplanted', and Afro-American culture based on slavery and racism in the USA: both of these minority group cultures met the needs of individuals for recognition and self-esteem, and, both contributed to the solidarity and mobility of minority groups.

The first section of this paper, sets out Park's view on the development of minority communities in cities, focusing primarily on his finding that the spatial isolation of Afro-Americans was favourable to the growth of separate social institutions and cultural activities, and his assumption that these would lead to greater race solidarity and increased participation in the dominant institutions of the encompassing white society.

The second section deals with Park's enduring achievements and his changing view of the destiny of Afro-Americans in northern cities. It concludes with a discussion of a few of the ways in which his students modified his ideas about race relations.

I IMMIGRANTS AND AFRO-AMERICANS IN CITIES

Park and Miller observed in their study *Old World Traits Transplanted*, that it is natural and beneficial for the newly arrived immigrant who 'does not know how to live except as a member of a group' to locate himself in the midst of fellow nationals who came to America before him (Park and Miller (1921) 1969:119).[2] The immigrant community provided the newcomer with essential services such as boarding

houses and restaurants; steamship, labour and real estate agencies; churches; mutual aid and benefit societies; banks and newspapers. These institutions formed a bridge between the immigrant's past experience and his new environment (*ibid.*: 119–44; 259–308).

In particular, Park as a former journalist, emphasized the importance of the newspaper to the immigrants. Even the most parochial foreign language newspapers accelerated integration into the larger community by relating urban life in America to the immigrant's past experience and by communicating the norms, values and conventions of the establishing American culture. 'The foreign language press, if it preserves old memories, is at the same time the gateway to new experiences', and for this reason 'foreign language papers are so frequently agencies of Americanization in spite of themselves' he wrote (Park (1922) 1970: 449). Similarly institutions, such as trade unions, schools and social settlement houses that provided channels of social interaction with American-born whites, also facilitated the growth of an 'American' world view.

Bridging the gap between past experience and the new demands of an unfamiliar urban life in America prevented demoralization. Park pointed out that most immigrants came from rural communities, where their lives were organized and prescribed through local institutions such as the extended family. These were absent in American cities, where the immigrant was required to organize his life around 'different and more individualistic standards' (Park and Miller (1921) 1969:61). Participation in immigrant organizations eased the reorganization of old-world 'habits' by providing the immigrant with collective support for new patterns of behaviour appropriate to his changed circumstances and curbed a drift toward personal disorganization. 'The organization of the immigrant community' Park and Thomas wrote, 'is necessary as a regulative mechanism' (*ibid.*:289).

Park and Thomas suggested that participation within the immigrant community also fulfilled the immigrant's need for recognition and self-esteem. They thought that social conflict among immigrant groups, and with American-born citizens, was largely about status. Immigrants, they wrote

> who begin by deserting their groups end by attempting to improve the status of these groups — seeking to make something with which a man may be proud to identify himself. The fact that the individual will not be respected unless his group is respected becomes, thus, perhaps the most sincere source of nationalistic movements in America. To this extent the nationalistic movements represent an effort to increase participation in American life (*ibid.*:143–4)

Thus, while the celebration of old world heritages and the assertion

of a separate group identity may be valued in and of themselves, they are also a strategy for improving the status of the immigrant group and the self-esteem of its members. As such, they support the immigrant's desire to participate in the wider American community on his own terms.[3]

The growth of the black ghetto during the first decades of the twentieth century indicated the deteriorating status of Afro-Americans during this period and the consequences of a racism that set them apart from white newcomers to cities (Philpott 1978; Lieberson 1980). The growth of specifically black institutions, like the growth of immigrant institutions, facilitated the transition of black migrants from rural to urban life. Like the immigrants, black migrants to northern cities such as Chicago, benefitted from the services, as well as from the recognition and regulation that participation in black institutions provided. Political machines, mutual aid and benefit societies, black churches and a black press were essential resources for the survival of blacks in the face of both spontaneous and organised resistance to their claims for jobs, housing, municipal services and political office (Chicago Commission on Race Relations (1922) 1968; Gosnell (1935) 1967; Drake and Cayton (1945) 1962; Cayton 1965; Osofsky 1966; Spear 1967; Philpott 1978; Zunz 1982). Moreover, these black institutions greatly contributed to the emergence of Afro-Americans as a national minority, a process that had its origin in the post-Civil War south.

In addition to building urban social institutions, America's black migrants, like its immigrants, confronted the task of how best to appropriate the culture of cities for their own use. In order to create a specifically Afro-American culture, which would promote self-esteem and enhance group status, black Americans had to shed their rural 'folk' culture built upon the experience of slavery and its racialist aftermath.

A specifically Afro-American urban culture required reinterpreting southern history and communicating a different view of the role and destiny of black Americans (Park (1923) 1950:284–300; (1943) 1950:301–15).

Initially, Park agreed with Booker T. Washington, for whom he worked as a public relations agent and ghostwriter at Tuskegee Institute between 1905 and 1914, that the growth of a self-conscious, unified black community was taking place in the south (Park (1913) 1950:204–20). By the 1920s, however, he reversed this opinion, writing that it was 'the great migration of Negroes from the plantation and small towns of the south to the manufacturing centres of the north' that had 'brought about, for good and for all, a great change in the condition and in the outlook of the Negro people' (Park (1935a) 1950: 167–8; (1923) 1950:284–300). He offered various reasons, in addition to that of migration itself, to explain the growth of an

organised, cohesive black national minority in northern cities.

First of all, Park noted that black Americans experienced two kinds of isolation: physical and cultural. Physical or spatial isolation resulted in ghettos where blacks, although differentiated by occupation, class, education, and place of birth, were forced to live together in the same area and to recognize their shared predicament. Cultural isolation, on the other hand, resulted in the exclusion of Afro-Americans from education and 'the techniques of communication and organization of the white man' (Park (1913) 1950:214–15).

Furthermore, Park suggested that the physical isolation of blacks from whites in cities in the north differed fundamentally from the more debilitating cultural isolation of blacks in rural areas of the south. Rural, southern blacks constituted 'a folk' whose 'habitat' was 'fixed', whose culture was 'local', whose political influence was negligible, and whose intellectual horizon was circumscribed by 'the shadow of the plantation', outside of which 'the only centers of Negro life are the rural churches and rural schools' (Park (1934) 1950: 66–78; Johnson 1934).

Blacks in northern urban ghettos were brought into close contact with each other and were presented with new opportunities for education, intellectual endeavour, business enterprise, religious organization, politics, a black press and — in all these areas — the emergence of black leadership. (Park (1935)(a) 1950:166–7) Moreover, the ability to read, whether poetry or newspapers, 'which was regarded as a luxury in the rural community, becomes a necessity to the city' (Park (1923) 1950:297).

Second, Park believed that the absence of the southern caste system, inhibiting the entrance of blacks into a range of occupations, and the existence of a class system, encouraged the growth of a 'robust and vigorous middle class' in the urban north. He envisioned 'pioneers' on a 'racial frontier' who would provide leadership for the black world within the white world (Park (1935)(a) 1950:176). Like Booker T. Washington, Park thought that individual economic success and occupational mobility were essential conditions for the collective mobility of blacks (Washington 1901). He also assumed that racial justice was possible within a class system and that racism — whether through a caste system or benign paternalism that sets apart Afro-Americans from others — impeded the free market's distribution of rewards on the basis of effort and skill (Park (1943) 1950:301–15). Comparing Washington's self-help programme for blacks with the federal government's paternalistic policies for native Americans, Park noted that,

> . . . the race which advances under special burdens and restraints is doing better than that which needs the special care and protection of the Government in order to maintain itself (Park to Emmett J.

Scott, Park–Washington Correspondence, Booker T. Washington Papers, date unknown).

Park believed that 'bi-racial organization', which he thought contributed to the emergence of a black middle-class was the 'unique' outcome of racial conflict in the USA. Bi-racial organization meant that blacks would not be relegated strictly to menial occupations, but would work at jobs in trades, businesses and the professions, which although not integrated, were the same as those in which whites worked. Park wrote

> 'The most profound changes in race relations, if not in racial ideology, have come about with the rise of a hierarchy of occupational classes within the limits of the Negro race, so that Negroes can and do rise to some sort of occupational and professional equality with other races and peoples who have not been handicapped by the degradations and institutions of a caste system . . . At present, at least in northern cities, to which Negroes in recent years have migrated in such large numbers, the status of the Negro population is no longer that of a caste. It is rather that of a racial and cultural minority (Park (1943) 1950:311).

Bi-racial organization actually helped to transform racial attitudes. Although the 'distinctions' and the 'distances which separate the races are maintained', what changes is that '(t)he races no longer look up and down; they look across' (Park (1928) 1950:243). This arrangement challenged stereotypes and encouraged changing the social imagery of blacks.

Moreover, bi-racial organization supports a sense of shared identity and a shared culture, and the positive evaluation of both of these. Park believed that in societies organized along 'horizontal lines', 'loyalty attaches to individuals, particularly to the upper class, who furnish, in their persons and in their lives, the models for the masses of the people below them'. Similar to the nationalistic movements in Europe, once emancipated from the constraints of caste, Park thought that Afro-Americans would create 'models based on their own racial individuality and embodying sentiments and ideals which spring naturally from their own lives' rather than embrace the attitudes and behaviour of the dominant white world (Park (1913) 1950:219).

Park propounded the idea that racial groups which comprise all social classes are 'intractable minorities engaged in a ruthless struggle for political privilege or economic advantage'. He maintained, that they are 'cultural groups' as well, struggling to preserve an identity, a heritage and distinctions of lifestyle (*ibid.*:218). Moreover, foreshadowing contemporary debates about the obligations of the state in a multi-ethnic society, Park observed that a racial group that is also a national minority may 'retain its loyalty to the state of which it is a part, but

only in so far as that state incorporates, as an integral part of its organization, the practical interests, the aspirations and the ideals of that nationality' (*ibid.*:220).

Park's analysis of bi-racial organization demonstrates his sensitivity to the importance of group identity and culture in maintaining or undermining a given racial order. He placed a strong emphasis in his perspective on 'culture-building' in transforming race relations.[4]

In general, culture-building requires that members of a minority reinterpret the group's past and positively identify with its ethos and its lifestyle as these exist in all of their present complexity. Culture-building activities include the creation and transmission of 'social meanings' such as those of self and group and their implicit or explicit evaluations, together with all the 'definitions of the situation' which arise out of and underlie social interaction in 'objective' social settings (Thomas (1923) 1967). Social meanings and definitions of the situation are created and disseminated by a variety of groups within any community, such as its intellectuals, politicians, musicians, clergy, teachers, and people in the media (Blumer and Duster 1980:211–38). Culture-building also includes creating and modifying institutions such as the family and the church (Hughes 1971:52–64).[5]

What are of interest here are Park's ideas about the subjective aspects of culture, and in particular, his view of the function of black literature and black history in altering race relations. In the 'stimulating environment' of northern cities, Park wrote, 'the Negro has developed an intellectual life and produced a literature which otherwise and elsewhere there would have been neither the occasion nor the opportunity' (Park (1935a) 1950:168). An important function of such literature was 'to state the case of the Negro to Negroes' and, thus, to heighten race consciousness, to sustain race conflict, and to present a positive evaluation of the Afro-American community (Park (1943) 1950: 308–9). 'Literature and art', wrote Park,

> when they are employed to give expression to racial sentiment and form to racial ideals, serve, along with other agencies, to mobilize the group and put the masses *en rapport* with their leaders and with each other. In such cases literature and art are like silent drummers which summon to action the latent instincts and energies of the race (Park (1913) 1950:216–17).

While Negro spirituals were the blacks 'literature of slavery', black poetry was 'a transcript of Negro life' in the present. Unlike spirituals, which emphasized life in the next world and urged 'patience, humility and resignation in this life', the poetry of black writers such as Claude McKay and James Weldon Johnson, Park noted, exhorted blacks to aspire to the best that life had to offer on this earth now (Park (1923) 1950:290–3). The 'poetry of the Negro renaissance', wrote Park, 'is

distinctly of this world. It is characteristically the poetry of rebellion and self-assertion' (*ibid.*: 290–4)

Park's study of contemporary black poetry led him to observe that rather than intending to

> . . . prove to himself and the white world that he was a man like other men; that he could think the white man's thoughts and practice the white man's arts

black poets were 'more concerned . . . in defining their own conception of their mission and destiny as a race' (*ibid.*: 290; 293). In this sense, poets such as McKay, Johnson, and Paul Laurence Dunbar were akin to the black politicians who had risen in ward politics and who, while they 'have very few illusions . . . in regard to the people they seek to represent, . . . make no apologies for them either' (Park (1935a) 1950:171). These similarities in the attitude between black poets and writers and black political leaders in cities were further evidence of the connections between culture and politics.[6]

In his analysis of race consciousness, Park himself turned to a metaphor used by Dunbar in his poem 'We Wear the Mask' (Park (1923) 1950:291)[7] Park suggested that the mask of colour hides the Afro-American's sentiments and his individuality from whites. To the average white American, all blacks, like all Chinese and all Japanese, look alike. Once 'the individual man is concealed behind the racial type', blacks become the objects of white imaginations (Park (1926) 1950:246).

Park also emphasized the role of black history in forging a positive image of blacks for blacks in the face of conventional stereotypes. Early in his affiliation with Washington at Tuskegee Institute, Park volunteered to write a history of American blacks in the form of a 'self-help reader' to be distributed throughout the southern school system, particularly in schools for 'colored boys and girls'. He intended the reader to modify the self-imagery of blacks in much the same way as his journalistic efforts for Washington were intended to modify the white's image of blacks. This project was to be an integral part of '. . . that work at Tuskegee which interests me most . . . I refer to attempts to build up a "race consciousness"' (Park to Emmet Scott, Park-Washington Correspondence, Booker T. Washington Papers, March, 1905). In a letter to Emmet J. Scott, Washington's secretary at Tuskegee, Park expressed the opinion that this proposed 'anecdotal history of the Negro' would suggest that

> (n)othing short of the history of Italy in the period of the Renaissance or France during the Revolution seems to me equal to the story of this people — if you consider it as the story of a *people*, a race and not a history of political controversy, as it usually is considered . . . (Park to Emmett Scott, Park–Washington Correspondence, Booker T. Washington Papers, March, 1905).[8]

It must be emphasised that Park did not think that institutional arrangements and the nascent culture of black Americans were African in nature. After describing the slave trade and the policies adopted to destroy the slaves' ties to kin and tribe, he concluded that

> (t)he fact that the Negro has brought with him from Africa so little tradition which he was able to transmit and perpetuate on American soil makes that race unique among all people of our cosmopolitan population (Park (1918) 1950:269)

The aim of black Americans was, therefore, not to adapt 'old world traits' to an urban environment. Rather, theirs was the task of reinterpreting for themselves the dominant white culture and Afro-American history of which the experience of slavery and its racist aftermath is so much a part.

Thus, Park suggested that for Afro-Americans, the process of forging a minority identity and culture differed from the pattern found among immigrant groups. However, for both immigrants and blacks, separate cultures, identities, and social institutions are adaptive mechanisms that should contribute to the survival and collective mobility of the group, and to its eventual full participation in American life as social equals on terms that are negotiated and not merely imposed.

2. TROUBLE IN PARADISE

Park's achievement is that he legitimated the study of ethnic and racial minorities as an area within sociology and as part of a university curriculum. This alone would warrant his place both in the development of sociology in the USA, and in the history of race and ethnic relations.

In addition to this accomplishment, he was also responsible for developing the perspective and method which led to the emergence of the 'Chicago school of sociology' in the 1920s and 1930s (Bulmer 1984). Urban ethnography — the study of social behaviour in 'naturalistic settings' was the fulcrum of social research at Chicago during Park's stewardship. Elaborating upon the research strategy first used by W. I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki in their study *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*, Park encouraged students to study human beings as they really lived (Thomas and Znaniecki 1918–1920). In addition to closely observed monographs which do record how people lived in cities, Park's students also used their findings to expand many of his original insights, and equally importantly, to modify the flawed aspects of his approach.

As noted in Part 1, Park developed an original view of the relationship between urbanization and racial conflict in which he

examined the role of Afro-American culture in influencing race consciousness, collective identity and collective action. What then, are the strengths of his innovative analysis of the factors affecting Afro-Americans in cities?

First of all, Park correctly claimed that black Americans would only achieve racial justice and the opportunity to participate fully in American life as an outcome of racial conflict. Race conflict he thought, was an indication of the greater aspiration to social betterment among Afro-Americans and the 'obstinate and irrational resistance to the Negro's claims' by whites (Park (1928) 1950:230–43; (1923) 1950:300).

In the 1920s, in anticipation of Gunnar Myrdal (Myrdal (1944) 1962) Park expressed the hope that White America's commitment to democratic principles would eventually undermine racial discrimination.

> The difference between democracy and other forms of society is that it refuses to make class or race, i.e., group distinctions. Distinctions and distances must be of a purely individual and personal nature (Park (1928) 1950:230–43).

However, at about the same time, Park was forced to acknowledge the similarities in attitude among all white Americans, including those '. . . sympathetic spectators, sharing vicariously' in the Afro-Americans' struggles 'but never able to make his case their own' (Park 1923) 1950:300). In both the north and the south, racial antagonism was sustained by the privileges conferred by patterns of segregation and dis-crimination favouring whites whether native or foreign born. Moreover, among white Americans, belief in black inferiority and the indissoluble link between race and culture persisted in the wake of the influential studies of the anthropologist Franz Boas, which sought to discredit this conceptual confusion (Stocking 1968: 195–233; Matthews 1977: 157–162.

Park concluded that it has become a 'necessity that Negores should cooperate to win for themselves a place and the respect in the white man's world that the Constitution could not give them . . .' (Park 1923) 1950:294). Blacks themselves would have to provide leadership in the conflict ahead.

Second, Park anticipated that racial conflict would take place in cities rather than in the rural, American south. The anonymity and impersonality of city life along with the heterogeneity of the urban population tended to blur distinctions between people. The city offered greater opportunities for minorities to escape from the constraints of a prescribed status and its hallowed conventions.

Migration from the rural south to the urbanizing north, resulted in black competition for scarce resources. World War II accelerated changes in the relationship between black and white Americans that

were already evident at the turn of the century (Osofsky 1966; Spear, 1967; Chicago Commission on Race Relations (1922) 1968). As Park predicted, in cities there were increasingly frequent incidents of interracial conflict, ranging from personal intimidation to public rioting, as blacks pressed for equal access to jobs, housing, transportation, schooling and political office (Waskow 1966; Polenberg 1980). In cities where blacks experienced occupational mobility and increasing civil rights, interracial tensions were greatest. 'From the black perspective the lowering of some barriers made those remaining seem more intolerable. To many whites, however, the remaining barriers seemed even more desirable than before' (Polenberg 1980:78). By 1964, despite the successful agitation to ensure greater civil liberties for Afro-Americans in the south, ghetto riots became a more usual way of expressing interracial tensions in northern cities. Rioting in New York, Chicago and Los Angeles, and the limitations imposed by blacks upon white participation in civil rights organizations, bore out Park's prediction, although not in ways of which he would have approved, that racial struggle would more and more depend upon black leadership. Writing about race riots between 1964 and 1972, the American historian Richard Polenberg points out that

> The typical rioter was not a deviant member of the community, not the most economically disadvantaged, and poorly educated, but rather a 'new ghetto man', more intensely sensitive to his deprivation relative to other blacks and more keenly conscious of his racial identity (Polenberg 1980:235).

Third, Park was among the first to recognize the prophylactic qualities of minority group cultures in general, and of Afro-American culture in particular. Jane Addams and other settlement house workers had commented upon the beneficial effects that foreign cultures seemed to have in helping immigrants to adjust to the strains of urban life in America (Addams (1892–1910) 1965:28–123; Higham 1984:217–18). However, the favourable influence of a parallel development among black southern migrants, seemed to have escaped their consideration.

Park, on the other hand, thought that the generic features of parochial minority group cultures regardless of content, were of value — whether for black Americans or for immigrants — because each culture corresponded to universal human needs.[9] These included the need for recognition, self-esteem, and solidarity with others. Moreover, the 'ethnicity paradox' suggests that minority group culture is adaptive because each supports efforts to greater participation in mainstream American life even in the face of opposition from others.

Park's observations then, predate current preoccupation with the question of how ethnic cultures, including Afro-American culture, support or depress the collective social mobility of the group as a

whole, as this is measured by their share of resources such as income, education and health (Glazer and Moynihan 1963; Light 1972; Lieberson 1980; Sowell 1981). Park and his students also anticipated questions regarding the relationship between ethnic identification and achievement, for example, in schools, and whether effective political organization for minority groups, and in particular for Afro-Americans, requires a prior commitment to 'cultural nationalism' (Cruse 1967; Blauner 1972: 124–61).

Furthermore, Park's interest in parochial minority culture raised a whole series of other questions about the value of maintaining separate ethnic and racial identities. He insisted upon differences between minority groups within American society at a time when most intellectuals assumed that Americanisation and 'Anglo-conformity' were desirable if not inevitable (Gossett (1963) 1965; Higham 1965).

Park's concerns continue to infuse concepts such as 'social assimilation' about which he wrote, with an appropriate ambiguity (Park (1913) 1950: 204–20, 1935(b):281–3; Gordon 1964; Higham 1984:175–97, 198–232). Moreover, concepts such as culture and assimilation remind sociologists now, as in Park's day, that they may not assume that a shared heritage, religion, skin colour, or historical memories of subordination and dominance, become increasingly less important than social class in influencing collective action in metropolitan centres. Rather, sentimental cultural bonds, which may or may not further material interests, are more or less important depending upon the specific situation considered and the ethnic 'class fraction' involved (Rex and Moore 1967; Wallman 1979:1–14; Miles 1984:217–37; di Leonardo 1984; Lal forthcoming).

Finally, Park's interest in how communication and mass media, such as the newspaper, sustains or alters racial imagery which in turn affects identity and interaction both within and between socially differentiated groups, continues to yield useful findings and to provide direction in changing racial stratification (Killian and Grigg 1967; Blumer and Duster 1980: 211–38; Barker 1981; Reeves 1983).

Clearly, Park's insights into race relations in cities, and his influence upon research in this area, are of continuing importance. However, having pointed out the strengths and significance of Park's analysis, it is also necessary to consider the flawed aspects of his thinking. These were just as effectively revealed in the subsequent research of his students as they were in the comments of his less sympathetic critics.

To begin with, Park underestimated the degree to which the progress of black Americans would depend upon the goodwill of white Americans rather than the efforts of blacks alone (Blumer 1965:322–36). Thus, he exaggerated the extent to which heightened race consciousness and racial solidarity could mitigate discrimination.

One of the reasons why Park did not anticipate the ways in which

the white-dominated society would affect how blacks live is because he confronted a world in which the ravages of economic depression, white racism, demands for an increasingly skilled and educated labour force, and the exclusionary policies of any labour unions, had not yet conspired to dry up aspirations and opportunities among blacks for both individual and group advancement. Thus Stanley Lieberson points out that between reconstruction and the 1930s, when the economic prospects for Afro-Americans declined both absolutely and relative to white groups, blacks demonstrated the same desire for literacy and education as immigrants (Lieberson 1980:123–252). It was Park's students who were compelled to address the question of how the economic and political institutions of the dominant white society determined the organization of black life and the development of Afro-American personality.

With regard to Park's belief in the efficacy of self-help, for example, his students St. Clair Drake, Horace Cayton and E. Franklin Frazier each pointed out that the fate of the black community was overwhelmingly determined by decisions made by whites and upon events occurring outside the black ghetto. 'The fate of Black Metropolis' wrote Drake and Cayton in 1945

> is dependent on the fate of Midwest Metropolis, of the country, and of the world. Forces which are in no sense local will in the final analysis determine the movement of this drama of human relations toward hope or tragedy (Drake and Cayton (1945) 1962):767.

The same observation is relevant to his discussion of bi-racial organization which he had hoped would improve interracial communication, for as his student E. Franklin Frazier pointed out, the parallel emergence of 'the colored world within' depended on the resources available and the extent to which the interests of powerful whites permitted such development (Frazier (1949) 1968:43–61). Moreover, Frazier noted that

> occupations in the Negro group do not have the same connotations and so do not give the same social status as similar occupations in the white community. The standard of living and the modes of behavior are derived from their relative position in the Negro community (Frazier (1931) 1968:215).

Subsequent historical events vindicated the appraisal of Park's students that overwhelmingly white Americans determined outcomes for black Americans. The refusal or willingness of the federal government to enforce existing civil rights legislation or to frame new legislation promoting equal opportunities for blacks, the policies of white-dominated labour unions and businesses, the restricted covenants entered into by real estate agents, combined to influence the experience of blacks after World War II as they had before.

A second shortcoming in Park's approach is his relative indifference to those features of the black urban community that contributed to social fragmentation and disorganization. Foremost among these is the temptation for emergent middle-class business and political leaders to use their economic and political power to further self-interest at the expense of working-class blacks. Park preferred to stratify populations in terms of occupations rather than social classes. He tended to over-emphasize the homogeneity of goals and outlooks among blacks. Subsequently, Frazier, Drake, Cayton and another of Park's students, Charles Spurgeon Johnson, revealed the sources of divisiveness within America's 'dark ghettos'.

Frazier's study of the black bourgeoisie, for example, uncovered types of race consciousness and cultural activities that were based on economic success, and not on education or intellectual accomplishments. These activities, founded upon consumption and attempts to imitate the white world, fragmented the black community rather than providing it with group leadership (Frazier 1957). In the 1920s, Park had applauded black poets and anticipated their contributions to a redefinition of black identity. In 1955, Frazier wrote bitterly of the failure of the Negro Renaissance of the 1920s. 'The short stories, novels, and poems which expressed this new evaluation of the Negro and his history in America by artists and intellectuals', wrote Frazier 'were unread and ignored by the new middle class that was eager to gain a few dollars' rather than a 'new conception of themselves' (Frazier (1955) 1968:262).

A third problematic aspect of Park's approach has to do with the overwhelmingly positive outcomes that he attributes to minority group cultures. Park's use of the culture concept begs the question of whether cultures which perpetuate a set of beliefs and values which are self-destructive and a style of life which inhibits success as this is measured by the dominant culture, should be judged 'inferior' or 'less adaptive to a particular set of circumstances' (Sowell 1981:285; Flew 1985). Frazier prefigured the 'culture of poverty' debate stirred by Oscar Lewis (Frazier 1934; (1939) 1966; 1968; Lewis 1959; 1961; 1966; Valentine 1968).

In this respect, the social historian Jean Quandt argues that Progressive intellectuals, among whom she includes Park, elevated the concept of culture to a position of dominance in 'an effort to deal with the problem of the division of labour, the specialization of knowledge, and the fragmentation of social life'. She goes on to note that the culture concept was used to 'give the individual a sense of connection with the largely unseen and complex environment in which he played a part' and 'to foster a sense of solidarity which would mitigate conflict, selfishness, and indifference to the common good' (Quandt 1970:126). Quandt concludes that this framework dealt with social and economic issues as problems of culture and

communication. They showed, she goes on to say, a 'certain disregard' among Progressives, 'for questions of social structure, economic power, and material reward' (*ibid.*: 130).

Quandt's observation is both acute and on balance, a fair appraisal of the way in which Park used the concepts of culture and communication — both of which were essential not only to his analysis of race and ethnic relations but also to his overall sociological perspective. Further, her conclusion reiterates complaints effectively voiced first by Oliver Cromwell Cox, and later by other Marxist and non-Marxist sociologists and historians. These authors agree that Park's sociology of race and ethnicity obscured the importance of both social class, and the inequitable distribution of economic and political power, for determining the life chances of Afro-Americans and influencing the future of race relations (Cox (1948) 1970:303–17; Turner 1967:xvii; Schwendinger and Schwendinger 1974).

However, the Chicago school, although it accommodated a variety of approaches to the study of group life, was overwhelmingly committed to the view that sociology was the equivalent of urban anthropology (Park (1916) 1952:13–51; Blumer 1968:1–60). As ethnographers of the city, it is not surprising that the concept of culture, which had of late served the anthropologists Boas, Edward Sapir, W. Pitt Rivers and F. Lowie so well in their investigations of race in small, non-industrial, agricultural societies, recommended itself as an efficient approach to the study of 'unknown' cultures — whether of foreigners or native-born Americans — within the USA. Besides, as the sociologist Norbert Wiley points out, the 'interlocking concepts — culture, symbol, self and interaction — would create an important alliance between cultural anthropology, at least in its ascendant Boasian variety, and the pragmatic, interactive sociology' and differentiate social science from biologically rooted explanations of social life (Wiley 1986:27).

Culture, communication and social interaction continue to be pivotal to sociological work within the Chicago tradition. In particular, these concepts reappear in the literature on race and ethnic relations as in the idea of 'race prejudice as a sense of group position', (Blumer 1958:217–27) and the theory of 'collective definitions' (Blumer and Duster 1980:221–37; Lal 1986:280–98).

Therefore, while there are many pitfalls attendant on seeing discrimination, race prejudice, poverty, unemployment, illegitimacy, and other sources of misery and deprivation for black Americans as problems of culture and communications *alone*, this observation should not lead to the conclusion that the concepts of culture and communication are superfluous to the analysis of race and ethnicity. Rather, sociologists should continue to ask how a wide range of factors, incuding culture and communication, influence minority relations.

Park's own students and other scholars working within the Chicago school tradition have, in fact, included social class and social structure, the dilemmas of status and reference group, to the battery of concepts used in their analysis of race relations. For example, Drake and Cayton argued that material and emotional impoverishment for blacks in the 'underclass' of Black Metropolis, could only be understood when related to both social stratification in the encompassing city of Chicago and, the historical context of national unemployment and underemployment (Drake and Cayton (1945) 1962). Similarly, Park's student Everett Hughes captured the experience of Afro-Americans who are professionals, through the idea of the 'contradictions of status' (Hughes (1945) 1971:141–50).

The appearance of such terms as 'social structure' and 'social class' represented a shift in the sociological thinking of this later generation of scholars working within the Chicago tradition. This transformation did not signify a 'scientific revolution' (Kuhn 1964), as one might be tempted to argue with respect to the emergence of the 'caste and class school' or social systems theories. Nor does it support the view that both 'the idiom' and 'the Negro subject matter' of the Chicago School were eclipsed between 1940 and 1960 because 'this tradition' lacked 'an authoritative theoretical formulation capable of demanding explicit incorporation into a new analytical scheme developing at Harvard' (Shils 1970: 808). Rather, the work of Frazier, Drake and Cayton, Johnson, Hughes, Blumer and others, represents developments *within* the shared approach originating with Park at Chicago and which placed the concepts of culture and communication, and the methods of ethnography, at the head of the sociological agenda.

The fundamental difference between Park and these scholars was less a matter of approach than of their prognosis for the future. Park's students were more pessimistic than he was about the future of race relations and the achievement of racial justice for blacks. Drake and Cayton, for example, saw no reason to suppose that the contradiction between democratic values and the policies of segregation and discrimination, would be resolved as Park himself hoped. They showed that the 'contradictory principles' of 'free competition' and 'fixed status' continued to govern race relations in Chicago (Drake and Cayton (1945) 1962:757–60) and that 'it is conceivable that the Negro question — given the moral flabbiness of America — is incapable of solution' (*ibid.*: 766). Park himself would have applauded these later efforts to explore the condition of Afro-Americans in cities and to provide a more realistic assessment of the prospects of racial justice in America.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This article started its life as a paper presented at The International Conference on the History and Ideology of Anglo-Saxon Racial Attitudes c. 1870–1970, held in September 1982 at Westhill College, Birmingham, England. Nearly a decade later, it has emerged in its present form, having benefitted from the helpful comments of Martin Bulmer, Joyce Gelb, Paul Rich, Rita Simon and John Stone. My colleague, Michael Levin, provided a steady diet of incisive criticism and unfailing friendship — a combination hard to find. Sasha Shaw and Pauline Ryall, the librarians at Goldsmith's College, cheerfully got any books and articles that I needed, Joy Seaton typed and retyped material with an astounding efficiency and undiminished goodwill. Troy Duster gave me the opportunity to try out some of my ideas at the Institute for Social Change, University of California, Berkeley, California, August 1986, for which I am grateful. Jovencia Peralta, Sandra Shavick, Annie Walker and my parents were always there when I needed them, while my children, Deepika and Akshay, were, thank God, just always there. My husband, Deepak Lal, claims to have bankrolled the whole enterprise.

NOTES

1. Nathan Kantrowitz's suggestion that Park believed that assimilation 'requires residential desegregation' and that 'Park introduced the idea that segregation is "bad", within a social Darwinist mode of thought' is an over-simplified and misleading summary of Park's views (Kantrowitz 1981:47).

2. W. I. Thomas was primarily responsible for the text of *Old World Traits Transplanted*. Due to a scandal near the time that the study was to be published, his name was deleted from authorship. Herbert Miller was cited as Park's co-author (Janowitz 1966:xvi; Matthews 1977:118; Kurtz 1984:250).

3. John Higham suggests that 'Jane Addams's friendliness toward minority cultures at Hull House' might also have contributed to Park's belief that 'group pride actually mediates the assimilative process' (Higham 1984:218–19).

4. The term 'culture-building' is my own and not Park's. It has also been used by Robert Blauner in his article, 'Black Culture: Myth or Reality?' (Blauner 1972:124–61).

5. By institutions, I mean relatively permanent patterns of social interaction (e.g., roles, offices) organized to achieve shared or complementry goals, and which include subjective factors such as shared meanings and shared values. Institutions are a facet of a group's culture. As Everett Hughes notes

> institutions are just those social forms which grow up where men collectively face problems which are never completely settled. In various times and places, men have voluntarily met to solve problems. It seems likely that, when they do so, and continue to do so for long enough, they produce relationships and ideas which succeeding generations accept somewhat involuntarily . . .
>
> (Hughes (1931) 1979: Preface)

(See also Hughes 1971:5–13, 14–20; (1931) 1979: 1–9). For a discussion of the difficulties in differentiating between

institutions, social structure, and culture, see Blau 1975.

6. Black journals such as *The Crisis*, *Opportunity*, and *The Messenger* dealt with political issues as well as publishing stories and listing cultural activities of interest to blacks.

The Harlem Renaissance provides a useful case study of the alliance between literature and the arts generally, and politics (Osofsky 1966; Anderson 1981). Also suggestive of the relationship between politics and art are Cruse (1967) and Blauner (1972).

7. Dunbar's poem goes as follows:

We wear the mask that grins and lies,
It hides our cheeks and shades our eyes –
This debt we pay to human guile,
With torn and bleeding hearts we smile
And mouth with myriad subtleties.
(Dunbar, cited in Park (1923) 1950:291)

8. The self-help reader was also aimed at mitigating the problem of educating black children in the rural south, whose experience was fundamentally different from that of their teachers and textbook writers. 'When knowledge which the school is seeking to impart is remote from the experience of the pupil, the task of translating it into the language that the student understands is a difficult one . . .' (Park (1937) 1950:55). In the jargon of the 1960s, Park proposed to make education 'relevant' to black students.

9. The term 'parochial minority group cultures' is my own and not Park's.

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Stjepan G. Meštrović

Durkheim's concept of anomie considered as a 'total' social fact*

ABSTRACT

Marcel Mauss's notion of the 'total' social fact as a phenomenon that includes the sociological, psychological and physiological dimensions of a phenomenon simultaneously is applied to Durkheim's concept of anomie. In this new reading, the psychological and physiological aspects of anomie are brought out. Implications for operationalizing this new way of reading anomie are explored briefly.

It is well known that Durkheim's thought has been incorporated into contemporary sociology along the lines that it is positivistic, realist and an example of extreme sociologism. Durkheim and the Durkheimians certainly repudiated these labels. The Durkheimians called their epistemology 'renovated rationalism'.[1] They focused on 'representations' of reality and self-consciously attempted to overcome the object–subject distinction.[2] They insisted that sociology was distinct from psychology and biology, but were also against compartmentalization. The purpose of this essay is not to enter into a polemic nor to exacerbate the object–subject debate. Rather, we shall attempt to enter into the role of the other with regard to the Durkheimians. The Durkheimian notion of the 'total social fact' as the conjunction of the sociological, psychological and biological aspects of a phenomenon shall be the focal point. It shall be applied to Durkheim's concept of anomie.

Anomie read from the point of view of the 'total social fact' takes on an entirely different meaning compared to the positivistic 'normlessness.' While it is necessary to compare the two readings at certain junctures in this essay, the central purpose is not to evaluate the merits of one reading relative to the other. Rather, our aim is to read anomie from a perspective that we believe is closer to what the Durkheimians might have intended. The main feature of this new reading is the connection of anomie with psychological and physio-

logical pain. In this regard, this essay may be regarded as a sequel of sorts to recent alternatives to the functionalist version of anomie found in the works of Meštrović and Brown[3] and Hilbert,[4] for example. Because the Durkheimians were as concerned with the object–subject distinction, if not more so, than recent commentators on the epistemological crisis in sociology,[5] this new reading might also have some contemporary relevance. The implications of this new way of comprehending anomie will be explored briefly.

DEFINITION OF THE TOTAL SOCIAL FACT

In his *Sociology and Psychology*,[6] Durkheim's nephew and collaborator, Marcel Mauss, develops the notion of the 'total social fact'. Though Durkheim did not use this precise phrase Mauss assumes, and I think correctly, that Durkheim implied it consistently.[7] It is a notion that flows out of Durkheim's concept of *homo duplex* and his epistemological position. Or, as Mauss put it more precisely, it assumes a *homo duplex* within the *homo duplex*. That is, object and subject are two antagonistic parts of a dualism, but the subject is also divided into a *homo duplex*, psychological representations versus 'the body'. Durkheim elaborated on these subjects especially in his essays entitled 'Individual and collective representations',[8] 'The dualism of human nature and its social conditions'[9] and in *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*[10] — though Mauss is more succinct. In *The Forms*, he claimed that the concept of 'totality' is the most important yet neglected of philosophical categories.[11] In *The Division of Labor*, he warned against the compartmentalization of science into particular disciplines and specializations without regard to their interrelatedness.[12] Thus, according to Mauss, Durkheimian sociology 'presupposes the combined study of these three elements: body, mind and society'.[13] He elaborates

> In reality . . . rarely or even hardly ever . . . do we find man divided into faculties. We are always dealing with his body and his mentality as wholes, given simultaneously and all at once. Fundamentally body, soul and society are all mixed together here . . . [these are]the phenomena of totality.[14]

Mauss illustrates the total social fact with reference to the study of language, Robet Hertz's distinction between the right and left, voodoo death and Durkheim's *Suicide* — among many other references to his own works. Because his references to these works and studies are fleeting, and presuppose that the reader is familiar with the bulk of the work of the Durkheimians, we shall fill in part of what Mauss apparently believes is obvious.

For example, the Durkheimian conceptualization of language as a

total social fact presupposes that it can be divided into three components:[15] the social, which consists of the written word; the psychological, which consists of speech; and the physiological, which consists of the larynx and other physical organs necessary for speech. Some will recognize in this characterization of language part of Ferdinand de Saussure's famous distinction between *langue* and *parole*, which became the basis of the modern science of linguistics. But in assuming that, as Saussure put it, 'language is a social fact,'[16] Saussure also adopted much of Durkheim's epistemological position.[17]

The Durkheimian disciple Robert Hertz[18] treats the distinction between the right and left as collective representations. But Mauss is correct to note that Hertz treats this distinction as a total social fact.[19] On the collective level, the right signifies the sacred, and the left signifies the profane. On the psychological level, one refers to the right whenever one wants to appear trustworthy, bind a contract, give one's word and in short, partake of the sacred on the subjective level. Thus, one shakes hands, salutes and blesses with the right hand. The left refers to the sinister, suspicious and even evil, variations of the profane. Thus, according to Hertz, one wears the wedding band on the left hand — the left side is the one that is tempted. Men are associated with the right, and women with the left. But Hertz is aware that heredity, psychological training and the brain interact to produce this phenomenon. Thus, the right side of the brain controls the left side of the body. The right side of the brain is associated with emotive but not analytical skills. Females are typically associated, at least in stereotypes, with right-brain functions and with the left in general, and vice versa for males. Hertz speculates briefly on how evolution, social rearing and individual learning might have interacted to produce these effects, and how they might be modified in the future.

Perhaps the most intriguing illustration of the total social fact made by Mauss[20] is the connection between voodoo magic and anomie. In voodoo death, a person often dies because he believes that he has been cursed. The curse carries the weight of the collectivity. The belief is psychological. Mauss explains that the physiological instinct of self-preservation has been influenced by subjective belief which in turn was modified by society. It is in this complicated, interactive sense that voodoo death is an excellent illustration of the total social fact. The citations that Mauss makes to Durkheim are brief but highly suggestive: 'This study [of voodoo death] will also enable me to take further Durkheim's very fine and profound study of the relation between the individual and the social in the case of suicide'.[21] According to Mauss, Durkheim showed that collective currents and states such as war and other crises produce psychological and physiological effects on courage and its opposite, what Mauss calls 'weakness toward life'. As in voodoo death, 'society gets you' through anomie.[22] In another brief link, Mauss writes: 'To close, may I

mention once again that these facts [about voodoo death] confirm and extend the theory of anomic suicide that Durkheim expounded in a book which is a model of sociological demonstration'.[23]

Mauss's illustrations are certainly all too brief, and not exhaustive. It would be a challenge to compile the works of the other Durkheimians[24] in the context of the total social fact. This much is clear: the bulk of their writings are interdisciplinary in nature. Maurice Halbwachs' *Morphologie sociale*[25] stands out as a brilliant and thorough defense of Durkheim's stand on totality. Mauss's writings on the gift,[26] sacrifice[27] and magic,[28] especially, are relevant to this investigation because they all concern themselves with the process by which humans repair anomic-like disequilibria such that 'body, soul and society' are harmonized again. Such a project is beyond the scope of this essay, though it is important. We shall concentrate here on a new reading of Durkheim's comments on anomie in *Suicide* in the context of the total social fact. The implications of this reading for sociology are that it denies any fundamental division between sociology and psychology in Durkheim's thought, a division Durkheim and his followers denied many times in any event, but which continues to be falsely attributed to him. It denies the radical distinction between subject and object which continues to inform social science because object and subject are understood to be simultaneously involved in all phenomena. Finally, it leads to new problems and hypotheses based on Durkheim's thought.

ANOMIE AS A TOTAL SOCIAL FACT

Durkheim never used the word 'normlessness', nor is there any support for reading anomie as 'normlessness' historically, contextually or linguistically. Rather, Durkheim referred to anomie as a painful state of *dérèglement*.[29] *Dérèglement* is a word difficult to translate into English. Literally, it means derangement, and it connotes a kind of immorality and madness. In this paper, the manner of reading anomie and *dérèglement* as total social facts will be made explicit.

Durkheim understood anomie as a total social fact in at least three different ways. First, it definitely presupposes the conjunction of the sociological, psychological, and physiological. Second, it connotes madness and immorality, which are themselves total phenomena. Third, it assumes that the individual's physiological instinct of self-preservation is weakened by anomie.


On the social level of analysis, anomie is literally a derangement of collective representations, a situation in which morals and standards are 'upside down' [*renversé*] such that the 'lower' pole of *homo duplex* rules over the 'higher.'[30] In the vocabulary of Schopenhauer — whom

Durkheim admired greatly — the insatiable, egoistic 'will' rules over mind.[31] On the psychological level, it is manifested — using Durkheim's vocabulary — by frenzy, impatience, restlessness, feverishness, disenchantment, fatigue, excessive excitement, agitation, distress, exasperation, misery and insatiability (among other similar psychological states).[32] Had the word 'stress' existed in Durkheim's time, perhaps he would have said that it is manifested by symptoms of stress. On the physiological level, anomie is experienced as pain and suffering — what Durkheim refers to as *souffrance*, *tourment*, and *douleur*.[33] In his follow-up to Durkheim's *Suicide*, Maurice Halbwachs also emphasizes that 'A man must have reached a rather high degree of suffering for him to decide to pass through these doors' to suicide and adds

> We can assume that the number of suicides is a rather exact indicator of the amount of suffering, malaise, disequilibrium, and sadness which exists or is produced in a group. Its increase is the sign that the sum total of despair, anguish, regret, humiliation, and discontent of every order is multiplying.[34]

In short, for Durkheim, anomie is painful to the individual experiencing it and it hurts. In the Parsonian-Mertonian version, anomie has no feeling to it. Ironically, their version of the state of 'war of all against all' is quite bland. Even Srole's[35] extension of the Mertonian reading, the understanding of anomie as a subjective state of 'meaninglessness', is not correct. Durkheim certainly never refers to anomie in this way. 'Meaninglessness' is as difficult to conceptualize as the vacuous 'normlessness'. What does 'meaninglessness' feel like? For Durkheim, anomie has meaning precisely in the fact that the incorrect arrangement of social representations produces distressing psychological symptoms which eventually produce physical, organismic pain.[36]

According to Durkheim, neurasthenia predisposes the individual to suicide because, on the psychological and physiological levels, such an individual is overly sensitive and suffers too much. The pain drives the individual to abandon life, weakens his instinct of self-preservation in the manner suggested by Mauss. Durkheim describes the neurasthenic as delicate, sensitive, easily stimulated, unstable, and 'destined to suffer'.[37] Translated into the more modern vocabulary of psychologists like Asenath Petrie,[38] one could characterize Durkheim's neurasthenics as 'augmenters' as opposed to 'reducers'. Augmenters suffer because they are psychologically and physically overly sensitive to stimuli. In Hilbert's words, one would say that neurasthenics suffer from chronic pain, that they have normalized pain.[39] But Durkheim denies that neurasthenia is an original cause of suicide because this affliction can be controlled (the neurasthenic can control his or her exposure to stimuli) and because society sometimes rewards it



> The *organic-psychic* temperament most predisposing man to kill himself is neurasthenia in all its forms. Now today neurasthenia is rather considered a mark of distinction than a weakness. In our refined societies, enamoured of things intellectual, nervous members constitute almost a nobility.[40]

To put it another way, neurasthenia is only 'part' of the 'total' social fact of anomie. It is an excellent summary of what anomie feels like on the psychological and physiological levels; but without the social dimension it is not a full explanation of how anomie results in suicide.

Halbwachs emphasizes that Durkheim gives a complicated account of society's role in the genesis of neurasthenia relative to suicide. Indeed, Durkheim writes

> The hypercivilization which breeds the anomic tendency and the egoistic tendency also refines nervous systems, making them excessively delicate; through this very fact they are less capable of firm attachment to a definite object, more impatient of any sort of discipline, more accessible both to violent irritation and to exaggerated depression.[41]

Thus,

> A given number of suicides is not found annually in a social group just because it contains a given number of neuropathic persons. Neuropathic conditions only cause the suicides to succumb with greater readiness to the current. Whence comes the great difference between the clinician's point of view and the sociologist's.[42]

Without a doubt, positivistic methodologies have not accounted for the complexity of Durkheim's argument above.

The second aspect of reading anomie as a total social fact that Mauss only touches upon has to do with its connotations of madness and immorality. Mauss writes: 'The absence of social instinct, immorality, amorality, have long been a sure sign of a certain *kind* of madness'.[43] Again, Mauss seems to assume that the reader is already apprehending *dérèglement* in its standard meanings of immorality and derangement. Perhaps what he means is that in anomie the social, psychological and physiological aspects of being human are deranged to the extent that what is abnormal is accepted as normal, what is pathological is tolerated. Madness reigns, only most people cannot recognize it because they have already been influenced by it to some extent. *Dérèglement* is not the absence of norms; rather, it is itself a deranged norm, a pathology-producing *règle*. Thus Durkheim writes

> The passion for infinity [anomie] is commonly presented as a mark of moral distinction, even though it cannot so appear except in deranged consciences which establish as a rule the derangement

> from which they suffer. Since this disorder is at its apex in the economic world, it has most victims there.[44]

Another telling passage which implies the derangement of human nature is the following

> Yet these dispositions [toward anomie] are so inbred that society has grown to accept them and is accustomed to think them normal. It is everlastingly repeated that it is man's nature to be eternally dissatisfied, constantly to advance, without relief or rest, toward an indefinite goal.[45]

The third aspect of anomie that Mauss exposes has to do with the 'thanatomania' to which he refers, all the modern variations of 'voodoo death' in which the physiological 'instinct of self-preservation' is weakened. Mauss's brief examples of this 'thanatomania' are 'mythomania, legal folly, fanaticism and group vendetta, the hallucinations of the funerary cult'.[46] According to Mauss, this 'thanatomania'

> . . . will enable us to see in detail what is to be made of the instinct for self-preservation in man: to what degree it is dependent on society and can be denied by the individual himself for an extra-individual reason. What I shall present to you will really be a study of human 'morale' (as the English say); in it you will see how the social, the psychological and the physiological are mingled.[47]

Mauss never quite delivers on this promise. At least he never spells out the connections he mentions. What can be surmised from his comments is that anomie literally weakens the will to live. It is like a loss of morale in combat, or the temporary yet deep depression that sometimes accompanies mourning. In a sense, he intimates a medical dimension to *dérèglement* (which is consistent with its dictionary meanings). Because anomie is such a fundamental derangement of society and of the motives of its individual members, individuals are more prone to give up on life in times of stress, figuratively and literally.

Durkheim's analysis of anomie *does* carry this third dimension, though it has been overlooked. In *Suicide* he argues that 'poverty protects against suicide because it is restraint in itself'.[48] Poverty does not necessarily weaken the desire to live. But 'financial crises' *and* 'crises of prosperity' unleash the limitless, indefinite will. 'Because they are crises,' he continues, 'that is, disturbances of the collective order', they are disturbances of equilibrium in individuals, and as such increase the 'impulse to voluntary death'.[49] In the vocabulary of Mauss and the total social fact, Durkheim is saying that all *dérèglements* affect the organisms's fundamental instinct of self-preservation. Elsewhere, Durkheim is still more explicit, writing that in anomie

> Effort grows, just when it becomes less productive. How could the *desire to live* not be *weakened* under such conditions?[50]

With tremendous pathos, Durkheim describes the manner in which anomie brings about weariness, disillusionment, disappointment, pain and a tendency to grope at random, which in turn brings on still other crises, among many other psychological and physiological disturbances until life itself seems 'intolerable'.[51]

These three dimensions of apprehending anomie as a total social fact illustrate the rich texture of the concept not captured by 'normlessness'. 'Normlessness' implies deviance, but not madness or immorality, which *dérèglement* does. 'Normlessness' cannot explain why anomie should lead to suicide or self-destructive behavior in general. But the dimension of the total social fact explains why anomie inherently impels individuals to death: like voodoo curses, it automatically weakens the will to live. Incidentally, this understanding suggests another aspect to the anomie-deviance link. If anomie leads to crime and juvenile delinquency, as it purportedly does, perhaps criminality is another expression of weakened 'social morale', a refusal to abide by society's rules because one has, to a large measure, abandoned life.

IMPLICATIONS FOR OPERATIONALIZING ANOMIE AND ITS EFFECTS

Up to now, anomie has been conceptualized as 'normlessness' and operationalized, rather unsuccessfully, as lack of 'status integration' or as Srole's 'meaninglessness.' Investigations have failed to support the proposition that any of these terms are valid indicators of anomie.[52] Moreover, because these terms do not imply the total social fact, it is not clear which dimension of anomie they purport to capture. Thus, it is not clear how 'status integration' measures a societal condition when it consists of measuring individual social relationships. And it is not clear why having many social relationships should necessarily protect one from anomie. For Durkheim, at least, the quality and nature of those relationships are important. In sum, despite the tremendous apparent popularity of Merton's reading of what Durkheim meant by anomie, 'normlessness' has not really been a useful concept.

In addition, it is factually incorrect to attribute the widespread misunderstanding of 'integration' as social ties, contacts and supports to Durkheim. Durkheim refers to integration as a property *of groups*, not as the attachment of individuals to groups.[53] Moreover, even if one assumes for the sake of argument that Durkheim did intend integration to refer to social ties, one encounters difficulties. Contemporary sociologists focus on the proposition that suicide varies

inversely with integration, and ignore his claims that it can also be caused by excessive integration. Suppose that one drops the term 'integration'[54] from such discussions because of this problem. That still leaves the fact that Durkheim argued that other versions of social ties, contacts and supports can be pathogenic. He showed that women were shielded from suicide precisely because they participated less than men in society, that the lengthening of the day contributes to suicide in urban areas because long days encourage social interaction, and so on.[55] For Durkheim, the quality *and* extent of exposure to society determines the extent of 'prolongation' of the social dimension on the psychological and physiological dimensions, but is not, by itself, in a compartmentalized fashion, related causally to suicide. It must interact with other dimensions of the total social fact.

We have by no means exhausted the other ways in which Durkheim treats anomie as a social fact. Consider additional aspects that could be applied to Durkheim's thought as suggested by Maurice Halbwachs and Marcel Mauss. For example, religion, too, is a total social fact. The Durkheimians believed that modern religions are more concerned with suffering and sorrow than primitive ones.[56] This fact could offer part of the psychological explanation as to why Protestantism is a more fertile ground for suicide than the more ancient Judaism and Catholicism.

Both Halbwachs and Mauss make much of Durkheim's claim that 'the forces impelling the farm laborer and the cultivated man of the city to suicide are widely different'.[57] This is because the totality of life is experienced differently in urban versus rural society. Mauss writes that in the city, 'in summer, social bonds are relaxed, fewer relationships are formed, and there are fewer people with whom to make them; and thus, psychologically, life slackens its pace'.[58] The reverse is true in the country because summer is the beginning of harvest. Thus suicide rates should escalate in urban areas in the summer but decrease in rural areas. Halbwachs adds that 'in the city, occasions for boredom, humiliation, disappointment, and suffering on account of others . . . are multiplied'[59] compared to rural areas because of the possibility of more social contacts *and* weaker social bonds. They draw the conclusion that urban suicide is fundamentally different from rural suicide, and that both types follow different laws relative to the effect of the seasons on social life.

This complex understanding of suicide on the part of the Durkheimians calls into further question the simplistic understanding of 'integration' as social ties discussed above. Urbanism increases social contacts, but not necessarily bonds; rural living may increase bonds, but is low on contacts. Yet both social bonds and contacts are affected by seasonal variations. The works of the other Durkheimians add still more perspective on Durkheim's truly intricate argument in *Suicide*, which cannot be pursued here. The point is that the notion of

the total social fact forces one to re-evaluate how Durkheim's argument in *Suicide* has been read and operationalized by contemporary sociologists working in the positivistic tradition which Durkheim criticized.

Our reading of anomie from the perspective of the total social fact suggests theoretical affinities that might be more useful to explore. Faris and Dunham's classic attempt to link social disorganization, the subjective experience of social isolation and the physiological aspects of schizophrenia — three obvious components of the total social fact — comes to mind. Dunham's[60] recent retrospective look at this study suggests that the Chicago School did *not* consciously attempt to make the theoretical statement that the Durkheimians attempted. Nor have subsequent epidemiological studies refined the theoretical connection between a social condition and physical and/or mental symptoms. In general, methodology has been emphasized over theory. Nevertheless, it would be an important project to try to spell out theoretical affinities between the Durkheimians and the Chicago School.

Another large body of theory and research stems from Hans Selye's original formulation of the stress concept. Selye definitely ventured into sociology and suggested that disequilibrium on the societal level can have repercussions on the psychological dimension which in turn will affect the organism in the form of physiological signs of stress. For example, consider Selye's opening line in *Stress Without Distress*: 'Almost four decades of laboratory research on the physiological mechanisms of adaptation to the stress of life have convinced me that the basic principles of defense on the cellular level are largely applicable also to people and even to entire societies of man.'[61] And Selye insisted that 'stress has its own characteristic form and composition but no particular cause'[62] — it is as if the effects are a 'prolongation' of causes that could begin with societal disturbances. Contemporary stress research has not developed this seemingly Durkheimian aspect of Selye's thought. It has focused instead on specific 'stressful life events'. But even specific 'events' are shaped, at least in part, by collective representations.[63] Similar affinities between anomie as a total social fact and the works of other forerunners of the stress concept, among them Freud, Walter Cannon, Claude Bernard and René Dubos could also be made.[64] For example, Walter Cannon alluded to 'analogies between the body physiologic and the body politic' such that 'the homeostasis of the individual human being is largely dependent on social homeostasis'.[65] This Durkheimian sounding hypothesis has never been formally tested.

The point is that Mauss's notion of the 'total social fact,' or things very similar to it, are implied by many important theoretical traditions other than the Durkheimian. And these have not been fully incorporated into social research because the notion of the total social

fact is not positivistic, and recent developments in sociology have been dominated by positivistic methodologies.

One would like to suggest how anomie as a total social fact could be operationalized. Unfortunately, this is not an easy task because positivistic methodologies may not be suitable to the very notion of the total social fact. These methodologies rest on a strict division of object and subject, while Durkheim's renovated rationalism implies the confluence of object and subject. A workable alternative might be an attempt to emulate the more 'naturalistic' studies of Durkheim's followers. In addition, various portions of existing theory and methodology might be modified slightly to make room for Durkheim's conceptualization. We shall make a cautious move in these directions.

OPERATIONALIZING ANOMIE AS A TOTAL SOCIAL FACT

First, anomie needs to be operationalized into its three components and it must be determined whether and which components coincide. The societal component itself needs to be divided into the varieties of anomie that Durkheim treats: intellectual, conjugal, domestic, political, economic, religious and so on. Phenomena not usually considered to be indicators of anomie by contemporary researchers, but suggested by the Durkheimians, need to be considered, among them: the prevalence of pragmatism, social injustice, the absence of democracy, movements toward magic and superstition in modern societies and other ruptures in social equilibrium.[66] For example, Durkheim's theory suggests that totalitarian regimes will produce more physical symptoms of anomie than democracy[67] — this would be an interesting hypothesis to test. The psychological component needs to tap into the complex that Durkheim describes as 'neurasthenia', impatience, insatiability, irritability and so on. The well-known Type A personality comes to mind, but specific scales will need to be developed to capture these psychological aspects of being anomic. Finally, on the physiological level, researchers will have to capture direct and indirect indicators of pain. Such scales already exist (though they have not been correlated with anomie) but other indirect indicators include efforts to suppress pain: drug abuse, excessive alcohol consumption, addiction to common food substances, and various consumptive disorders. Durkheim suggests that these three dimensions of anomie coincide, but that aspect of his theory has not been consciously, formally tested.

Second, there is a need to explore the ramifications of conceptualizing anomie as a 'kind' of madness and immorality. Mauss suggests that in instances of fanaticism and group vendetta, 'normal' instincts of self-preservation and respect for human life become deranged. It would be interesting to engage in qualitative studies of such group

behavior to determine the mechanisms by which 'normal' behavior derails, especially in the context of the three dimensions of the total social fact. What social factors trigger a lynching, for example? What are the participants experiencing subjectively? And what are they experiencing physiologically (one wonders how many of them vomit, experience diarrhea and other unpleasant symptoms during such instances)? Present theories of collective behavior and movements do not always invoke anomie theory, and if they do, they do not invoke it as a total social fact. From a quantitative perspective, one wonders whether rates of lynching, riots and mob violence would correlate with other indicators of anomie.

Finally, perhaps the most fascinating aspect of anomie that Mauss illuminates is the link to voodoo. In essence, Mauss was describing what has come to be known as the self-fulfilling prophecy effect with the caveat that it incorporates the societal, psychological and physiological dimensions. Anomie is demoralizing. It leads one to believe that one will die before one's time. It is interesting that in *Suicide*, Durkheim defines suicide in terms of *knowing* or believing one shall die (which Mauss considers equivalent), *not* intending death.[68] Scores of contemporary commentators have misread Durkheim's definition as implying intention. But Durkheim's followers were steadfast in insisting that he meant that in suicide one *knows* but does not necessarily intend that one shall die in the near future.[69] Durkheim specifically rejected the possibility of knowing our intentions because we can be mistaken concerning our motives due to the unconscious and other factors.[70] But it is possible to *know* that our acts should eventually produce death. Of course, this led Durkheim to claim that suicide is not an isolated case of monstrous phenomena, but merely 'the exaggeration of common practices' that form a continuum of self-destructive behaviors.[71] In the language of Mauss, Durkheim is saying that in anomic suicide (which is the 'true' suicide) one gives up on life, and regardless of the exact method one chooses in dying — direct or indirect, fast or slow — the subjective belief that life is over contributes to the organism's physiological death. And this subjective belief, in turn, has been influenced by society's demoralizing effects.

Studies of wartime morale and its relationship to casualties of all kinds, including 'acidents', would be illuminating in this regard. In the many studies of Nazi concentration camp survivors, none have approached the Holocaust as an instance of anomie, much less anomie as a total social fact. It would be important to know how the survivors maintained their morale psychologically and physiologically despite the rupture of their social worlds. And how did they restore morale in their lives after the Holocaust? But even the more mundane kinds of morale or the lack of it in sports, one's job, family or group would be interesting to relate to symptoms of stress. What is the

quality of morale of individuals who engage in communal or private self-abuse characterized by the immoderate consumption of drugs? Or of individuals who are accident prone? And what are the social origins of demoralization? These are important and fascinating questions that have not yet been linked to anomie theory.

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NOTES

* The research for this paper was supported by a Fellowship from the National Endowment for the Humanities, for which I am deeply grateful. I would also like to express my apreciation to M. Philippe Besnard for his helpfulness at the Maison des Sciences de l'Homme in Paris, and to the reference librarians at Lander College: Ann Hare, Betty Williams, and Susan Going.

1. Stjepan G. Meštrović, 'Durkheim's renovated rationalism and the idea that "collective life is only made of representations"', *Current Perspectives in Social Theory*, vol. 6, 1985, pp. 199–218. For example, Emile Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, New York, Free Press, [1912] 1965, pp. 31–2, writes: 'The rationalism which is imminent in the sociological theory of knowledge is thus midway between the classical empiricism and apriorism' and 'thus renovated, the theory of knowledge seems destined to unite the opposing advantages of the two rival theories.' Célestin Bouglé, *The French Conception of 'Culture Générale' and Its Influences Upon Instruction*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1938, p. 22, refers specifically to Durkheim's 'renovated rationalism' such that it was 'a rationalism impregnated with positivism'.

2. For discussions, see Philippe Besnard, *The Sociological Domain: The Durkheimians and the Founding of French Sociology*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982; Célestin Bouglé, *op. cit.*; André Lalande, *Vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie*, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, [1926] 1980, pp. 920–2; Allan Janik and Stephen Toulmin, *Wittgenstein's Vienna*, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1973; S. Meštrović, *op. cit.*, Stjepan G. Meštrović, *In the Shadow of Plato: Durkheim and Freud on Suicide and Society*, Doctoral dissertation, Syracuse University, 1982; Robert A. Strikwerda, *Emile Durkheim's Philosophy of Science: Framework for a New Social Science*, Doctoral dissertation, University of Notre Dame, 1982. Thus, Emile Durkheim, *The Rules of Sociological Method and Selected Texts on Sociology and Its Method*, New York, Free Press, [1895] 1982, p. 34, writes: 'We had expressly stated and reiterated in every way possible that social life was made up entirely of representations'.

3. Stjepan G. Meštrović and Hélène M. Brown, 'Durkheim's concept of anomie as dérèglement', *Social Problems*, vol. 33, 1985, pp. 81–99.

4. Richard A. Hilbert, 'Anomie and the moral regulation of reality: the Durkheimian tradition in modern relief', *Sociological Theory*, vol. 2, 1986, pp. 14–39.

5. Anthony Flew, *Thinking About Social Thinking: The Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, New York, Basil Blackwell, 1986; David Sylvan and Barry Glassner, *A Rationalist Methodology for the Social Science*, New York, Basil Blackwell, 1986; Roger Trigg, *Understanding Social Science*, New York, Basil Blackwell, 1985; Paul Riesman, *Freedom in Fulani Social Life: An Introspective Ethnography*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1977.

6. Marcel Mauss, *Sociology and Psychology*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, [1950] 1979.

7. Marcel Mauss, *Oeuvres*, Paris, Les Editions de Minuit, 1969, pp. 269–302. See also S. Meštrović, 1982, *op. cit.*

8. In Emile Durkheim, *Sociology and Philosophy*, New York, Free Press, [1898] 1974, pp. 1–34.

9. In Robert N. Bellah, *Emile Durkheim on Morality and Society*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1973, pp. 144–66.

10. Emile Durkheim, [1912] 1965, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, New York, Free Press.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 489.

12. Emile Durkheim, *The Division of Labor in Society*, New York, Free Press, [1893] 1933, pp. 357–73, wherein he charges that social scientists, in particular, 'proceed with their investigations as if the different orders of facts they study constituted so many independent worlds'. See also his attack on intellectual anomie in Emile Durkheim, *Pragmatism and Sociology*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983.

13. Mauss [1950] 1979, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 25.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 20.

16. Ferdinand de Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics*, New York, Philosophical Library, [1912] 1965, p. 6.

17. P. Doroszewski, 'Quelque remarques sur les rapports de la sociologie et de la linguistique', *Journal de Psychologie*, vol. 30, 1932, pp. 82–91; Antoine Meillet, *Linguistique historique et linguistique générale*, Paris, Champion, 1982. This epistemological point is discussed in A. Cortese and S. Meštrović, 'From Durkheim to Habermas: the role of language in moral theory', paper presented to the American Sociological Association, Chicago, 1987.

18. Robert Hertz, *Death and the Right Hand*, Aberdeen, Cohen and West, [1909] 1960.

19. Mauss [1950] 1979, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 54.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 13.

22. An insight also made recently by Daniel O'Keefe, *Stolen Lightning: The Social Theory of Magic*, New York, Random House, 1982, pp. 296–310, wherein he observes that 'Mauss' argument contains the hint that voodoo death is the primitive phenomenon that precedes suicide and that suicide in modern society takes the place of voodoo death'. He elaborates: 'The mystery of suicide in advanced societies, and of voodoo death in primitive societies, is perhaps a key to understanding the magical nature of the self' and concedes that 'in an important sense, Durkheim is right . . . suicide . . . is a "something" that "gets" you'.

23. Mauss [1950] 1979, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

24. Besnard, *op. cit.*, has recently outlined their works, but has not pursued this line of analysis. However, it is evident from his observations, as well as from reading their reviews in *L'Année Sociologique*, that the works of most of the Durkheimians are cross-disciplinary. Several works are such extraordinary examples of approaching phenomena from the perspective of totality, that they shall be noted here: Maurice Halbwachs, *The Collective Memory*, New York, Harper & Row, [1950] 1980, treats memory as a social, psychological and physiological problem simultaneously. Maurice Halbwachs, *Esquisse d'une psychologie des classes sociales*, Paris, Colin, [1938] 1964, is a brilliant analysis of the 'social psychology' of values. Célestin Bouglé, *Chez les prophètes socialistes*, Paris, Alcan, 1918, includes a philosophical comparison and contrast of Durkheimianism and Marxism that touches on many of these issues. Stefan Czarnowski, *Le Culte des héros et ses conditions sociales*, New York, Arno Press, [1919] 1975, approaches heroes as social 'totems'. Georges Davy, *Le Droit, l'idealisme et l'experience*, Paris, Alcan, 1922, approaches law specifically from the point of view of reconciling the object–subject debate. Henri Hubert, *The Rise of the Celts*, New York, Alfred Knopf, [1925] 1934, uses language to reconstruct the history of a dead civilization!

25. Maurice Halbwachs, *Morphologie sociale*, Paris, Colin, [1938] 1970. Halbwachs approaches phenomena as diverse as religious intensity, the differences between the sexes, democracy, even birth and death, as being simultaneously biological, sociological, and psychological. He makes it clear from the beginning that his aim is to defend Durkheim's notion of the representation as a bridge between the idea and its 'material substratum'.

26. Marcel Mauss, *The Gift*, New York, Harper & Row, [1925] 1967.

27. Henri Hubert and Marcel Mauss, *Sacrifice: Its Nature and Function*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, [1898] 1964, p. 97, write: 'But if sacrifice is so complex, whence comes its unity? It is because, fundamentally, beneath the diverse forms it takes, it always consists . . . in establishing a means of communication between the sacred and the profane worlds'. Thus, sacrifice is an example of totality *par excellence*. It is no surprise that Durkheim placed a great deal of importance on this work, writing in a letter to Henri Hubert that sacrifice 'c'est là une notion fondamentale qui a joué un rôle capital dans l'évolution des moeurs et des idées. L'école anthropologique n'en a pas saisi toute l'importance, précisément parce qu'elle n'en a pas vu la nature sociale' (unpublished letter of 5 June 1898, courtesy of M. Besnard).

28. Henri Hubert and Marcel Mauss, *A General Theory of Magic*, New York, Norton, [1904] 1972.

29. Meštrović and Brown, *op. cit.*

30. For example, Emile Durkheim, *Socialism and Saint-Simon*, Yellow Springs, Antioch Press, [1928] 1958, p. 240, accuses the Saint-Simonians of promoting anomie because they 'wanted to get the most from the least, the superior from the inferior, moral rule from economic matter'. This is the basis of his entire critique of economic and political anomie. Thus, in *Professional Ethics and Civic Morals*, Greenwich, Greenwood Press, [1950] 1983, p. 109, he attacks classical democratic theory understood as will of the people' on the grounds that this 'will' is as unstable, infinite and indefinite in the political arena as it is in the economic.

31. André Lalande, 'Allocution pour le centenaire de la naissance d'Emile Durkheim', in *Annales de l'Université de Paris*, 1960, p. 23, reports that Durkheim was so enamored with Schopenhauer's *The World as Will and Idea* that his students nicknamed him 'Schopen'. It seems to me that Durkheim's version of *homo duplex*, especially in his 1914 essay on that subject, is essentially a refraction of Schopenhauer's dualism between representations and the passionate, infinitely tyrannical 'will'. See Arthur Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Idea*, New York, AMS Press, [1818] 1977.

32. Emile Durkheim, *Suicide: A Study in Sociology*, New York, Free Press, [1897] 1951, pp. 271–326 *passim*.

33. *Ibid.* Durkheim argues that the suffering stems from the fact that in anomie the emancipated 'will' cannot be sated: 'Irrespective of any external regulatory force, our capacity for feeling is in itself an insatiable and bottomless abyss. . . . unlimited desires are insatiable by definition and insatiability is rightly considered a sign of morbidity . . . they cannot be quenched. Inextinguishable thirst is constantly renewed torture' (p. 247).

34. Maurice Halbwachs, *The Causes of Suicide*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, [1930] 1978, p. 314.

35. Leo Srole, 'Social integration and certain corollaries: an exploratory study', *American Sociological Review*, vol. 21, 1956, pp. 709–16.

36. It is important to note that this is a three-step process. Emile Durkheim, *Moral Education*, Glencoe, Free Press, [1925] 1961, p. 33 illustrates this well when he writes: 'Should the rules of conjugal morality lose their authority, should husband–wife obligations be less respected, should passions and appetites ruled by this sector of morality unleash themselves . . . such passions would entail a disillusionment which translates itself graphically into statistics of suicide'. In general, 'the notion of the infinite, then, appears only at those times when moral discipline has lost its ascendancy over man's will' (p. 43) — another echo of Schopenhauer. Society's 'dejection and pessimism [are] reflected in the curve of suicides' (p. 68).

37. Durkheim [1897] 1951, *op. cit.*, pp. 68–76.

38. Asenath Petrie, *Individuality in Pain and Suffering*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1967.

39. Hilbert, *op. cit.*

40. Durkheim [1897] 1951, *op. cit.*, p. 181, emphasis added.

41. *Ibid.*, p. 323.

42. *Ibid.*

43. Mauss [1950] 1979, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

44. Durkheim [1897] 1951, *op. cit.*, p. 257, my translation.
45. *Ibid.*, p. 257.
46. Mauss [1950] 1979, *op. cit.*, p. 14.
47. *Ibid.*, p. 24.
48. Durkheim [1897] 1951, *op. cit.*, p. 254.
49. *Ibid.*, p. 246.
50. *Ibid.*, p. 253, emphasis added.
51. *Ibid.*, pp. 256–7.
52. Richard A. Dodder and Doris J. Astle, 'A methodological analysis of Srole's nine item anomia scale', *Multivariate Behavioral Research*, vol. 15, 1981, pp. 329–334; Jack P. Gibbs, 'Testing the theory of status integration and suicide rates', *American Sociological Review*, vol. 47, 1982, pp. 227–37; Eugen Schoenfeld, 'Integration and anomia: a re-examination', paper presented to the Southern Sociological Society, Memphis, Tennessee, 1982.
53. Durkheim [1897] 1951, *op. cit.*, p. 209, writes: 'So we reach the general conclusion: suicide varies inversely with the degree of integration of the social groups of which the individual forms a part.'
54. For reviews of the use of the concept of 'integration' in relation to Durkheim's formulation see Jack Douglas, *The Social Meanings of Suicide*, Princeton, 1967 and Stjepan Meštrović and Barry Glassner, 'A Durkheimian hypothesis on stress', *Social Science and Medicine* vol. 17, no. 18, 1983, pp. 1315–27.
55. Durkheim [1897] 1951, *op. cit.*, p. 117 writes 'that day favors suicide because this is the time of most active existence, when human relations cross and recross, when social life is most intense' and on p. 119: 'Thus everything proves that if daytime is the part of the twenty-four hours most favorable to suicide, it is because it is also the time when social life is at its height. . . . the mere lengthening of the days seems to offer wider latitude to collective life.' With regard to women, Durkheim writes on p. 299 'If women kill themselves much less often than men, it is because they are much less involved than men in collective existence; thus they feel its influence — good or evil — less strongly.'
56. Durkheim [1912] 1965, *op. cit.*, p. 354. In general, Durkheim was a pessimist who believed that the advance of the division of labor brings less happiness. See also Durkheim [1893] 1933, *op. cit.*, p. 249.
57. Durkheim [1897] 1951, *op. cit.*, p. 151.
58. Marcel Mauss, *Seasonal Variations of the Eskimo: A Study in Social Morphology*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, [1950] 1979, p. 77.
59. Halbwachs [1930] 1978, *op. cit.*, p. 319.
60. In Myrna Weissman, *Community Surveys of Psychiatric Disorders*, New Brunswick, Rutgers University Press, 1986, pp. 65–76.
61. Hans Selye, *Stress Without Distress*, Philadelphia, Lippincott, 1974, p. 17.
62. Hans Selye, *The Stress of Life*, New York, Harper & Row, 1978, p. 64.
63. Meštrović and Glassner, *op. cit.*
64. Discussed in Stjepan Meštrović, 'A sociological conceptualization of trauma', *Social Science and Medicine*, vol. 21, 1985, pp. 835–48.
65. Walter Cannon, *The Wisdom of the Body*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1963, p. 313.
66. Meštrović and Brown, *op. cit.*
67. Durkheim [1950] 1983, *op. cit.*, in the sense that political and economic anomie constitute a 'public danger' because they cause such great suffering to the unsuspecting public.
68. Durkheim [1897] 1951, *op. cit.*, p. 44 writes: 'The term suicide is applied to all cases of death resulting directly or indirectly from a positive or negative act of the victim himself, which he *knows* will produce this result' (emphasis added). This passage is discussed at length in Meštrović 1982, *op. cit.* In addition, Durkheim's understanding of unconscious motivation is discussed in Stjepan G. Meštrović, 'Durkheim's concept of the unconscious', *Current Perspectives in Social Theory*, vol. 5, 1984, pp. 267–88.
69. See especially Maurice Halbwachs [1930] 1978, *op. cit.*, p. 291 wherein he writes: 'Durkheim did not say, "the act accomplished by the victim with the intention or prospect of putting himself to death". Often it is impossible for us to

scrutinize intentions.' And on p. 294: 'We notice that when Durkheim defines suicide as an act which the victim knows must produce death, he does not say that this act is voluntary.'

70. Durkheim [1897] 1951, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

71. *Ibid.*, pp. 45–6.

BOOK REVIEWS

Racial Attitudes in America: Trends and Interpretations *Howard Schuman, Charlotte Steeh, and Lawrence Bobo* Harvard University Press/Social Science Research Council Committee on Social Indicators 1985 259pp. £18.95.

This is a good book in two respects: it addresses an important subject and it is a model of clarity for the presentation and evaluation of survey data. The first chapter offers an excellent discussion of the key points in the history of the last 100 years of race relations in America and makes that history accessible to Europeans.

The second chapter discusses the sources and nature of the data which the rest of the book explores. The National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago, the University of Michigan's Institute for Social Research and the Gallup Organization are the three sources of the survey data examined. Time series data, stretching from 1942, on attitudes to racial integration and government policy to promote integration has been combed to locate 32 questions which have been asked more than once and at points more than a couple of years apart. The reasons for retaining these items from the total pool of survey data on racial attitudes are given in an appendix.

The bulk of the book examines the ways in which racial attitudes have changed, and the evidence suggests that they have changed considerably. In 1942, only 32 per cent of white Americans thought that black and white children should attend the same schools. By 1982, 9 out of every 10 were in favour of integrated education. The social characteristics correlated with a pro-integration view were what one would expect. Northerners with a lot of education were more pro-integration than Southerners with little education but the direction and rate of change is similar for the various groups.

What is important is that while attitudes towards matters of *principle* show a steady and general shift towards racial tolerance and pro-integration positions, attitudes towards the role of government in *implementing* integration policies have not moved at the same pace; and, in some cases, they have not even moved in the same direction. Since the 1960s, there has been a decline in white American support for forced integration. While Southern whites had always been unenthusiastic about forced integration (the percentage favouring it varying between 20 per cent and 30 per cent between 1964 and 1978), the response of Northern whites to the question 'Do you think the government in Washington should see to it that white and black children go to the same schools, or stay out of this matter as it is not its business?' shifted from over 50 per cent in favour of intervention in 1966 to 28 per cent in 1978. Only in the cases of restaurants and other public accommodations, where interaction is relatively transient and impersonal, is there evidence of steady and increasing support for government action to implement policy.

The lack of enthusiasm for government action to turn principle into reality might be explained by a general reluctance to encourage state intervention; but such an explanation is not supported by the available evidence which suggests that, in other important areas of life, white Americans are quite happy to see increased state intervention.

This book is a model of the presentation for survey research data. At every stage the limitations of the material are honestly and interestingly discussed. I was fascinated to know that telephone interviews, where the respondent cannot be sure of the race of the questioner, produce more pro-integration sentiments than do the traditional face-to-face interviews. But in the end it is the limitations of survey research which caused my frustration

with the work. A number of competing explanations for the willingness of white Americans to accept the principles of integration, but not the need for government enforcement, are discussed but the discussion is bound to go nowhere. Survey questionnaires do not tell us enough about the respondents and their interpretive procedures to be able to understand their reasonings, their values and their motives. Seeing someone's photograph is not the same as knowing that person. But this book is an excellent collection of photographs.

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Ethnic Groups in Conflict *Donald L. Horowitz* London: University of California Press 1985 697pp. £21.25

In recent years I have seen three major texts in the field of 'comparative ethnic relations'. The most recent, my concern here, is Donald Horowitz's *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*; in 1983 Michael Banton's *Racial and Ethnic Competition* was published and in 1978 Richard Schermerhorn's *Comparative Ethnic Relations* was given a second printing. They share the ambition of writing comparatively, on a global scale, within a unified theoretical framework, about a class of phenomena referred to as 'racial and/or ethnic relations'. In my view the *scale* of comparison is *too* ambitious, the unified theory is destined to continue to escape us, and the class of phenomena is highly elusive. Schermerhorn's is the least instructive. He does define ethnic groups ('real or putative common ancestry etc.'). But he doesn't define 'ethnic relations'; perhaps he thinks it simply means relations between ethnic groups, whatever that would designate. Banton is much more helpful in that he not only works towards a definition of racial and ethnic groups (relatively unproblematic as a task), but also has some interesting things to say about the nature of the study of ethnic relations and racial relations. 'There is nothing' he writes 'in the relations between people considered to be of different race that cannot also be found in the relations between people considered to be of the same race'. He is quite sure that it is wrong to assume that '"race" (In Banton's later works 'race' has increasingly appeared in inverted commas) relations are a special kind of relations' (p. 76). And *I* am sure he is right about this. But, having concluded thus, I find it hard to understand why the Professor writes a book of 400 pages which is, essentially an attempt to develop a specific (rational choice) theory of a specific set of phenomena (racial and ethnic relations). But there is an answer of a kind, at least as regards 'racial relations' if not as regards 'ethnic relations'. For the distinguishing mark of 'racial relations' is the consciousness of race, 'the social use of phenotypical features as signs identifying group membership and the roles people are expected to play'. But my understanding of the non-specificity of racial relations is that where social relations are influenced by this kind of consciousness, it is only one of many influences and not necessarily the preponderant one. Social relations in American Negro slavery were not an instance of race relations; racial consciousness was an element of American slavery. A further difficulty in Banton's approach is that whilst race relations are given a definition (the social use of phenotypical features etc.) *ethnic relations* are not. Surely he would not fall back on the Schermerhorn solution of simply defining ethnic *groups* and taking for granted that we all understand what the study of intergroup relations entails. The term 'intergroup relations' is highly problematic.

One could try to fit 'ethnic relations' into the analogous model of Banton's 'racial relations' so that ethnic relations would become social relations 'influenced by consciousness of membership of a cultural group with some claim to control inclusion'. But as such it would suffer from the same deficiencies as the definition of 'racial relations'. For where social relations are influenced by ethnicity — i.e. a sense of ethnic inclusiveness — this is only one of a multitude of influences. The use of the terms ethnic or racial relations tempts us into the error of thinking that ethnic or racial conscious-

ness is the *defining* characteristic of the relationship that we are studying. Of course sometimes this is true; but books about race relations and ethnic relations by no means confine themselves to such a small minority of cases.

Even if we have got so far as defining racial groups and ethnic groups, and racial relations and ethnic relations, we are still entitled to ask another question: for, if racial relations, say, are posed as a sub-type of *social relations*, the phrase *social relation* is crying out for a sharper definition. It is hardly enough on its own to indicate what the subject matter is to be. Are social relations face to face, are they guided by norms as in the classical role theory formulations, are they interpersonal relations shaped by power and interest, and would they include economic relations understood as part of a determinate economic structure? It is notable that Banton spends much more time on the nature of the *explanans* than he does on the nature of the *explanandum*. Of course all the discussion of what racial groups *are* and what racial relations *are* contribute to a construction of what the *explanandum* is to be; but what I have said immediately above serves to show that this is not enough. What is it *about* so-called racial or ethnic relations that we seek to explain? The remarkable thing about Chapter Five, 'Theoretical approaches', is that it is a discussion (an interesting one) of various theories as if they were theories of the same thing. In other words the discussion of a series of different *explanans* proceeds on the assumption that they are all addressed to the same set of *explananda*. Clearly they are not.

Michael Banton does however give one very significant clue to what he considers to be the *explanandum* (of the study of racial — and by analogy — ethnic relations). It is indeed more than a clue, it is a positive formulation

> The long run 'problem' of 'race' relations is that of explaining how groups identified by such (racial) signs come to be created, how they are maintained, and how they are often dissolved.

Sociology, on this recipe, is the study of group formation and group identity, and of their maintenance and dissolution. The sociology of race relations or ethnic relations is the same as the above where the social groups are identified by racial signs or ethnic *significata*. The rest of the book is the advancing and exposition of the claim that the best *explanans* for this type of 'group formation, group identity etc.' is a version of methodological individualism called rational choice theory. On the virtues of such an approach I have nothing to say here. But even if I were convinced of the power of rational choice theory to explain what 'actors' do I would retain all the doubts about what the theory is purporting to explain that I have outlined above.

When I first read Horowitz's *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* I started with a similar scepticism about the grander scale of theorising about 'ethnic relations' but found that I was gradually being disarmed. Part of the reason for this is that, despite the generality of the title, Horowitz's claims are actually considerably more modest than some of his predecessors in that he has circumscribed his chosen class of phenomena considerably more narrowly than, say, Michael Banton. The arguments become more compact and empirically grounded when a limited range of cases are eligible for comparison. The bases of inclusion in his study are established early in Chapter One (p. 16 ff 'The scope of the comparison'): the societies studied are (1) States that became independent after World War II, in Asia, Africa and the Caribbean; (2) Cases where the ethnic groups in a divided society do not stand in a clear hierarchical relationship to each other; (3) the ethnic groups involved are relatively large, being groups implicated in national politics (rather than much smaller regional peoples); and (4) The groups are ascriptively defined whether by colour, appearance, language or religion. He acknowledges that some of these defining characteristics may not be strictly ascriptive (a person may change his religious identity) but argues that, in the developing world, religion is essentially a matter of ascription. This is a quite radical delimitation of comparative cases

excluding, as it does, all ethnic group conflict in the developed world (e.g. in the USA, Canada, UK, etc.) or in 'ranked situations such as white dominance in South Africa'.

Thus the subject matter of Horowitz's illustrative discussions is to be found in such African societies as Nigeria, Uganda, or Kenya where 'tribal', regional and religious points of division retain their political strength even though (or perhaps *because*) no single group is unambiguously identified with a dominance in wealth and/or power. Outside of Africa the examples upon which he frequently draws are Malaysia, Guyana, Fiji, Sri Lanka and India. Malaysia and Fiji are examples of countries where an immigrant group (the Chinese in Malaysia, the Indians in Fiji) has achieved a measure of economic mobility in the modern sector, whilst the land and, to some extent, political power, has remained in the hands of the sons of the soil (Malays in Malaysia, Fijians in Fiji). This is the classic grist to the Horowitz mill; where class, power and ethnicity are arranged in an overlapping and interlocking pattern. So the reader should be prepared for the fact that the substantive materials of this book are not those most readily associated with 'ethnic conflict'. The reader will learn a good deal about Guyana, Sri Lanka and Malaysia, three of the author's most oft-used examples. But the curious thing about the author's decision to concentrate upon 'unranked systems' is the importance he attaches to 'disproving' class theories of ethnic conflict. Excluding discussion of societies where ethnic divisions coincide relatively closely with class divisions is hardly the most convincing way of addressing this issue. In fact the whole confrontation with the issue of class is thoroughly unsatisfactory, especially since he appears not to understand the Marxist analysis to which he is addressing himself. The ominous sign is that the discussions of Marxism are built around page references to Dahrendorf. There are two obvious indications of his failure to understand social class. One is the fact that he treats classes as real social groups as if they were one alternative form of affiliation — and he imagines that Marx understood classes in this way. The second is that he suggests that Marx wrote of class position as an 'inherited and inescapable fate' which the very fact of social mobility would disprove. This notion of class (in Marxist writing) as an ascribed form of social affiliation fixed at birth is so contrary to actual Marxist class analysis that it invalidates long tracts of Horowitz's argument from about p. 89 onwards.

Not quite so devastating in its effect is the confusion over the term ethnic group. The early part of the book is refreshingly practical, cautious and sensible in reaching towards a working definition of ethnic groups (p. 41 ff.). Central to his conception of ethnic groups are a belief in common ancestry, the use of a set of basically ascriptive social characteristics, and a kin-like sense of union which goes beyond kin boundaries. Now presumably the ethnic group would only include those individuals who have the 'chance' to belong to such a group *and* seize the opportunity. What, for example, would be make of a Malay in Malaysia who actively suppresses his Malay identity? But, despite the cautious definition, Horowitz later in the book drops all caution about the ambiguous boundaries of ethnic group life and speaks monolithically of, say, the Malays in Malaysia. I did not see any extended discussion of ethnic identity on the individualist model (how does the individual actor mobilize his/her ethnic identity — if at all) as against the corporate model where ethnic groups are seen as an inescapable dimension of group membership and the group is seen to have a certain corporate or 'group' existence. This difficulty is indeed, in my view, characteristic of the whole field of study of ethnic relations.

Some of the best passages in Horowitz's book are the extended discussions of individual cases or the detailed comparison of two. This is not to scorn the comparative effort but, of course, it does depend ultimtely on the quality of the case studies. Horowitz and Banton have absorbed scores of these and have set out to integrate the understanding of them. But the grand-scale comparative

sociologist is not in control of the materials and yet tends to treat all 'reports' as equally valid. The more the reader knows of a particular area or case, the less satisfactory the abbreviated exemplificatory reference seems. This is bound to be the more so in Michael Banton's work because of the wider ambit of his cases.

Whereas Banton is very explicit about his theoretical approach, I did not find it easy to see just what Horowitz believes the crucial motive forces (in promoting ethnic conflict) to be. It is apparent from his secondary analysis of 'ethnic politics' (which is a most stimulating and valuable part of the work) that he sees external circumstances (the demographic mix, the historical disposition of land and labour along ethnic lines) as powerful constraints. But he also comes from the bottom looking up (like Banton) at the strategic choices which individuals make (in circumstances not of their choosing) as they calculate the gains and losses. Thus a voter in a party system structured along ethnic lines perfectly well understands the gains that *could* be made by casting a vote for a party — if it existed — which downplayed purely ethnic appeals and stressed a universalistic programme of reform. But the risk is too great. In a zero-sum ethnic game he risks losing all if he fails to add his one vote to the party which, for all its faults, promises to remain faithful to 'his people'. The difference between Banton and Horowitz is that Banton has conducted an intellectual experiment to see how far he can get by hypothesizing that such rational choices explain much, most or all of what people do. It is rationalist methodological individualism at its barest; it reaps all the gains and incurs all the losses known to accompany this approach, as documented in sociological texts of theory and method. Horowitz by contrast is much *more* impressed by the sheer force of the 'irrational' attachment to the group itself, an argument that tends to the tautological in the explanation of ethnicity (people belong to groups, their group identities are important, they seek to preserve them). It is in Chapter Four (p. 143 ff.) that Horowitz develops what seems to be his central hypothesis, that people come to invest a great deal materially and, above all, social psychologically, in group attachments; that these are sustained and psychologically reinforced by the human habit of group comparison; that ethnic attachments are rooted in kinship and this explains their power and passion; and thus people go to what appear to be extraordinary lengths to preserve and strengthen these group identities and everything implied by them.

At this point Horowitz and Banton come full circle and join hands. For, at the very root of their sociologies, is an extraordinarily simple (some would say dated) conceptualization of our subject matter. People belong to 'groups', they assume social roles in the contexts of these groups, and they learn to value and adhere to identities which invoke a corporate (or at least collective) life beyond their own. In a hundred and one cases Banton seeks to explain these attachments by showing how, in the eyes of actors, to do so is — or is not — rational. Horowitz is less convinced of the rationality of the process, placing more faith in the social psychological process which reinforce collective identities, but his approach remains based on the same conception of society as composed of groups and, more abstractly, roles, and a conception of social process as being one of group formation and dissolution.

All this says little *directly* about why I remain sceptical about this scale of comparative effort. But my implied arguments are not difficult to discern; the theory which explains too much explains too little; the conceptualization of sociology as the study of group formation and identity is irretrievably formalistic; and the wider the inclusiveness of the conceptualization, the greater the risk of trivialization. But my strongest reservation is the one which Michael Banton appeared to have espied and then neglected. That is, that 'ethnicity' and 'racial consciousness' are *aspects* of social relations and social structures which are defined more profoundly and more tellingly in other terms — and you can't have a sociology of aspects.

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Sovereign Individuals of Capitalism
Nicholas Abercrombie, Stephen Hill, and Bryan S. Turner Allen & Unwin London 1986 211pp. £22.20 (£7.95 paper)

This book is in the same vein as the authors' previous collective effort, *The Dominant Ideology Thesis* (1981). It is provocative and wide-ranging, identifying ambiguities and dogmatism in how sociologists have understood the notion of individualism and its supposed connections to capitalism, both theoretically and historically. More generally, as a way of approaching the substantive issues, Abercrombie, Hill and Turner develop some interesting thoughts on the relation between discourses, society and economic forms. *Sovereign Individuals of Capitalism* thus has the virtues of a stimulating and racy critique.

But it has some of the faults too. Stylistically, its main claims are too often unhelpfully grandiose. Substantively, they are sometimes no more than half-established. *The Dominant Ideology Thesis* was an important article fleshed out into a book. This book by contrast contains many topics, terms, and critiques which could do with considerably more elaboration in that nearly every sub-discussion feels dangerously brief. In places this lends itself to succinct summary, for instance the commentary on the classic sociologists' views on individualism, or the analysis of the changing location of the confessional from medieval to modern society. There are however some alarming truncations. The rise of the novel is heralded as a prime indicator of the long-run process of 'the Discovery of the Individual', but it gets only one and a half pages of treatment. The 'Uniqueness of the West' likewise. The question of whether any or all of capitalism, market society and wage labour was significant in medieval times is handled with inadequate referencing to the complicated historiographical issues and evidence. This kind of whistle stop tour of relevant debates seldom wholly justifies the sweeping (and usually negative) generalisations that hang on it.

Lack of space, though, is not the real problem, since the authors spend much time referring to previous works, or setting up what they will be saying later, or reminding us of what is supposed to have been established. In this they follow a regrettable tendency in recent social theory texts. Meanwhile, several central discussions require fuller and more careful development. For example, for a topic of considerable contemporary interest, there is relatively little conceptual work on the terms self, individual, person, subject, and all the 'isms' which accompany them. True, there are important distinctions made between 'the Discovery of the Individual' (the long-run cultural process of emphasising unique personal attributes), individualism (egoistic social philosophy), and individuation (the emergence of techniques of identification and surveillance). Each of these reveals different and often ambiguous connections to capitalist development in the west, and this is well brought out. Some of the classifications in play, however, look more idiosyncratic. When they pay close attention to the various 'discourses of the individual', for example, the authors single out anarchism, socialism, individuality and individualism. Each of these is handled very briefly (anarchism and socialism are almost run together), and little rationale is offered for the nature of the categories. Are these discourses meant to be explicit traditions and postulates? If so, where is liberalism? And if so, what is individuality doing there, since it refers to a much more opaque cultural formation of self-referential experience and cultivation? In any case, Lukács once made a seminal series of links between the 'internal' process of representation and reflection and the brasher, out-in-the-world egoism of individualism. Though Goldmann (who took over this theoretical line from Lukács) is mentioned several times in the text, opportunities properly to analyse such connections are missed.

As to the principal claim of the book, the authors want to say that there is no necessary connection between capitalism and individualism. This is shown by reference to the separate origins of the two phenomena, and by their current dissonance in advanced (especially

Japanese) capitalism. But, following another fashion of dubious worth, the authors conclude that such connections as there are must therefore be *merely* contingent. This construction of a polarity between pure necessity and mere contingency is surely questionable, and not only from a Lukácsian point of view, though, again, he had interesting things to say about the dilemma-generating structure of such dichotomies. It is argued that the view that there is an intrinsic, logical, or definitional relationship between individualism and capitalism is mistaken. But who holds this view? Did Marx or Weber really say this? By contrast, the authors' alternative appears to endorse the idea that doctrines and social organisation just happen to flit in and out of each other's historical ambiance. At best this is an extreme extrapolation, at worst a hostage to irrationalism. As sociologists, Abercrombie, Hill and Turner are too serious to be led very far by this kind of debilitating polarity; yet time and again when it comes to weighing up what the book is doing, the overall message is puffed up into the affirmation of such a dualism: either an essentialism is posited, or there is nothing but contingency.

The detailed positions are less gestural, but tend somewhat to compromise the general framework as a consequence. From the fact that corporate capitalism today is non-individualistic, it does not follow that no form of 'elective affinity' between individualism and early capitalism can be asserted. Nor does it follow from the separate origins of the two halves of the equation that over a long-run period relations between the two must ever and only be seen as fortuitous. The authors say that 'in the early modern period they collide and for a while shape each other' (p. 2). This indeed is to take the broad view, but against the run of the prose, they are very much committed to the importance of this collision, and the off-hand tone undermines the positive short-run explanations. In fact, the authors end up supporting most of the associations which are customarily asserted: individualism (though not in its narrow, doctrinal sense) was a significant part of the logic of de-tribalisation, urbanisation, legal rationality, and generalised commodification (pp. 71, 171–2). What they are really doing is questioning the exact causal links, refining the periodisation, and charting the contemporary diversion of capitalism from individualism. These are worthy tasks, and the authors contribute to them. But contrary to what is implied, many of the traditional issues remain unresolved, and no new framework of explanation is evident. Indeed, in spite of the confident tone, there seems to be considerable hesitancy about the object and purpose of sociological explanation. On the one hand, the emphasis on pure contingency is paraded and the merest hint of teleology decried. This is fine, but tends to leave very little that is in need of explanation. On the other hand, the idea of a functional dependency is progressively constructed in which, it is allowed, individualism constitutes the *form* of capitalism. One problem here is that for theorists of contingency, the essence/form metaphor, which is summoned up in this formulation, undercuts the bent of the discussion. Another is the argument that particular discourses and forms of economic organisation, such as individualism and capitalism, enter into a functional circle only *after* they have become dominant (p. 190). But this is a highly implausible and static solution: how convenient that a functional dependence should be struck between two forms of life which appear just to arrive on the scene as 'dominant'!

This suggestion of inexplicability is curtailed when the more interesting and dynamic notion of a functional *spiral* between ideas and society is posited. A parallel is developed between Toulmin's evolutionary theory of scientific concepts and the nature of socially dominant discourses. It cannot be said that these issues are either resolved in themselves or re-united with the substantive questions in a conclusive way, but for me this is the best part of the book, partly because difficult matters are being treated in an open way. Otherwise, if we take as a check-list the problems itemised on pp. 28–32, the book cannot be said to have fulfilled its programme. These are: the problem of periodisation; the necessity of the con-

nection between individualism and capitalism, the definition of capitalism; the political purchase of individualism; the relegation between beliefs and behaviour; and the importance of social classes. In my view, only the first and fourth of these are dealt with to convincing effect.

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Stages of Identity: A Study of Actors
Sharon Mast Gower 1986 217pp. £17.50

In a study of dramatic actors' 'acting' socially, qualms concerning the dramatic metaphor being turned back on itself are inevitable. Interactionist theory does appear to come into its own here with the phenomenon dictating the theory most appropriate to its analysis. Thus there is a pleasing irony in the emerging truism that 'Dramatic reality . . . is . . . socially constructed'.

A further qualm might be whether interactionism indulges the self-regarding nature of the acting profession too much? But Sharon Mast argues that the theoretical standpoint is appropriate given the special problems of identity construction facing the actor; at the same time she remains aware that the actor's skills in impression management could exacerbate the standard methodological problem of subject concealment or distortion.

The study focuses on three areas: the transformation of personal identity which occurs in drama school; the negotiation of both dramatic and everyday reality which goes on in a fringe theatre group; and the problems of sustaining an occupational identity in television production.

Audition for drama school involves intuitively seeking the innate qualities of the actor which can be developed with training. Paradoxically, once in school, to avoid being typecast and thereby limit their range of dramatic roles the student must play down this 'magical' ability to 'arrest attention' and present more 'fluid, neutral or muted' personal identities. Moreover this presentation of uniformity is essential for the co-operative teamwork needed for dramatic production.

Lying behind the pedagogic ideology of the school is the notion that the self must change if one is to acquire the occupational identity of the actor. It is such a radical re-socialisation process that a crisis point in training arises when students feel that their own identity is jeopardised. Mast sees this as an experiential, non-cognitive attainment of self-awareness which eventually demystifies both the work and the teacher so that '. . . by learning to evaluate their own work, students learn a firm grasp of the occupational world which was once alien and exotic'. In the end there is such a fine line between staged emotions and personal feelings that the possibility of the manipulation of one's own and others' emotions is raised. 'Performance' becomes a habit that actors find hard to break.

With a 'power-sharing' director conducting rehearsals which incorporated interpretive discussion, the work of the fringe theatre company entails creative characterisation rather than mere reproduction. The script becomes only a framework around which dramatic reality gets constructed and the full meaning of the play can only be realised in production. Conflict between participants is avoided since cooperation takes place *through* their characters.

Unsurprisingly, acting for television requires the subordination of the actor to the technical and organisational demands of television production. Extensive pre-planning precludes much interpretive work by actors. The script has to be seen as fixed and unproblematic by the time it gets to the actor. Typecasting becomes fairly inevitable since it offers a safe bet for the production team, although it necessarily limits the actor's personal rewards in terms of character discovery. This giving rise to actors executing a scripted role in an independent way without generating and developing it in interaction with others — all encapsulated in the lovely expression: 'co-ordinated autism'.

Mast concludes that the socialisation process necessitates the objectification of the actor's self and body; and in learning the characterisation of others' selves and bodies, they too get objectified. The

career path for acting offers no clear pattern apart from the need to present valid retrospective and prospective biographies to those with the power to give work. An angle which could have been pursued in more depth to take account of the nature of power and status relations in the acting profession and the media industry.

The culminating theoretical discussion criticizes the dramatic analogy itself on the grounds that it is built upon an audience perspective of the actor's goals. The potential contribution to dramaturgy offered here, however, suffers from trying to cover too much conceptual ground in such a short space. For example, the notion of motives as linguistic statements is peremptorily rejected in favour of a rather brief consideration of the variety of levels of awareness possible concerning 'motivated acts' and how this bears on authentic characterisation. None the less, one could hardly disagree with the conclusion that when employing dramaturgy more emphasis should be put on actors than on roles and on interpretive scenarios than immutable scripts.

Ultimately my initial qualms were slightly justified in the impression that Mast appears to forget that dramaturgy is only a metaphor in the social world and as such has more heuristic than explanatory value. Yet there can be no denying the explanatory power of this study itself. Despite extensive developments in cultural studies and in the sociology of film, there exists no adequate sociology of theatre nor of acting. This research offers a significant contribution toward the establishment of such a field and provides an excellent basis for further work; especially in the areas which are acknowledged to have been omitted — 'the large scale professional theatre, the film industry and (largest category of all) the un- or under-employed actor'.

Ron Iphofen
Coleg Harlech

Hare Krishna in America *E. Burke Rochford* Rutgers University Press 1985 305pp. $25.00 ($11.00 paper)

Motorists travelling along I-70 from New York to points west can hardly fail to notice a large billboard in West Virginia urging them to visit what has, in recent years, become the state's second largest tourist attraction — 'Prabhudpa's Palace' a major center of the International Society for Krishna Consciousness, popularly known as the Hare Krishna Society.

The story of its growth, recruitment practices, and social dynamics is the subject of this informative though disjointed work. In an opening chapter on 'fieldwork and membership' the author pleads to confusion about his own role when he moved from graduate student field analyst (1975), to convert (1976), then back to researcher (1979–81) and now (1985) to sympathetic author of a monograph about his former fellow believers at the Los Angeles 'New Dwarka' center. Even now he remains confused about the role of sociology (it promotes a 'cynical way of seeing and analyzing'), but has gone ahead with a traditional functional analysis anyway.

The meat of this study centers on questions about membership, conversion processes, sex roles, recruitment and finally about prophetic roles and dissension within the group. There is a wealth of information that Rochford has only been able to digest partially and the book deserved better guidance and editorial advice from the publisher because both the data and the author's unique status as believer-*cum*-sociologist should have yielded greater insights than what we have come to expect from most cult watchers. The work moves in too many directions at once; yet at the same time gives us too little social history, or insight into the interior lives of the Hare Krishna devotees.

The movement began in New York in 1965 when Sril Prabhupada came from Calcutta to spread the word of Krishna Consciousness to the western world. After he failed to gain a following among the elderly on the West Side of Manhattan he moved to the Lower East Side to sell his message to the emergent drug/youth culture. In 1967 he moved to the heart of America's consciousness-expanding country, the Haight-Ashbury District of San Francisco and during the

next two years converted between 150 and 200 to the banner of 'Hare Krishna' and the belief that one could 'stay high all the time, discover eternal bliss' without drugs. Those who came to him were young college dropouts adrift in the counter culture sea who tuned in to this guru. Most entered this ascetic and communal society after encountering the Hare Krishnas chanting and dancing in the streets. They came because the philosophy attracted them and because their initial contact with the devotees was warm and friendly.

By 1975 there were 30 centers spread throughout the USA. In the mid-1970s there was a decline in sect membership as the counter-culture wound down and the founder died. Prabhupada's death in 1977 precipitated a power struggle between the international governing board of the society and leading gurus some with peculiar western sounding titles such as Northwest Guru, Foreign Guru and Western Guru.

The book's last section deals with those disputes and briefly touches on the sect's international growth (forty-three centers in Europe and forty in Latin America by 1983). This final section is most suggestive for other researchers. Rochford has clearly struggled over his material for many years with considerable personal and professional anguish. Yet there are many missed opportunities in this study. For example, he tosses away (in an intriguing footnote) the fact that many members came into the society because they liked the vegetarian regime. A study of the eating habits of such sects might tell us a good deal about their appeal. It is a rare communal society that does not at some point in its history produce a cookbook just like the Ladies Aid Society. Why? And many groups had heated debates over the role of food (the Shakers for one) in their spiritual scheme.

Rochford is so interested in interactional analysis on a personal level that he virtually ignores the dispute between the gurus and the Governing Board Commission which reads like the struggle over spiritual authority that characterized both the early Christian settlements and the Avignon papacy. Scholars of contemporary religious movements will find much raw material here that should enlarge our understanding of the relationship between prophetic authority, modernization and religious belief.

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La Formation d'une Pensée Sociologique: la Société Polonaise de l'Entre-deux-guerres *Janina Markiewicz-Lagneau* Editions de la Maison des Sciences de l'Homme Paris 1982 345pp. n.p.

The only book on some subject is always the best book. The book on Polish sociology, by Professor Janina Markiewicz-Lagneau of the University of Paris, who died this year, is the only book that has appeared so far in any language on this subject. So it can be recommended to everyone who needs information on Polish sociology. There is a lot of information in this book, especially on the 1918–1948 period which determined the characteristics of this sociology. The information was collected carefully and with a knowledge of the subject which can be attained only by someone whose native language is the language of the culture studied. Moreover, the author has carefully classified the information in such a way as to make it possible to compare the development of Polish sociology with the development of sociology in other countries, though at the same time regarding it consistently as *science et conscience* (the author herself refers to this formula of R. Aron) of the society in which it originated. This gives food for thought to Polish sociologists, who have still not attempted such a synthesis, being content for the present with fragmentary presentations or rather general outlines of the whole. This can be useful reading for foreigners, who often imagine Polish sociology as a whole by analogy with two or three contemporary sociologists whom they met by chance at some conference or congress.

I am not saying, however, that J. Markiewicz-Lagneau's book is very good. This, unfortunately, cannot be said of

it, though it contains no errors and egregiously false statements. Firstly, it almost entirely ignores a number of noteworthy authors, among whom one of the most eminent is Ludwik Petrazycki. Secondly, with the exception of Znaniecki, who is rather well known in the world (not in France, to be sure), no author has been described in such a way that the reader could gain an insight into the degree of originality of his views. For example, Ludwik Krzywicki is mentioned in the book many times, but it is hard for the reader to understand what this scholar represented and what his level of scholarship was. Thirdly, the connection of sociology with the life of society has been shown rather schematically: the author, rather than analysing the connection whose existence she correctly notes, writes alternately about Polish sociology and about the history of Poland. It is not always clear whether the numerous historical digressions are supposed to explain something in the views professed in Poland or whether their aim is to supply the French reader with a certain amount of elementary information on how Poland differs from France, for example. I well understand the nature of the difficulties the author had to overcome in presenting Polish sociology to the contemporary reader. One of its peculiarities, for example, is the prominence of the nation, which in the sociology of many other countries plays a minor role.

I believe that the main source of these and similar weaknesses of the book reviewed was the wish to present the development of Polish sociology as comprehensively as possible. This was supposed to be a book in which the reader would find out almost everything: in what kind of society this sociology originated, what its most important interests and subjects were, what place it had among other sciences, the institutionalization of the discipline, what empirical studies were conducted and how they were financed, etc. This was certainly a laudable intention, but probably unfeasible. Such a history of sociology (and of any other discipline) has not yet been written and is not likely to be written. Limited books are generally written: about theory, about empirical studies, about institutionalization, about the connections of sociology with politics, etc. And that is how it probably must be.

In this book there is a bit of everything. Enough to interest the reader, but not enough to satisfy his interest.

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Class at Work: The Design, Allocation and Control of Jobs *C. R. Littler and G. Salaman* Batsford 1984 127pp. £6.95 (paper)

This book is part of Batsford's 'Work and Society in the Eighties' series, and it is primarily designed to be a textbook for industrial sociology and business studies courses. It also serves as a vehicle for some of the authors' own conceptual work much of which has already been published elsewhere.

The initial chapters deal with workplace and class based inequalities such as income and health, and at the macro level, the development of monopoly capitalism and its implications for the organisation of work. The discussion of the development of capitalism is the weakest being over-reliant on an uncritical use of Mandel's work and gives little impression of the debates in this area. The next chapter deals with the core issues of the book — the control of work. This covers the development of factories, the commodification of time and the shortcomings of conventional labour process theory in relation to managerial strategies and workplace consent. In chapter five the authors consider the design of jobs from Taylorism and Fordism to the contemporary vogue for quality circles. The next chapter on technology also deals with contemporary issues of robotics and flexible manufacturing systems. The book finishes with a brief discussion of Poulantzas and Wright on class theory, and the effects of the early 1980s recession on the labour process.

As a textbook Littler and Salaman's work treats contested issues fairly but critically and makes it clear where the

authors stand in the debates. However the text is not sufficiently comprehensive to be a textbook for an undergraduate course in industrial sociology. Wider debates and changes in industrial relations are largely ignored, as are the significant contributions of feminist research on the labour process. Nevertheless the book deserves a significant place on reading lists for being up to date on the debates it does cover and especially its coverage of new developments in the workplace. Most of all perhaps, its 'textbook value' lies in the straightforward writing and accessibility to non-specialists.

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Talcott Parsons and the Capitalist Nation-State: Political Sociology as a Strategic Vocation *William Buxton* University of Toronto Press 1985 331pp. £29.00 £11.50 (paper)

During a long, prolific and distinguished career Parsons translated *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* and was widely recognised as a, if not the, major American interpreter of Weber in particular and European social thought in general. One of my earliest impressions of Parsons was formed on the basis of reading Mills's 'translation' of *The Social System* and his argument that Parsons had betrayed the classic sociological tradition. To the extent that Buxton seeks to interpret the relationship between Parsons's social thought and advanced capitalist society, it represents an attempt to rescue Parsons from this famous critique. Thankfully there is much more to Parsons than *The Social System* and Buxton's revised doctoral thesis is a strong statement to this effect.

Buxton's point of departure is that hitherto both critics and sympathisers have assumed that Parsons was 'primarily a descriptive theorist who sought nothing more than to portray reality on a social-scientific canvas'. Buxton challenges this interpretation by claiming that he was an 'activist' thinker who was concerned to 'change, shape and transform social and political life through his own intellectual efforts'.

This lengthy and well-written book is divided into three parts. In Part I Buxton traces the early development of Parsons's thought partly in relation to his liberal Calvinist upbringing and more importantly with reference to his appreciation of European social theory. According to Buxton this led Parsons to define sociology as 'the scientific study of how ultimate values became embodied in institutions'.

In Part II Buxton shows how Parsons linked his conception of social science to the practical problems faced by America during the Cold War era. Basically Parsons advocated state support for the social sciences and regarded the role of a professionalised social science in terms of helping to defend the capitalist state against internal and external threats, e.g. McCarthyism and communism.

In Part III the rise and fall of political sociology as conceived by Parsons is reviewed. In many respects this section of Buxton's book is less satisfactory than the first two, not least because Buxton is strangely quiet about Parsons's response to the post-1960s political and academic changes he appraises.

Buxton has certainly succeeded in showing how Parsons was closely connected to the real world but has done so in a manner that is arguably more sympathetic than critical. Not all sociologists, not even North American ones, share Parsons's confidence in American capitalism and democracy.

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Investigating Robbery *Michael Banton* Gower 1985 125pp. £16.50

The research on which this tantalisingly sketchy monograph is based stemmed indirectly from Michael Banton's membership of the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure, which raised questions in the minds of certain senior officers in the Avon and Somerset Constabulary about the adequacy of police powers for the investigation of serious crime. It analyses the investigational problems posed by

the 157 cases of robbery, or attempted robbery, recorded by the police in the central 'A' division of Bristol during 1983. Banton discovered that most of the largest of his three categories of robbery, *viz* street robberies, were relatively trivial, and that many reports were dubious, ending up as 'no crime', thus showing that rape is not the only crime in police experience in which there appear to be large numbers of false allegations, especially when in the majority of reported street robberies no independent evidence is available. In a typically low-key discussion of the ethnicity of alleged offenders, Banton rightly warns against making sweeping generalizations on the basis of the initial description of suspects by victims, and without examining the proportion of various ethnic groups in the relevant areas and age groups.

This study adds in a small but significant way to the growing body of literature that provides an alternative perspective upon the interpretation of criminal statistics, and cautions against unreasonable expectations in the ability of the police to improve their clear-up rates in a meaningful way. Banton's evidence suggests that serious crimes, like robbery, may be committed by relatively small groups of actively criminal young men, so that an undue use of prison 'write-offs' could easily increase the official clear-up rate by 60 per cent or more. Experimental use by the Avon and Somerset C.I.D. of a modified Californian case-screening scoring system did not prove too successful, perhaps due to the failure to separate the element of 'solvability' from that of 'seriousness'. Most of Banton's presuppositions about the likely limited effects of increasing the number of police powers on patrol, or police powers to detain or question suspects were confirmed by the research (although it did not *directly* address these issues), and he concluded that 'the key to the detection of robbery lies in the information given to the police by members of the public and not in any reinforcement of police powers to question suspects in custody' (p. 102). This message has perhaps come too late for the authors of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act!

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University of Hull

The World We Have Gained: Histories of Population and Social Structure *L. Bonfield, R. Smith and K. Wrightson* Basil Blackwell 1986 421 pp. £29.50.

The Fertility Revolution: A Supply-Demand Analysis *A. E. Easterlin and E. M. Crimmins* University of Chicago Press 1986 209pp. £21.25

Population Thought in the Age of the Demographic Revolution *J. C. Riley* Carolina Academic press 1985 225pp. £24.75

The British Fertility Decline: Demographic Transition in the Crucible of the Industrial Revolution *M. S. Teitelbaum* Princeton University Press 1984 269pp. £39.80

The Fear of Population Decline *M. S. Teitelbaum and J. M. Winter* Academic Press 1985 201pp. £30.50

If economics were ever to divest itself of its reputation for being 'the dismal science' the mantle might well fall on demography. In *The Fear of Population Decline* Teitelbaum and Winter show how population decline 'has evoked fear, confusion and misunderstanding among a broad community of politicians, scientists, churchmen and novelists in many countries'. But, we might observe, not just population decline. While the authors argue convincingly that small negative growth rates induce disproportionate levels of anxiety, demographic growth does not bring peace of mind. Rather, they are likely to provoke dire warnings of a Malthusian kind. The book might well have simply been titled 'The Fear of Population Trends'.

The books by Riley and by Teitelbaum and Winter are both concerned with the relationship between demographic processes, population thought and policy. Riley examines the growing confidence with which men (sic) began to explore demographic processes during the eighteenth century 'demographic revolution' especially in the context of the development of probability theory in mathematical forecasting and surer knowledge of vital statistics of man and man's environment. But Riley is not content merely to examine how thought reflected, or failed to reflect, actual trends. He is also

concerned to re-open the question of whether populationist activism should be linked to growth. He notes that the eighteenth century demographic revolution was a broad European phenomenon while explanations have tended to be particularistic (regional or national). He argues that eighteenth century thinkers had a deepening sense of imbalance between population and the environment which led to actions in the areas of epidemic disease, sanitation and welfare policy that, in turn, may have served as a *general* stimulant to demographic growth.

Teitelbaum and Winter's approach is less dialectical, but they offer a fascinating cross-national survey of thinking about population among those sectors often described as 'informed opinion'. In fact, the term would be inappropriate here since Teitelbaum and Winter are keen to stress how muddled and ill-informed such opinion often is. They provide a useful typology of meanings which can be conveyed by the phrase 'population decline' ranging from various technical measures to socio-political perceptions of deteriorating population 'quality'.

The Fertility Revolution and *The British Fertility Decline* are more directly concerned with actual demographic processes than with what people have thought about them. In both works the influence of 'the dismal science' is very apparent. Easterlin and Crimmins formalise the sociological conditions of reproduction in terms of an economic theory of childbearing. 'Motivation is seen as a matter of a couple's reproductive supply and demand conditions' (180) including attitudes and access to techniques of fertility control. Their analysis combines micro-level studies of Sri Lanka and Colombia with macro-level studies of Karnataka, Taiwan and ten Indian States, from which they conclude that the limited success of family planning programs might be due to insufficient attention to the population's state of motivation and perceived costs of regulation.

Teitelbaum's research into the dramatic decline in British fertility from 1841 to 1931 builds on the descriptive model of the demographic transition, but argues that the social and economic components of that model are unable to account for the surprising characteristics and timing of the decline. Working on the premise that the ultimate level of explanation must be macro-analytic, he develops a multivariate analysis to show that cultural factors, not included in the original theory, and proportions of the population in coal-mining occupations, enhance the theory's explanatory power.

Economic modelling and multivariate analysis make valuable contributions to demographic analysis, but some of the assumptions and conclusions made in these works are unlikely to receive a sympathetic response from sociological readers. Thus, in Easterlin and Crimmins, we encounter references to the 'natural fertility regimes' of pre-modern societies (are they simply ignorant of work by anthropologists and social historians on interpersonal relations?), while Teitelbaum concludes that 'we can say with reasonable assurance that there were effects of socioeconomic forces independent of cultural factors, and vice versa'. This may be so as the statistical outcome of an analysis of operationalised variables, but in any other sense this comment has lost touch with social reality.

One must also be concerned with the lack of impact which feminism has had on historical and comparative demography. It's not that references to feminism as a political movement are absent (the impact of feminism on women's right to choose finds its due place in Teitelbaum and Winter, for example). Rather, it is the absence of any sense that reproduction has always been a potential arena for *conflict* between the sexes. Within the demographic tradition it is nearly always the more or less rational *couple* which makes the decisions about controlling fertility. But perhaps Western Feminism cannot entirely escape all blame for this. Its understandable concern to establish 'a woman's right to choose' has tended to draw attention away from possible demographic consequences (which may be more compelling in countries faced with more pressing demographic problems).

The World We Have Gained, containing fifteen new essays, is, of course, a celebration of the life, work and influence of Peter Laslett who has done more than most to introduce a sociological sensitivity into historical demographic research. The range of themes covered in the volume — population, marriage, family and household reconstructions, illegitimacy, widowhood, property transmission etc. — is a reminder of the breadth of Laslett's interests in this one field alone. And the essays are a reminder, too, that without such widely-cast yet detailed investigations into social structure and processes, trends in population will retain their mysterious quality and their capacity to induce fear — even when such fear may be unwarranted.

Chris Middleton
University of Sheffield

Divided We Stand: Working-Class Stratification in America *William Form* University of Illinois Press 1985 306pp. £29.95

The lack of a significant socialist labour movement in the USA has tried the minds of many social scientists over the years. In his eminently useful book William Form crunches the problem through his computer's microchips. He presents a detailed quantitative analysis of labour market segmentation in the USA and its relationship to political attitudes and behaviour. There is both secondary analysis of official data sources and surveys carried out by other researchers, and of some original fieldwork done by the author himself. One chapter also compares labour market segmentation in the USA with France relating the different patterns to the very different labour movement politics in the two countries.

Theoretical discussions in the book are, in contrast, rather sparse and schematic, with the structure of the argument and the detailed use of data very much in keeping with the tradition of North American positivism. A broadly Weberian model of classes as groups of occupations sharing common career and intergenerational mobility chances is deployed. This generates a division of the working class into five strata based on property, skill and wages. Furthermore a variety of other significant mutually reinforcing divisions in the working class such as race, sex, core/periphery sectors and unionised/non-unionised workers are also identified. A labour aristocracy of self-employed manual workers, skilled employees and foremen on the boundaries of the working class is found to be both politically most active and yet most conservative.Form argues that these mainly economic divisions largely explain the political cleavages in the U.S. working class.

There is a useful chapter on technology and gender at work, but there is little in the way of theoretical discussion of gender divisions. Form's explanation of the sources of political divisions within the USA working class, and between French and U.S. workers reads, from a British perspective with the current stress on non-economic factors in shaping working class consciousness, as being far too economistic. This is even more surprising since Weberians, the sociological tradition to which Form firmly attaches himself, usually throw this criticism at Marxist sociology. Despite these drawbacks the author has produced a useful addition to our empirical knowledge of the U.S. working-class.

Paul Bagguley
University of Lancaster

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PUBLISHED FOR
THE LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS
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LONDON AND NEW YORK

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